

**Velvet Glove, Iron Fist or Even Hand?  
Protest Policing in the United States, 1960-1990**

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**ABSTRACT**

Scholars of social movements largely agree that since the 1960s, protest policing in the U.S. has decreased in severity. This characterization runs counter to socio-legal arguments that posit that during this same period, virtually all forms of state social control (including policing) have increased in severity over the same period. To some degree, both of these arguments obfuscate what is really of essence to policing of protest: the character of the protest event itself and the level of threat posed to officers charged with policing of protest. Trends in U.S. protest policing over the 1960-1990 period are examined. Results show that while it is generally true that aggressive policing of protest is less likely following the 1960s, threatening protest events are always likely to be policed aggressively, regardless of the time period. The magnitude of influence regarding the latter influence far exceeds that of the former. These findings suggest that general claims about the increasing or decreasing severity of policing over time are less useful to understanding protest policing than are arguments about the character of the protest event and the level of threat posed to police officers.

The 1960s and early 1970s are generally thought to be characterized by some of the most aggressive and violent protest policing in U.S. history. During this time, protesters were harassed, pepper-sprayed, tear-gassed, pushed with horses, hosed, beaten and shot. Despite the earlier use of these dramatic policing methods in the United States (Churchill and Vander Wall 1988; Donner 1990; Goldstein 1978; Gotham 1994; Levin 1971; Linfield 1990; Wolfe 1978), it was not until this period that the frequency, magnitude, and consistency of application of these methods reached unprecedented levels – seemingly throughout the whole country (Davenport and Eads 2001; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Goldstein 1978; McCarthy and McPhail 1998; McPhail, Schweingruber, and McCarthy 1998; Skolnick 1969; Stark 1972). This has led some scholars to refer to this early era of protest policing as the period of “Escalated Force” (e.g., McPhail et al. 1998; McCarthy and McPhail 1998).

According to many scholars, this aggressive and violent era of protest policing was short-lived. In response to both the popular outrage generated by the behavior of the police and to the immense political pressure that emerged from various communities throughout the U.S., it is argued that by the 1970s, American law enforcement organizations underwent a dramatic shift in how they treated protesters (e.g., McPhail et al. 1998; McCarthy and McPhail 1998). These changes were profound for they provided citizens with guarantees that police response to protest would be less aggressive and violent. In addition to this, the police received extensive training on how to deal with protesters in a non-aggressive manner and a permit system was instituted, which guaranteed dissidents a space within which they could protest and allowed authorities advance warning about exactly what was going to happen at a given protest event (McPhail et al.

1998).<sup>1</sup> Together, these changes have led scholars to refer to this later era of protest policing as the period of “Negotiated Management” (e.g., McPhail et al. 1998; McCarthy and McPhail 1998).

Despite consensus among social movement scholars about the transition from Escalated Force to Negotiated Management, these claims do not follow straightforwardly from the broader sociological and political science literature. Indeed, research concerned with state social control suggests that the coercive efforts of authorities against those within their territorial jurisdiction have increased (and not decreased) in frequency and severity over this same period. For example, although not focused exclusively on protest policing, Jacobs and Carmichael (2001), Sutton (2000), Beckett and Sasson (2000), and Western and Beckett (1999), point to the fact that imprisonment and incarceration rates in the U.S. have increased significantly since the early 1970s, while Jacobs and Helms (1999) identify the dramatic increases in money spent on corrections.<sup>2</sup> More directly relevant to the protest policing literature identified above, Jacobs and Britt (1979) and Jacobs and O’Brien (1998) focus on the increased use of deadly force by police against ordinary citizens. Finally, Kraska and Kappeler (1997) document the rise in police paramilitary units in local police forces between the late 1960s and the mid 1990s, noting that the original purpose of these units was to control public protest. Taken together, these broad increases in state social control and paramilitarization call into question the accepted wisdom of

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<sup>1</sup> The creation of a permit system was particularly important because it addressed a common factor associated with earlier police outbursts of repressive activity: surprise and a lack of preparedness.

<sup>2</sup> This dramatic expansion of the U.S. criminal justice system was not caused by increases in crime or increases in the severity of crime. In fact, most data indicate that while crime rates have fluctuated, the various indicators of social control have increased rather steadily (see discussion in Beckett and Sasson 2000, Chapter 2).

social movement scholars who argue that the policing of protest has declined markedly since the 1960s (or at the very least, they call for a thorough empirical investigation into this claim).

We introduce a third account and explanation of U.S. protest policing over the last three decades. Rather than emphasize the broad institutional practices (e.g., police training, legal changes, changes in social control) that have either contained or unleashed police aggressiveness, our approach is to draw on research in political science and sociology (e.g., Walter 1969; Dallin and Breslauer 1970; Davenport 1995; Davenport et al. 2003; Earl and Soule 2006), which focuses on police response to *threat* at protest events. Specifically, we maintain that police respond to protest between 1960 and 1990 as they always have, increasing or decreasing the level of aggressiveness in accordance to the level of behavioral threat that they are confronted with at protest events. According to our argument, to understand trends in policing one needs to pay close attention to the ways in which citizens engage in political challenges and how features of these challenges are perceived by state agents responsible for controlling citizens. While there may be some general effect of changing institutional factors, the essence of protest policing is really determined by facets of protest events. Specifically, we argue that police response in most situations is proportional to the level of threat encountered.

This paper examines a database compiled by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Sarah Soule, and Susan Olzak from newspaper accounts of protest events on approximately 15,000 public protest events in the U.S. over a 31-year period (1960-1990) in an effort to evaluate which of these accounts best characterizes police response to protest. We begin with a discussion of the accepted wisdom of de-escalation in protest policing that characterizes the transition from Escalated Force to Negotiated Management. Next, we discuss the state social control literature, which suggests instead that there is a general trend of escalation of strategies employed by police

against citizens. Following this, we describe our alternative account of protest policing over this period, which focuses on the behavioral threats posed by protesters at public protest events. After presenting our data, methodological techniques and statistical findings, we conclude with a discussion of the implications of our research for the study of protest policing and social movements, in particular, and social control, in general.

