

Clergy and Churches as Political Elites and Cue Givers: Preaching to the Choir?

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To the casual observer, the prophetic words of the French Aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, may seem like a contemporary commentary on the prevalence of religion in American political life. Yet this prophet of American political philosophy was observing the advent of the Republic when he remarked that religion was one of the “causes which maintained democracy.” (Tocqueville 1966, 1) Indeed Tocqueville did not find that American clergy were singularly devoted to the “otherworldly” but noted rather, “if you converse with these missionaries of Christian civilization, you will be surprised to hear them speak so often of the goods of the world, and to meet a politician where you expected to find a priest.” (Tocqueville, 1966, 317) Two hundred years later it would be difficult to find a student of American politics who is not familiar with the prominent role that clergy have played and continue to play in the political arena. Clergy have been an inextricably force in American politics since the first English settlers stepped off the boat at Jamestown, from their pointed sermons (both in support of and opposition) before and during the American Revolution, their advocacy of charitable societies during the Second Great Awakening, their position at their vanguard of the abortionist movement, their championing of the cause of workers during the Progressive Era, their support for temperance, to their involvement in the civil rights and anti-war struggles of the 1960’s.

Today clergy continue to carry the banners of political action on a diverse, and often controversial, cohort of issues that include the environment, immigration, social welfare, death penalty, foreign policy, Middle East policy, pornography, gambling, abortion, civil rights, and gay rights. Clergy actively participate in both direct and indirect

political cue-giving as well as a myriad of other political activities. (Guth et. al. 1997) As congregational leaders, American clergy have the unique potential to act as political elites providing cues to their parishioners on political, social, and religious issues as well as creating an environment in which such cues are readily received and accepted and in which political behavior is normalized. Yet, what are the observable effects of cues from the pulpit on the political behavior and attitudes of church members? While some scholars have explored the political beliefs and behavior of clergy who provide cues (Crawford and Olson 2001; Djupe and Gilbert 2001, 2003; Guth et al. 1997; Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974), little if any research has provided empirical evidence as to the effect of clerical cues on church members. Are there observable effects on attitudes and behavior of parishioners who receive cues from their clergy? Moreover, does this vary between the major religious traditions: Evangelical Christians, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Black Protestants?

Role of Political Cues

Political science has long held that the American electorate has only a vague notion of politics, as voters are not interested with most questions of public policy, are poorly informed about political issues, care little about election outcomes, and do not connect opinions on one issue with those on another. (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Zaller 1992) For Converse, a belief system is the “configuration of ideas and attitudes in which elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence”. (Converse 1964, 207) In this typology, ideological systems range from comprehensive to narrow, where most Americans have a narrow worldview with only weak association between their opinions on discrete issues (Converse 1964). Thus

the average voter does not connect opinions on different issues in a systematic way, and they are not constrained by a comprehensive ideology. (Campbell et al. 1960) In stark contrast, political and social elites have more constrained belief systems, that cover a broad spectrum of issues and in which discrete positions on individual issues are integrated into a central belief system. (Campbell et. al. 1960; Converse 1964; McClosky, Hoffman, and O'Hara 1960) For these political elites, their constrained attitudes allow them to form a stable and comprehensive conservative or liberal worldview from their disparate opinions.

In light of this reality, students of politics have long held that the unconstrained mass voter is able to operate in the democratic system with reasonable efficacy through the political cues they receive from the constrained elites. (Campbell et. al. 1960; Converse 1964; Downs 1957) The assumption underlying this assertion is that there are limits to human cognition, and thus, individuals rely on mental shortcuts to simplify the information they receive into general categories of usable knowledge. (Rosch 1978) People therefore use these mental shortcuts as a method of organizing and retaining the flow of information they receive daily (Hastie 1986; Taylor and Crocker 1981; Wyer and Srull 1985) and draw upon these mental shortcuts in the decision making process. (Conover and Feldman 1989; Miller, Wattenberg, and Malanchuk 1986; Morgan and Schwalbe 1990) According to this theoretical approach, information that a candidate is an evangelical Christian activates a voter's prior knowledge structure about evangelicals and their politics allowing inferences to be made about the future behavior of an evangelical candidate.

In a formal sense, this theory reveals that political cues trigger specific preexisting cognitive structures which move voters toward a particular political decision or attitude. (Conover and Feldman 1989) Scholars have identified numerous symbolic political cues upon which individuals make political evaluations, such as a candidate's party affiliation (Brown and Woods 1991; Campbell et al. 1960; Iyengar et al. 1999; Rahn 1993; Stokes and Miller 1962; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), issue positions (Conover and Feldman 1989; Weisberg and Rusk 1970), ideology (Aldrich 1981), and incumbency status. (Hinckley 1980; Jacobson 2000) Concurrently symbolic non-political cues like a candidate's race (Gilliam and Masket 2000; Mendelberg 1997; Reeves 1997), a candidate's personality (Conover 1981; Graber 1972; Miller et al. 1986; Popkin 1991; Rosenberg and McCaffrey 1987), and a candidate's gender (McDermott 1997) have also been found to have a measurable impact on voter's political evaluations.

Not only do most voters rely on these political cues to provide a cognitive context in which to make decisions, but some scholars have argued that even citizens with the required personal traits and attitudes for political participation may remain inactive absent an external impetus. (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995) Individuals become politically active as a result of 1) the appearance of salient issue which directly or via political cue-givers motivates involvement and/or 2) individuals become active within groups which foster political skills, provide political information at low cost, stimulate political interest, and even provide outlets for political activity. (Verba, Schlozman, Brady 1995) Until recently, most scholarly research has concentrated on the role of the mass media as the primary political and social cue-giver as well as the mode of political communication to the public. (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and

McPhee 1954; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998; Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Zaller 1996) Yet the potential for clergy to be political cue-givers and the church to be a context in which those cues shape political behavior and spur political action easily seems to rival any influence held by the media over the political beliefs and actions of the electorate, particularly given the high numbers of church attendees among the voting population. (See Finke and Stark 2005) Yet, two important questions must be answered: 1) Are clergy truly political elites with constrained worldviews capable of providing political cues to the congregation and 2) do churches provide the necessary group context in which those cues can be received?

Clerical Belief Systems: A Protestant Schism

Before we can assess whether clergy are political elites capable of providing political cues, it is necessary to establish a foundation for the disparate belief systems held by American clergy. Political scholars have tied clerical belief systems directly to their theology (Djupe and Gilbert 2003; Guth et al. 1997), which divided during the 19th century creating a de facto “two-party system” in American Protestantism (Marty 1970) between Evangelicals, who adopted an orthodox religious perspective, and Mainline Protestants, who adopted a modernist perspective, at least among clergy and other church leaders. (Kellstedt and Green 1993) However, the line is not static and certainly not as lucid as is popularly asserted in the media.

The roots of the split lie in the reaction to shifting intellectual perspectives among theologians to the ideas of Charles Darwin and the German higher criticism of the Bible, as well as the displacement of the primacy of Protestantism in the United States with the immigration of Catholic, Jewish and other religious minorities. Darwinism and German

higher criticism of the Bible challenged not only the literalism of the text, but also its historical and scientific inerrancy. This led to the development of a “liberal theology” which attempted to reconcile the Bible to the modern understanding of the world, emphasizing Jesus Christ and the transcendent nature of God. Yet at the turn of the twentieth century most religious elites steered a middle course between the orthodox and the modernist positions, although the latter had permeated the seminaries of most large denominations. (Hoge 1976)

Concurrently industrialization led to urbanization, accentuating distinctions between social classes and creating a large class of marginalized laborers. Industrialization also ended the dominance of Protestantism in American social, political, and religious life as many of these laborers were recent Catholic and Jewish immigrants. In response the “social gospel” emerged among those clergy who favored liberal theology, which focus not on individual spiritual transformation, but on social change and education. (Hoge 1976) Thus social reform and education became to primary vehicles to remove sin. It is the distinction between those who emphasized the “social gospel” and those who emphasized an “individual gospel” that shaped the current two-party system in American Protestantism. (Marty 1970)

As late as 1920 both of these groups still existed within the major denominations, yet the failure of the fundamentalist to halt the progress of social gospel advocates, led to their eventual schism. (Marsden 1975) Yet theological conservatives included not only the fundamentalist exiles from the Mainline churches, but also a Evangelicals whose denominations, for a variety of reasons, had not experienced the theological schism faced by their Mainline counterparts. (Oldfield 1996) Thus from the 1920's onward,

denominations dominated by traditionalist charted a distinctive religious course from those dominated by modernists. For those in the pews, however, the mainstream religion in the United States remained largely evangelical, even in Mainline churches, despite the perception by many elites who tend to associate Mainline churches with the mainstream of American religion. As George Wills observed, Mainline churches may have “appropriately [and metaphorically] borrowed” the term for the main artery leading from Philadelphia to its “fashionable suburbs”, but evangelical Protestantism has been and continues to be the mainstream of American religion (Wills 1990, 19).

Clerical Belief Systems: Theological and Political Landscape

From the advent of this realignment and long before it was reflected among congregants, clergy of orthodox persuasion began to look to the Republican Party, while modernists leaned Democratic. (Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974) Indeed by the 1970’s many clergy had abandon the party of their parents in favor of the one befitting their theological perspective. (Quinley 1974) These attachments would harden as members of the orthodox and modernists camps found likeminded allies on differing sides of the partisan divide and the ideological divisions between the two parties came to reflect the religious cleavage. (Layman 2001) Indeed the natural alliance between the concordant religious and political camps served to mutually reinforce the separation from their ideological divergent religious and political foes, particularly on religious and moral issues.

What specifically is the demarcation between the orthodox camp and the modernist camp among American clergy? Theologically there are clear distinctions, with an overwhelming majority of orthodox clergy holding more conservative positions,

including: 1) Jesus as the sole avenue to salvation, 2) belief in an actual devil, 3) the inerrancy of the Holy Scriptures, and 4) the virgin birth. In contrast, significantly fewer modernist clergy hold those positions. (Guth et al. 1997, Smidt 2004) This theological divide has meaningful political implications moving modernist clergy to adopt a social justice agenda, while orthodox clergy gravitate toward moral reform. (Beatty and Walter 1989)

Through the twentieth century modernist clergy increasingly advanced the “social gospel”, beginning with the Progressive Era and continuing through the New Deal, Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society, and Civil Rights Movement of the 1960’s. (Guth et. al. 1997, Smidt 2004) At the advent of the twenty-first century, Mainline clergy had maintained these strong social justice positions and added additional issues such as environmentalism. (Fowler 1995) Indeed, scholars have found that among modernist clergy, the most relevant political issues include civil rights, the environment, hunger and poverty, women’s rights, and the anti-war agenda. (Djupe and Gilbert 2003, Guth et. al. 1997)

Befitting their moral reform emphasis, orthodox clergy have adopted a “civic gospel”, which has developed more slowly over the twentieth century with its roots in “the last crusade for Protestant civilization”, the campaign for Prohibition. (Guth et. al. 1997, 15) The “civic gospel” continued to develop in battles over state lotteries and took its current form beginning in 1962 when the Supreme Court struck down school prayer. By the 1970’s, notably following the 1972 Roe vs. Wade decision, many evangelical preachers began to present “Christianity as an alternative, in one’s political as well as personal life, to a liberalism which was socially pervasive but morally bankrupt.”

