

Part 2: Liberty, Anarchy, and the Balance of Powers: Explaining Alexander Hamilton's Ambivalent Federal- Republican Leadership

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In early 1802, just two and half years before his untimely death and fourteen years after helping to bring about the ratification of 1788, a despondent Hamilton complained to a trusted friend that “Perhaps no man in the United States has sacrificed or done more for the present Constitution than myself; and contrary to all my anticipations of its fate, as you know from the very beginning, I am still laboring to prop the frail and worthless fabric.”¹ This statement captures well one of the most interesting aspects of Hamilton’s constitutional leadership: the fact that he *did* labor so much to “prop” the Constitution that he thought in many ways woefully *inadequate*. That he qualified it as merely the “present” constitution and belittled it as “frail and worthless fabric” suggests he continued to be pessimistic about its long-term suitability even as he continued to labor on its behalf in the last years of his life. Although even careful scholars of Hamilton have tended to downplay or explain it away, the evidence suggests that, after a brief stint of quasi-republican enthusiasm in the early years of the revolution, Hamilton never wavered from a strong preference for a unitary national (i.e. continental in scope) state modeled after the English mixed constitution at the heart of which would be an hereditary monarch. This was most plainly on display over a four day period at the Constitutional convention during which he “acknowledged himself not to think favorably of republican government,”² suggested “great economy might be obtained” by extinguishing the States in exchange for a unitary “General Government,”³ and professed to believe “the British government is the best in the world; and that [he doubted] much whether anything short of it will do in America.”⁴ His support for the Constitution, which framed a federal republican union, was thus at most ambivalent. Any study of his leadership on behalf of the Constitution must therefore begin with that fundamental, and puzzling, fact.

The following three chapters are an attempt to not only assert, but also explain, Hamilton’s ambivalence toward the idea of the federal republican union, and thereby to

¹ “Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris,” Feb. 27, 1802. All references to Hamilton’s writings are from the Lodge (1904) collection, which has been made freely and publicly accessible in a variety of digital formats by the Liberty Fund’s Online Library of Liberty. I am greatly indebted to the Maryland Institute for Technology in the Humanities (MITH) for giving me financial and technical assistance to acquire and reorganize the Hamilton collection to make it more compatible with the digital text analysis software applications (*QDA Miner* and *WordStat*) used for this study.

² Speech at the Federal Convention, June 22, 1787. (Madison’s Notes.)

³ Speech at the Federal Convention, June 18, 1787. (Madison’s Notes.)

⁴ *Ibid.*

shed light on the relative contributions of his creative agency and external structural conditions to shaping the nature and character of the fledgling American regime. Of course, as Mansfield has reminded us, that regime was itself ambivalent, with the constitutional President representing not only a check on monarchical-executive power, but also an admission of its “necessity,” and thus of the unfitness of traditional republican forms.⁵ It is argued here that Hamilton’s ambivalence was a contributing factor to the ambivalently federal republican character the regime would take. I thus use the notion of ambivalence in two ways to represent the link between Hamilton’s agency and the form of the regime itself: through his corrective leadership, Hamilton’s ambivalence would contribute to giving the regime itself an ambivalently federal republican character.

To develop an accurate account of Hamilton as a constitutional leader constrained and enabled by structural conditions, we must consider two distinct (though, albeit, related) ways in which structures would impinge upon or facilitate his agency. The first is with respect to his *constitutional judgments*, or what he thought to be the elements of the best constitutional regime in light of the ends he thought it ought to serve and the situational constraints and opportunities that he thought the regime would need to contend with or be able to exploit in order to secure its ends. The second is with respect to his *political judgments and actions*, or how he sought to realize his constitutional vision given the fact that he was committed to assuring consent (or acquiescence) to his plan *politically*, rather than by force or fiat, and thus would need to adjust his aspirations in light of the limits and opportunities for deliberation, persuasion, bargaining, and conciliation created by the prevailing and often conflicting identities, beliefs, and opinions of his fellow citizens with whom he would need to associate through pre-existing institutions and amid established constellations of power and interests.

This, to say the least, creates a daunting hermeneutical challenge, for it requires that we (1) determine why he considered X to be the best regime, (2) determine why he settled for Y instead, and (3) distinguish between X and Y. Fortunately, Hamilton simplified this by often going to extraordinary lengths to not only explicate his constitutional judgments, but also to declare when (and why) he thought certain courses of action were merely the best available concessions to unalterable (at least in the short run) political realities rather than the measures most likely to directly promote the best constitutional regime. While such statements present some of the best evidence of his constitutional and political judgments and actions, and the reasons behind them, other evidence is available as well. To gain insight into his constitutional judgments, and the structural factors shaping them, it is also useful to consider statements he made—either to trusted friends and allies or consistently overtime to a variety of audiences—regarding his (1) beliefs, values, and judgments pertaining to the ends of the regime, (2) perceptions of the “necessities” (or “exigencies”) with which the regime would need to cope or “duties” (or “responsibilities”) that it would need to meet, and (3) judgments about the constitutional elements/form most likely to secure or promote the regime’s ends in light of those

⁵ Mansfield (pp. 247-297, esp. p. 275) also makes the novel suggestion that the “Constitution formalized the ambivalence of virtue ... in the ambivalence of executive power, weak or strong,” where the ambivalence of virtue is between “outstanding virtue,” as found in Aristotle’s great-souled men, and mere “republican virtue,” which jealously seeks to reign-in all power, including that exercised by the former.

necessities and duties. Another reliable indicator of his sincere constitutional judgments are statements he made pertaining to constitutional form that he knew contradicted the beliefs and prejudices of his audience and, thus, if anything, would hurt rather than help him politically. To gain insights into his political judgments and actions, it will be helpful to interpret his public writings with one eye toward (what the above hermeneutical approaches revealed to be) his vision of the best constitutional regime. When in public (e.g. *The Federalist* essays) he articulated views that contradicted, or at least partly deviated from, beliefs that the evidence suggests he strongly held, then we can glean insight about the accommodations he felt forced to make to his audience(s), and, thus, what aspects of his leadership on behalf of the constitution were due to either his compromised (political) or sincere (constitutional) judgments.

Based upon my reading and interpretation of Hamilton's writings and the vast secondary literature on Hamilton and the founding era, over the next three chapters I will argue the following:

I. The core end Hamilton sought to preserve and promote with his constitutional regime was a particular conception of liberty that, though he refined it over the years, he consistently adhered to throughout his life. I therefore think he spoke with justification when he claimed to be "as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and ... as willing a martyr to it," even if his conception of liberty is somewhat foreign to twentieth and twenty-first century understandings.

II. For Hamilton, "liberty"—which he qualified at different times as "true," "rational," "durable," and "civil" to distinguish it from contending conceptions—consisted of the simultaneous (1) negation of both dominating (arbitrary, tyrannical, master-slave) and anarchical (licentious) relationships and (2) affirmation of civil (honorable, just, honest, moderate, humane) relationships. Put another way, for Hamilton, that person is free who is enabled to live civilly by a regime *because it* removes or counters anarchical and dominating relationships without becoming a source of domination in itself.

III. For Hamilton, a regime constituted to promote and preserve this conception of liberty must assure (1) effectual rule (2) through legitimate laws (3) justly enforced, where legitimate laws are those that emanate from (a) a legislative process systematically constrained to accord with the governed's direct and indirect interests (though not necessarily their mere "inclinations"), (b) the Vattel-Puffendorf conception of natural law (or its derivatives: natural rights and the laws of nations), (c) traditional common law, and/or (d) agreements negotiated and agreed-to with other sovereigns (i.e. treaties).

IV. With the single exception of a brief moment of republican enthusiasm in the middle of the Revolutionary War, Hamilton consistently held throughout his life that republican forms of government are neither necessary nor sufficient for meeting those conditions for securing liberty. Due to unalterable human nature, he believed that republics, despite their many appealing features, are less capable of maintaining

effectual rule (i.e. compelling or inspiring obedience to laws) and assuring the legitimacy of the laws, and no more capable of assuring just enforcement of laws, than was Great Britain's mixed-constitution.

V. For Hamilton, part of the genius of Great Britain's mixed-constitution was that it gave "the many" sufficient legislative and judicial power to assure protection of their interests and rights while granting "the few" and the monarch sufficient power and independence to prevent the community from falling victim to the principal flaws of pure republics: their propensity to slip into anarchy; susceptibility to "Caesarism" or domestic, foreign, minority, and majority factional strife and domination; inability to ascertain the true interests of the governed; and, thus, their failure to sustain effectual rule and the conditions of legitimate lawmaking.

VI. For Hamilton, the fact that the regime had to contend with other states in a situation of interstate anarchy presented another compelling reason for thinking liberty would be better preserved by a constitution that included aristocratical and monarchical, in addition to popular, elements. If a constitution does not grant adequate powers for a regime to effectively participate in interstate power politics, then it can undermine liberty by either forcing statesmen to act extra-constitutionally, and thus harming the constitution's authority as an instrument of rule of law in general, or by constraining statesmanship to such a degree that the regime falls under the domination of (i.e. can "receive law" from) external state(s). For various reasons, Hamilton thought constitutional monarchs (perhaps in conjunction with members of the aristocracy), vested with nearly full constitutional discretion in foreign affairs, to be best suited for responsibly leading the regime in interstate power politics.

VII. Similarly, Hamilton thought a North American federation (let alone a confederation) of States—understood as a system of shared sovereignty between State governments and a supranational government that is designed primarily to reconcile State sovereignty with the need to maintain peaceful and just relations between the States and to strengthen their collective capacity for effectively pursuing common interests, particularly in their relations to external states—to be neither necessary nor sufficient for meeting the conditions required for protecting liberty from the pernicious consequences of structural interstate anarchy. Indeed, Hamilton thought that—due to the interstate-anarchy-caused problem of preventing a regime from falling subject to the arbitrary will of threatening neighboring states while maintaining a free constitution—liberty would be better served by the weakening or elimination, rather than the strengthening or preservation, of State sovereignty. His preference for a strong unitary nation-state was thus a simultaneous response to two manifestations of structural interstate anarchy: the *unalterable* anarchy between the North American States and European states and the (potentially) *alterable* anarchy among the North American States/sections themselves. As a gifted statesman, he understood better than most the nature of the "necessities" mandated by interstate relations in structural anarchy and thus, as a zealous advocate for liberty, sought to eliminate that anarchy when possible and, when that anarchy could not be avoided,

find a way to constitute a regime fit for meeting such necessities without unduly undermining the institutional basis of domestic liberty.