### **UNDERSTANDING U.S. PROTEST POLICING, 1960-1990**

From the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century through the 1970s, the police in the United States held significant discretionary power over how to deal with the protest (demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, riots and armed attacks). During this period, police used intimidation, tear gas, beatings, raids, mass arrests, and physical and electronic surveillance to control protest, largely with impunity (Donner 1990; Earl 2003; Goldstein 1978). Accordingly, researchers (McPhail et al. 1998: 51) have referred to this approach as the Escalated Force model – a strategy denoted by five distinct characteristics, the last two of which are the focus of this research (*italics ours*):

- 1) Limited concern with the First Amendment rights of protestors and police obligation to respect and protect those rights;
- 2) Limited tolerance for community disruption;
- 3) Limited communication between police and demonstrators;
- 4) *Extensive use of arrests as a method of managing demonstrators*; and,
- 5) *Extensive use of force in order to control demonstrators*.

What happened in the U.S. after this period of Escalated Force is unclear. In the social movements literature, the accepted wisdom is that, with the transition to Negotiated Management, policing became much less aggressive and arrests became less extensive. But, this characterization runs counter to the broader social control literature, which implicitly suggests

that arrests and police use of force such as beatings increased. Each of these arguments is discussed in turn, followed by a discussion of an alternative characterization, that of proportional response of policing to protester threat.

### **The Velvet Glove and the De-Escalation of Protest Policing**

Most researchers and observers argue that the policing of demonstrators has diminished in severity since the late 1960s. In the wake of media disclosures, investigations and lawsuits regarding restrictions of civil liberties and violations of personal integrity enacted by federal, state and local authorities (McPhail et al. 1998: 57), governing officials established what is commonly referred to as “public forum and protest law” (Gora, Goldberg, Stern, and Halperin 1991; Snyder 1985). From these efforts a “Velvet Glove” was placed over the coercive hand of the state and a series of legal directives established clear designations for where, when and how citizens could engage in protest (e.g., obtaining permits, selecting an adequate location and securing police protection). Although a number of laws relevant to the topic were passed, scholars suggest that the most important were two federal legal decisions handed down in 1969: *Brandenburg v. Ohio* and *Watts v. United States* (McPhail et al. 1998: 58).

Following these changes in legal constraints, policing organizations engaged in a substantive revision of how they approached dissent, moving away from aggression and violence toward a more peaceful and “negotiated” style. In this approach there was greater interaction between police and protestors, greater management of protest events and, subsequently, fewer arrests as well as fewer instances of pepper spraying, beatings, choke holds and shootings – because they would not be deemed necessary as the event had been “controlled” or acceptable as the law/norms had changed (McCarthy and McPhail 1998; McPhail et al. 1998; Soule and Earl 2005). Of course, this is not to say that these activities never took place; rather, it is to say that

they would be viewed as a method of last resort and that, in general, their frequency of use would decline following the late 1960s.

The modifications in policing undertaken after the legal and institutional changes are believed to be so dramatic that the post-1969 period is generally thought of as the “détente” period between those who engage in protest and those who police them – a pattern that is believed to have persisted for nearly 3 decades. This is not just conjecture. Drawing on data collected by a prominent group of social movement scholars in sociology (Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Sarah Soule, and Susan Olzak, described in detail below), Figure 1 shows some preliminary support for this hypothesis. Over the 1960-1990 period, aggressive policing of protest (defined as police use of force and/or violence) has generally declined (also see Soule and Earl 2005). There is a slight increase in the early 1980s, but generally the figure lends support to the de-escalation argument outlined above.

[Figure 1 About Here]

Other evidence also lends some support to the de-escalation argument but is not as definitive. For example, when we examine the yearly number of arrests at protest events (again, using the same database), we see that there are fewer arrests made at public protest events in later years than there were in earlier years.

[Figure 2 About Here]

On a preliminary basis, it seems reasonable to argue that social movement scholars are absolutely right in arguing that the policing of protest qualitatively changed in (or around) 1969, from a period of Escalated Force (characterized by a lot of arrests and police violence) to one of Negotiated Management (characterized by comparatively fewer arrests and less violence). From this, we derive our first hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 1: After 1969, arrests and violent protest policing in the U.S. decrease.*

### **The Iron Fist and the Escalation of State Social Control**

While the conventional understanding of U.S. protest policing during the 1960-1990 era is plausible, it is not the only possibility. The essence of the transition from Escalated Force to Negotiated Management is explained by a fundamental shift in the law and corresponding standard operating procedures of the police in response to protest. A different and equally plausible argument emerging from the broader sociological and political science literatures suggest that aggressive policing (the “Iron Fist”) continues and even grows as it becomes institutionalized within police organizations.

For example, one of the main developments within policing during the 1960-1990 period was the creation and utilization of distinct police units for different purposes. One set of police organizations that have been largely ignored by scholars of protest policing are police paramilitary units (PPUs).<sup>3</sup> Formed during the late 1960s and early 1970s, in part to respond to civil disorders (Kraska and Kappeler 1997),<sup>4</sup> the presence of these units has exploded with nearly 90% of all police departments adopting them (Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Booth 1997). The

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<sup>3</sup> But see Jefferson (1990) and Waddington (1993) for a discussion about PPU in the British context. While both scholars acknowledge the dramatic increase in PPU in Britain, Waddington (1993) argues that the organization and special training of this type of officer leads to a decrease in violence associated with rogue policing, whereas Jefferson (1990) argues that the increase in PPU has led to an increase in police violence.

<sup>4</sup> PPU also respond to terrorism, hostage situations and other events in which “heavy weapons units” are needed, such as some drug related activities (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). A related line in the literature argues that when the threat of communism declined, the U.S. began to focus state activity on domestic crime, thereby increasing the size and strength of the “criminal justice-industrial complex” (Christie 1994).

growth of PPU is important because the presence of such units facilitates (and potentially even calls for) their use within situations of political dissent. Thus, studies have shown that not only have PPUs increased in number in the U.S., but the number of times they are called upon has also increased (Kraska and Kappeler 1997). This has effectively “paramilitarized” local police forces over the same period that social movement scholars argue that protest policing became ‘kinder and gentler.’

The general trends here are interesting as they mirror broader patterns within the social control literature, which stipulates that across a wide variety of indicators, the United States is systematically becoming more aggressive with regard to how citizens are treated by the police. Perhaps the most frequently cited information is that the incarceration rate in the U.S. (defined as the rate of incarceration in federal and state prisons at the end of each year) has grown dramatically over the period in question (e.g., Jacobs and Carmichael 2001; Sutton 2000; Beckett and Sasson 2000; Western and Beckett 1999). Figure 3 shows data from the National Prisoners Statistics Program, and indicates that incarceration rates in the U.S. have increased over this period.