(Nesmith 1994, 21) This new “civic gospel” was readily adopted by many orthodox clergy, (Guth et al. 1997, Smidt 2004) who held an almost universal belief that the Bible was the authoritative source for theology and that it was the only logical foundation for the nation’s moral system. (Jelen 1993) In contrast to the social justice agenda of modernist clergy, the moral reform agenda emphasizes traditional worldviews, sexual mores, family values, abortion, alcohol and drug abuse, pornography, gay rights, school prayer, gambling laws, Middle East policy, and education issues (e.g. vouchers and the evolution debate). (Guth et al. 1997)

American Catholic and Black Protestant clergy developed theological and political positions distinctive from their Evangelical and Mainline peers because of their unique histories and structures. American Catholic clergy have been moral conservatives, although strong social and economic liberalism, resultant from their theology and advocacy for their historically immigrant communities, traditionally push Catholics towards the Democratic Party. (Pendergast 1999) However the socio-economic disadvantages faced by Catholics have largely disappeared and there is evidence that moral issues have increased in salience for many Catholic clergy relative to issues of social justice, spawning a similar two-party divide between orthodox and modernist within the Catholic Church. (Byrnes 1993; Bendyna, Green, Rozell, Wilcox 2000; Fowler et. al. 2004; Layman 2001; Wald 2007; Welch and Leege 1991) Indeed there has been a clear effort on the part of the Catholic hierarchy to emphasize orthodox theology and traditional morality among clergy and through clergy to the church at large. (Mockabee 2007)

There is little evidence that this divide has split Black Protestantism, as socially liberal attitudes and the legacy of civil rights overshadows strong moral conservatism, holding Black clergy firmly in the Democratic Party¹. Historically, Black Protestant clergy have been extremely active and effect in mobilizing black congregants behind social welfare and civil rights issues and candidates. (Lincoln and Mamiya 1991) Yet there is evidence of theological shifts to the left on moral issues, particularly among the clergy and churches with history of strong political ties to the Democratic Party. (McDaniel 2005; Smidt 2004) Concurrently a growing number of black church leaders are finding accord with evangelical leaders through para-church organizations. While these divergent trends do not indicate a divide akin to that of white Protestants and Catholics, there are some who would assert that realignment, albeit slowly, should take (and perhaps is taking) shape in the Black Protestant tradition as well. (Hunter 1991)

Clerical Activism

Tocqueville found “that the American clergy in general...are all in favor of civil freedom but they do not favor any political system...they keep aloof from parties and from public affairs (314)...these ministers of the Gospel eschew all parties, with the anxiety attendant upon personal interest.” (1966, 314, 320) Unlike their clerical ancestors, contemporary clergy have become active partisan and political activists (Crawford and Olson 2001; Djube and Gilbert 2003; Guth et al. 1997; Hadden 1969; Jelen 2001; Olson 2000; Quinley 1974; Smidt 2004; Stark et al. 1971). The scope of a pastor’s political activism is determined by personal belief, denominational influence, congregational context (Campbell and Pettigrew 1959, 1987; Thomas 1985) and

¹ For a full review of the literature on Black Protestantism and political action see Lincoln and Mamiya 1991, McClerking and McDaniel 2005, McDaniel 2003, and Politics in the Pews: The Political

community context. (Djupe and Gilbert 2002) Concomitantly, feelings of efficacy, partisan commitment, and issue intensity also influence the political activism of clergy. (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995)

Liberal, predominantly Mainline, but also Catholic and Black Protestant clergy joined the reform movements of the 1960's with great enthusiasm, for which they were branded "New Breed". (Garrett 1973) Their involvement in the liberal agenda was often controversial with the strongest opposition coming from "Old Breed" traditionalists who believed that the role of the clergy was not political, at least not on the issues² and using the tactics employed by the New Breed. (Stark et al. 1970) Although liberal clergy did face obstacles to political advocacy, as their ideology moved farther, often significantly, to the left of their congregations. Activist ministers with conservative congregations faced the threat of losing their jobs, the withholding of funds by church boards, and the departure of members. (Campbell and Pettigrew 1959; Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974) Indeed, New Breed activism in the 1960's was eventually ended in part because of congregational opposition. (Balmer 1996; Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974)

Yet liberal clergy have remained active (Kirkpatrick 1976) and they have advanced ambitious political and social agendas, through organizations such as the National Council of Churches or at the annual conferences held by most Mainline denominations. In some cases, Mainline parish clergy do not share the liberal theology or politics of their peers and national leaders and often ignore their denomination's political and social agenda. (Guth et. al. 1997) Even when they share the liberal theological and political convictions of their peers, local clergy, often faced with social and morally more

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conservative congregations, may remain silent. (Djube and Gilbert 2003; Guth et. al. 1997; Smidt 2004) This is particularly true of divisive moral issues, like abortion and civil rights for homosexuals, where both parish clergy and national church leaders tend to hold significantly more liberal positions than their congregants in Mainline denominations.

Most early students of clerical activism mistakenly believed that it was a product of liberal theology and not of contemporary issues, as their views were distorted by focusing on the socially liberal clergy of the 1960's. (Beck & Jennings 1979; Stark 1980) These early scholars concluded that with the end of the great social reform movements (i.e. civil rights and social welfare) prevalent in the 1960's, the role of clergy as political leaders would fade. (Quinley 1974) This was not an unreasonable, as during this period theological conservative clergy were largely silent on political and social issues and removed from political and social activism. (Koller and Retzer 1980; Nelsen and Baxter 1981)

At the height of New Breed activism in the 1960's, those conservative clergy who were involved in politics were considered part of the far right fringe. (Jorstad 1970) Most scholars felt that orthodox clergy were not involved in politics because of their preoccupation with the next world, as political efficacy was ultimately unimportant compared to the business of saving souls. (Stark et al. 1970) Thus regardless of a vague link between salvation and a moral society, many orthodox clergy viewed politics as "simply irrelevant to the important task of spreading the word of God, and to the occasioning of individual religious conversions". (Jelen 1993, 46) Naturally, scholars

² Particularly onerous to the "Old Breed" clergy was opposition among their liberal peers to the nation's foreign policy, notably the Vietnam War. (Garrett 1973)

have also traced some of this reluctance, at least among evangelicals, to the conservative premillennial eschatology of orthodox clergy, a theology which posits that Christ's second coming is imminent and that it will usher in his thousand year reign on earth. (Guth et al. 1995; Wilcox et al. 1991) This theological perspective naturally shifts emphasis away from the hope of redeeming a fallen and doomed world toward the mission of preparing souls for the Christ's return.

Despite these traditional obstacles to political advocacy, the past quarter century has witnessed the dramatic rise of political advocacy among conservative religious leaders. With the immense increase in the scope and size of government following the New Deal and the Second World War (Lowi 1969), the government became entangled in a host of new moral and religious issues. This, along with the nationalization of communication and entertainment, effectively ended the ability of theological conservatives to enjoy a subculture isolated from the modern and increasingly morally onerous elite mainstream. (Oldfield 1996) In the wake of a decade of unfavorable decisions by the Supreme Court beginning with *Engel v. Vital* (1962) and culminating with *Roe vs. Wade* (1972), conservative political and religious leaders began to look to one another as allies in the political debates on moral and cultural issues³.

For orthodox clergy, the obstacles to political activism were overcome primarily because of the growing perception that moral issues had entered the realm of politics. (Wuthnow 1983) The rising tide of orthodox clerical activism was vividly displayed in the 1988 Presidential Election with the candidacy of Pat Robertson, an Assembly of God minister. During this period, Evangelical clergy also closed the education gap with their

³ For a full review of the literature on the rise of political activism among conservative Christian and clergy see Guth et al. 1997 and Oldfield 1996.

Mainline counterparts and as activism and education are highly correlated (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995), this caused greater political activism among evangelicals. (Guth et. al. 1997) Thus by the 1980's most scholars found that activism among evangelical clergy was on par with their liberal Mainline peers by the 1980's. (Beatty and Walter 1989; Guth 1984; Guth et. al. 1997; Koller and Retzer 1980)

Overall, the number of politically active liberal and orthodox clergy is roughly equal, although they have very different agendas and strategies. (Guth et al. 1997, Smidt 2004) While modernist clergy still have a historical edge in direct political participation (Guth et. al. 1997), conservative clergy have surpassed liberals with respect to cue-giving. (Smidt 2004) It is apparent that many orthodox clergy have overcome the doctrinal particularities of religious tradition to mount an ever more unified political front on moral and cultural issues. (Hunter 1991; Oldfield 1996) However, while there is certainly evidence that modernist clergy are political active especially on social issues, there is little more than anecdotal evidence (Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 1991; Guth et al. 1997, Smidt 2004) that they represent actual opposition to the orthodox position on moral and cultural issues, both because of the limited support of their congregations and the relatively low salience they place on these issues.

Again Catholic and Black Protestant clergy have charted unique courses. For Catholic clergy, liberal social activism has historically coexisted with conservative moral activism. Although there is evidence of a subtle realignment among liberal priests who primarily advocate a social welfare agenda and conservative priests who favor a conservative moral agenda (Byrnes 1993), the American Catholic hierarchy remains

committed to both, although attention to the later has certainly increased by Catholic leaders. (Mockabee 2007)

For Black Protestants, a long history of activism especially on civil rights and social welfare has tied them to the Democratic Party. Among politically active Black clergy, the growing divide between the Democratic Party and the church on moral issues has been virtually ignored. Rather, the legacy of civil rights subsumes any moral issue inclination which might push them in the orthodox direction, preventing them from connecting their moral orthodoxy to a Republican identity. (Lincoln and Mamiya 1991; McDaniel 2003, 2005)

Clergy as Political Elites

It is clear that clergy have both constrained belief systems and are actively involved in political advocacy on both the left and right. Thus clergy can certainly be counted among the political and social elite, as they are by definition “in the business of opinion leadership.” (Guth et al. 1997, 17) Just as the national debate between Lyndon Johnson and Barry Goldwater produced greater ideological refinement among the general electorate (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976), the politicization of religion in American has created increasingly sophisticated political elites among clergy, especially on the right. (Guth et al. 1997)

While some scholars have asserted that political elites can organize their worldviews into multiple distinct dimensions (e.g. social welfare attitudes and moral values), clerical beliefs are increasingly uni-dimensional along the orthodox/modernist cleavage. (Guth et. al. 1997; Wuthnow 1988) Like other political elites, orthodox clergy considered themselves more conservative than when they were younger, while modernist

clergy believe they have become more liberal over the years. (Guth et al. 1997) Studies of political elites often reveal them to be more extreme than their followers. (Bibby 1987) Liberal Mainline clergy have long been recognized to be more liberal than their congregations (Hadden 1969; Quinley 1974) and because of this ideological gap, these clerical activists have often been dubbed “generals without armies”. (Adams 1970) Indeed, Mainline clergy consider themselves more liberal than their congregations on virtually every major political issue, often by a sizable margin. (Guth et. al. 1997) While some have asserted that evangelical clergy are also more conservative than their congregations (Campolo 1995), empirical studies have found that conservative clergy typically fall roughly in line with the ideology of their church members. (Guth et al. 1997)

Clergy, as religious and political elites, have influence over their congregation’s political activities and attitudes. Scholars have noted that identifying issues as salient often affects an individual’s decision to become politically involved, develop an issue position, or choose a candidate. (Iyengar and Kinder 1987) Just as the media has been shown to frame issues in a way which dictates how a voter will respond to it (Iyengar 1991), clergy have the ability to provide political information, prime and frame political issues, increase issue salience by agenda-setting, advance and endorse candidates, parties, and issue positions, and mobilize their congregations for political activity. While previous generations of scholars believed that a pastor’s influence over the actions and opinions of their congregation depended upon their personality, pastoral skills, and the nature of the congregation (Vidich and Bensman 1968), more recent work has touted the influence that pastors have simply by virtue of their position as elites. (Guth et. al. 1997;

Smidt 2004) Indeed, regardless of whether they choose to exercise their influence for political ends, clergy have enormous potential to influence their congregants. (Djupe and Gilbert 2001; Guth et. al. 1997) As religious and political elites, clergy also participate in elite discourse, bargaining, and decision making not only with other religious elites, but also with social and political elites. They can seek to move a particularly religious denomination or group in a given religious (which might have political implications) or political direction (which might have religious implications)⁴. They can also lobby political official, as leaders of the evangelical community did on issues of judge selection and African Aids relief during the Bush administration. (Wald 2007)

As religious elites, clergy have unique resources upon which they can draw to exert political influence and encourage political activity. They typically are highly educated and thus they are more likely to be politically attentive, possess political knowledge, structure their politics in ideological terms (or at least in terms used by other political elites), and effectively frame broad political, social, economic, and religious issues according to their own worldview. (Guth et. al. 1997) Unlike most political activists who must build a political organization to advance their worldview, clergy are furnished with a preexisting organization. Churches have facilities for meetings and events, a network of volunteers, and often even vehicles to transport church members to the polls. (Wald 1991) Indeed churches are the most widespread voluntary organization in the country and possess in the pastor an opinion leader who carries immense authority to articulate a given worldview, frequent meetings (weekly or more frequently) in which