VIII. Hamilton viewed America's particular place in the tail of the "anarchical society" of European states as creating not only constraints but also opportunities for promoting domestic liberty. First, the credible threat to American autonomy posed by European powers presented a tangible common interest by which to strengthen the bonds of union between the States (and thus for reducing their sovereignty and the anarchy between them). Second, the natural barrier created by the Atlantic Ocean would allow the Americans to rely more upon naval than army forces for protecting and advancing their interests in relation to Europe, thus allowing Americans to avoid a dangerous standing army. (However, this also weakened Hamilton's political ability to create a national army sufficiently strong to counter threats of force by the States and, thus, to mitigate State sovereignty and inter-State anarchy.) Third, international law, if exploited correctly, could serve as a civilizing structure through which the Americans could effectively pursue their interests in rivalry with other states while affirming, instead of rejecting, their regime's commitment to liberty through law. Doing so, however, would require constituting the regime to act lawfully in its international affairs, and Hamilton thought this (as with meeting the exigencies of international power politics) would be best served by entrusting diplomatic and military power to insulated and honor-bound monarchical (and perhaps aristocratic) elements within a unitary regime.

IX. Hamilton knew it was politically infeasible to fully realize his constitutional vision in 1787-88. Not only the general population, but also many of his fellow political elites, were ideologically ensnared by the radical Whig science of politics that held, among other things, that liberty stood in a zero-sum relation to government power and that any constitution was destructive of liberty that countenanced standing armies, aristocratical or monarchical elements, or any curtailment of close control of rulers by the ruled. Furthermore, there was little he could do, in the short-run at least, about the influence wielded by the State's and their ambitious officials over the loyalties and opinions of the vast majority of Americans. Worse yet (for Hamilton), these two factors—radical Whig political culture and entrenched power and interests within the States—tended to reinforce one another as the great mass of radical Whig republicans, primarily concerned with controlling their own governments and dismissive of the perils of inter-State anarchy, viewed the fate of their own liberty as inexorably linked with that of State sovereignty. Consequently, what Hamilton held to be the two principal imbalances of the status quo constitution in 1787-88—excessive democracy (*viz. a viz.* deficient monarchical and aristocratical elements) and excessive State power in inter-State anarchy (*viz. a viz.* deficient centralized power)—also created the principal political obstacles to correcting the imbalances. His effort at constitutional leadership would require dealing with entrenched State elites through a popular citizenry deeply prejudiced in favor of both pure republican government (unmixed with monarchical or aristocratic elements) and extensive State autonomy from central government control.

X. Given the political constraints he faced, and his commitment to constitutional leadership through political means, Hamilton's optimal strategy was to throw his support behind the essentially federal-republican—and, therefore, in his view, flawed—Constitution in 1787-88 and then seek to imbue it as much as possible with the monarchical, aristocratical, and national elements he thought to be both wanting in the Constitution and yet vital for protecting liberty, and thus civility, from the twin threats of anarchy and domination. In doing so, he would take advantage of four major situational opportunities/assets available to him: (1) the receptiveness of the people to arguments based upon economic self-interest, (2) the fact that modern military power relied less upon widespread martial virtue and more upon economic productivity and financial credit, (3) the people's trust in George Washington, and (4) the fact that he could honestly claim that he (like his republican rivals) was a "zealous advocate of liberty" and that he simply believed his most principled republican opponents to be mistaken as to what constitutional form liberty is "most eligible."⁶

In the first chapter I will attempt to explicate Hamilton's theory of liberty and dispel the myth that he was a committed republican. In the second chapter, I will consider why he thought liberty would be better secured by a constitutional monarchy than by a republic. Finally, in the third chapter, I will consider how his views on liberty and interstate anarchy played into his ambivalent stance toward the federal republic.

Chapter 2.1: Zealous Advocate of Liberty, Ambivalent Friend of Republican Government

In recent decades, scholars have made two major revisions to Hamilton's historical reputation as an embryonic Caesar or Napoleonic "militarist" thirsty for tyranny at home or *imperium* abroad. The first revision, by defending his republican credentials, has simply replaced one mischaracterization with a new one, while the second, by portraying him as a committed advocate for American liberty, has hit upon a core truth. The new consensus view of Hamilton as a republican is probably due, more than anything else, to Gerald Stourzh's (1970) (otherwise masterful) examination of Hamilton's political thought. The credit for the growing appreciation of Hamilton's efforts to promote and preserve liberty and free government lies most prominently with the scholarship of Karl-Friedrich Walling (1999) and James H. Read (2000). These three scholars, and many others in recent decades, have overstated Hamilton's republican aspirations, dismissing his explicit and implicit claims to the contrary either by ignoring them, denying that they were actually uttered, or treating them as fleeting or insincere (e.g. Stourzh 1970, 46-52; McDonald 1982, 103; Rahe 1994c, 112-113; Walling 1999, 99-100; Read 2000, 58-62; Chernow 2004, 232-235; Harper 2004, 37). While it is certainly the case that Hamilton thought it *politically* impossible to establish a replica of the British constitution in America, he made it clear, as quoted above, that he doubted "anything short of it will do in America." His *constitutional* judgment, therefore, was clearly not pro-republican even if his *political* judgment led him grudgingly toward propping the "frail and worthless [republican] fabric."⁷ Walling and Read, on the other hand, while mistakenly attributing

⁶ Speech, June 22, 1787. (Madison's Notes.)

⁷ This made him a republican no more so than a Green Party member's sophisticated vote for Al Gore in 2000 rendered her a Democrat.

republican conviction to Hamilton, have hit upon the element of Hamilton's thought that can best explain his simultaneous belief in the inadequacy of republican government and his laborious effort to make America's republican Constitution work. That element is Hamilton's theory of liberty, something for which he claimed to be "as zealous an advocate ... as any man whatever, and ... as willing a martyr to it, though he differed [from those who thought favorably of republican government] as to the form in which it was most eligible."⁸ To understand why Hamilton thought liberty was less eligible under a republican than a mixed constitutional form of government, we must first better illuminate his concept of liberty and the contending constitutional forms that may promote and preserve it. Then we can better understand his critique of republicanism and preference for the British constitution.

I. Hamiltonian Liberty as Non – Domination Through Law

In his pre-revolutionary exchange with the Tory Samuel Seabury, Hamilton repeatedly spoke of the *condition* (or "state") of the free person. As he defined it, freedom should be understood negatively—as not being a slave, or not living according to the will of another person who stands before him as a master:

The only distinction between freedom and slavery consists in this: In the former state a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent, either in person or by his representative; in the latter, he is governed by the will of another. In the one case, his life and property are his own; in the other, they depend upon the pleasure of his master. It is easy to discern which of these two states is preferable. No man in his senses can hesitate in choosing to be free, rather than a slave.⁹

Notably, Hamilton here implies that a person's status as a free person is not in any way diminished on account of being "governed by laws."¹⁰ Rather, it is only when laws fail to meet standards of legitimacy—in this case, direct or indirect consent by the governed to their enactment—that those bound by them fall from a state of freedom into one of slavery.

Forrest McDonald was certainly correct when he wrote that Hamilton "always championed liberty and abhorred slavery," but he was only half-correct in writing that "the Hamilton of 1775 often sounded rather like his opponents in maturity. . . . Much of what he said about slavery at first was patriotic hyperbole, but beneath the talk about evil ministerial designs lay an intense hostility toward slavery in the more conventional sense." While it is certainly the case that Hamilton was one of the most committed abolitionists of the founding generation, McDonald seems to have overlooked the fact that, throughout his life, Hamilton spoke of political freedom using the language of mastery and slavery. As Table 1 demonstrates, if anything changed after 1774-5, it was

⁸ Speech, June 22, 1787. (Madison's Transcript.)

⁹ "A Full Vindication," December 15, 1774.

¹⁰ Six years later he would make a stronger statement to the same effect: "The obedience of a free people to general laws, however hard they bear, is ever more perfect than that of slaves to the arbitrary will of a prince." (Letter to James Duane, September 3, 1780.) Due to statements like these, and further reasons to be made clear below, I think Read (2000) was mistaken in attributing to Hamilton the view that "all law involves some restrictions on liberty. (p. 74)"

not his propensity to exhibit abhorrence for political (non-“conventional” forms of) slavery, but rather the number of paths to enslavement down which he feared the Americans might fall.¹¹ If his major pre-revolutionary concern was with America’s enslavement to Britain due to an absence of American representation in the legislative process, his purview with respect to threats of political slavery would expand in the revolutionary and post-revolutionary eras (as evidenced by at least 16 statements using the word “slave” and its cognates from 1781-1803) to include the specter of American enslavement to European powers due to American constitutional, diplomatic, or strategic error or weakness, as well as the classic forms of factional (the many over the few or the few over the many), tyrannical (one over the rest), or military (viz. a viz. civilian authority) domination resulting from a variety of causes, including interstate anarchy; domestic anarchy, lawlessness, and licentiousness; lack of electoral insulation in the Senate; and insufficient faith in the capacity of the people for self-government.

It is my contention that Hamilton’s usage of the language of slavery, mastery, dependence, and domination reflects much more than “rhetorical hyperbole.” As Bernard Bailyn points out, “‘Slavery’ was a central concept in eighteenth-century political discourse. . . . the absolute political evil . . . [and was a concept] with a specific meaning which a later generation would lose (1992, 232-233).” In recent years, Quentin Skinner (1998, 2008a, 2008b) and Philip Pettit (2008, 1999) have done the most to recover the lost meaning of this concept.¹² By their account, the notion that liberty is not living in a condition of slavery (or, as Pettit prefers, as enjoying a condition of “non-domination”)—where no person or groups stands above another as a master, with the ability to harm them, with impunity, according to their arbitrary will—was the conventional theory of freedom not only in the 18th century, but also throughout the early modern and ancient Roman eras. This theory of liberty—which Skinner refers to as “neo-roman” and Pettit (misleadingly) calls “republican”¹³—is distinct from both the “positive” vs. “negative”

¹¹ I discovered these passages through a three step process. I began by reading all passages returned by the following search expression: slave OR slaves OR slavery OR enslave OR enslaves OR enslaved OR enslaving. I tagged those paragraphs that were clearly examples of using master-slave language to discuss political liberty and excluded those that referred to the literal institution of slavery (in the conventional sense). I then did a fuzzy search based-upon all the tagged hits and then tagged the new passages as either hits or misses. Finally, third, I used QDA Miner’s “Query by Example” (machine-learning-aided search) to create a search list that took into account both hit examples and miss examples. I then tagged hits and misses again and repeated the process until it returned no additional hit passages.