[Figure 3 About Here]

Related to this point, others have examined U.S. criminal justice expenditures, pointing to the increases in money spent on the criminal justice system over the 1960-1990 period (e.g., Jacobs and Helms 1999).<sup>5</sup> Still others have focused on the growth of police force size (Jacobs 1979), which has increased over the period of interest to this study.

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<sup>5</sup> For example, the U.S. spent less than 20 billion dollars on its criminal justice system in 1975 and close to 100 billion in 1993 (Beckett and Sasson 2000).

Given this discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude that there may have been an increase in aggressive protest policing over the last three decades – a trend mirroring the broader increases in state social control. Thus, we offer a second hypothesis, which is an alternative to Hypothesis 1 above:

*Hypothesis 2: After 1969, arrests and forceful protest policing in the U.S. increase.*<sup>6</sup>

### **The Even Hand and Proportional Response**

We introduce a third possibility for describing and explaining trends in the policing of protest over the 1960-1990 period. While both the de-escalation and escalation arguments focus on dynamics within government institutions (prompted by law and changes in police units, respectively), our research attempts to reinsert the character of protest itself back into the discussion. Specifically, drawing on a long tradition in political science and sociology commonly referred to as the “conflict-repression nexus” (e.g., Hibbs 1973; Lichbach 1987; Davenport 1995; Moore 1998; 2000; Earl et al. 2003; Shellman 2007), we maintain that state coercive behavior is responsive to the manifestation of *threat* present within the behavioral challenges directed against government authorities; the more threatening the protest is to state agents (and citizens), the more aggressive the coercive response of the state agents will be.

This approach is consistent with older approaches to state repression (Davenport 1995). It is also consistent with more recent approaches to protest policing (e.g., Earl and Soule 2006),

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<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that while there is no specific event or set of events in 1969 like those legal changes described above with regard to the de-escalation argument, there is a fundamental (but more gradual) shift that occurs over time, which directly corresponds with this temporal designation. That is, beginning in the late 1960s and continuing through the 1970s and 1980s, there was an unprecedented growth of paramilitary units in local police departments (Kraska and Kappeler 1997:6).

which have argued for the importance of understanding the threats to police that are sometimes posed by protesters at public protest events. In their “Blue Approach” to understanding protest policing, Earl and Soule (2006) point out that socio-legal scholars have long argued that one important concern to police is the “loss of control” of a given interaction with citizens (e.g., when there are a lot of protesters present, when protesters use violence, when counterdemonstrators are present, and when protesters damage property). Thus while political elites may be concerned with “diffuse” threats of dissidents (e.g., articulating revolutionary goals), police are concerned with the “situational” threats posed by dissidents at protest events.<sup>7</sup>

The logic underlying this position of proportional responsiveness is depicted in the following figure from a website for law enforcement training,<sup>8</sup> which identifies exactly how police officers are expected to respond to the activities of a subject, in our case a protester at a public protest event. Note the near perfect correspondence between subject and police behavior; verbal threats lead to verbal commands/announcements, non-threatening physical activities lead to non-lethal holds/restraints and lethal threats lead to lethal responses.

[Figure 4 About Here]

This proportional response argument (the “Even Hand”) is important because we believe that the protest policing literature has mistaken a decrease in *occurrence* of aggressive policing with a decrease in *opportunity* for aggressive policing. For example, after 1969, there was a decrease in the frequency of protest (Soule and Earl 2005), as social movements were effectively repressed

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<sup>7</sup> This approach is also consistent with certain arguments in the broader policing literature, which argue that violence by civilians begets violence by police. This line of reasoning underlies the “community violence perspective,” the “reactive hypothesis,” and the “danger perception theory” (see review in MacDonald, Kaminski, Alpert, and Tennenbaum 2001).

<sup>8</sup> The relevant URL is as follows: <http://www.tacticalselfdefense.com/>; the site was accessed on February 7, 2007.

(e.g., Goldstein 1978; Donner 1990; Cunningham 2004), the protesting population aged (e.g., Demerath, Marwell, and Aiken 1971; Jennings and Niemi 1981; Fendrich 1993), and efforts were made to accommodate the grievances of those protesting (e.g., Lipset and Marx 2001; Gamson 1975). Figure 5 shows the yearly number of protest events in the U.S. and indicates an overall decline in protest, suggesting the possibility that a decrease in the occurrence of aggressive policing may, in fact, be due to fewer opportunities for protest policing.

[Figure 5 About Here]

Does the proportion of aggressive protest policing decline, however, relative to non-aggressive policing when we consider the level of threat posed by protesters? We feel that this is a more appropriate question, albeit a more complicated one. When asked, it compels one to rethink the de-escalation argument, bringing in elements of the escalation thesis. For example, it may be the case that aggressive protest policing generally declines as a function of altered laws, training and dispositions, but that the “paramilitarization” of the police increases the use of aggressive behavior whenever threatening dissident activity takes place.<sup>9</sup> From this, we derive the following hypothesis:

*Hypothesis 3: The odds of arrests and forceful protest policing increase as threat increases.*

In addition to this, we explore the possibility that the trends identified by the escalation and de-escalation arguments (Hypotheses 1 and 2 above) interact with our emphasis on threat. Specifically, we offer two alternative hypotheses regarding changes in police aggressiveness in response to threat over time:

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<sup>9</sup> Below we describe in detail what constitutes “threat.” For now, protest is “threatening” when the number of participants is large, when property is destroyed, when protesters use confrontational tactics, when counterdemonstrators are present, when protesters use multiple tactics, and when the government is targeted.

*Hypothesis 4a (De-Escalation): After 1969, arrests and forceful protest policing decrease as threat increases.*

*Hypothesis 4b (Escalation): After 1969, arrests and forceful protest policing increase as threat increases.*

Hypothesis 4a suggests that the legal changes and training of police organizations causes them to reduce their use of aggression, despite sometimes confronting threatening protest events. This represents the strongest possible test of the argument of de-escalation. Support for this hypothesis would indicate that the transition to Negotiated Management following 1969 has been thorough and that, even when confronted with highly threatening protester behavior, police will respond with “velvet gloves.”