⁴ Indeed changes “in the nature of the clergy ordained by each denomination or in the candidates nominated by political parties may affect the theological emphasis advanced by clergy or the political agendas advanced by candidates for public office” (Smidt 2004, 4) Thus there is an interplay between religious and political elites as well as between both and their individual and joint constituencies.

to advance that worldview, a willing audience to receive it, and a social network to reinforce it. No other organization which engages in political advocacy can boast these resources and commitment levels. (Wald 2007)

Clerical Political Cues

In the same way most Americans look to political elites to interpret the complex political world (Campbell 1960; Converse 1964), structuring their political beliefs in accord with the elites from whom they receive and accept political cues (Layman and Carsey 2002; Zaller 1992), church members rely on clergy to interpret Scripture and draw out its implications for a congregant's beliefs and actions. It is not surprising then, that under these conditions congregants do not easily ignore pastoral cues. (Crawford and Olson 2001; Fetzer 2001; Penning and Smidt 2001; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990) The reception and acceptance of cues is contingent upon the political predisposition of cue-giver and the message itself, relative to that of the individual receiving the cue. (Zaller 1992) There is also a concomitant calculus, transcendent of partisanship, on the part of those receiving cues as to the credibility of the cue-giver. (Druckman 2001) Clergy are again advantaged given that church members give greater credence to positions taken by their pastor than they do other news sources. (Buddenbaum 2001). Yet it is not necessary that clergy provide direct political cues to their congregation. As members rely on clergy for interpreting authoritative Scripture, they are able to create a worldview through sermons, religious education classes, and church media which while their primary message is religious possess real political implications. Those implications can then be elucidated by the pastor, yet in many instances it is likely they are clarified in

the minds of congregants by the socialization which takes part within the social networks of the congregation.

However, if clergy indeed wield this enormous influence, we might expect that they are simply preaching to the choir. This may be somewhat true. However, church membership is rarely static and pastoral cues certainly reach the newly converted. Moreover, political messages from the pulpit can intensify and reinforce the preferences of the congregation, as well as framing them within the context of contemporary political struggles. (Jelen 2001) (p. 8) Moreover, clergy can also encourage and direct political action on the part of church members either for a particular issue (Tays 1990) or a particular candidate. (Hertzke 1993)

There is certainly ample empirical evidence that clergy are cue-givers although the frequency and style varies among religious tradition as well as between orthodox and modernist clergy. Over a five year period, thirty-four percent of those who regularly attended church were asked by someone in authority in that church to vote or take some other form of political action (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1997) and twenty-seven percent of churchgoers received some kind of information about candidates or parties in their congregations. (Kohut et al. 2000) Research on both the electorate and political elites has revealed strong relationships between approval for political action and undertaking that activity. (Barnes and Kaase 1979) Indeed, most liberal and conservative clergy approve of cue-giving in the form of taking stands on social and moral issues, offering public prayers for such issues, and speaking in sermons on such issues. (Guth et al. 1997) Few clergy openly endorse candidates from the pulpit, although there is little evidence this hesitance stems from a possible threat to the church's

tax-exempt status. (Guth et al. 1997) Rather clergy on both sides report they are strongly motivated to political action by their own theological and political attitudes, as well as those of their congregation. (Guth et al. 1997) Indeed, clergy are perceived as political cue-givers by the members of their congregations, especially activists in those congregations, and that this type of leadership meets with general approval. (Leege, Kellstedt, and Wald 1990; Leege and Kellstedt 1993) Other influences that increase a minister's cue-giving activity include conservative eschatology⁵, a personal political agenda, a conservative moral and cultural agenda, party identification, and issue liberalism or conservatism. (Guth et al. 1997)

In Mainline denominations, the majority of the clergy often pray publicly on social issues, while fewer deliver sermons or take public stands on these issues, and virtually none address specific parties or candidates. (Djube and Gilbert 2003) In contrast, many Christian right organizations have sought to organize orthodox pastors in order to mobilize their congregations since the 1980's. (Conn 1996) Thus orthodox clergy are much more likely to believe they can influence the political beliefs of their congregation. (Guth et al. 1997) Accordingly, orthodox clergy are more likely to give political cues than their modernist counterparts and more readily endorse and pray for candidates. (Guth et al. 1997; Smidt 2004)

Congregational Context

It is evident that clergy as political elites provide cues to their parishioners, but the dynamic of the congregation cannot be ignored as it serves as either an impetus or an obstacle to political cues as well as providing the context in which such cues are received,

⁵ Although the prevailing wisdom is that conservative eschatology associated with Premillennialism and Dispensationalism hinders political involvement among clergy, Guth et al. (1997) find clear empirical

accepted, and reinforced. Many liberal clergy will acknowledge that the congregants in their pews have views which are much more conservative with regards to social, cultural, and moral issues as well as theological and eschatological position than their own. (Guth et al. 1997) This gap often prevents liberal clergy from providing the intensity and frequency of cues as they may wish. While modernist clergy are sometimes pressured towards political inaction by conservative or even moderate congregations, apolitical orthodox, especially evangelical clergy, are often pressured to engage in political action by their congregations. (Dobson 1996) Not only are evangelical laity more likely to be in the pews on Sunday to receive clerical pronouncements on political issues, but they are also more likely to view their pastor's word as authoritative, and more likely to accept the connection between political action and Biblical commandments. (Jelen 1993) As a group, orthodox clergy perceive much more support for political activity from their congregation and thus while modernist clergy are more apt to approve of political action and cue-giving, conservative congregations are more apt to approve of the activity. (Guth et al. 1997) This provides a strong advantage to orthodox evangelical and Catholic clergy in the acceptance of their political cues.

There is little dispute that religious belief can shape political choices and membership in religious organizations, including churches, create social networks which reinforce those preferences among parishioners. (Huckfeldt, Plutzer, and Sprague 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1990) The congregation provides an important contextual element for political cues from the clergy. The contextual approach has been relevant in the social sciences since it was first applied to electoral data (Tingsten 1937) and identified as a key mode in explaining behavior. (Durkheim 1951) Unquestionably

individual's political choices are constrained by (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1988) and their political attitudes reinforced or undermined by the various social contexts of which they are a part. (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1986)

Churches as voluntary organizations which promote frequent social interaction and strong normative ties have long been considered ideal locations for the transmission and maintenance of group attitudes. (White 1968) Churches influence a member's behavior inside and outside of the congregation (Kanagy 1992; Schwadel 2002), by providing a message that has direct and indirect political implications as well as a social dynamic which brings members into conformity with group behaviors and attitudes. (Wald, Owen, Hill 1988) Not only do churches play a vital role in developing social and political skills among their members including civic abilities and political acumen (Djube and Gilbert 2001; Legee 1988; Putnam 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), but churches also provide a context for political cues through informal networks, formal networks, and the congregation as a whole. (Djube 1997) Thus church socialization brings congregants into line with not only their fellow church members, but also the attitudes and behaviors of their pastors. (Gilbert 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wald 1997; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988, 1989, 1990; White 1968) Churches therefore serve as a check on the forms and frequency of cues received, as well as provide a social context which makes the message from the pulpit that much more potent.

This phenomenon is not unique to white Protestant churches, as the congregational context has also been vital in Black Protestant and Catholic churches. Among Black Protestant churches there is evidence that the social dynamics of the

congregation may be even more powerful in reinforcing the message from the pulpit. (Lincoln and Mamiya 1991; McClerking and McDaniel 2005) Among American Catholics, the congregation serves to reinforce the messages of the church especially in congregations where conservative clergy stress moral and cultural issues like abortion. (Bendyna et al. 2000; Byrnes and Seger 1992; Prendergast 1999)

Exploring Religious Cue Effects

Previous research has created a strong foundation upon which to explore the question of whether political cues from clergy have a measurable effect on the vote choices and attitudes of congregants. It is possible that the cues clergy provide to their church members have little real impact, as the individual in the pew already has the same political and ideological preferences as their clergy. In these cases clergy are effectively “preaching to the choir”. However, it is not unreasonable based on the literature to believe that clerical cues will have a measurable effect on congregant behavior. Thus individuals who receive cues from their clergy encouraging political activity should be more likely than those who do not receive cues to engage in the desired behavior.

To this end this research will explore for five outcomes: 1) strong party identification in the proper direction for congregants who receive clerical cues (i.e. congregants have stronger partisan identification in a direction aligned with the message from the pulpit)⁶, 2) a greater likelihood of voting for the proper candidate in Presidential Elections (i.e. congregants are more likely to vote for the candidate consistent with the

⁶ Although there might be some self-selection bias with regards to the impact of cues on party identification, one need only consider the shift in alignments among some religious traditions, which were certainly resultant in party from clerical cues.

message from the pulpit), 3) candidate and party evaluations⁷ aligned with the expected partisanship of clergy in a particular religious tradition, 4) clerical political cues are translated into appropriate ideological positions on key political issues as well as appropriate evaluations of groups and institutions among congregants, and 5) clerical cues increase the salience of certain political issues. However, we should not, based on the existing literature, expect individuals who receive clerical cues to behave in a similar way across religious traditions. Therefore, this study will examine these outcomes within the four largest religious traditions in the United States: Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Black Protestants

Evangelical Protestants are expected to have stronger Republican Party affiliation and vote more Republican in Presidential Elections. This cohort should also have more conservative evaluations of political issues, groups, and institutions as well as place greater salience on moral issues.

Although Mainline Protestants have a strong historical attachment to the Republican Party, they also have a history of activism by liberal clergy. While conservative parishioners may maintain their partisan affiliation in spite of the liberal political cues received from their clergy, it is more likely that they will look for another church or conform to the political cues they are receiving. Therefore, while Mainline churches are by no means predominantly Democratic, we would expect congregants in churches with clerical political cues to have stronger alignment to the Democratic Party and have higher support for the Democratic candidate in presidential elections. In this scenario, Mainline Protestants should also have more liberal attitudes toward political

⁷ Students of electoral politics have ascribed a central role to candidate evaluations in the voting process. (See Stokes 1966), as they influence individuals electoral choices. (See Kelley and Mirer 1974; Markus and

issues, groups, and institutions as well as place lower salience on moral issues. Yet it is also possible that liberal clergy faced with conservative or even mixed partisan congregations will not be able or willing to provide strong partisan cues, or such cues will be ignored. If this is the case, we should see no significant results for Mainliners.

Catholics may receive mixed cues from their clergy in many cases, advocating social welfare which ties them to the Democratic Party, while concurrently pushing a very conservative cultural agenda leading them towards the Republican Party. However, while this ideological configuration cuts against the current political formulation, this does not rule out the possibility of observing some effects. Because of this reality, Catholics are not be expected to favor one partisan side over the other, yet one would expect to see Catholics hold conservative attitudes on moral issues concomitantly with moderate to liberal attitudes on social welfare issues. In addition the church's emphasis on moral issues should raise their salience.

Among Black Protestants one expects more positive evaluation of and affiliation with the Democratic Party as well as higher Democratic voting for President. Yet, their moral traditionalism should push them in a conservative direction on attitudes toward moral issues and groups (e.g. abortion and gays and lesbians), while their social/economic liberalism should pull them to the left on social welfare issues and groups (e.g. the role of government and big business).