¹² As will be discussed below, Skinner (1998) argues that the “liberal” theory of liberty, first articulated by Hobbes, would eclipse the “neo-roman” (absence of slave-master relations) theory of liberty in the early 19th century and reach hegemonic status by the 20th century. Now, he argues, “the neo-roman theory of liberty has been so much lost to sight that the liberal analysis has come to be widely regarded as the only coherent way of thinking about the concept involved (p. 113).”

¹³ Skinner (2008a, 84) has recently conceded defeat to Pettit and his followers in the debate over what to call this concept of liberty. However, he most certainly is correct that “republican” in the strict sense meant being opposed to monarchy, and while all early modern republicans adhered to the “so-called republican theory of liberty,” it “was also espoused by a number of writers—for example, John Locke—who would have been horrified to be described as republicans (ibid.).” Furthermore, as will be discussed below, Hamilton, who also clearly adhered to this theory of liberty, was often careful to distinguish between “free” and “republican” states, with the latter being just one type of the former. He did not think freedom as non-domination was achievable only through republican forms; quite the contrary, in fact. To avoid confusion, therefore, I shall adopt the neo-roman label (even if Skinner is willing to abandon it.)

alternatives laid out by Isaiah Berlin (1958) and the closely related “ancient” vs. “modern” conceptions delineated by Benjamin Constant (1816 / 1988). As is well known, Berlin’s negative liberty and Constant’s “liberty of the moderns” conceptualize liberty as “non-interference”: an individual is free to the extent that no human being actually interferes with her actions, either by direct physical coercion or credible threat of coercion. Berlin’s positive liberty, by contrast, sees liberty as the achievement of “self-mastery, with its suggestion of a man divided against himself (Berlin quoted in Pettit 1999, 18).” The most common manifestation of the positive view is in the participatory democrat’s contention that self-mastery can be achieved only through direct participation in “governing a political community that controls its own fate (Sandel 1996, 274).” This participatory democratic / positive libertarian conception of freedom—wherein the sovereign people, as manifested in the will of the majority, is master and the state its slave—touches upon what Constant meant by the “liberty of the ancients.” The neo-roman theory, by contrast, combines elements of both, as it “consists in an absence, as the negative conception has it, but in an absence of mastery by others, not in an absence of interference (Pettit 1999, 22).” As will be discussed presently, each theory yields different conclusions about how liberty, constitutional form, and law interrelate. By elucidating these distinctions we will be better able to see the role played by the concept of liberty as non-domination in Hamilton’s constitutional judgment.¹⁴

¹⁴ It is beyond the scope of this chapter to assess the historical merits of Skinner’s and Pettit’s treatment of the ancient-modern distinction. Whereas those two emphasize the continuity between Roman political thought and that of such early modern thinkers as Machiavelli, Harrington, Swift, Sidney, Locke, Trenchard, Gordon, Bolingbroke, and Montesquieu, Straussian scholars such as Stourzh (1970), Pangle (1990), Mansfield (1993), and Rahe (1994c, 1994b, 1994a) emphasize the rupture with the ancients ushered in by Machiavelli. Of these, Rahe is the most thorough and convincing, going to great lengths to demonstrate that modern philosophers followed Machiavelli in seeking to create “new modes and orders,” the result of which would be “a species of republican government hitherto unknown to man,” as it was predicated upon a rejection of “the classical philosophy which lived on within the Church and thereby at the fundamental principle underlying not only that philosophy but the political practices of the ancient republics: the trust in man’s doubled-edged capacity to reason and make speech concerning the advantageous, the just, and the good. (Rahe 1994a, 215)” I hope to grapple with this issue someday, but for now think it adequate to note that, no matter how irreconcilable their views may be in other respects, Skinner’s and the Straussians’ positions on this point are not necessarily incompatible. The difference seems to be largely one of emphasis. Skinner and Pettit are most concerned about Hobbes’ attack on the conceptualization of the relationship between liberty, constitutional form, and law that (as they convincingly demonstrate) was espoused by most ancient and early modern philosophers until the early 19th century when Hobbes’ view (although, obviously, not his preferred constitutional form) eventually triumphed. Importantly, it is on this point that they see Machiavelli and Locke standing with the ancients (and most other early moderns) against Hobbes. For Straussians, by contrast, the important point is that Locke saw himself as pursuing Hobbes’ ends—“fostering a political and social environment favorable to rapid progress in the sciences and the arts; and to that end, [destroying] the moral ethos fostered by the ancient Greek philosophers and to reduce radically, if not eliminate altogether, the political influence of the Christian church” (Rahe 1994b, 225)—through drastically different means (*ibid.*, 134-168; 215-249). It seems to me that one aspect of the difference in means employed between Locke and Hobbes is that each attempted to propagate a different theory regarding the relationship between liberty, constitutional form, and law. Consequently, Skinner and Pettit can be correct about this difference between Hobbes and Locke (and most of the ancient Roman and early modern mainstream) regardless of whether or not Rahe and other Straussians are correct that Hobbes, Locke, and the other early modern philosophers shared the same ultimate goal. It is also noteworthy that Rahe barely covers the Roman writers in his survey of the “ancient” republics, while Skinner and Pettit look most closely at their writings. So, part of the disagreement is also due to which ancient writers are emphasized.

1. Negative Liberty vs. Neo-Roman Liberty

The basic difference between neo-roman liberty and negative liberty is that the former holds non-domination up as a political ideal, while the latter considers non-interference to be the relevant standard. The two positions will both consider a person to be unfree who is dominated and interfered with, and a person to be free who is not dominated and not interfered with. Where they differ is on the status of the person who is either (1) dominated, but not interfered with, or (2) interfered with, but not dominated. The neo-roman theorist holds the former to be unfree and the latter free, while the negative liberty theorist holds the former to be free and the latter unfree (Pettit 1999, 21-24). Put another way, they differ in that the neo-roman theorist insists that (1) under no condition can the slave be considered free, even a slave who is fortunate enough to have a kind master who does not interfere with her, and (2) a person's liberty is not diminished if she is interfered with by someone who does not stand above her as a master—that is, as someone who can exercise arbitrary power over her with impunity.

The theory of negative liberty is commonly associated with the liberal tradition and its emphasis upon minimizing coercion and/or protecting negative rights. However, Skinner and Pettit insist that Locke—unlike his 19th century liberal descendents, who would equate coercion or rights infringements with particular *cases* of liberty loss—used the concept of rights instrumentally as a means of securing a *condition* of neo-roman liberty.¹⁵ Indeed, they trace the origin of the liberal/negative theory of liberty, not to Locke, but to Hobbes, who, in his effort to legitimate absolutism, initiated an attack on the reigning (neo-roman) theory of liberty (see esp. Skinner 1998, 2008b). Hobbes argued that since liberty is simply a matter of the absence of physical interference, all legal constraints abridge freedom regardless of the form of government from which they emanate. Consequently, full liberty would require, among other things, ‘the Silence of the Law,’ as he put it in *Leviathan* (quoted in Skinner 1998, 9).

Hobbes thought it necessary to advance this theory to counter a key claim of the neo-roman theory, which is that a free government—one that does not dominate its citizens—is a government “of laws, not men.” In the neo-roman view, law is held to be integral to freedom, rather than necessarily antithetical to it as Hobbes argued in his effort to defend monarchical absolutism. Pettit has reconstructed the two fold link between neo-roman liberty and law. On one hand, legitimate laws—for example, those that track the governed's common interests and/or “are not the instruments of any one individual's, or any one group's, arbitrary will”—do not reduce the liberty of those subject to them (Pettit 1999, 36). Such interferences constitute a “secondary evil;” they “reduce the range or the ease with which [one] can exercise undominated choice” in a manner analogous to how physical limitations can reduce someone's “freedom of choice” (Pettit 1999, 303). But this alone does not make that person unfree. It only illustrates that a person's freedom

¹⁵ It seems that, with the assent of the “liberal theory” of negative liberty we have lost the notion of liberty as a *condition* or *state* and have become concerned more with token *cases* or actual infringements. Perhaps this has led to the common tendency today (e.g. Nozick 1974) to essentially equate liberty, justice, and negative rights protection.

(living in a condition of non-domination) does not consist of being unrestrained from doing all things he wants to do. On the other hand, the neo-roman tradition holds not only that legitimate legal sanctions are *compatible* with liberty, but also that law *creates* liberty by helping to produce the conditions that will assure the government does not become a source of domination: “The political authorities recognized by the laws represent potential dominators, but the recurrent [neo-roman] idea is that these will themselves be suitably constrained—they will have no arbitrary power over others—under a proper constitution (Pettit 1999, 36).”

What, then, makes a constitution proper for neo-roman liberty? Pettit stacks the deck a bit by labeling this conception of liberty “republican liberty.” After all, the theory of neo-roman liberty was adhered to by many thinkers in the 17th and 18th centuries who cannot properly be classified as “republicans in the strict sense of opposing the institution of monarchy.” Locke, for example, while a “neo-roman” in this sense, nevertheless thought a monarch armed with the prerogative “power of doing public good without a rule”¹⁶ essential to a good constitution, and “would have been horrified to be described as [a] republican” (Skinner 1998, 55, n. 177). Furthermore, the post-Restoration British constitution led 17th and 18th century philosophers to begin asking two related but distinct questions regarding the link between neo-roman liberty and constitutional form. Some wondered whether Great Britain’s mixed constitution should best be thought of as republican, in spite of its monarchical element, and others considered whether “rule of law, not men” (and, therefore, neo-roman liberty) might be secured as well (if not better) under a monarchical as a republican government. Montesquieu (1748 / 1989) can be interpreted as answering either or both of those questions in the affirmative in two oft cited passages in *Spirit of the Laws*: “Britain,” he wrote, “is a nation that may be justly called a republic, disguised under the form of a monarchy,” and, is the only nation “in the world that has for the direct end of its constitution political liberty.” In his essay “On Civil Liberty” (1752 / 1826), David Hume, one of Hamilton’s leading philosophical influences, answered the second question in the affirmative, suggesting that not only the British limited monarchy, but also other modern monarchies, could secure neo-roman liberty:

It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, *that they are a government of Laws, not of Men*. They are found susceptible of order, method, and constancy, to a surprising degree.