Hypothesis 4b, suggests that the paramilitarization of police organizations and overall increases in social control causes police to increase their use of aggression when they are confronted with threatening protest events. Support for this hypothesis would indicate that despite legal changes and training of police officers in protest management, when police are threatened they will respond with an “iron fist” and will do so increasingly after 1969, with the rise of paramilitary units in local police forces and the overall increase in state social control.

In the next section, we describe our data and methodological techniques for evaluating these various hypotheses about the protest policing in the U.S.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

### **Data Source: The Dynamics of Collective Action, 1960-1990**

The unit of analysis in this paper is the *protest event* (or “*events*”), which is defined as any type of activity that involves more than one person and is carried out with the explicit purpose of articulating a grievance against a target, or expressing support of a target. While the larger project from which we draw collected information on a variety of different forms of action

used at protest events, we focus our attention on the set of events which might possibly draw police action. These are: rallies, demonstrations, marches, vigils, picketing, civil disobedience, ceremonial events, motorcades, dramaturgical demonstrations, symbolic displays, riots, mob violence, ethnic conflicts, and attacks.<sup>10</sup>

Data on these events were drawn from daily editions of the *New York Times* (NYT) between 1960 and 1990. Newspaper data on collective action events is one of the most widely used forms of data used by social movement scholars and there is a vast literature designed to uncover potential biases of this data source. Since these potential biases are reviewed elsewhere in depth, we do not reiterate these here, but instead direct interested readers to the bibliographies of Earl et al. (2004), Oliver and Myers (1999), and Oliver and Maney (2000). For more in-depth discussions of the procedures employed by the creators of the dataset employed here we refer readers to Earl et al. (2003), Soule and Earl (2005), Earl and Soule (2006), Van Dyke et al. (2004) and McAdam and Su (2002).

For a particular protest event to be included in the dataset, it must meet three basic criteria. First, there must be more than one participant at the event. Thus, acts of protest carried out by individuals, such as uncoordinated hunger strikes or acts of self-immolation, are not included. Second, participants at an event must articulate some *claim*, whether this be a grievance against some target or an expression of support of some target. The events in the dataset are associated with *any* claim or issue area articulated by participants (in other words,

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<sup>10</sup> The other major event forms that were coded in the larger project, but not included in the analysis here, are: petitioning, tabling, boycotts, legal actions, and press conferences. Note that if these forms were used in conjunction with another form from the list above, they were included in our analysis.

these are not specific to a particular movement or set of movements).<sup>11</sup> While claims can often be grouped into distinct “social movements” or “issue areas,” the coding team did not attempt to do this a priori. Because the protest required an event to articulate some claim, they did not code such collective events as block parties, annual parades, and fund-raising campaigns.<sup>12</sup> The event must have happened in the *public sphere* or have been open to the public for the coding team to include it in their dataset. Thus, private or closed meetings by social movement actors are not included, but events within organizations (e.g., schools, churches, private organizations) are included *if* they were open to the public.<sup>13</sup> Finally, these events occurred all over the U.S.<sup>14</sup>

As designed, data were collected in two distinct stages. First, researchers read each and every page of each and every daily issue of the NYT “scanning” for any mention of protest events. By avoiding the use of an index to the NYT, they were able to find events that were

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<sup>11</sup> The project coded events associated with both sides of each claim or issue area. For example, they coded both pro-choice and anti-abortion events. In all, they coded over 160 different claims articulated over this period (available from the second author).

<sup>12</sup> Note that if a block party turned into a demonstration in which participants articulated some claim, this would be coded.

<sup>13</sup> The data cannot speak to changes in protest that takes place outside of the public sphere, such as changes in movements that develop within corporations. As well, the dataset does not include organized labor events (e.g., work stoppages, strikes) because the dynamics of labor events are likely different from the rest of the protest sector. Note that if an organized labor event morphed into a public protest event, it would be coded as a distinct event, however.

<sup>14</sup> Because the data source is the NYT, the possibility of a regional bias in the data is worth noting (Earl et al. 2004). However, since we are not making claims about differences in policing across regions, this does not affect the paper at hand.

embedded in articles on other (often related) topics. For example, protest events by tenants were found embedded in more general articles on the rising cost of housing. It is likely that such events would *not* be indexed under headings such as, “protest” or “demonstration.” As a result, the project’s strategy nets a greater number of events than other strategies. The second stage of data collection involved the content coding of each event, noting that a single article can discuss multiple events. Project personnel coded information on a variety of different topics, including the claim or issue area articulated at the event, event size and location, the initiating group(s), targets of the event, organizational presence, tactical forms employed, and police presence and action taken by these actors at the event. Intercoder reliability estimates for most items on the codesheet were consistently at or above 90% agreement. In all, there are 15,076 collective events occurring in the U.S. between 1960 and 1990.<sup>15</sup>

### **Dependent Variables**

In the analysis presented below, we are interested in accounting for the probability of two different forms of protest policing during the 1960-1990 period at a given event. As noted by Earl et al. (2003), much of the literature on the policing of protest has examined policing in a dichotomous fashion – that is, police either show up at a protest event or they do not. Similar to this research, we recognize that police have a wide array of options once present at a protest event, some more aggressive than others. For our purposes, we focus on two aspects of police behavior: the occurrence of arrests and the use physical force (e.g., pushing, shoving, hitting and beating) and/or violence (e.g., use of guns, tear gas, and other forms of equipment to control

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<sup>15</sup> Note that in some of the statistical analysis presented in Table 1 and Table 2 (below), there are somewhat fewer cases due to missing data on one or more variable. The full database covers over 20,000 events but this is because it includes events using tactical forms that we exclude (see earlier footnote).

protesters at the event). Over the entire period, in 22% of the events, arrests were made and 13% of the public protest events were met with force and/or violence.<sup>16</sup> We examine both of these policing strategies separately below. Descriptive statistics on these, and all of our independent variables, are presented in Appendix A.