Data and Methods

To test for the effects of clerical cues two questions from the 1996 and 2000 American National Election Studies (ANES) will be used. In both surveys respondents were asked two questions related to cue giving in churches. The first ask respondents if

any information on “candidates, parties, or political issues” had been made available at the church.⁸ The second ask directly whether clergy or church leaders had encouraged the respondent to vote for a particular candidate or party. Previous studies have used these items to measure their effects on voter turnout among Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Black Protestants, with mixed results generally finding strong effects for evangelicals, but little to no effects for other traditions. (Wilcox & Sigelman 2000) These questions will be used to consider two sets of respondents: 1) those for whom clergy directly endorsed a candidate or party and 2) those who received political information at their place of worship⁹ or received direct endorsements from their clergy (i.e. combining the affirmative respondents from the two questions)¹⁰. However, in the 1996 NES only 204 respondents received either church cues, clergy cues, or both and in 2000 only 230 individuals responded affirmatively on the two questions. Moreover, when considering the items in separate models for each religious tradition the sample size

⁸ These items include voting guides such as those distributed by the Christian Right organizations, which encourage voting for particular candidates especially Republicans as a Christian duty (See Wilcox & Sigelman 2001), but also may be issue based as in Catholic churches and even some Mainlines with conservative clergy where it is not uncommon to have material encouraging members to support pro-life candidates. (Hunter 1991)

⁹In comparing the results of individual who only received political information at their place of worship and the combined measure of those who received only political information, only direct endorsements, or both revealed little difference in providing statistical significance across the dependent variables. In some instances the combined measure produced some significant coefficients where political information only did not. Therefore because both measures reflect the presence of political cues from clergy (See Footnote 10 and See Djupe and Grant 2001; Wilcox and Sigelman 2001), the results from the political information alone are not included in the analysis, although they are available upon request.

¹⁰ Research on clergy political elites and church context has revealed that churches where there is political activity have certain characteristics making them “political churches”, namely clergy approval and participation in cue giving. Therefore, while clergy might not directly endorse a candidate, it is assumed that even in churches where only information was made available that 1) this information aligns with the political and theological position of the pastor and 2) that clergy are providing political cues which make it clear that it is the responsibility of church members to align their political behavior with that of the church and pastor. (See Djupe and Grant 2001; Wilcox and Sigelman 2001)

is decreased further. Therefore in order to bolster the sample size the data from the two years have been pooled into a single set of observations¹¹.

Individuals who attend church often are more likely to be politically active (Peterson 1990; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1995; Putnam 2000) and are more likely to receive, accept, and normalize political cues from their clergy and church (Guth and Green 1993; Layman 2001; Legee, Kellstedt, and Wald 1990; Wald et al. 1993; Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988), as attendance is positively correlated to conformity with group norms and attitudes. (Stark 1984) To capture the variation in the effects of worship attendance, the three models for each cue type include interactions between each type of cue and attendance¹². The interaction indicates the difference in the effect of attendance for those who receive cues and those who do not¹³. To capture the variation across each religious tradition all regression, logistic regression, and ordered logistic regression analyses were estimated separately for each tradition:

¹¹ Given the nature of pooled data, a dummy variable has been included for year, with 0 for 1996 and 1 for 2000, which is to account for the possibility that the intercepts in the model vary between the two years. Even after including dummies, there is still the possibility of non-constant error variance between years and that errors for observations within each year are correlated. Given these problems the regression and logit coefficients remain consistent, although their standard errors may not be accurate leading to errant t-statistics. This possibility was addressed by computing robust standard errors using Huber's and White's formula for heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and relaxing the independent errors assumption with each year, by clustering the data on survey year in STATA. (See Huber, Peter J. (1967) "The Behavior of Maximum Likelihood Estimates Under Non-Standard Conditions." *Proceedings of the Fifth Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability* 1:221-33. and White, Halbert. (1980) "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity." *Econometrica* 48:817-38)

¹² The attendance variable was recoded from three questions in the ANES and ranges on a scale from 0 for "Never" to 5 for "More than once a week". It is treated as a continuous variable in the analysis. (See Layman 2001)

¹³ The analyses were also run using a non-interactive model $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1(\text{Cues}) + \beta_2(\text{Attendance}) + \beta_3(\text{Control Variables})$ for each religious tradition. The results found a significant effect for clerical cues on roughly the same dependent variables as the interactive model, although the model did not perform as well on some dependent variables, particularly presidential vote. The interactive model was ultimately chosen because of its theoretical superiority. Attendance in this model was a dummy variable coded 0 for non-frequent and 1 for frequent.

Evangelical Christian, Mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Black Protestants¹⁴. The models also include standard demographic variables¹⁵ and party identification¹⁶ in order to gauge the effect of political cues across religious environments.

Six sets of dependent variables are considered in order to account for our four outcomes: 1) party identification, 2) the 1996 and 2000 presidential vote¹⁷, 3) candidate and party evaluations from 1996 and 2000¹⁸, 4) cultural attitudes¹⁹, attitudes on the role of government²⁰, and abortion attitudes²¹, 5) feelings towards environmentalist, gays and lesbians, the Christian Coalition, the women's movement, fundamentalist Christians, big business, the military, unions, and the Supreme Court, and 6) the salience of abortion (a

¹⁴ Religious traditions were assigned primarily using denomination, but also race, religious commitment, respondent's self-identification on a religious tradition question, and biblical inerrancy. (See Layman 2001 for 1996 coding using these criteria, for 2000 coding see Layman and Green 2005)

¹⁵ The demographic control variables are income, education, region, gender, and age. The model does not control for race as this is captured through our religious tradition variable where only non-black Protestants are included in the categories for evangelicals and mainlines. Income and education are continuous variables ranging from 0 to 1; region is a dummy variable 0 for non-south and 1 for south; gender is a dummy variable 0 for male and 1 for female; age is a continuous variable.

¹⁶ Party Identification is treated as a continuous variable ranging on a 7 point scale with 1 for "Strong Democrat" to 7 for "Strong Republican", although this often masks the effects of other variables on vote choice and issue attitudes we found stronger effects almost universally by including it as a control variable. This variable is of course excluded as a control in the first model where it is the dependent variable.

¹⁷ The Presidential Votes for the 1996 and 2000 election were combined, with 0 for the Democratic Candidate (Bill Clinton in 1996 and Al Gore in 2000) and 1 for the Republican Candidate (Bob Dole in 1996 and George W. Bush in 2000).

¹⁸ Attitudes toward political parties are feeling thermometers which range from 0 (Unfavorable) to 100 (Favorable). Attitudes toward candidates are represented by the difference between the feeling thermometer rating of the Republican candidate and the thermometer rating of the Democratic candidate, providing a comparative candidate score, with higher values indicating more favorable feelings toward the Republican candidate.

¹⁹ The two cultural attitude measures are factor scores, for a discussion see Appendix A. These variables range from 0 to 1 where higher scores indicate more conservative positions. Both variables represent a moral issue component. The first variable includes opinions on gay rights, abortion, and the role of women. In the second, the role of women was removed it has been less emphasized in recent political discourse.

²⁰ The role of government is a factor score, for a discussion see Appendix A. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 where higher scores indicate more conservative positions. Attitudes toward the role of government represent a social welfare issue component including opinions on whether the government should ensure quality standards of living by providing jobs, whether the government should supply health insurance, and the appropriate level of services offered by the government.

²¹ Although included in the cultural attitude variable, the impact of clerical cues on abortion attitudes was separated to examine it independently because of its central and enduring place in pastoral political pronouncements and activities, particularly among orthodox clergy.

proxy for moral issues). The later categories are measures of key political issues, groups, and institutions for which clergy may provide cues. The groups and institutions²² related to moral and cultural attitudes include gays and lesbians, the Christian Coalition, the women's movement, fundamentalist Christians, the military, and the Supreme Court²³, while groups and institutions related to social welfare and economic attitudes include unions, big business²⁴, and environmentalist.

The models where party identification, the factor scores of cultural attitudes and the role of government, and all the feeling thermometers are used as dependent variables employ simple OLS regression using robust standard errors clustering on year. As presidential vote is a dichotomous variable, a normal OLS regression model is not appropriate. First, it is expected that there will be heteroskedasticity as most residuals at extreme (high or low) values of the independent variable will be clustered around 0 for the Democratic candidate or 1 for the Republican candidate and thus the error variance will be small. However, as a dichotomous variable has no values between 0 and 1, observations in the middle of the independent variable will have greater error variance. While coefficients should remain unbiased, they will not be efficient due to the heteroskedasticity. Moreover, the relationship between the probability of voting Republican and the independent variables will not be linear, but more likely s-shaped (i.e. practically all of the votes at low and high values on the feeling thermometer will fall into only one category Democratic or Republican). Therefore, a Logistic Regression Model is

²² Attitudes toward groups and institutions are feeling thermometers which range from 0 (Unfavorable) to 100 (Favorable).

²³ As an institution the Supreme Court has increasingly been held in contempt by conservative Christians as an undemocratic institution, which promotes a liberal moral and cultural agenda.


²⁴ Unions and big business were included as some research has indicated a distinct connection between religious belief and individualistic pro-capitalist attitudes among conservative Christians, particularly

appropriate to account for these problems. For our abortion variable again it is not appropriate to use OLS regression, because we do not expect a linear relationship and we expect the same type of heteroskedasticity present in presidential vote model. However, because our model is now ordinal and not dichotomous, a simple Logistic Regression model, intended for a dichotomous dependent variable is also no longer appropriate. Thus we need to estimate an Ordered Logistic Regression model, which predicts the probability that Y is in one category versus another.

Analysis


The results provide a picture of the frequency and distribution of clergy and church cues among the four major religious traditions. As seen in charts 1 and 2, Black Protestants and Evangelicals proportionally received by far the most political cues in the 1996 and 2000 elections, while Catholics received fewer and Mainline Protestants by far

Chart 1



evangelicals (See Barker and Carman 2000). Catholics and liberal mainlines have traditionally supported workers rights and therefore, some Christians may be receiving cues related to these groups.

Chart 2



the fewest. Indeed in both elections the proportion of Mainliners that received cues was less than half that of their Evangelical and Catholic counterparts. This certainly reinforces the notion that the dominance of Mainline churches by liberal clergy stunts cue-giving because these clergy are reluctant to provide cues to their typically more conservative congregations. Each religious tradition saw an increase in the proportion of cues received in 2000 over 1996, yet was most pronounced for Evangelicals and even more so for Black Protestants.

Chart 3 shows that those who receive direct endorsements from clergy are also likely to have political information available at their place of worship.²⁵ Among the several implications which can be drawn from this, is the reality that when clergy are

politically active, they are likely to use more than just the pulpit as a means of conveying political information. Indeed it may be that many of those who claimed not to have received direct endorsements from their clergy, but did claim that political material was available at their place of worship, simply missed their pastor's political pronouncement, perhaps because they were more subtly couched in the religious context of the sermon. Another implication is that, since political information is often provided by politically active members of their congregation with pastoral approval, the presence of these opinion leaders in church advocating political action may encourage the pastor to be more vocal or make the political agenda of the church more visible. These conclusions appear particularly applicable to Evangelical churches and it is not surprising a high proportion of them report receiving both types of cues.

A final point of interest in the raw data is the party identification of those who received either type of political cue. Chart 4 shows the distribution of party identification as a proportion of who received cues in each religious tradition. Unsurprisingly Evangelicals tend to be fervent Republicans, with most cue receivers identifying themselves as weak or strong Republicans. In contrast the distribution of party identification among Mainline Protestants is relatively equal across the partisan spectrum, with slightly high proportions of Mainliners identifying themselves in moderate categories such as Independent Republican, Independent Democrat, and Weak Democrat. Catholics also tend to have little variation across categories of party identification, while Black Protestants are even more Democratic than Evangelicals are Republican, with almost all Black Protestants identifying as Strong Democrats.

²⁵ Indeed among all those who received direct endorsements in either 1996 or 2000, 61% also had political information available at their place of worship versus 39% who only received pastoral cues. (Pearson

Chart 3





Chart 4



chi2= 261.6486 Pr = 0.000)

Party Identification: The impact of clerical cues on party identification yield mixed results. As seen in table 1, the results reveal that direct endorsements for Evangelicals has a puzzling effect increasing Republican affiliation for individuals who do not attend church and receive cues, yet decreasing Republicanism as attendance increased among those who received cues. As previous research has revealed, attendance without cues generally pushed one in the Republican direction in both the 1996 and 2000 elections. (Layman 2001) There is no obvious reason for declining Republican affiliation as the attendance of those who receive cues increases and it runs counter to our predictions. It could be the result of high multicollinearity²⁶ in the interaction terms and therefore, this does not necessarily refute our hypothesis. Yet as the graph reveals as well as the failure to find statistical significance on two of the interactive terms, the most likely reason is that there is little difference in the impact of attendance on party affiliation between those who do and do not receive cues.