Property is there secure, industry encouraged, the arts flourish, and the prince lives secure among his subjects, like a father among his children.

So, by the time of the American revolution, it was widely believed that neo-roman liberty was compatible with the institution of monarchy. That being said, it is true, as Hume noted, that the traditional (pre-Restoration) view was that it was not. James Harrington’s position in *The Art of Lawgiving* (1659 / 1771), for example, was far closer to the conventional understanding:

YET the one man in the monarchical family giving laws, and the many in the popular family doing no more, it may in this sense be indifferently said, that all laws are made by men. But it is plain that where the law is made by one man,

¹⁶ Second Treatise, 1690 / 1978, Ch. 14. For the Machiavellian roots of Locke’s executive (and thus the United States presidency), see Mansfield (1993).

there it may be unmade by one man; so that the man is not govern'd by the law, but the law by the man; which amounts to the government of the man, and not of the law: whereas the law being not to be made but by the many, no man is govern'd by another man, but by that only which is the common interest; by which means this amounts to a government of laws, and not of men.

Hamilton, like most pre-Revolutionary Americans, was clearly aware of the possibility that neo-roman liberty can be secured by a monarchical government. For example, in the midst of arguing vehemently on behalf of American freedom from British subjugation he felt it necessary to refute Seabury's charge that his arguments implied the need for republican government. "I am a warm advocate for limited monarchy," he declared in *The Farmer Refuted*, "and an unfeigned well-wisher to the present Royal Family." Going further, he wrote:

You are mistaken when you confine arbitrary government to a monarchy. It is not the supreme power being placed in one, instead of many, that discriminates an arbitrary from a free government. When any people are ruled by laws, in framing which they have no part, that are to bind them, to all intents and purposes, without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are, in the strictest sense, slaves; and the government, with respect to them, is despotic. Great Britain is itself a free country, but it is only so because its inhabitants have a share in the legislature. If they were once divested of that they would cease to be free. So that, if its jurisdiction be extended over other countries that have no actual share in its legislature, it becomes arbitrary to them, because they are destitute of those checks and controls which constitute that moral security which is the very essence of civil liberty.

As Stourzh has pointed out, it was "the reluctant decision for independence," and the meaning imputed onto it by Thomas Paine's *Common Sense*, that "brought about [a] shift of thought and terminology that turned advocates of 'free government' into 'republicans'" (1970, 40-44; see also Wood 1993). However, as Table 2 demonstrates, Hamilton seems to have held fast to the distinction between free and republican government throughout his life. In 1794, for example, when commenting on the French Revolution, he chastised the zeal of those who predicted "the French nation will establish for themselves not only a free but a republican government..." Similarly, in his draft of Washington's Farewell Address (1796), Hamilton suggested (to no avail) that Washington remind his countrymen that not all free governments are republican: "T is essentially true that virtue or morality is a main and necessary spring of popular or republican governments. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to all free governments."

It can safely be said, therefore, that Hamilton saw no necessary link between liberty and republican government. More specifically, he saw two major contenders: the English mixed constitution (or other form of constitutional monarchy) or a self-limiting republic. He, like most Americans, understood well the idea that the British constitution achieved a government of laws, not of men, through its heralded balance of powers among the social orders: the one (king), the few (lords), and the many (commons). In theory, no group received the law unilaterally as each had the resources and institutional powers to assure

that their interests and/or rights were reflected in the enactment and enforcement of law. By the original theory, moreover, each (if not corrupted) contributed a particular functional excellence to the good of the whole: from the monarch, resistance to “invasion from abroad and insurrection at home”; from the aristocracy, “conjunction of counsel in the ablest persons ... for the public benefit”; and, from the many, “the courage and industry which liberty begets.”¹⁷

The republican approach to securing neo-roman liberty, by contrast, consists largely in the use of institutional devices—such as rotation of offices, elections, representation, and separation of powers—in conjunction with the inculcation of the virtue of public vigilance among the people, to assure that the enactment and enforcement of law tracks the interest of all the governed. As Hamilton wrote in a committee report as a member of Congress in 1782:

The truth is, the security intended to the general liberty in the Confederation consists in the frequent election, and in the rotation, of the members of Congress, by which there is a constant and an effectual check upon them. This is the security which the people in every State enjoy against the usurpations of their internal governments; and it is the true source of security in a representative republic.¹⁸

It is critical to emphasize, however, that this neo-roman republicanism is also highly suspicious of (mere) majoritarianism. It does not countenance domination of the minority (or of the whole) by the majority any more than domination by a tyrant or oligarchy over the rest. Neo-roman republicans stand with Polybius, who wrote in his critique of Athenian democracy that simple majoritarian rule amounts to domination of the city “by the uncurbed impulse of a mob” (quoted in Pettit 1999, 286), and with founding era Bostonian Judge Story, who wrote that “in a republican government the fundamental truth is, that the minority have indisputable and inalienable rights; that the majority are not everything, and the minority nothing; that the people may not do what they please” (quoted in Stourzh 1970, 56). To this end, neo-roman republicans favor additional institutional measures—such as judicial review, executive veto, trial by jury, supermajoritarian voting rules, and bills of rights—to counter the threat of “majoritarian tyranny.” Below we will consider the evidence for, and reasons behind, Hamilton’s constitutional judgment in favor of adopting a mixed constitution, as opposed to a self-limiting republic, to achieve neo-roman liberty. But, first, we must consider another type of republicanism that Hamilton unequivocally rejected, one based upon the positive, rather than neo-roman, theory of liberty, and that was not at all concerned about checking the “uncurbed impulse of [the] mob.”

2. Positive Liberty vs. Neo-Roman Liberty

¹⁷ The quote and description of the original theory of the English mixed constitution comes from Pocock (2003, 361-365). The theory was drafted by Falkland and Colepeper on June 21, 1642 in an attempt to convince Charles I to declare England’s a mixed government in order to prevent civil war.

¹⁸ Hamilton, “Report on the Impost Duty,” December 16, 1782. As further testament to the idea that neo-roman liberty does not hold liberty to be lost in the case of “interference without domination,” it is noteworthy that Hamilton wrote this in order to argue against those who claimed the impost abridged liberty. The report was signed by Madison and one other committee member.

By considering a person to be free to the extent that she achieves mastery over herself, the positive conception of liberty leaves the social or relational aspect of freedom unspecified. The neo-roman theory, by contrast, by holding that a person is free to the extent that she is not mastered, or dominated, by anyone else, is an inherently social and relational concept. While the two forms of freedom might not be incompatible—e.g. one might find the achievement of self-mastery to be most realizable if not in a condition of servitude to another—the two ideals certainly are not synonymous. This becomes evident when one considers the two different species of republicanism informed by the different theories. It is important to briefly review this distinction because the word “republican” took on an amorphous quality in the founding era due to the fact that the more populist version informed by the positive conception of liberty—which I shall call “neo-athenian” to distinguish it from the neo-roman view—became the more common understanding among the people.¹⁹ While some, like Hamilton and John Adams, for whom it was a settled matter that the neo-roman conception of liberty was the true version, tended to ponder whether liberty could be best secured under the British mixed constitution or a self-limiting republic, many others agreed with the Bostonian Benjamin Hichborn, who adhered to the neo-athenian republican view that considered “civil liberty to be, not a ‘government by laws,’ made agreeable to charters, bills of rights or compacts, but a power in the people at large, at any time, for any cause, or for no cause, but their own sovereign pleasure, to alter or annihilate both the mode and essence of any former government, and adopt a new one in its stead.”²⁰

That Hamilton, Adams, and others thought the neo-athenian view to be a perverse theory of republican liberty does not mean they could ignore it. Indeed, it seems that the neo-athenian conception was the default meaning of republicanism in the founding era, obliging one to make a specific qualification if one wished to be understood as referring to the neo-roman view (see e.g. Wood 1969). James Madison, for one, at times did not even acknowledge the neo-roman alternative. In his “Vices of the Political System of the United States” he argued that “According to Republican Theory, Right and power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonymous.”²¹ He seems to have implied that this was a problem with republicanism in general, rather than only one version of it. Writing in private to Jefferson on the question of the Bill of Rights he would complain that “In our [republican] Governments the real power lies in the majority of the

¹⁹ This is certainly not the only possible way to classify republicanism in the founding era. Cutting across this divide is the useful regionally-based distinction drawn by Forrest McDonald between “puritanical” and “agrarian” republicanism (1985, 70-77). (Cite Wood, Pocock, etc. here on the normal meaning attributed to “republicanism.”)

²⁰ Adams (1787 / 2001) decided that “the true and only true definition of a republic” to be “a government, in which all men, rich and poor, magistrates and subjects, officers and people, masters and servants, the first citizens and the last, are equally subject to the laws.” While certainly inspired by the neo-roman theory, this is a problematic conception of the rule of law for it privileges the enforcement of law without mentioning the conditions of lawmaking. While, certainly, equality under the law can be a useful deterrent to arbitrary lawmaking, the classical meaning of “rule of law, not men” has to do with the distribution of resources and the institutional arrangements that are in place to prevent any person or group from being in a position to unilaterally receive law, and thus to assure each that their interests and rights will be duly reflected in the substance of the law (that, albeit, from the standpoint of justice and the deterrent effect just mentioned, should be equally binding upon all.) The Hichborn quote is from Stourzh (1970, 56).

²¹ April 1787. All Madison citations from Madison (Madison 1900).

Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents.”²² This, he implied, was an essential characteristic of republican governments.