### **Independent Variables**

The first independent variable we include below is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 for events that took place after 1969. We include this variable because of the significance of this year to the de-escalation and escalation arguments outlined above in Hypotheses 1 and 2. Supporting the former, the post-1969 period is especially interesting because of the two federal legal decisions handed down in 1969 (*Brandenburg v. Ohio* and *Watts v. United States*), which protected the right to protest (McPhail et al. 1998: 58). As well, we wanted to capture the post-Kerner Commission era and also the era in which civilian police officers were trained in SEADOC.<sup>17</sup>

The conventional understanding of de-escalation suggests that the likelihood of arrests as

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<sup>16</sup> Despite being identified by McPhail et al. (1998: 51) as a dimension of protest policing worthy of attention, we do not focus on arrests as a method of managing demonstrators. Essentially, this is for two reasons. First, the use of force and violence is the most egregious form of state power that can be exercised, agreed upon by both international and domestic law. To highlight this form of behavior is thus extremely important. Second, arrests are legally supported forms of police action both before and after the shift in protest policing noted in the literature. As a result, this makes the detection of any changes in behavior extremely complex. What we offer therefore is a critical but limited test of the negotiated policing argument.

<sup>17</sup> SEADOC I (Civil Disorder Orientation Course) was launched in February 1968 by the U.S. Government and was designed to educate and train police officers. In 1969, it was canceled and redesigned to address the policing of public disorder evolving out of civil disobedience associated with the Civil Rights and Antiwar Movements (see McCarthy and McPhail 1998; McPhail et al. 1998 for more discussion).

well as use of police force/violence will be higher prior to 1969 or 1970 and will decrease afterward, as the norm of protest policing switched from Escalated Force to Negotiated Management. In contrast, the escalation and social control arguments predict just the opposite; that is, following the late 1960s, we ought to see an increase in arrests as well as police force/violence.

In the models presented below we also include 7 different measures designed to tap the level of threat presented by the protest event to authorities. These measures of threat are included in our models to test Hypothesis 3 above.<sup>18</sup>

The first of our threat measures is designed to tap the radical nature of protest during our period. As we note above, several scholars argue that protesters pursuing radical or revolutionary goals will be considered more threatening to state authorities, thus will be more likely to be policed aggressively than more moderate protesters or protesters that are “accepted” by the polity (Bromley and Shupe 1983; Davenport 1995; Gamson 1975; McAdam 1982; Tilly 1978; Wisler and Guigni 1999). Drawing on the distinction made between “Old” and “New” social movements, we measure the extent to which a radical or revolutionary goal was articulated at an event by the *target* of the particular protest.<sup>19</sup> In particular, we argue that any event that

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<sup>18</sup> Note that data on all of these are drawn directly from the news articles on the protest events as described above.

<sup>19</sup> This strategy differs from that of Earl et al. (2003) who code “radical goals” by the presence of very specific claims judged by the research team to be radical in nature. While this is certainly a reasonable method for the shorter time period studied by these scholars, over the course of the 31-year period examined here, many claims once thought to be radical in nature, become less so. For example, claims of women’s liberation were once thought to be radical, but by 1990 would likely not be considered so. Thus we decided to consider any event that targets the government to be radical or revolutionary.

*explicitly* targets the state might rightly be considered to be radical in nature. As designed, this is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 when the event explicitly targeted any level (e.g., city, county, state, federal) and any branch (e.g., legislative, judicial, administrative) of the U.S. government.

A second distinct aspect of the threat posed by an event is its size (Tilly 1978; Earl et al. 2003). Thus, we include a measure of the size of the protest event (number of participants, logged). The logic here is that larger events are more threatening to police because they identify a larger number of aggrieved individuals, they are more difficult to control, they present more opportunities for violation of laws, and harbor a greater potential to harm police officers present at the event. In our dataset, a specific number of protesters was reported in the news article for about 51% of the events. In the remaining 49% of the events, coders were asked to estimate the number of protesters based on verbal cues in the article (e.g., “small,” “few,” or “handful” of protesters were estimated to be in category 1).<sup>20</sup> For events in which there was *not* a specific number reported, researchers imputed a number by choosing the mid-point of each category. In our dataset, the average size of all protest events in the 1960-1990 period was 1,533 participants.<sup>21</sup>

We also include four aspects of the behavioral challenge presented by protesters. The first of these is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when protesters used *extremely confrontational tactics* (such as attacks, riots, melees, and/or mob violence). Between 1960 and 1990, protesters used such tactics at 16% of events. The second of these is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when

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<sup>20</sup> The specific categories are as follows: category 1 = less than 10, category 2 = 10-49, category 3 = 50-99, category 4 = 100-999, category 5 = 1,000-9,999, and category 6 = over 10,000 participants.

<sup>21</sup> As a robustness check, we ran the analyses presented below on two different sets of events: those for which the number of participants was reported in the news article and those for which coders estimated the number of participants. The pattern of results was the same on both sets and was as presented below.

protesters employed *less confrontational tactics* (such as civil disobedience, demonstrations, and rallies). Protesters used such tactics in 71% of events in this period. The third measure of the behavioral threat presented by protesters is a dichotomous variable coded 1 when protesters damaged property at an event. Over this period, protesters damaged property at about 10% of the events. Our last measure of the behavioral challenge of protesters is a measure of tactical variety, which ranges from 1 to 4 and is a count of the number of different protest tactics used by protesters. We include this measure because it has been shown that policing of fewer tactics is easier than policing of multiple tactics (Davenport 1995). When greater numbers of tactics are used, authorities are confronted with a more complex scenario, and are forced to improvise and employ personnel with greater variation in training/preparation – dynamics which frequently lead to greater levels of police aggression.

A seventh and final threat measure is a dichotomous variable that is coded 1 when there were counterdemonstrators present at the event. We include this variable because research shows that the presence of counterdemonstrators increases the probability of conflict at an event and therefore increases the level of threat to police agents (Waddington 1994; Earl and Soule 2006). Over this period, 6% of events had counterdemonstrators present.