Among Black Protestants there was virtually no effect of direct endorsement or other political cues. This certainly reflects the overwhelming alignment and loyalty to the Democratic Party among this cohort (See Chart 4). Interestingly, Catholics who received direct endorsements from their pastors did move in a Republican direction. While Catholics became more Republican as attendance increased regardless of whether they received cues, those who received direct endorsements from their priests were even more likely to identify as Republican relative to those who did not. This was not seen in the model with both direct endorsements and political information, which indicates

²⁶ Indeed in the model for evangelicals who received either direct endorsements, the VIF on cues and cues *attendance was 13.96 and 14.11 respectively. These extremely high scores are a strong indicated of substantial multicollinearity.

powerful effect of a clear political message from the pulpit relative to more subtle political cues on the part of clergy.

By far the most interesting findings are for Mainline Protestants and clearly cut against the convention wisdom for this group. Like Catholics, Mainliners became more Republican as attendance increased regardless of whether they received cues, but those who received direct endorsements from their pastor were even more likely to identify as Republican relative to those who did not. This also held true in the second model for those who receive either direct endorsements or political information. On the surface it seems problematic that those who never attended church but perceived that they received cues were less likely to be Republican, yet there is an intuitive explanation. Since there are no actual cases²⁷ of individual who never attend yet received cues, this coefficient indicates that among infrequent attendees who receive cues there is a tendency toward more Democratic identification. One might posit that if as the data indicates Mainliners are receiving cues which are pushing them in a Republican direction then those individual who do not attend frequently may do so because they perceive hostile political rhetoric from the pulpit. Moreover, as more frequent attendance and the reception, acceptance, and socialization of political cues are intimately tied, there is a threshold below which the effect of cues is most likely minimal or may even be misinterpreted by the congregant. This is most likely somewhere between those who attend almost every week and those who attend weekly. (See Mainline Graph in Appendix C)

This leaves unanswered the question of why Mainliners were moved in the Republican direction. The simple answer is that, like Evangelicals and Catholics, the

²⁷In the actual data set, there were several cases of individuals who reported never attending church, but yet receiving cues. These individuals were recoded as missing for the purposes of the analysis.

majority of clergy were providing cues which pushed congregants in a Republican direction. (See Charts in Appendix B) This has significant implications for the hypothesis about Mainline cue giving and there will be a full discussion later in the paper.

Table 1: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Party Identification¹			
Independent Variables	Coefficients	Independent Variables	Coefficients
Evangelicals		Catholics	
Model 1		Model 1	
Clergy Cues	0.199 (3.815) ²	Clergy Cues	1.311* (0.808)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.155 (0.666)	Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.314* (0.19)
Attendance	0.304*** (0.110)	Attendance	0.116** (0.056)
R ²	0.15	R ²	0.08
Model 2		Model 2	
Church Cues	-0.147 (1.049)	Church Cues	-0.178 (0.527)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.033 (0.175)	Church Cues*Attendance	0.092 (0.043)
Attendance	0.293** (0.06)	Attendance	0.099* (0.016)
R ²	0.15	R ²	0.07
Mainline Protestants		Black Protestants	
Model 1		Model 1	
Clergy Cues	-3.098 (1.005)	Clergy Cues	-0.129 (0.057)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.91** (0.334)	Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.030 (0.095)
Attendance	0.115* (0.064)	Attendance	-0.070 (0.024)
R ²	0.15	R ²	0.04
Model 2		Model 2	
Church Cues	-1.954** (0.769)	Church Cues	-0.564 (0.215)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.481** (0.195)	Church Cues*Attendance	0.092 (0.030)
Attendance	0.097 (0.066)	Attendance	-0.081 (0.017)
R ²	0.14	R ²	0.05
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study			
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.			
² Standard errors are in parentheses.			
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)			

Presidential Vote: The results as seen in table 2 indicate that for Evangelicals and Mainline Protestants cues from clergy have a significant relationship with the presidential vote. In the model where Evangelicals received direct cues there was no difference in the effect of attendance on the vote, as conditioned by cues, although all the coefficients

moved in the hypothesized direction (See Appendix D). However, for Evangelicals in the model where either type of cue was received, the affect of attendance was conditioned by the reception of the cue, producing a stronger relationship between the probability of voting Republican as attendance increased for those who received cues relative to those who did not. This reveals that as attendance increases for those who do and do not receive cues, the probability of voting Republican for those who receive cues increases more rapidly. We would expect evangelicals to respond so readily to clerical cues, as moral and social issues, which do not have the complexity of economic or foreign policy matters (Carmines and Stimson 1989), are easily linked to candidates. (Guth et al. 1997) Moreover Evangelicals are the primary target of Christian conservatives (Wilcox 2000) and Evangelical doctrine makes it possible to link scriptural commands with politics in a way that carries great weight. (Jelen 1993) The results revealed that those who did not attend, yet perceived receiving cues, were less likely to vote Republican, however this has little substantive meaning as these individuals are not likely picking up cues from the pulpit.

For Catholics there was some evidence that attendance increased the probability of voting Republican, but there was no significant relationship between cues and voting. The result was similar for Black Protestants as attendance increased Democratic voting regardless of the reception of cues.²⁸ Thus there is little evidence that Black Protestant

²⁸Neither model could be calculated for Black Protestants, as the it cannot be completely determined. Simply, there is only one outcome for some combination of the independent variables. In this case when including church attendance, clergy cues, and clergy cues*attendance in a model together for Black Protestants, the variables perfectly predict the presidential vote. For example it is likely that all individuals who receive clergy cues voted for the Democratic candidate. Thus there is no variation in our dependent variable (Presidential Vote) and standard errors cannot be estimated for the variables involved. This is partially a result of our small sample size, but primarily the homogeneity of the group. A simple cross-tabulation for both cohorts (i.e. Model 1 and 2) reveals that there is no difference in the level of Democratic voting between those who did and did not cues with a Pearson $\chi^2 = 0.0927$ Pr = 0.761 for the cohort in Model 1 and a Pearson $\chi^2 = 1.1083$ and Pr = 0.292 for the cohort in Model 2. A logit model with the cues variables removed does show increased attendance leads to a high probability of voting Democratic, which is significant at the 0.05 level.

clergy, even those who place greater emphasis on moral issues, are moving congregants away from their Democratic moorings.

Table 2: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Presidential Vote ¹					
Independent Variables	Logit Coefficient	Predicted ² Probabilities	Independent Variables	Logit Coefficient	Predicted Probabilities
Evangelicals			Mainline Protestants		
Model 1			Model 1		
Clergy Cues	2.66	0.641	Clergy Cues	-3.209**	1.965
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.441	0.93	Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.863**	0.502
Attendance	0.226**	0.868	Attendance	0.221**	0.054
N=361			N=430		
Pseudo R ² = 0.54			Pseudo R ² =0.56		
% Correctly Predicted=89.2			% Correctly Predicted=89.7		
Model 2			Model 2		
Church Cues	-2.109**	0.793	Church Cues	0.192	0.651
Church Cues*Attendance	0.396**	0.174	Church Cues*Attendance	0.158	0.283
Attendance	0.179***	0.038	Attendance	0.197**	0.028
N=361			N=392		
Pseudo R ² =0.54			Pseudo R ² =0.58		
% Correctly Predicted=88.6			% Correctly Predicted=89.5		
Catholics			Black Protestants³		
Model 1			Model 1		
Clergy Cues	-0.058	0.530	Clergy Cues	---	---
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.053	0.274	Clergy Cues*Attendance	---	---
Attendance	0.019	0.066	Attendance	---	---
N=497			N=151		
Pseudo R ² =0.51					
% Correctly Predicted=87.3					
Model 2			Model 2		
Church Cues	-0.373	0.857	Church Cues	---	---
Church Cues*Attendance	0.167	0.218	Church Cues*Attendance	---	---
Attendance	0.129**	0.011	Attendance	---	---
N=497			N=165		
Pseudo R ² =0.51					
% Correctly Predicted=87.5					
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study					
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.					
² The predicted probability for cues is the probability of voting for the Republican candidate when attendance=0 and cues=0. The predicted probability for cues*attendance is the probability of voting for the Republican candidate when attendance=5 and cues=5. The predicted probability for attendance is the probability of voting for the Republican candidate when attendance=5 and cues=0.					
³					
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)					

Like party affiliation, the most interesting results are for Mainline Protestants in that they directly counter our predictions. Cues from clergy, especially the direct endorsement of candidates or parties, do not move Mainliners in a Democrat direction, nor do the combination of liberal clerical cues and conservative congregations nullify the effects of cue-giving. Rather Mainline Protestants who received direct endorsements had

a greater probability of voting Republican as worship attendance increased, than those who did not receive cues. Indeed of those Mainline respondents who identified the content of the clerical cue they received, 71% stated that their clergy member encouraged them to vote for either the Republican presidential candidate or to support the Republican Party (See Appendix B), which is virtually equal to the same statistic for Evangelicals.

As with party identification, in the model in which individuals received direct endorsements only, those who never attended church but perceived that they received cues were less likely to be Republican. Here explanation follows the same logic as it did in the party identification model. It is important to note again, that like party identification, this finding indicates that more frequent attendance and the reception, acceptance, and socialization of political cues are intimately tied. There is a connection between attending almost every week or more and receiving the impact of the pastoral cue. (See Mainline Graph in Appendix D)

Party and Candidate Evaluation: The relationship between party and candidate evaluations and clerical cues affirmed the findings on party identification and the presidential vote. However, even when party identification was dropped out of the model as a control variable, neither type of clerical cue provided any significant coefficients in the models where evaluations of the Republican and Democratic Parties were the independent variables, although the direction of coefficients did reflect the other findings for each tradition.²⁹ The relationship between cues and candidate evaluations produced more significant results, with strong findings for Evangelical and Mainline Protestants. Again Mainline Protestants behaved contrary to the hypothesis. For both groups, attendance for those who did not receive cues was associated with more positive

Table 3: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Attitudes Toward Presidential Candidates¹			
Independent Variables	Candidate Evaluation	Independent Variables	Candidate Evaluation
Evangelicals		Mainline Protestants	
Model 1		Model 1	
Clergy Cues	-0.028 (0.041) ²	Clergy Cues	0.059 (0.018)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.007 (0.002)	Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.002 (0.008)
Attendance	0.016* (0.005)	Attendance	0.007* (0.001)
R ² =0.52		R ² =0.53	
Model 2		Model 2	
Church Cues	-0.088* (0.041)	Church Cues	-0.018* (0.002)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.018* (0.01)	Church Cues*Attendance	0.013** (0.000)
Attendance	0.013** (0.005)	Attendance	0.006* (0.001)
R ² =0.53		R ² =0.53	
Catholics		Black Protestants	
Model 1		Model 1	
Clergy Cues	-0.001 (0.073)	Clergy Cues	-0.004 (0.062)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.006 (0.018)	Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.004 (0.009)
Attendance	-0.000 (0.005)	Attendance	0.005 (0.004)
R ² =0.48		R ² =0.18	
Model 2		Model 2	
Church Cues	-0.019 (0.007)	Church Cues	-0.027 (0.056)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.005 (0.003)	Church Cues*Attendance	0.006 (0.116)
Attendance	-0.000 (0.005)	Attendance	0.003 (0.002)
R ² =0.48		R ² =0.18	
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study			
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.			
² Entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.			
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)			

evaluations of the Republican candidate in the direct endorsement cohort, although evaluations were no higher for those who did receive cues. However, in the larger cohort including both direct endorsements and other political cues the model found significance each of the three variables of interest. Again, for those who never attended yet perceived some sort of cues they rated the Republican candidate lower, while attendance was

²⁹ These results have not been reported but are available upon request.

associated with more positive Republican ratings for those who did not receive cues. However, as with party identification and the presidential vote, the positive relationship between attendance and candidate evaluation in the Republican direction was stronger for those who receive cues compared with those who did not.