For his part, Hamilton evidenced a clear understanding of the distinction between neo-roman and neo-athenian liberty and republicanism, and was in fact willing at times to use the ambiguity to his advantage. In *Federalist 71*, he would employ the logic of neo-roman liberty—pointing to the importance of executive independence from the legislative branch—in arguing against the (neo-athenian) republican fear of four year presidential terms:

It is one thing to be subordinate to the laws, another to be dependent on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last violates, the fundamental principles of good government; and whatever may be the forms of the constitution, unites all power in the same hands.

In *Federalist 9*, he would point to the “means, and powerful means ... [that] tend to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government,” which had been invented or perfected in modern times, thus allowing “the enlightened friends of liberty ... to [not] abandon the cause of [republican] government as indefensible.” The “means” to which he was referring were the standard institutional mechanisms for protecting neo-roman liberty from the degeneracy of republics into factional or tyrannical (i.e. arbitrary) rule:

The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges, holding their offices during good behaviour; [and] the representation of the people in the legislature, by deputies of their own election...

And, yet, as Stourzh (Stourzh 1970, 52-54) points out, Hamilton sometimes used the language of neo-athenian republicanism in order to advance causes at odds with that view.²³ His classic argument for constitutional supremacy and judicial review in *Federalist 78*, for example, used the neo-athenian notion of the people as sovereign master to argue for a neo-roman institutional mechanism intended to protect the rights of minorities from the uncurbed legislative will of, yes, that same sovereign master:

There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act therefore contrary to the constitution can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

Similarly, in his *Tully* essays (1794), he sought to secure popular support for suppression of the Whisky Rebellion by portraying the whisky rebels as an anti-republican minority faction standing against the people’s sovereign “general will” as expressed through the Constitution, by which, after all, the sovereign people delegated to Congress the authority

²² Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 17, 1788.

²³ This, Stourzh astutely points out, seems to have been Hamilton’s rhetorical strategy throughout the *Federalist* essays. Of course, Stourzh, who did not define the varieties of republicanism in relation to their underlying theory of freedom, did not use the “neo-roman” and “neo-athenian” labels.

to impose excise taxes. Anyone who thinks the government should not use force to compel the rebels into submission, he wrote,

attempts to set up the *will* of a part against the *will* of the whole, the *will* of a *faction* against the *will* of the *nation*, the pleasure of a *few* against *your* pleasure, the violence of a lawless combination against the sacred authority of laws pronounced under your indisputable commission.²⁴

There should be no doubt, however, that when Hamilton thought of “true liberty,” he thought of it in terms of the neo-roman ideal where law creates and sustains the conditions of non-domination. Perhaps his most succinct statement exhibiting his adherence to this view (and, once again, his belief in its priority over constitutional form) was in an address he gave to the electors of the State of New York in 1801. The disagreement between the Federalist and Republican (“anti-federal”) parties, he said that day,

... is indeed a war of principles -- a war between tyranny and liberty, but not between monarchy and republicanism. It is a contest between the tyranny of Jacobinism, which confounds and levels every thing, and the mild reign of rational liberty, which rests on the basis of an efficient and well-balanced government, and through the medium of stable laws shelters and protects the life, the reputation, the civil and religious rights of every member of the community.

II. The “Best in the World” vs. The (Hopefully) Good Enough for Now: Reconsidering Hamilton’s Republican Credentials

Given that Hamilton adhered to the neo-roman theory of liberty, his constitutional preference had to be for either a self-limiting republic or some sort of constitutional monarchy. In a post-independence American society where not only monarchy, but even any republic uniformed by the neo-athenian view of freedom, was thought to be necessarily antithetical to civil liberty, anyone harboring sympathy for Britain’s mixed constitution would find himself in a precarious political dilemma. If such a person wanted to improve upon his country’s republican constitution, he would have to somehow gain popular approval for institutions unpalatable to most of the public. I think this is precisely the position in which Hamilton found himself for the remainder of his political life after the revolution. In this last part of the chapter we will consider the case that, despite the scholarly consensus to the contrary, the Anglican mixed constitution was Hamilton’s true preference.²⁵

1. Stourzh’s (Surprisingly Thin) Argument

²⁴ Hamilton, “Tully (#2),” 1794.

²⁵ At this point, I am deliberately focussing on Hamilton’s views on the self-limiting republic vs. the mixed constitution, and ignoring his arguably more immediate fear that the federal structure of the union would be insufficiently strong to prevent *de facto* anarchy between the states and an attendant host of horrors for civil liberty, for the simple reason that the scholarly consensus seems closer to correct with respect to his attitude toward State sovereignty/anarchy and mostly mistaken in regards to his republican credentials. I also think it is important to be clear that his views on republicanism bore an important relation to his distrust of federalism, and this can best be seen by first better elucidating his view on republicanism.

As mentioned above, the current scholarly consensus that Hamilton was a committed republican seems to be due in large part to the rich and penetrating treatment of his political thought offered by Gerald Stourzh (1970). Stourzh's argument was actually quite nuanced, much more so than most of what has followed, and despite his conclusion that Hamilton was in fact a republican (38-75), he would also later admit that Hamilton held certain "obsolete" ideas that led to his "favoring monarchy" and having a negative "appraisal of republican regimes" (107-108). This leads one to wonder if even Stourzh himself truly believed Hamilton to be a friend of republican government. Nevertheless, since his conclusion affirming Hamilton's republicanism has been so influential, we should begin by reviewing the case he made.

Based upon his vast knowledge of the history of political thought and of the writings of the founding generation in general, Stourzh laid-out six criteria for defining republican government: lack of heredity, plurality of voters, majority rule, representation²⁶, rule of law, and government informed by the principle of virtue. Of these, Stourzh argued that the first is the most undeniable criterion: "From the rise of medieval communes and city-states to the present day, the absence of a hereditary monarchy has been regarded as one, if not the single, distinguishing feature of republican government" (45). For assessing Hamilton's republican conviction based upon this criterion, Stourzh made a three part argument. First, he acknowledged "Hamilton's attachment to Great Britain's mixed government, including its hereditary components, King and Lords." Second, by implication, he argued that it matters not what Hamilton's true preference may have been; all that matters is that he did not "seriously envisage or think possible the introduction of hereditary elements into the Constitution of the United States." Third, as evidence supporting the second premise, he noted that the closest thing to the British mixed constitution that Hamilton ever proposed—a "sketch of a 'high toned' government including life tenure for the President as well as for the Senate"—was "put forward in the secrecy of the Federal Convention," did not (even in Hamilton's estimation) "have any real chance of being adopted," and, by excluding hereditary elements, was, strictly speaking, republican (46).

By now it should be clear that I accept the first premise and reject the reasoning of the second and third. The main reason to accept the first premise is that, as discussed above, Hamilton clearly stated this to be the case at the Federal Convention. I'll discuss further reasons for believing this below, but first we should turn to the crucial part of Stourzh's argument, which is that we should not pay attention to Hamilton's sincerest preference, but, rather, should consider only that which he thought was politically possible. It seems to me that this is a mistaken starting point. When characterizing a person's constitutional judgment, it makes little difference what she thinks is possible to achieve politically. That Hamilton did not think it possible to introduce hereditary elements into the U.S. Constitution in 1787-88 does not mean he did not think it desirable or even necessary. Indeed, he made it clear that he not only thought "the British government is the best in the world," but also that he "doubt[ed] much whether anything short of it will do in

²⁶ Stourzh (55-56) added this simply because it was a highly influential (if insincere) claim made by Madison in *Federalist 10*, although Stourzh noted that he, like John Adams (and probably Madison himself!), did not think the assertion was justifiable.

America.”²⁷ That he thought it both necessary and politically impossible did indeed complicate things for him, but I see no reason to privilege the latter fact over the former. This is the case especially if we consider that he seemed to think that it would someday be politically possible to Anglicize the American constitution. This is supported by a statement he made a few moments later in the same speech, suggesting that public opinion was slowly moving closer to his way of seeing things and that, by implication, he might one day be able to see his true preference come to fruition:

I hope gentlemen of different opinions will bear with me in this, and beg them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which has taken place, and is still going on The members most tenacious of republicanism are as loud as any in declaiming against the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind leads me to anticipate the time when others as well as myself will join in the praise bestowed by Mr. Neckar on the British constitution, namely, that “it is the only government in the world which unites public strength with individual security.”

If Hamilton thought the Anglican constitution would one day be politically achievable in America, then we should not dismiss his admission that he thought this would be a welcome development. It suggests, in fact, that we should entertain the possibility that Hamilton understood his task as a constitutional leader to require both saving America’s republican “experiment” from degeneration into democracy and anarchy while laying the groundwork—institutionally, socio-economically, and culturally—for its eventual transition into something (he thought to be) much better. If this is true, then Hamilton’s speech, far from being a “eulogy” of the British constitution, as Rahe suggests, was in fact an attempt to sway elite opinion toward supporting his longer term objective of leading it to sprout in America.

If the third part of Stourzh’s argument proves anything, it is that Hamilton faced insurmountable political obstacles to implementing hereditary monarchy in 1787-88. Again, if we think sincere preferences are the most relevant consideration in characterizing a person’s constitutional commitments, then we should pay particular attention to that which he said and wrote in the secrecy of the convention. It is difficult to imagine a situation more likely to reveal true preferences. His audience, after all, while not likely to be predisposed to think his vision wise, either in the ideal or political sense, was also not likely to use his statements to kindle fear and distrust of the Convention’s objectives and thereby undermine the constitutional reform that most of the delegates supported. Hamilton knew well that there were limits to what the Convention could seriously consider. Whatever they drafted would need to be acceptable to the great mass of citizens: they could not “shock the public opinion,” as he put it, lest they fail to ratify and thus remain in the much worse status quo. It should be added that Hamilton made it abundantly clear in his writings that he thought a failure to ratify would have disastrous consequences.²⁸

²⁷ Speech at the Federal Convention, June 18, 1787. (Madison’s Notes).

²⁸ See, for example, his “Impressions as to the New Constitution September,” 1787, where he argues civil war, dismemberment, or reunification with Britain would result; and the concluding paragraph of the final *Federalist* essay (85) where he warned of “anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue.”

