Daniel R. Vincent

Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
University of Maryland
College Park, MD 20742
Tel: 301-405-3485
Email: vincent@econ.umd.edu

Daniel R. Vincent, Professor, received his Ph.D. in Economics from Princeton University in 1987. He was a Rhodes Scholar and received an M.A. from Oxford and a B.A. in History from the University of Toronto. Before joining the University of Maryland, he taught at the University of Western Ontario, the Department of Managerial Economics and Decision  Sciences at Northwestern University and at the California Institute of Technology. His main area of research is the application of game theory to trading environments. He has studied dynamic bargaining with asymmetric information and the theory of auctions. His current research is on revenue maximizing selling mechanisms for sellers with more than one object -- an area sometimes referred to as "multi-dimensional mechanism design".  Other research interests include industrial organization theory, with a focus on two-sided markets and on antitrust issues. In 1999, he was a visiting scholar at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. Recent papers include "Multidimensional Mechanism Design" and "Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multi-Good Monopolist" (both jointly authored with Alejandro Manelli and both in the Journal of Economic Theory) as well as "The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Network" with Marius Schwartz in the Review of Network Economics.
 

A CV and a homepage are also available.