It is not difficult to explain the poor performance of these items. Certainly, the sparse impact of clerical cues on candidate evaluation could be, as with all the models examined here the result of the high multicollinearity in the interaction terms³⁰. Yet it is more likely that the distinct personal dimension between Presidential candidates in the two years affected the pooled analysis. In addition, the high variation due to the individual relativity inherent in evaluations on a large scale, like a feeling thermometer which ranges from zero to one hundred, could have muted the effects of cues.

Social and Cultural Attitudes: Four models were used to measure the effect of cues on moral and social welfare issues. Attitudes on moral issues were measured using two factor scores of cultural attitudes and a simple ordinal abortion variable, while social welfare and economic attitudes were measured using a factor score where respondents evaluated the role of government. For Evangelicals, attendance led to more conservative cultural attitudes, although there was no difference between those who did and did not receive cues for either the direct endorsement or the combined cue model. This is not surprising as evangelical clergy most likely have not emphasized all of these cultural issues, particularly the role of women and gay rights issues³¹, in their case for the vote.

³⁰ For example in the model for evangelicals who received either direct endorsements or other cues, the VIF on cues and cues *attendance was 11.07 and 11.79 respectively. These extremely high scores are a strong indicated of substantial multicollinearity. The pattern was no different for any of the model with VIF scores on these variables ranging from around 7 to as high as 19.

³¹ This data predated the rising profile of issues regarding homosexuality, coming before both the controversial Supreme Court case on homosexual sodomy in Texas, *Lawrence v. Texas* (2003) and the later decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Court on gay marriage in *Goodridge v. Department of Public*

Traditionally, abortion has been the litmus test upon which orthodox clergy encourage their congregants to test candidates and parties, especially among clergy who may be hesitant to directly endorse a candidate or party. Thus there is also no surprise that while more frequent attendance increased the probability that Evangelicals would hold a more conservative attitude on abortion regardless of the reception of cues, those who received cues were even more likely to hold conservative attitudes for the model which included both cues

Interestingly only Evangelical produced any movement on the role of government item. There was a significant relationship in a conservative direction for those who received direct endorsements or other cues between attendance and the role of government. This finding has two implications. First, for the most part, it is moral and not social welfare or economic issues, which are emphasized in the political messages of Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic clergy. For Black Protestants it is likely that an emphasis on civil rights issues dominate the political messages produced from the pulpit. The second implication is that, among those Evangelical churches where there is an emphasis from the pulpit and other church opinion leaders on Republican allegiance, members may more readily conform their ideological structures to those of Republican elites, either because they are made more aware of them by the pastor or other church opinion leaders or because the politization of the church engenders greater awareness of the respective positions of each party across a range of issues.

Catholics provided few surprises. Unlike Evangelicals there were strong findings for those who received cues in the cultural attitude and abortion models. While more

Health (2004). It is probably that a gay marriage variable would produce very significant results in the 2004, although the cueing questions were not asked in that year.

frequent attendance lead to more conservative cultural attitudes in both models regardless of cues, the effect was more pronounced for those who received cues. Likewise in the abortion model Catholics behaved as expected as more frequent attendance moved in a pro-life direction, regardless of the reception of cues. However, for those who received either type of political cues the effect of more frequent attendance was even larger.

Table 4A: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Attitudes on Cultural Issues and the Role of Government¹			
Independent Variables	Cultural Issues 1²	Cultural Issues 2²	Role of Government
Evangelicals			
Model 1			
Clergy Cues	-0.191 (0.062)	0.091 (0.205)	-0.231 (0.362)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.029 (0.015)	0.027 (0.045)	0.045 (0.930)
Attendance	0.038*** (0.005)	0.043*** (0.008)	-0.127 (0.038)
R ²	0.25	0.25	0.16
Model 2			
Church Cues	0.030 (0.041)	-0.048 (0.041)	-0.215 (0.126)
Church Cues*Attendance	-0.001 (0.007)	0.021 (0.007)	0.033** (0.001)
Attendance	0.038*** (0.006)	0.036*** (0.009)	-0.013 (0.027)
R ²	0.25	0.25	0.17
Mainline Protestants			
Model 1			
Clergy Cues	-0.068 (0.206)	-0.386** (0.206)	0.240 (0.306)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.245 (0.229)	0.127** (0.229)	-0.164 (0.031)
Attendance	0.031* (0.008)	0.033*** (0.006)	0.000 (0.008)
R ²	0.30	0.30	0.23
Model 2			
Church Cues	-0.143 (0.076)	-0.225** (0.099)	-0.403 (0.632)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.094** (0.035)	0.079** (0.025)	0.033 (0.071)
Attendance	0.024** (0.001)	0.026** (0.008)	0.003 (0.011)
R ²	0.32	0.32	0.25
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study			
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.			
² The entries on Cultural Attitudes and Role of Government are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.			
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)			

Table 4B: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Attitudes on Cultural Issues, the Role of Government, and Abortion¹			
Independent Variables	Cultural Issues 1²	Cultural Issues 2²	Role of Government
Catholics			
Model 1			
Clergy Cues	-0.114 (0.041)	-0.06 (0.117)	0.133 (0.503)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.048* (0.02)	0.025 (0.027)	-0.039 (0.106)
Attendance	0.02** (0.003)	0.023** (0.007)	0.010 (0.005)
R ²	0.20	0.20	0.18
Model 2			
Church Cues	-0.139 (0.101)	-0.106 (0.069)	-0.083 (0.041)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.06** (0.026)	0.033** (0.016)	0.019 (0.027)
Attendance	0.017** (0.001)	0.018** (0.007)	0.004 (0.018)
R ²	0.20	0.20	0.18
Black Protestants			
Model 1			
Clergy Cues	0.059 (0.053)	0.201 (0.164)	-0.266 (0.184)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.010 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	-0.001 (0.003)
Attendance	0.033* (0.015)	0.027* (0.014)	-0.041* (0.006)
R ²	0.35	0.35	0.26
Model 2			
Church Cues	-0.059 (0.098)	-0.169 (0.125)	0.340 (0.396)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.031 (0.022)	0.047 (0.031)	-0.110 (0.122)
Attendance	0.025 (0.011)	0.021 (0.015)	-0.016 (0.037)
R ²	0.36	0.36	0.26
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study			
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.			
² The entries on Cultural Attitudes and Role of Government are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.			
³ Entries on abortion attitudes are order logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.			
⁴ Entries for ordered logit goodness of fit are McKelvey and Zavoina's R ² .			
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)			

This would seem to indicate that among Catholic clergy there is a strong link between moral issues, particularly abortion, and political pronouncements. Indeed among Catholics who identified the content of the political cue they received, more respondents noted that their clergy gave cues on a specific issue than any other mention. Moreover, 29% of Catholic mentioned receiving a cue on a specific issue, compared to 17% of Mainliners, 15% of Evangelicals, and 2% of Black Protestants (See Appendix B).

If Catholic priests are providing cues on social welfare issues, they do not seem to be reaching the pews, as none of the coefficients for Catholics on the role of government were significant. This could be the result of the shifting demographics and party alignment among Catholics as higher incomes and a focus on moral issues has moved some attention away from the traditional social welfare agenda (Bendyna et al. 2000) or simply because these items do not tap the social welfare issues emphasized by Catholic clergy.

Table 4C: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Attitudes on Abortion¹

Independent Variables	Order Logit Estimates²	Always Allow³	Only If Clear Need	Rape, Incest, Danger To Mother	Never Allow
Evangelicals					
Model 1					
Clergy Cues	0.345 (0.627)	-0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.06
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.137 (0.210)	0.0002	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002
Attendance	0.469*** (0.066)	-0.371	-0.128	0.19	0.31
R ²	0.21 ⁴				
Model 2					
Church Cues	-0.551 (0.507)	0.008	0.005	-0.005	-0.008
Church Cues*Attendance	0.210** (0.074)	-0.13	-0.098	0.025	0.254
Attendance	0.416*** (0.080)	-0.32	-0.124	0.17	0.28
R ²	0.22				
Mainline Protestants					
Model 1					
Clergy Cues	-0.425 (0.932)	0.057	-0.011	-0.039	-0.007
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.140 (0.184)	-0.120	0.004	0.095	0.021
Attendance	0.357*** (0.014)	-0.416	0.046	0.301	0.069
R ²	0.21				
Model 2					
Church Cues	-1.84*** (0.411)	0.414	-0.147	-0.232	-0.033
Church Cues*Attendance	0.493*** (0.085)	-0.447	-0.169	0.276	0.34
Attendance	0.327*** (0.017)	-0.383	0.045	0.279	0.06
R ²	0.22				
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study					
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.					
² Entries on abortion attitudes are order logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.					
³ Change in the predicted probabilities of holding each attitude 1) for cues where cues=0 and attendance=0, 2) for cues*attendance where cues=1 and attendance=5, and 3) for attendance where cues=0 and attendance=5.					
⁴ Entries for ordered logit goodness of fit are McKelvey and Zavoina's R ² .					
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)					

Table 4D: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Attitudes on Abortion¹					
Independent Variables	Order Logit Estimates²	Always Allow³	Only If Clear Need	Rape, Incest, Danger To Mother	Never Allow
Catholics					
Model 1					
Clergy Cues	-1.638* (1.310)	0.37	-0.047	-0.047	-0.077
Clergy Cues*Attendance	0.552** (0.195)	-0.326	-0.192	-0.091	0.608
Attendance	0.388*** (0.050)	-0.39	-0.052	0.269	0.174
R ²	0.22 ⁴				
Model 2					
Church Cues	-2.203** (0.994)	0.496	-0.054	-0.33	-0.113
Church Cues*Attendance	0.615*** (0.152)	-0.407	-0.197	-0.046	0.646
Attendance	0.318*** (0.038)	-0.321	-0.048	0.235	0.135
R ²	0.24				
Black Protestants					
Model 1					
Clergy Cues	-0.298 (1.372)	0.074	0.0007	-0.043	-0.0314
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.033 (0.283)	.045	0.001	-0.003	-0.001
Attendance	0.232** (0.092)	-0.269	-0.003	0.152	0.12
R ²	0.24				
Model 2					
Church Cues	-1.559 (1.778)	0.37	-0.026	-0.208	-0.137
Church Cues*Attendance	0.231 (0.328)	-0.277	-0.056	0.13	0.203
Attendance	0.192** (0.090)	-0.223	-0.003	0.128	0.098
R ²	0.25				
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study					
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.					
² Entries on abortion attitudes are order logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.					
³ Change in the predicted probabilities of holding each attitude 1) for cues where cues=0 and attendance=0, 2) for cues*attendance where cues=1 and attendance=5, and 3) for attendance where cues=0 and attendance=5.					
⁴ Entries for ordered logit goodness of fit are McKelvey and Zavoina's R ² .					
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)					

For Black Protestants across all three issues there were no effects of either type of clerical cue. Attendance did push Black Protestants in a socially liberal direction on the role of government and a conservative direction on abortion and the second cultural issues model, although there was not difference between those who did and did not receive cues.

Again the findings for Mainline Protestants defy expectations in a very interesting way. While there was no movement on the role of government item, those who attend more frequently hold more conservative positions on both cultural attitude item as well as the abortion item, regardless of whether they received cues. For those who did receive cues, however, the relationship between attendance and cultural attitudes as well as between attendance and abortion was even stronger. Thus contrary to the hypothesis, the impact of attendance and clerical cues on Mainline Protestant attitudes on moral issues appears almost identical to that of Evangelicals, if not stronger.

Attitudes Toward Groups and Institutions: The attitudes toward groups and institutions were intended to gauge the effect of clerical cues on those entities associated with social and economic attitudes³² as well as moral and cultural attitudes. The analysis again yielded mixed results across traditions, but generally followed the trend observed with the other dependent variables. As with those other dependent variables, Evangelicals' feelings toward the Christian Coalition, Christian Fundamentalist, Gays and Lesbians, and the Women's Movement, moved in the expected direction as attendance increased regardless of whether an individual received political cues. The reception of political cues did seem to condition the effect of attendance on attitudes toward Christian Fundamentalist and the Supreme Court. Again variability in the meaning of any one respondent's evaluation relative to another may be the cause of the weakness of these items across religious tradition with respect to those who received cues. Concurrently, the weakness may also be a result of the fact that clergy do not emphasize these attitudes in their political messages any more than their peers who do not provide perceivable

³² There were no significant coefficients in our models for feeling towards unions or environmentalist and therefore they are not considered in the analysis, nor represented in the table.

political cues. Regardless of the statistical significance, for the most part the direction of the coefficients appears to align with expectations across variable and religious tradition.