A final problem with Stourzh's argument is that he claimed not only that Hamilton's proposal was merely for an executive to serve "on good behavior," but also that "hereditary succession was not in his mind (Stourzh 1970, 52)." The record shows, to the contrary, that hereditary monarchy clearly was on Hamilton's mind. In the speech he gave in proposing his plan, for example, he was full of praise for the institution. For example, according to Madison's notes, Hamilton said the following:

As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there be a good government without a good Executive? The English model was the only good one on this subject. The hereditary interest of the king was so interwoven with that of the nation, and his personal emolument so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad, and, at the same time, was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled to answer the purpose of the institution at home.²⁹

Even more telling is that in his notes for the part of his speech where he discussed his actual plan, he wrote (although refrained from actually saying aloud) that the executive "ought to be hereditary, and to have so much power, that it will not be his interest to risk much to acquire more."

2. Skeptical and Critical, But Not Subversive

To be clear, I am not suggesting that Hamilton sought to subvert America's experiment with the self-limiting republic—in the sense of conspiring to install a monarch or stage a coup—or even that he wanted to see it fail. Read's (2000, 59-61) defense of Hamilton's republicanism seems to be predicated upon the assumption that Hamilton had to be either a committed republican who supported America's republican constitution or a monarchist who hoped for its failure:

The fact that Hamilton had greater doubts than most of his contemporaries about the future prospects of republican government does not mean he wanted it to fail. (Had he wanted it to fail, his efforts as treasury secretary to give a fledgling republican government secure fiscal foundations would have been counterproductive.) (ibid. 59)

This statement is correct as far as it goes, but it hardly proves that Hamilton did not prefer the Anglican model (and thus hereditary monarchy.) The problem with this is that it ignores the possibility that Hamilton both feared the republican government's failure and hoped for (or thought necessary) its eventual movement into a constitutional monarchy. If such is the case, it would be quite possible that he would pursue measures he thought would simultaneously help to prevent what he feared and promote, or at least not impede, the development of what suspected was most necessary. His fiscal policies, to use Read's example, would have the effect of increasing both national and executive power at the expense of the States and legislature. This, in his view, would both compensate for problems with pure federalism and republicanism and place the regime on a road to greater future augmentations of relative power by the national executive.

²⁹ Speech at the Federal Convention, June 18, 1787. (Madison's Notes).

Another way to put this is that Hamilton understood there to be a continuum of regimes, ranging from neo-athenian republics to absolute monarchies (with the British mixed constitution somewhere in the middle), and he thought all regimes are in motion toward one extreme or the other.³⁰ The question, then, was in which direction along the continuum America was to move, and Hamilton had a clear sense that the Constitution of 1788 represented movement in the right direction—away from pure republican and toward the mixed constitution—by introducing much-needed monarchical and aristocratical elements in the form of the President, Senate, and Supreme Court. However, in his judgment, it was far from complete. The constitution was still not properly balanced as it was still excessively democratic and deficiently aristocratic and monarchical. Although he thought there was much progress to be made, he certainly did not want to risk moving in the opposite direction, which, in his view, was the likely result of the failure of the republican Constitution.

3. Hamilton's Problematic Disavowals

Another reason to trust Hamilton's statements from the Convention is that his disavowals after the fact were often based on demonstrable falsehoods (indicating he knew he had something to hide), were actually quite modest in their endorsement of republicanism, and were all but silent on the demerits of monarchy. It is not surprising, given what he said at the Convention, that Hamilton's political rivals, Jefferson and Madison in particular, would be inclined to suspect him of conspiring to install a monarch, nor that he would often have to defend himself against such charges. In five surviving documents—two private letters, an internal governmental memo, and two party paper articles—Hamilton defended his republican credentials against charges that he and perhaps the Federalist Party sought to lead the new republic into a monarchy.³¹ Some of his responses were simply silly, such as when he wrote in the "Amicus" essay (1792) that the claim that he "*opposed* the Constitution in the Grand Convention, because it was too *republican*, and advocated the *British monarchy as the perfect standard*" was "a gross misrepresentation" since he, after all, was "the only member from the State to which he belonged who signed the Constitution." All the evidence, of course, from his notes and the transcripts by both Madison and Yates, suggests that the accusation was in fact accurate. And, as was discussed above, that he voted for (and wished well the success of) the Constitution is perfectly compatible with his having thought it fell well short of "the perfect standard." Also unpersuasive were his arguments that he "never made a proposition to the Convention which was not conformable to the republican theory" and that "the highest-toned of any of the propositions made by him was actually voted for by the representation of several States," including Madison.³² The problem with this is that

³⁰ It is not unlikely that he had read Hume's (1752 / 1826) essay, "Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy or to a Republic," wherein Hume speculated as to which direction Britain's mixed regime was heading, implying that, at the time, it was near the middle of a one dimensional continuum from a pure republic to absolute monarchy (and heading slowly toward the latter.)

³¹ "Objections and Answers Respecting the Administration of the Government," 1792; "Letter to Edward Carrington," May 26, 1792; "Catullus to Aristides No. 3," September 29, 1792; "Amicus," September 11, 1792; "Letter to Timothy Pickering," September 18, 1803.

³² "Amicus," 1792. Here he was referring to his proposed amendments that the Senate and President serve on "good behavior." He made a similar argument in ____?

his “highest toned” statements on behalf of the Anglican and against the proposed constitution were not formal propositions. So while it is technically true that he did not officially propose anything inconsistent with “the republican theory,” it does not mean he didn’t make many statements denouncing that theory nor, indeed, that he did not admit “himself not to think favorably of republican government.”

Hamilton offered a more subtle distortion in his letter to Timothy Pickering of September 18, 1803. Here he argued that his proposed plan

was predicated upon these bases: 1. That the political principles of the people of this country would endure nothing but republican government. 2. That in the actual situation of the country, it was in itself right and proper that the republican theory should have a fair and full trial. 3. That to such a trial it was essential that the government should be so constructed as to give all the energy and stability reconcilable with the principles of that theory.

By my terminology, it can be said that his first two propositions assert not only that Hamilton’s political judgment, but also his constitutional judgment, led him to prefer the republican form. This, however, contradicts the thrust of what he actually said at the Convention. There he argued plainly and vehemently that while the people were too prejudiced against monarchy to accept anything other than a republican constitution, he himself “doubt[ed] much whether anything short of [the British constitution] will do in America.” More importantly, it is noteworthy that in this statement he does not claim that *his* political principles will “endure nothing but republican government.” In fact, the second and third propositions reflect a common theme in all of his statements wherein he disavowed his alleged anti-republican views. Hamilton consistently spoke of republicanism as a metaphorical defendant on trial and/or a theory or hypothesis to be tested in the laboratory of North America.³³ His attitude was no exactly that of a detached observer, but rather more that of either a judge maintaining order and procedural fairness in the court or a scientist attempting to carefully control the conditions of experimentation. Like a good common law judge honoring the right of the accused to be held innocent until proven guilty, or a good scientist employing the Cartesian method of methodological doubt, Hamilton withheld judgment about republican government until all the facts were in. “Whatever might be his theoretic doubts,” he wrote of himself anonymously in the third person in 1792, he believed republican government “merited his best efforts to give success to it in practice ... [and] that hitherto, from an incompetent structure of the government, it had not had a fair trial, and that the endeavor ought then to be to secure to it a better chance of success by a government more capable of energy and order.”³⁴

This skeptical, scientific, juridical posture—however sincere it may have actually been—helped Hamilton to turn the tides against his opponents and claim he was the best friend of republican government in America (without disavowing support for the British constitution) while the self-proclaimed “Republicans” were its true enemies. It just so

³³ On one occasion he offered a third metaphor: the republic as a person for whom the status of his immortal soul was in question, thus leading Hamilton to “fear that it may not justify itself by its fruits.” (Letter to Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792.)

³⁴ Hamilton, “Objections and Answers Respecting the Administration of the Government,” 1792.

happened that, as the last quote above hints toward, the factors required for giving republican government a fair trial (or properly controlled experiment) were the very factors neglected by the Americans' insufficient inclusion of aristocratic and monarchical elements in their Constitution: energy, order, stability, firmness, durability, efficiency, and wisdom. As he told Pickering, a "fair trial" for the "republican theory" would be one where the "government [is] so constructed as to give all the energy and stability reconcilable with the principles of that theory." The great thing about this, of course, is that is failsafe for someone who favors the Anglican constitution: If the republic fails under these controlled conditions, the good news is that those very conditions (strength and independence in the President, Senate, and Judiciary) are a step in the right direction toward a constitutional monarchy. If there is any doubt that Hamilton continued to hold the Anglican constitution up as his yardstick of good government, one should take notice of the language he used when admitting to Carrington that he harbored doubts about the future success of the "republican theory:"

I said that I was affectionately attached to the republican theory. This is the real language of my heart, which I open to you in the sincerity of friendship; and I add that I have strong hopes of the success of that theory; but, in candor, I ought also to add that I am far from being without doubts. I consider its success as yet a problem. It is yet to be determined by experience whether it be consistent with that stability and order in government which are essential to public strength and private security and happiness.³⁵

The trial of the republic, in other words, was a question of whether it would meet the high standard of Neckar's description of the British government that Hamilton quoted at the Convention—i.e. that it "unites public strength with individual security."

The flipside of this was that those who threatened to disrupt order by rallying public fear against the policies of the government, or who's policies were intended to diminish the constitutional energy and firmness of the government, were standing in the way of a fair trial for republican government. "The truth unquestionably is," he wrote in a memo, that the only path to a subversion of the republican system of the country is by flattering the prejudices of the people, and exciting their jealousies and apprehensions, to throw affairs into confusion, and bring on civil commotion. Tired at length of anarchy or want of government, they may take shelter in the arms of monarchy for repose and security.³⁶

Similarly, to Carrington he wrote:

On the whole, the only enemy which Republicanism has to fear in this country is in the spirit of faction and anarchy. If this will not permit the ends of government to be attained under it, if it engenders disorders in the community, all regular and orderly minds will wish for a change, and the demagogues who have produced the disorder will make it for their own aggrandizement. This is the old story. If I were disposed to promote monarchy and overthrow State governments, I would mount the hobby-horse of popularity; I would cry out "usurpation," "danger to liberty,"

³⁵ Hamilton to Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792.