Finally, in an effort to gauge temporal shifts in how these different threat measures influence the deployment of aggressive policing (exploring Hypotheses 4a and 4b above), we include an interaction term between each threat variable and our post-1969 period variable. This is the most direct way to examine changes in the effects of these measures between the pre- and

post-1969 period as outlined above.<sup>22</sup>

### **Estimation Technique**

In line with our interest in exploring 2 different aspects of protest policing (arrests and force/violence), we use logistic regression analysis, which is the appropriate method to use with dichotomous dependent variables. This model is nonlinear and is expressed as:

$$P = \frac{\exp(x_j\beta)}{1 + \exp(x_j\beta)},$$

where  $P$  = the probability of aggressive policing of protest events (as described above),  $x$  is the set of covariates, and  $\beta$  is the set of coefficients (see Stata Corporation 1999: 224). Coefficient estimates were obtained through the “logit” routine in Stata (Version 9.0). However, as Long and Freese (2001: 145) note, the interpretation of logistic regression coefficients can have “little substantive meaning for most people.” Thus, we present the odds ratios instead. The odds ratio is the odds of observing a police use of physical force and/or violence or arrests at a given event versus not observing these strategies. An odds ratio for a particular independent variable with a value *higher* than 1 indicates an *increase* in the odds associated with a one unit increase in the particular explanatory variable. An odds ratio for a particular independent variable *between* 0 and 1, indicates a *decrease* in the odds associated with a one unit increase in the particular explanatory variable.

In the models, we cluster observations by the year in which the event took place, to allow us to assume that events are independent across years, but not necessarily within them. By

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<sup>22</sup> It would be interesting to include measures of police organization as Earl and Soule (2006) do, however since these are national-level data, it would be insurmountable to track local level characteristics of police organizations throughout the country.

clustering observations by year Stata calculates the robust standard errors (also referred to as the Huber/White or sandwich estimates), thus allowing for more conservative estimation of our models.

## **RESULTS**

As designed, our research attempts to answer three distinct questions: 1) does escalation or de-escalation better characterize the post-1969 period, 2) does dissident threat to police outweigh the importance of the escalation or de-escalation, and 3) does an interaction between dissident threat and the escalation/de-escalation trend help us understand the dynamics of protest policing in the U.S.? Each of these questions is addressed below for the two different dependent variables described above, the occurrence of arrests and the occurrence of police force and/or violence at a given event.

### **Arrests**

Table 1 presents the results of logistic regression models predicting the presence of arrests at public protest events in the U.S. between 1960-1990. Across all models in this table, the odds ratio on the post-1969 dummy variable is less than 1, indicating that in the period following 1969, arrests were less likely to occur at protest events. For example, in model 1, the predicted probability of arrests occurring in the 1969-69 period was .26, while it was .19 in the 1970-1990 era. This directly supports the de-escalation (or transition from Escalated Force to Negotiated Management) argument.

[Table 1 About Here]

When we incorporate the seven measures of threat into the model (model 2), the influence of time is still negative; that is, police are less likely to arrest protesters after 1969. At the same time, we see that most aspects of behavioral threat increase the likelihood of arrest. For

example, when protesters engage in riots, attacks, mob violence and melees, police are much more likely to arrest them. In model 2, the predicted probability of arrests when protesters used these extremely confrontational tactics was .41, while it was only .14 when protesters did not use such tactics. In contrast, less confrontational tactics (e.g., demonstrations and pickets) are comparatively less likely to lead to arrests; the predicted probability of arrest is .22 when protesters used less confrontational tactics. Similarly, when protesters damaged property, the police were more likely to arrest individuals (the predicted probability of arrests is .45 when property was damaged vs. .15 when no property was damaged). With respect to the variety of tactics used, when protesters used only once tactic, the predicted probability of arrest was .14. This increases in .56 when protesters used 4 different tactics. Finally, counterdemonstrator presence also increases the probability of arrests, per our expectations. These findings directly support arguments about the proportional response of police to dissident behavior; that is, when protesters pose a threat to police, arrests are likely.

Interestingly, we find that the number of participants decreases the likelihood of arrest, contrary to our threat argument. Larger crowds are thus less apt to prompt authorities to manage them through arrest, perhaps because of the logistic difficulties of mass arrests. Also interesting is the fact that advocating radical goals has no influence on the occurrence of arrests; police are just as likely to do nothing as they are to arrest individuals when revolutionary goals are espoused by protesters. This indicates that diffuse threats (e.g., revolutionary goals) are less apt to prompt arrests than are more situational threats (for an elaboration of different kinds of threat, see Davenport 1995 and Earl and Soule 2006).

In the third model, we introduce statistical interactions of our threat variables and our dummy variable for time. When we do this, we find (again) that the odds of arrests are lower

after 1969 (the odds ratio is less than 1 in model 3 as it was in the previous models). As well, we find that the same threat variables yield positive and statistically significant influences as described above. We also find that of our interaction terms, only one is significant: the interaction of the use of a variety of different protest tactics and our dummy variable for time. Specifically, this indicates that while it is always the case that arrests are more likely when protesters used a variety of different tactics, the odds of arrests when a variety of tactics are employed are higher in the pre-1969 period.

What do we make of the fact that this is the only interaction term that is statistically significant? Essentially, this means that the other indicators of threat are equally likely to lead to arrests before and after 1969, even though (as noted above) the odds of arrests are generally lower after 1969. Thus, with respect to arrests at public protest events, Table 1 shows some support for the de-escalation argument and general support for arguments about proportional response. Will this general pattern hold true for the second form of policing that we examine, forceful policing as indicated by police use of force and/or violence?

### **Police Use of Force/Violence**

Table 2 presents the results of logistic regression models predicting the presence of police force and/or violence at public protest events in the U.S. between 1960-1990. Across all models in this table, the odds ratio on the post-1969 dummy variable is less than 1, indicating that in the period following 1969, police force/violence was less likely to occur at protest events (as was the case with arrests). Once more, this supports the arguments of social movement scholars like McCarthy et al. (1998) who maintain that after the late 1960s, the legal guidelines that police were subject to and the training that they underwent fundamentally altered the way in which they dealt with those engaging in dissident behavior.

[Table 2 About Here]

Model 2 in Table 2 adds our seven measures of threat and indicates uniform support for the proportional response hypothesis (Hypothesis 3); in all cases, the odds of police force/violence are increased when protesters engage in threatening activity. For example, when protesters engage in extremely confrontational activity (e.g., riots, melees, conflicts, attacks), they are much more likely to be met with police force and violence. The predicted probability of police force/violence is .29 when these tactics are used and .05 when they are not. These probabilities are actually similar to those generated by protesters damaging property; the predicted probability of police force/violence was .30 when property damage occurred, vs. .06 when it did not. The other five threat variables increase the odds of police force/violence in about the same manner (see model 2). Thus, the odds of police force and/or violence are also increased when protesters engage in less confrontational tactics (e.g., rallies and demonstrations), when counterdemonstrators are present, when protestors espouse radical goals, when they use a variety of tactics, and when the number of participants is high. In other words, these findings lend general support to the de-escalation argument, but also suggest that the proportional response argument ought not to be ignored, since it is obvious that changes over time are only part of the story.