Therefore, the large negative effect of more frequent attendance on feelings toward the Supreme Court, among Evangelicals who received both types of cues, is striking. Thus perhaps some of the clamor against the Court from members of the religious right is reaching the pews, via clerical cues. Given the increasingly hostile speech toward the Court from some members of the religious right (Hacker 2004) it would be interesting to see whether this trend continues after 2000. If indeed Evangelical elites are undermining the institutional legitimacy of the Court, this could have significant implications for compliance with future controversial Court decisions. (Gibson, Caldeira, and Spense 2005)

Among Catholics there also were not extensive results and only one visible effect of clerical cues. More frequent attendance did lead to more positive feelings of the Christian Coalition and Christian Fundamentalist, although there was no difference for those who did and did not receive cues.³³ The most striking finding was that, among Catholics who received both types of cues, more frequent attendance lead to less favorable opinions of big business. While this does not provide proof that Catholic clergy are providing clear cues on social and economic policy, it does indicate evidence that Catholic clerical cues may still include some elements of social welfare liberalism, which are normalized in the congregational context.

³³ It is important to note here and in other models with similar results that this does not indicate attendance for those who received cues also did not manifest this relationship. The structure of the model simply does not test this idea, but rather whether the effect of attendance is different for those who receive cues. To this end in a non-interactive model (see footnote 13), frequent attendance often had an effect regardless of cue giving.

The effect of cues and attendance for Black Protestants also demonstrated some interesting results. First, for both those who received direct endorsements and those who received both types of cues, more frequent attendance was associated with negative feelings toward the Supreme Court. While historically the legacy of civil rights endeared the African American community to the Court, especially among black churches, more recent findings have found that African American feelings toward the Court have declined because of less favorable outcomes in more recent civil rights cases. (Gibson and Caldeira 1992) Thus black clergy, the primary opinion elites within the African American community (Lincoln and Mamiya 1991), most likely have led this opinion transformation, particularly those who exercise their political voice. It is therefore unsurprising that those most proximate to these leaders would hold less favorable opinions relative to their peers.

These items did provide some evidence that Black clergy are providing cues which lead to more morally conservative attitudes toward gays and lesbians. Among those who received direct endorsements, increased attendance was associated with more negative feelings for both those who received cues and those who did not, however those who received cues rated gays and lesbians roughly ten points lower on the one hundred point scale at all levels of attendance. While for those who received either direct endorsements or other cues, frequent attendance was associated with more negative feelings toward gay and lesbians, relative to those who did not receive cues. Regardless of the reception of cues, those who attended more frequently held higher opinions of the Christian Coalition and Christian Fundamentalist. For Black Protestants in both cueing models, more frequent attendance lead to more positive feelings toward the women's

movement. This would seem to reflect the strong historical link between the women's movement and the civil rights movement.

Independent Variables	Big Business	Christian Coalition	Supreme Court	Christian Fundamentalist	Gay and Lesbians	Women's Movement
Evangelicals						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	-11.975 ² (6.970)	11.350 (7.462)	-9.066 (10.773)	-25.133* (10.001)	17.696 (14.783)	17.146** (0.693)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	1.906 (1.637)	-1.619 (1.817)	3.152 (1.911)	5.333* (1.828)	-4.589 (3.959)	-2.640 (1.021)
Attendance	0.0473 (0.938)	2.932*** (0.65)	-0.141 (0.264)	2.862*** (0.643)	-1.545* (0.423)	-2.345** (0.153)
R ²	0.07	0.12	0.04	0.10	0.11	0.15
Model 2						
Church Cues	-1.096 (1.303)	3.234 (0.590)	3.113* (0.341)	-0.109 (2.216)	-3.761 (10.645)	-1.595 (3.566)
Church Cues*Attendance	0.064 (0.005)	0.042 (0.285)	-0.820* (0.121)	0.435 (0.433)	-0.065 (2.411)	-0.547 (0.890)
Attendance	0.143 (0.764)	2.71*** (0.7)	0.168 (0.167)	2.963* (1.292)	-1.646* (0.665)	-2.117** (0.0126)
R ²	0.06	0.12	0.13	0.09	0.11	0.15
Mainline Protestants						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	15.772 (18.318)	15.761 (4.351)	-0.836 (9.585)	-7.665 (9.562)	0.958 (21.473)	-15.887 (32.075)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-1.830 (4.528)	-1.076 (0.443)	0.862 (1.108)	3.582 (1.793)	-1.637 (3.971)	3.759 (4.729)
Attendance	0.329 (1.103)	2.284** (0.032)	-0.015 (0.101)	1.920* (0.286)	-1.932 ** (0.685)	-1.448** (0.288)
R ²	0.06	0.10	0.06	0.11	0.23	0.16
Model 2						
Church Cues	3.053 (3.720)	5.472* (0.722)	-12.834*** (0.007)	1.246 (2.439)	11.067 (3.872)	-5.814 (15.292)
Church Cues*Attendance	-0.646 (0.158)	-0.899 (2.47)	2.276 (0.508)	1.397 (0.937)	-4.170* (0.572)	0.590 (2.777)
Attendance	0.379 (1.027)	2.371** (0.079)	-0.146* (0.021)	1.760* (0.281)	-1.513** (0.360)	-1.360** (0.439)
R ²	0.05	0.19	0.16	0.11	0.24	0.16
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study						
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.						
² The entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.						
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)						

Table 5B: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on Attitudes Toward Various Groups and Institutions¹						
Independent Variables	Big Business	Christian Coalition	Supreme Court	Christian Fundamentalist	Gay and Lesbians	Women's Movement
Catholics						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	11.423 ² (4.597)	7.705 (9.743)	2.383 (5.570)	14.198* (6.077)	9.044 (10.170)	4.879 (0.653)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-3.696 (1.615)	-1.201 (2.579)	-0.974 (1.616)	-2.214 (1.797)	-2.524 (3.042)	-0.203 (1.125)
Attendance	0.049 (0.259)	1.695** (0.301)	-0.497 (0.316)	2.098** (0.099)	-0.019 (0.303)	-0.646 (0.196)
R ²	0.16	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.14	0.14
Model 2						
Church Cues	7.364* (0.753)	-0.243 (2.535)	5.511 (4.190)	-3.983 (8.448)	7.017 (0.542)	1.729 (8.226)
Church Cues*Attendance	-2.438* (0.407)	-0.230 (0.996)	-1.469 (1.049)	0.696 (1.250)	-1.951 (0.496)	-0.137 (2.257)
Attendance	0.333 (0.308)	1.789** (0.070)	-0.292 (0.268)	2.009** (0.060)	0.202 (0.386)	-0.646 (0.130)
R ²	0.16	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.14	0.14
Black Protestants						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	6.926 (18.543)	-6.788 (3.125)	18.464* (2.445)	-8.694 (6.198)	-10.142** (0.277)	-22.588** (0.258)
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-1.750 (5.685)	1.295 (1.650)	-5.545** (0.916)	0.501 (1.033)	1.478 (0.653)	3.910* (0.610)
Attendance	1.772 (0.484)	3.092 (0.472)**	2.495** (0.876)	1.835* (0.998)	-2.019* (0.311)	-0.642 (1.535)
R ²	0.10	0.13	0.11	0.11	0.16	0.04
Model 2						
Church Cues	-5.152 (1.928)	-11.752 (10.355)	4.009 (0.806)	3.764 (10.026)	8.340 (9.037)	-10.966 (8.402)
Church Cues*Attendance	1.336 (1.865)	2.294 (1.012)	-2.379** (0.490)	-1.681 (1.465)	-3.822* (0.499)	2.261** (0.127)
Attendance	1.284 (0.474)	2.715** (0.154)	2.568** (0.953)	2.333** (0.639)	-0.763 (0.482)	-0.817 (1.316)
R ²	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.10	0.18	0.03
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study						
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.						
² The entries are OLS coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.						
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)						

Like Evangelicals, Mainline Protestants had less positive feelings of homosexuals and the women's movement and more positive feelings toward the Christian Coalition and Christian Fundamentalist as church attendance increased, regardless of whether they received cues. Yet for Mainliners who received either type of cue, the effect of attendance on attitudes toward homosexuals was even more negative than for those who did not. Why did this result manifest itself for Mainliners alone? The simple reason is

that homosexuality was emphasized in a negative way by Mainline cue-givers. Unlike Evangelical clergy who until recently have had little reason to place emphasis on homosexuality in their political cue-giving, relative to other issues, Mainline clergy, particularly conservative ones, have been on the frontlines of a battle over gay rights within their denominations for some time. This reality certainly increased the salience of this issue for these clergy and undoubtedly engendered its entrance into the lexicon of their political pronouncements, evidently even more so than their Evangelical peers. Thus if it is orthodox clergy who are the predominant cue-givers among Mainliners (See Appendix B), this result would appear to reinforce that notion. Another area of comparability with Evangelicals was in feelings toward the Supreme Court. Among those who received either direct endorsements or other cues, attendance was associated with more negative feelings toward the Supreme Court for those who did and did not receive cues. However those who did receive cues rated the Court thirteen points lower at all level of attendance than those who did not.

Issue Salience: The final set models are intended to gage the impact of clerical cues on the salience of moral issues, which seem to be one of the dominant issues motivating cue-giving, particularly among Evangelical, Mainline Protestant, and Catholic clergy. For each of these religious traditions more frequent church attendance increased the salience of abortion, as respondents were more likely to indicate that it was an extremely important issue. Yet there is also evidence that, among each of these religious traditions, those who received cues were more likely to indicate that abortion was an extremely salient issue, as attendance increased, when compared to those who did not receive cues. Thus as orthodox clergy emphasize conservative moral issues it not only leads to more

conservative attitudes on those issues, but also increases the likelihood that these issues will be part of the voting calculus.

Table 6A: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on the Saliency of Abortion¹						
Independent Variables	Order Logit Estimates²	Extremely Important³	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Too Important	Not Important At All
Evangelicals						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	0.275 (0.893)	-0.054	-0.005	0.039	0.015	0.004
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.213 (0.197)	0.302	0.108	-0.143	-0.041	-0.041
Attendance	-0.204*** (0.054)	0.2	0.02	-0.143	-0.058	-0.016
R ²	0.22 ⁴					
Model 2						
Church Cues	0.743 (0.691)	-0.140	-0.022	0.106	0.044	0.012
Church Cues*Attendance	-0.232* (0.137)	0.320	-0.090	-0.166	-0.050	-0.013
Attendance	-0.165** (0.058)	0.162	0.014	-0.117	-0.046	-0.012
R ²	0.24					
Mainline Protestants						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	-1.881* (1.03)	0.406	-0.08	-0.238	-0.067	-0.019
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.456** (0.229)	0.173	0.333	0.018	-0.029	-0.022
Attendance	-0.176** (0.060)	0.133	0.077	-0.131	-0.060	-0.019
R ²	0.24					
Model 2						
Church Cues	-1.35 (0.995)	0.268	0.006	-0.195	-0.061	-0.018
Church Cues*Attendance	-0.191 (0.238)	0.121	0.155	0.126	-0.110	-0.041
Attendance	-0.165*** (0.061)	0.124	0.073	-0.124	-0.056	-0.017
R ²	0.25					
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study						
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.						
² Entries on abortion attitudes are order logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.						
³ Change in the predicted probabilities of holding each attitude 1) for cues where cues=0 and attendance=0, 2) for cues*attendance where cues=1 and attendance=5, and 3) for attendance where cues=0 and attendance=5.						
⁴ Entries for ordered logit goodness of fit are McKelvey and Zavoina's R ² .						
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)						