³⁶ Hamilton, "Objections and Answers Respecting the Administration of the Government," 1792.

etc., etc.; I would endeavor to prostrate the national government, raise a ferment, and then "ride in the whirlwind, and direct the storm."³⁷

4. Not a Fleeting Moment

Perhaps the best criticism of this interpretation is that it relies too much upon statements made at the Convention. Perhaps, as one very able biographer has argued, Hamilton, being "headstrong," "loose-tongued," and "laboring under some compulsion to express his inmost thoughts," simply "blundered" into his controversial statements and then "never again uttered a kind word for monarchy" (Chernow 2004, 233-235). It seems that this argument gets right at the heart of the matter: What *was* Hamilton's tendency over time? How *did* his statements at the Convention compare to statements he made before and after? More specifically: Is it literally true that Hamilton "never again uttered a kind word for monarchy" after the Convention? What about before it? How did his statements toward monarchy compare to statements he made about republicanism?

To examine this, I read every paragraph in which Hamilton's discussed monarchy or republican government and coded each as either "neutral," "favorable," "unfavorable," or "mixed."³⁸ Hamilton spoke of specific monarchs or of monarchy in 361 paragraphs and 105 discreet cases (i.e. documents or speeches); and he spoke of republics or republicanism in 282 paragraphs across 177 cases. Of the monarchy paragraphs, 92% (331) were coded neutral, while 73% (207) of the republicanism paragraphs were coded as such. At the case-level unit of analysis, there were 85 (81%) neutral monarchy cases and 110 (62.1%) neutral republican cases. In general, my coding decisions were based on the principle that I should error on the side of refuting my thesis (i.e. reading greater republican than monarchical conviction in Hamilton.) Also, I marked statements as neutral unless Hamilton made an explicit evaluative comment regarding republics or monarchs in general; I did not, for example, count a statement as "favorable" if he simply refrained from challenging someone else's view(s).

Charts 1 (a-d) and 2 (a-d) report Hamilton's tendencies in the aggregate and over time in statements about monarchy and republicanism respectively, and Tables 3 and 4 list every statement and attendant coding decision for paragraphs that were not coded "neutral," again, for monarchy and republican paragraphs respectively.³⁹ An immediate finding is that, while Chernow was not quite right that Hamilton literally *never* spoke a good word about monarchy after the Convention (since Hamilton did, after all, make favorable or mixed statements in four paragraphs post-ratification), the more striking fact is that he

³⁷ Hamilton to Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792.

³⁸ Monarchy paragraphs were discovered by a two-step process. First, I conducted the following Boolean search: "monarch* OR king OR kings OR queen OR queens OR royal OR royalty." I then read and coded every returned paragraph, marking some (e.g. references to Rufus King) as "falsepositive." I then did the same for republicanism, simply using "republic*" as the search expression. This yielded just one false positive: a statement about "republication."

³⁹ Since there were only 30 distinct monarchy paragraphs, I list the relevant text from each paragraph in Table 3. However, since there were 75 republican paragraphs, to save space, I simply report my summary coding justification for each paragraph. The full text of each coded paragraph will eventually be available at a stable URL, and is available upon request in the meantime.

offered few evaluative comments about the institution at all. Only 30 paragraphs, eleven of which were from the same case in the pre-war era, evidence a clear attitude toward monarchy. Of these, overall, his assessment was more favorable than unfavorable, even if the pre-revolutionary cases are ignored. Twice in the *Federalist* (22 and 75), for example, out of the shadows of the Convention, he repeated his belief that hereditary monarchs are incorruptible in foreign affairs, suggesting that, in this respect at least, no better model exists for that aspect of executive (Locke's "federative") power. But, in general, he offered few explicit views one way or another about monarchy.

What is striking, however, is how many unfavorable or mixed statements he made about republicanism. Overall, 77% of his non-neutral statements were covered by those two categories, and nearly half (48%) were purely unfavorable. Also notable is that most of these statements were uttered in the latter part of his life, from the framing era (1787-88) until his death (1804). Prior to the Convention he actually evidenced a greater propensity to say favorable or mixed things about republicanism although his overall statement-rate in those earlier time periods was much lower, and actually very similar to the monarchy time series. Beginning with the Convention, however, Hamilton suddenly began to opine much more frequently about republican government and, when he did so, the overwhelming majority of the time he had at best qualified positive things to say about it and, again, nearly half the time, he expressed unqualified unfavorable views.

In perusing Table 4, we find that the overwhelming majority of his 36 unfavorable statements had to do with the inherent instability of republics. Eight times he mentioned that republics are highly susceptible to foreign corruption or intrigue. Another eight times he spoke either of their simple susceptibility to tyrants and demagogues or of their propensity to fall into a complex violent cycle between the extreme of anarchy and despotism. Four times he rejected the claim that republican governments are more pacific or just in their dealings with other states (and therefore claimed that they are unstable in their relations with each other) and another four times he complained that the central tendency in republics is for the legislative to dominate the executive (and therefore to incline too much to democracy.) Of his mixed statements, moreover, four indicated that he thought republics needed to combine monarchical elements in order to enjoy the benefits of both, while six were of the skeptical, scientific, juridical tone, discussed above, whereby he could essentially admit to not thinking republican governments can "unite public strength with individual security"—that is, sustain the conditions of neo-roman liberty—as well as the British constitution and get away with advocating policies designed to make the American Constitution function more like the Anglican model. These findings alone do not prove my thesis, but they certainly are compatible with it.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued that Hamilton adhered to neither the negative nor the positive conceptions of liberty as described by Isaiah Berlin. Instead, his was the view of liberty as non-domination, which I follow Quentin Skinner in referring to as "neo-roman." I contend, against a scholarly consensus that seems to have emerged in the wake

of Stourzh's masterful exposition on Hamilton's political thought, that Hamilton was at most an ambivalent republican who thought neo-roman liberty could best be secured in America by emulating the British mixed constitution. Knowing he was politically prohibited from openly advocating for such a model in America, he instead would try to imbue the American republican constitution with functional equivalents to the aristocratic and monarchical elements he thought desirable or necessary for securing liberty as non-domination through law. In the next chapter I will look more closely at his critique of republican government and attempt to explicate both the intrinsic and extrinsic reasons that he thought the British model to be "the best in the world."

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Table 1: Hamilton’s Usage of “Master-Slave” Language in Statements Pertaining to Political Liberty

Title	Year	Text	Existing or Potential Master-Slave Relationship	Cause of Enslavement
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	That they are enemies to the natural rights of mankind is manifest, because they wish to see one part of their species enslaved by another. That they have an invincible aversion to common-sense is apparent in many respects: they endeavor to persuade us that the absolute sovereignty of Parliament does not imply our absolute slavery; that it is a Christian duty to submit to be plundered of all we have, merely because some of our fellow-subjects are wicked enough to require it of us; that slavery, so far from being a great evil, is a great blessing; and even that our contest with Britain is founded entirely upon the petty duty of three pence per pound on East India tea, whereas the whole world knows it is built upon this interesting question, whether the inhabitants of Great Britain have a right to dispose of the lives and properties of the inhabitants of America, or not.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	The only distinction between freedom and slavery consists in this: In the former state a man is governed by the laws to which he has given his consent, either in person or by his representative; in the latter, he is governed by the will of another. In the one case, his life and property are his own; in the other, they depend upon the pleasure of his master. It is easy to discern which of these two states is preferable. No man in his senses can hesitate in choosing to be free, rather than a slave.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	There is less reason now than ever to expect deliverance, in this way, from the hand of oppression. The system of slavery, fabricated against America, cannot, at this time, be considered as the effect of inconsideration and rashness.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	It is impossible to conceive any other alternative. Our Congress, therefore, have imposed what restraint they thought necessary. Those who condemn or clamor against it do nothing more nor less than advise us to be slaves.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	That the necessity of the times demands it, needs but little elucidation. We are threatened with absolute slavery. It has been proved that resistance by means of remonstrance and petition would not be efficacious, and, of course, that a restriction on our trade is the only peaceable method in our power to avoid the impending mischief.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	That it is not the probable source of greater evils than those it pretends to remedy, may easily be determined. The most abject slavery, which comprehends almost every species of human misery, is what it is designed to prevent.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	Were not the disadvantages of slavery too obvious to stand in need of it, I might enumerate and describe the tedious train of calamities inseparable from it. I might show that it is fatal to religion and morality; that it tends to debase the mind, and corrupt its noblest springs of action. I might show that it relaxes the sinews of industry, clips the wings of commerce, and introduces misery and indigence in every shape.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	Under the auspices of tyranny the life of the subject is often sported with, and the fruits of his daily toil are consumed in oppressive taxes, that serve to gratify the ambition, avarice, and lusts of his superiors. Every court minion riots in the spoils of the honest laborer, and despises the hand by which he is fed. The page of history is replete with instances that loudly warn us to beware of slavery.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	Besides, while Great Britain was engaged in carrying on an unnatural war against us, her commerce would be in a state of decay. Her revenues would be decreasing. An armament, sufficient to enslave America, would put her to an insupportable expense.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	Those who advise you to do it are not your friends, but your greatest foes. They would have you made slaves, that they may pamper themselves with the fruits of your honest labor. 'T is the Farmer who is most oppressed in all countries where slavery prevails.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	You have seen how clearly I have proved, that a non-importation and a non-exportation are the only peaceable means in our power to save ourselves from the most dreadful state of slavery.	American subjugation to	Absence of American