Finally, model 3 includes interaction terms for various threat measures and the dummy variable for the post-1969 period. This model shows that the above findings hold true; that is, while there is a general decrease in the odds of police force/violence following 1969, when protesters engage in threatening behavior, they are likely to be met with police force and/or violence. However, as was the case with arrests, only one of the interaction terms was significant. In this case, it is the interaction of extremely confrontational tactics and the post-

1969 dummy variable. This suggests that the use of riots, attacks and melees was less likely to be met with police force and/or violence in the post-1969 period, lending support to the de-escalation arguments, at least with respect to this set of protester tactics. With respect to police use of force and/or violence at public protest events, therefore, as we showed with arrests, Table 2 reveals some support for the de-escalation argument but general support for proportionality.

## CONCLUSION

We began this paper with the general goal of assessing the veracity of the claim that protest policing in the U.S. has become less severe in the post 1960s era. According to this claim, in the wake of the 1960s, the legal system and training procedures relevant to protest policing have led the coercive hand of the police to be covered with a “velvet glove.” We contrasted this portrayal with one derived from the social control literature, which argues that since the late 1960s, social control has escalated in the U.S., as characterized by increasing incarceration rates, increasing spending on policing, and increasingly dominant paramilitary styles of policing (and growth of paramilitary units in local police forces). In short, this alternative portrays the coercive hand of the police to be more of an “iron fist,” whereby protest policing has become more severe since the late 1960s. We described a third alternative; that is, that an adequate investigation of protest policing must be sensitive to the character of the protest event and especially to the level of threat posed by protesters to police. We noted that this third alternative considers the “even hand” approach of police; that is, their response is (and was throughout the entire period of observation) proportional to the level of threat posed by the behaviors of protesters.

Investigating over 15,000 protest events between 1960 and 1990 associated with a variety of different social movements, our research shows that in general, arrests and police use of force/violence are lower after 1969, as predicted by the de-escalation argument. While somewhat unequivocal, by far the greater predictor of arrests and police force/violence is the level of threat posed by protesters at a given protest event, as predicted by the proportional response argument. Taken together, these findings indicate that the odds of arrests and police force/violence were impacted much more by threatening behavior of protesters than by any generic changes in policing and police strategies over time driven by broad-scale institutional changes.<sup>23</sup>

Importantly, these findings suggest a decoupling between general legal changes and philosophies of police training, on the one hand, and the specific police-protester interactions, on the other hand. Specifically, while the de-escalation literature is quite useful in giving us a sense of the broad landscape of police response to protesters based on what their training was and based on how the legal system portends to treat protesters and their right to free speech, it cannot predict precisely how police will behave in a given protest situation. Instead, the behaviors employed by protesters and the level of threat they pose are greater predictors of police response.

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<sup>23</sup> While the patterns revealed in Tables 1 and 2 are similar, there are four notable differences that merit additional attention. First, protester use of radical goals did not increase the odds of arrest, but did increase the odds of police force/violence. These findings suggest that while authorities are no more likely to arrest protesters that targeted the government, they are more likely to beat and tear gas them. Second, our research shows that while police were less likely to arrest individuals when the size of the protest was large, they were more likely to use force/violence in this situation. Third, when protesters engaged in rioting and attacks, police were very likely to respond in some manner, but especially with force and violence.



The results of this research are significant because threats and proportional response of police to protest are revealed to be the link between the two alternative portrayals of over time changes in how police respond to protesters. Specifically, aggressive protest policing (both arrests and force-based policing) is less likely after 1969. But, the explanation for this is not merely tied to changes in the legal system and in police training, but also to the type of protest that police confront. When challengers are non-threatening, the police avoid aggressive policing techniques and abide by their training. When, however, events are particularly large, tactically complex, especially confrontational, and so on, police respond with greater aggression.


The research here is not only important because it provides insight into historical patterns in protest policing, but because it also speaks to puzzles in the study of protest policing posed by recent events in the U.S. For example, while most looked at such events as the “Battle of Seattle” in 1999 and anti-WTO protests in Washington D.C. over the last few years as an end of the détente between police and protesters, our findings suggest a different interpretation. Given the greater responsiveness of police to threatening protest, it is clear that such incidents of aggressive policing do not necessarily represent a throwback to an earlier pattern. Indeed, if we are right, the only thing that had changed by the late 1990s was the manner in which protesters engaged in dissident activity. Both of these events were extremely large, were characterized by a diversity of tactics, and featured property damage – three of the factors found to significantly increase the likelihood of an aggressive police response. Thus, it is not so much that the police abandoned their philosophy of protecting protesters in favor of aggressively responding to them. Rather, it is likely that the features of these events were so threatening to police that they responded in a proportional manner – something that they have always done, regardless of the time period in question.

Another implication of our analysis is that it adds nuance to existing discussions of aggressive protest policing because we are able to analyze policing over a long period of time. Indeed, in order to properly understand how and why the police respond to protest, individuals should view trends that span several decades rather than shorter periods of time. This issue was raised by Davenport (1996) but has largely been ignored, in large part because of a lack of data. Adding an explicit consideration of time thus extends and enriches the “Blue Approach” advocated by Earl and Soule (2006) and further brings together distinct literatures (e.g., social movements, social control, criminology, and the conflict-repression nexus in political science).

Following this discussion, it seems reasonable to conclude with some concrete suggestions for future research. First, our analysis ends in 1990, but clearly an analysis of protest policing between 1991 and the present would be enlightening, especially because of some of the well-publicized events of aggressive policing discussed above. Does our speculation about the dynamics of police response to such events as the Battle of Seattle hold up to a systematic analysis such as we have conducted for the 1960-1990 era? Second, our research was conducted at the *event* level and predicted the occurrence of two different police strategies based on event characteristics and time. But, additional analysis should examine these general questions at other levels of analysis. For example, one might examine yearly or monthly or weekly counts of different policing strategies, introducing lags to examine how past policing strategies impact present ones (net of, and in combination with, protester threat). Third, one could examine the effects of various exogenous factors, such as the overall structure of political opportunities or public opinion, on police use of force and/or violence and arrests. As well, one might examine how these exogenous factors interact with protester-generated threat to affect policing. Perhaps it is the case that police respond in a less proportionate manner (or, in other words, they are more


tolerant of protester threat) when the political system is more open to protester claims? Last, but clearly not least, it is essential to explore what problems emerge when a political democracy experiences increasingly aggressive policing. Does aggressive policing necessarily weaken or undermine democracy, or are there situations in which such activities can strengthen democracy? On the flipside, can democracy be used to reverse trends in aggressive state response to protesters in non-democracies?