Table 6: Impact of Clergy and Church Cues on the Salience of Abortion¹						
Independent Variables	Order Logit Estimates²	Extremely Important³	Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Too Important	Not Important At All
Catholics						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	-0.539 (0.893)	0.1	0.019	-0.073	-0.036	-0.009
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.11** (0.008)	0.011	0.004	-0.009	-0.005	-0.002
Attendance	-0.186*** (0.051)	0.153	0.064	-0.121	-0.074	-0.021
R ²	0.22 ⁴					
Model 2						
Church Cues	0.217 (0.521)	-0.034	-0.018	0.028	0.018	0.005
Church Cues*Attendance	-0.111** (0.05)	0.124	0.023	-0.090	-0.045	-0.012
Attendance	-0.164** (0.054)	0.135	0.057	-0.107	-0.066	-0.019
R ²	0.24					
Black Protestants						
Model 1						
Clergy Cues	1.516 (1.37)	-0.247	-0.114	0.177	0.113	0.071
Clergy Cues*Attendance	-0.352 (0.308)	0.484	-0.144	-0.247	-0.061	0.03
Attendance	-0.143 (0.097)	0.147	0.02	-0.107	-0.039	-0.02
R ²	0.24					
Model 2						
Church Cues	0.480 (1.089)	-0.0974	-0.016	0.072	0.026	0.014
Church Cues*Attendance	-0.184 (0.242)	0.254	-0.028	-0.157	-0.045	-0.022
Attendance	-0.124 (0.108)	0.128	0.016	-0.093	-0.033	-0.017
R ²	0.25					
Source: 1996 and 2000 American National Election Study						
¹ All models in table include controls for income, education, age, gender, southern residence, and party identification; these data have not been included here but are available upon request.						
² Entries on abortion attitudes are order logit coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.						
³ Change in the predicted probabilities of holding each attitude 1) for cues where cues=0 and attendance=0, 2) for cues*attendance where cues=1 and attendance=5, and 3) for attendance where cues=0 and attendance=5.						
⁴ Entries for ordered logit goodness of fit are McKelvey and Zavoina's R ² .						
***p<.001; **p<.05; *p<.10 (two-tailed test)						

It is prudent to briefly consider why Mainliners are consistently revealing 1) a relationship that is not in the expected direction and 2) a stronger and more prevalent relationships between clerical cues and political behavior than any other tradition. The results on the relationship of clerical cues and party identification, the presidential vote, candidate evaluations, moral issue attitudes, evaluations of groups and institutions, and

moral issue salience have all been in the conservative direction. Moreover, the effects of cues have been more prevalent for Mainline Protestants than any other religious tradition. The explanation appears to lie in what clergy are providing cues in Mainline churches and the character of the Mainline denominations. Research has revealed that religious and political conservatism lead clergy in Mainline denominations to speak out on issues such as school prayer, abortion, and gay rights, while liberal clergy do not advocate on these moral issues³⁴, but rather on social welfare, economics, and environmental issues. (Djupe and Gilbert 2002) There is also evidence that southern and/or rural Mainline clergy, who are typically much more conservative than their non-southern and/or urban colleagues, are also more likely to provide political cues on moral and cultural issues. (Djupe and Gilbert 2002) Mainline denominations should also not be considered homogenous, as in centrist churches like the United Methodist where clergy are pulled toward both ends of the ideological spectrum. (Guth et al. 1997) In truth, it is the congregation not the denomination or religious tradition that provides the social context in which political attitudes and behaviors can be understood as individuals take cues from clergy and fellow parishioners. (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990) Thus in Mainline denominations liberal clergy may not be speaking in poignant political terms, while their conservative peers may be delivering political speech on moral and cultural issues akin to Evangelical clergy. Thus as the data confirms, orthodox clergy are the primary cue-givers in Mainline churches.

This answers the first question, but why should Mainline clerical cues be a more power predictor of congregant attitudes and behaviors relative to their Evangelical

³⁴ There are anomalies, but rarely do they take the form of political cues. Events such as the murder of Matthew Shepherd or the need to address the denomination's stance on issues of gay marriage or clergy do

counterparts. The answer lies in the distinct composition of Mainline denominations. Among evangelicals, orthodox clergy and their congregations typically concur on political and moral issues and thus in a sense the pastor is “preaching to the converted”. (Guth et al. 1997, 143) In Catholic churches, cues may only focus on moral issues, while cues from black Protestant clergy are still strongly Democratic. It is the contrast among Mainlines between churches with conservative clergy and churches with liberal clergy that cause cues to be more powerful for Mainlines than other traditions. In churches with conservative clergy the cues are more frequent and direct thus bringing congregant’s behavior into conformity with the pastors (or at very least leading to exit among those who have strong opposing positions), while in churches with liberal clergy, cues are much fewer, more obtuse, and often received by a congregation of mixed partisan affiliation. Strong belief in the literal interpretation and inerrancy of the Bible may also lead orthodox Mainline clergy to more fervent political rhetoric. These pastors are not afraid to decry the “false doctrines” and “false teachers” which they see as pervasive, particularly since they must contend with them within their own denominations and churches. Thus this may increase both the intensity and frequency of their political pronouncements relative to their Evangelical peers.

Conclusion

What then can be said based on these findings? Certainly there is evidence that cues from clergy are providing substantive changes in congregants behavior and attitudes across religious traditions. In many cases the shifts among parishioners who receive cues are aligned with theoretical expectations, in other cases, particularly among Mainlines they are not. While some might question the overall strength of the two items taken from

the ANES as a reasonable measure of true level and nature of the impact of clerical cues on parishioners, this research is an important first step and should provide an impetus for better data collection at the congregation level in order to further explore the relationship between pulpit and pew. Yet, even if these items only provide a weak picture of the relationship between clerical cues and the political behavior of congregants, as some previous research has indicated (Wilcox and Sigelman 2001), further data collection and study could uncover a relationship that proves even stronger than the one found here.

Unquestionably the most interesting findings were for Mainline Protestants and indicated that the cues received by parishioners in these left leaning denominations are emanating from conservative, not liberal clergy. However, a closer examination of the literature lends considerable evidence for this position, as the congregation not the denomination or religious tradition is the social context in which individual political attitudes and behaviors can be understood as individuals take cues from fellow congregants and clergy. (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990) We should also not expect that Mainline Protestantism or denominations within Mainline Protestantism are politically homogenous, because the particularities of each congregation often insulate them from the majority position of the denomination or tradition. (Djupe and Gilbert 2005) Indeed many southern and/or rural Mainline clergy may mirror Evangelical churches more closely in their political cue-giving than their fellow Mainline churches. (Djupe and Gilbert 2002)

Our results seem to support the conclusion that liberal clergy face congregations with less attendance, less deference to pastoral leadership, and less symmetry between clerical and congregational political beliefs, thus making parishioners less receptive to

political and social cues. (Leege and Kellstedt 1993) Moreover liberal clergy are hampered by church approval, which is the single most important factor in determining whether clergy give political cues. (Guth et al. 1997) Empirical studies have found that while Mainline clergy have become more liberal (Guth et al. 1997), their congregation's partisanship has remained relatively stable. (Layman 2001) Thus liberal Mainline clergy often face more conservative congregations which makes them less likely to provide political cues, while conservative clergy faced with more liberal congregations are more likely to provide political cues. (Guth et al. 1997) The presence of this persistent and vivid political and moral conservatism in Mainline churches begs questions for students of religion and politics to consider. First, how useful is the Mainline Protestant classification in explaining political behavior when there is clear evidence of an orthodox wing that is different both with regards to theological orthodoxy, partisanship, and political activity? Secondly, does the existence of this theologically and politically orthodox wing of Mainline Protestantism forecast a future divide among these denominations? Both questions require further research, especially at the congregational level.

The findings for Evangelicals reflected the homogenous nature belief within the religious tradition. Thus to some extent it is true that Evangelical pastors are preaching to the choir, but this conclusion would be too simple. Rather the literature suggests a more complex relationship of clerical cues and congregational socialization, which normalizes political behavior and attitudes. (Guth et al. 1997) Moreover, church membership is rarely static and pastoral cues certainly reach the newly converted and political messages

from the pulpit can intensify and reinforce the preferences of the congregation, as well as frame them within the context of contemporary political struggles. (Jelen 2001)

The impact of cues is also powerful for Catholics as an emphasize by clergy on moral issue considerations appear to be moving Catholics toward the Republican Party as well as in their attitudes on the moral issues themselves. Catholics are no longer monolithic Democratic voters (Bendyna et al. 2000; Prendergast 1999) and if clergy, particularly those who are most politically vocal, continue to emphasize these moral issues as an important consideration for political decisions, then committed Catholics will increasingly move toward the party that shares their views on these issues.

Among Black Protestants it is clear from the data that strong affections for the Democratic Party have not waned, particularly not among those who receive clerical political endorsements. Thus despite evidence that clerical cues and other cues inside the church are moving parishioners in a conservative direction on moral issues, it does not appear that they will move Black Protestants in the Republican direction any time soon. Indeed they appear to reinforce the Democratic attachment, while concomitantly emphasizing conservative moral values. Thus if there is to be a shift in Black Protestant partisanship, a shift will have to occur first among African-American religious elites.

There also appears to be a parallel between church attendance and political/social engagement, both with relation to attentiveness, elites, and social networks. Individuals who are more socially engaged are also more politically attentive and sophisticated (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993, 2001) and more likely to receive and accept political messages from elites. (Zaller 1992) Likewise those who attend church more often are more attentive to the pronouncements made from the pulpit (political or

otherwise) was well as those of other religious elites. Thus, just as those who are more attentive to politics are more likely to structure their political attitudes correspondent to those of political elites (Layman and Carsey 2002), congregants who are more attentive should be more likely to structure their religious (and related political views) attitudes similarly to their clergy. Finally just as the political views of the general population are reinforced and refined by their political likeminded social networks (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), the congregation and the social networks within it serve the same purpose for church members. Yet like the broader population churches also have members who are disinterested and disengaged and thus receive fewer, if any, religious or political message from church elites. Thus churches are a reflection of the interplay of political information and influence between of individuals, elites, and social networks in the broader population, albeit a considerably more homogenous one. Future research should explore the interplay of political information received by individuals from various levels and types of elites and how the social context of the individual effects the reception and acceptance of that information.

Clerical involvement in providing direction to their church members as political elites has a long history in American politics and religious elites continue to shape political discourse. Normatively, it behooves students of political science to consider clergy as an important alternative set of political elites which shape behavior and attitudes in a unique way. Typically public support for clergy as political elites has reflected the level to which other political elites agree with their issue positions. (Guth et al. 1996) The media and academic elites embraced the liberal clerical action in the struggles for civil rights, to end poverty, and stop the Vietnam War, yet they have been





much colder toward the Christian right's fight against abortion, pornography, and gay rights. However the persistent religious character of the United States and indeed American politics as well as the respect with which most American's regard clergy means that they will continue to connect their religious values to contemporary public policy issues. (Fetzer 1992) Indeed some have remarked that without moral cues from the nation's clergy the country would have a "naked public square" with "public life devoid of moral content". (Neuhaus 1984)

Appendix A: Results of factor analyses used to compute factor scores in tables 4A and 4B



Cultural Attitudes 1³⁵		Cultural Attitudes 2		Role of Government	
Abortion	0.65	Abortion	0.66	Government ensure jobs	0.78
Role of women	0.64	Homosexuals in the military	0.79	Government health insurance	0.77
Homosexuals in the military	0.74	Civil Rights for homosexuals	0.76	Government spending/services	0.74
Civil Rights for homosexuals	0.70				
Eigenvalue	1.88	Eigenvalue	1.64	Eigenvalue	1.76
Proportion of variance explained	0.47	Proportion of variance explained	0.55	Proportion of variance explained	0.59



³⁵ The factor scores were computed from the pooled data. Source: 1996 and 2000 National Election Study. All factor analyses use principal components extraction. All of the analyses produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one.

Appendix B: Pastoral Cues As Identified By Respondents for Each Religious Tradition.





Appendix C: The Impact of Worship Attendance on Party Identification as Conditioned by Pastoral Cues for Each Religious Tradition.






Appendix D: Predicted Probability of Voting for the Republican Presidential Candidate by Attendance and Pastoral Cues Reception for Each Religious Tradition.³⁶



³⁶ This model was not run for Black Protestants.



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