Source: *Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31*, National Prisoners Statistics Program (1981).

Figure 4 Proportional Response of Policing to Subject Actions



Source: <http://www.tacticalselfdefense.com/LE/MEB/chpr3.htm>, accessed February 7, 2007.

**Figure 5 Number of Protest Events in the US, 1960-1990**



**Table 1. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Models Predicting Arrests at Protest Events in the United States, 1960-1990. (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)**

	Model 1 Time Only	Model 2 Time and Threat	Model 3 Time and Threat Interactions
Post-1969 Dummy	.66*** (.07)	.74** (.07)	.55** (.11)
Number of Participants (log)		.93** (.02)	.96 (.03)
Property Damage by Demonstrators		2.25*** (.31)	2.37*** (.49)
Counter Demonstrators Present		1.48*** (.14)	1.42** (.26)
Less confrontational Tactics		2.56*** (.20)	2.26*** (.27)
Extremely Confrontational Tactics		3.97*** (.44)	3.68*** (.56)
Radical Goals		1.09 (.07)	1.15 (.11)
Tactical Variety		1.53*** (.09)	1.34*** (.10)
Number of Participants X Post-1969			.96 (.04)
Property Damage X Post-1969			.88 (.21)
Counter Demonstrators X Post-1969			1.14 (.23)
Radical goals X Post-1969			.91 (.11)
Tactical Variety X Post-1969			1.33* (.15)
Less confrontational Action X Post-1969			1.27 (.18)
Extremely Confrontational Action X Post-1969			1.14 (.24) (.15)
Cases	15,076	15,064	15,064
Model Log Likelihood	-7948.28	-7342.37	-7328.73

Notes: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$  (two-tailed test)

**Table 2. Odds Ratios from Logistic Regression Models Predicting Forceful Policing at Protest Events in the United States, 1960-1990. (Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses)**

	Model 1 Time Only	Model 2 Time and Threat	Model 3 Time and Threat Interactions
Post-1969 Dummy	.39*** (.06)	.40*** (.05)	.25* (.11)
Number of Participants (log)		1.15*** (.04)	1.13* (.05)
Property Damage by Demonstrators		2.19*** (.28)	2.17*** (.43)
Counter Demonstrators Present		1.86*** (.20)	1.71*** (.21)
Less confrontational Tactics		1.94*** (.14)	1.84*** (.17)
Extremely Confrontational Tactics		7.17*** (1.07)	5.62*** (1.23)
Radical Goals		1.44*** (.11)	1.46*** (.15)
Tactical Variety		1.42*** (.09)	1.46*** (.09)
Number of Participants X Post-1969			1.06 (.06)
Property Damage X Post-1969			1.09 (.24)
Counter Demonstrators X Post-1969			1.32 (.28)
Radical goals X Post-1969			.93 (.14)
Tactical Variety X Post-1969			.92 (.16)
Less confrontational Action X Post-1969			1.11 (.19)
Extremely Confrontational Action X Post-1969			1.79* (.44)
Cases	15,076	15,064	15,064
Model Log Likelihood	-5520.12	-4777.87	-4765.09

Notes: \*  $p < .05$ , \*\*  $p < .01$ , \*\*\*  $p < .001$  (two-tailed test)

## Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (n=15,076)

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	
1. Police Use of Force and/or Violence	.13	.33	1.0																
2. Arrests	.22	.41	.49*	1.0															
3. Post 1969	.54	.49	-.16*	-.09*	1.0														
4. Number of Participants at Event (log)	4.63	2.06	.08*	-.04*	.05*	1.0													
5. Protester Property Damage	.10	.30	.22*	.19*	-.06*	-.05*	1.0												
6. Counter Demonstrators at Event	.06	.24	.09*	.06*	-.09*	.06*	-.02*	1.0											
7. Stand. Confrontational Tactics	.71	.46	-.03*	.04*	-.05*	.16*	-.22*	.09*	1.0										
8. Ext. Confrontational Tactics	.16	.36	.26*	.2*	-.04*	-.14*	.46*	-.001	-.49*	1.0									
9. Government Target	.47	.50	.03*	-.005	-.002	.15*	-.08*	.009	.19*	-.18*	1.0								
10. Tactical Variety	1.23	.50	.15*	.15*	-.04*	.18*	.05*	.08*	.26*	.04*	.06*	1.0							
11. Number of Participants(log)*Post 1969	2.58	2.82	-.10*	-.09*	.83*	.46*	-.08*	-.06*	.03*	-.10*	.05*	.03*	1.0						
12. Property Damage*Post 1969	.05	.22	.09*	.09*	.21*	-.06*	.66*	-.04*	-.12*	.27*	-.03*	.03*	.12*	1.0					
13. Counter Demonstrators*Post 1969	.02	.15	.02*	.02*	.14*	.05*	-.03*	.59*	.05*	-.001	-.02*	.03*	.15*	-.004	1.0				
14. Government Target*Post-1969	.25	.44	-.07*	.05*	.53*	.12*	-.05*	-.07*	.07*	-.11*	.62*	.02*	.51*	.08*	.05*	1.0			
15. Tactical Variety*Post 1969	.66	.69	-.10*	-.01	.86*	.11*	-.02*	-.07*	.06*	-.02*	.02*	.31*	.77*	.21*	.14*	.49*	1.0		
16. Ext. Confront. Tactics*Post 1969	.08	.27	.11*	.09*	.27*	-.12*	.25*	-.02*	-.35*	.69*	-.10*	-.000	.13*	.43*	.04*	.02*	.24*	1.0	
17. Stand. Confront. Tactic*Post 1969	.37	.48	-.12*	-.03*	.70*	.14*	-.11*	-.04*	.50*	-.26*	.08*	.10*	.66*	.03*	.15*	.47*	.70*	-.13*	1.0

\* p < .05

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