			British	representation in legislative process
<i>A Full Vindication</i>	1774	Are you willing, then, to be slaves without a single struggle? Will you give up your freedom, or, which is the same thing, will you resign all security for your life and property, rather than endure some small present inconveniences?	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	1775	The idea of colony does not involve the idea of slavery. There is a wide difference between the dependence of a free people and the submission of slaves. The former I allow, the latter I reject with disdain.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	1775	When any people are ruled by laws, in framing which they have no part, that are to bind them, to all intents and purposes, without, in the same manner, binding the legislators themselves, they are, in the strictest sense, slaves; and the government, with respect to them, is despotic. Great Britain is itself a free country, but it is only so because its inhabitants have a share in the legislature. If they were once divested of that they would cease to be free. So that, if its jurisdiction be extended over other countries that have no actual share in its legislature, it becomes arbitrary to them, because they are destitute of those checks and controls which constitute that moral security which is the very essence of civil liberty.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	1775	It is therefore evident, to a demonstration, that unless a free agent in America be permitted to enjoy the same privilege, we are entirely stripped of the benefits of the constitution, and precipitated into an abyss of slavery. For we are deprived of that immunity which is the grand pillar and support of freedom.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	1775	The power of legislating for us, and of raising a revenue upon the articles of commerce, would be a sufficient degree of slavery.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	1775	If Great Britain can order us to come to her for the necessaries we want, and can order us to pay what taxes she pleases before we take them away, or when we land them here, we are as abject slaves as France and Poland can show, in wooden shoes, and with uncombed hair.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	1775	If she is determined to enslave us, it must be by force of arms; and to attempt this, I again assert, would be nothing less than the grossest infatuation, madness itself.	American subjugation to British	Absence of American representation in legislative process
<i>Hamilton to Robert Morris Re: National Bank</i>	1781	Great power, commerce, and riches, or, in other words, great national prosperity, may, in like manner, be denominated evils; for they lead to insolence, an inordinate ambition, a vicious luxury, licentiousness of morals, and all those vices which corrupt government, enslave the people, and precipitate the ruin of a nation.	General subjugation	Power, wealth, depravity
<i>Speech On the Treaty of Paris</i>	1783	Mr. Hamilton said that whilst he despised the man who would enslave himself to the policy even of our friends, he could not but lament the overweening readiness which appeared in many to suspect every thing on that side, and to throw themselves into the bosom of our enemies.	American subjugation to foreign powers	Diplomatic weakness
<i>Letter from Phocion: No. 1</i>	1784	But if you make a wanton use of it; if you furnish another example that despotism may debase the government of the many as well as the few, you, like all others that have acted the same part, will experience that licentiousness is the forerunner to slavery.	Subjugation of community to the many or to foreign powers	Licentiousness / anarchy
<i>Letter from Phocion: No. 2</i>	1784	But if experience, in this instance, verifies the lesson long taught by the enemies of liberty, that the bulk of mankind are not fit to govern themselves; that they must have a master, and were only made for the rein and the spur; we shall then see the final triumph of despotism over liberty; the advocates of the latter must acknowledge it to be an ignis fatuus, and abandon the pursuit. With the greatest advantages for promoting it that ever a people had, we shall have betrayed the cause of human nature.	General subjugation	Failure to believe that most of mankind can live without a master
<i>Federalist No 08</i>	1787	The inhabitants of territories often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees, the people are brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither remote nor difficult: but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold, or effectual resistance, to usurpations supported by the military power.	Civilian subjugation to military	Need to repel neighboring enemies
<i>Federalist No 08</i>	1787	If Britain had been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at home co-extensive with those of the other great powers of Europe, she, like them, would in all probability, at this day, be a victim to the absolute power of a single man. It is possible, though not easy, for the people of that island to be enslaved from other causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the kingdom.	British subjugation to foreign powers	Able to avoid without standing army due to insular position

<i>Federalist No 29: Concerning the Militia</i>	1788	If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would the militia, irritated at being required to undertake a distant and distressing expedition, for the purpose of rivetting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen, direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had meditated so foolish, as well as so wicked a project; to crush them in their imagined entrenchments of power, and make them an example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation?	Civilian subjugation to military	Not likely under proposed constitution
<i>Speech at Convention of New York Re: The U.S. Senate (June 24)</i>	1788	What is the tendency of the proposed amendment? To take away the stability of government, by depriving the Senate of its permanency. To make this body subject to the same weakness and prejudices which are incident to popular assemblies, and which it was instituted to correct; to destroy the balance between them. The amendment will render the Senator a slave to all the capricious humors among the people.	Senate subjugation to capricious will of the people	Short Senate terms
<i>Speech at Convention of New York Re: The U.S. Senate (June 28)</i>	1788	But what reasonable man, for the precarious enjoyment of rank and power, would establish a system which would reduce his nearest friends and his posterity to slavery and ruin?	Subjugation of many by the few	Disclaiming this as a motive of the framers of the the proposed constitution
<i>Vindication of the Funding System: No. 3</i>	1791	Of the second class of exceptions, the case of certain feudal rights, which once oppressed all Europe, and still oppress too great a part of it, may serve as an example; rights which made absolute slaves of a part of the community, and rendered the condition of the greatest proportion of the remainder not much more eligible.	Subjugation of many by the few	Feudal laws
<i>Tully: No. 3</i>	1794	Those, therefore, who preach doctrines, or set examples which undermine or subvert the authority of the laws, lead us from freedom to slavery; they incapacitate us for a government of laws, and consequently prepare the way for one of force, for mankind must have government of one sort or another.	Citizenry subjugated to government by force alone	Failure of rule of law due to violent defiance of legitimate laws
<i>Americanus: No. 1</i>	1794	[A]fter wading through seas of blood, in a furious and sanguinary civil war, France may find herself at length the slave of some victorious Sylla, or Marius, or Casar	Subjugation of few and many to one	Anarchy and disorder
<i>Americanus: No. 2</i>	1794	The subjugation of the United States to the dominion of those powers would fall more strongly under a like consideration. 't is impossible that either of them should consent that the other should become master of this country, and neither of them without madness could desire a mastery, which would cost more than 't was worth to maintain it, and which, from an irresistible course of things, could be but of very short duration.	Subjugation of America to European powers	Not likely to happen, because of lack of concerted effort by European states
<i>France</i>	1796	Those who can justify displeasure in France on this account, are not Americans, but Frenchmen. They are not fit for being members of an independent nation, but are prepared for the dependent state of colonists. If our government could not without the permission of France terminate its controversies with another foreign power, and settle with it a treaty of commerce, to endure three or four years, our boasted independence is a name. We have only transferred our allegiance! We are slaves!	Subjugation of America to France	Treaty obligations too onerous
<i>Hamilton's Draft of Washington's Farewell Address</i>	1796	That nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. . . . The government sometimes participates in this propensity, and does through passion what reason would forbid at other times; it makes the animosity of the nations subservient to hostile projects which originate in ambition and other sinister motives. The peace, often, and sometimes the liberty of nations, has been the victim of this cause.	Subjugation of America to European powers	Either habitual hatred or habitual fondness for other powers
<i>Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7, 1801: No. 1</i>	1801	Had he been victorious, those Americans, whose lives might have been spared, would have been doomed to wear out a miserable existence in slavery and chains.	Subjugation of America to European powers	Jefferson's construction of constitutional war powers
<i>Speech In the Case of Harry Crosswell</i>	1803	We have been careful that when one party comes in it shall not be able to break down and bear away the others. If this be not so, in vain have we made constitutions; for if it be not so, then we must go into anarchy, and from thence to despotism and to a master... [Liberty] is not to be endangered by a few thousand of miserable, pitiful military. . . . It is to be subverted only by a pretence of adhering to all the forms of law, and yet by breaking down the substance of our liberties; by devoting a wretched but honest man as the victim of a nominal trial.	Subjugation of Americans to despotic mob	Anarchy due to failure to uphold sanctity of law

Table 2: Sampling of Statements (Post-Independence) Indicating Hamilton’s Explicit Rejection of the Revolution-Inspired View that Only Republics can be Free

Title	Year	Text
<i>Speech in the Federal Convention (Madison's Notes)</i>	1787	He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of republican government; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their government as high as possible ... He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever; and trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it, though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible.
<i>Federalist No 09</i>	1787	From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics, the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. They have decried all free government, as inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans.
<i>Federalist No 26</i>	1787	In England, for a long time after the Norman conquest, the authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were gradually made upon the prerogative, in favour of liberty, first by the barons, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest part of its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant.
<i>Federalist No 70</i>	1788	In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a maxim which has obtained for the sake of the public peace, that he is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred. Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no responsibility whatever in the executive department, an idea inadmissible in a free government.
<i>Draft by Hamilton of Washington Letter to the President of the National Assembly of France</i>	1792	The circumstances which, under the patronage of a monarch who has proved himself to be the friend of the people over whom he reigns, have promised the blessings of liberty to the French nation, could not have been uninteresting to the free citizens of the United States, especially when they recollected the dispositions which were manifested by the individuals as well as by the government of that nation toward their still recent exertions in support of their own rights.
<i>Americanus: No. 1</i>	1794	... that the French nation will establish for themselves not only a free but a republican government ...
<i>Hamilton's Draft of Washington's Farewell Address</i>	1796	There is an opinion that parties in free countries are salutary checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to invigorate the spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is true; and in governments of a monarchical character or bias, patriotism may look with some favor on the spirit of party.
<i>Hamilton's Draft of Washington's Farewell Address</i>	1796	'T is essentially true that virtue or morality is a main and necessary spring of popular or republican governments. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force to all free governments.

Charts 1 (a-d): Hamilton on Monarchy

Chart 1 (a): Total Paragraphs in which Hamilton Expressed Favorable, Mixed, Or Unfavorable Views on Monarchy




Chart 1 (b): Total Cases




Chart 1 (c): Paragraphs in Which Hamilton Expressed Favorable, Mixed, or Unfavorable Views on Monarchy by Time Period





Chart 1 (d): Cases



Charts 2 (a-d): Hamilton on Republican Government / Republicanism

Chart 2 (a): Total Paragraphs in which Hamilton Expressed Favorable, Mixed, Or Unfavorable Views on Republicanism




Chart 2 (b): Total Cases




Chart 2 (c): Paragraphs in Which Hamilton Expressed Favorable, Mixed, or Unfavorable Views on Republicanism by Time Period




Chart 2 (d): Cases




Table 3: Text Data Used for Charts 1 (a-d) (Hamilton on Monarchy)

Time Period	Code	Title	Date	Text
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	So that to disclaim the authority of a British Parliament over us does by no means imply the dereliction of our allegiance to British monarchs...
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	The most valid reasons can be assigned for our allegiance to the king of Great Britain, but not one of the least force or plausibility for our subjection to parliamentary decrees.
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	Another, and the principal source, is that protection which we have hitherto enjoyed from the kings of Great Britain... The king himself, being the supreme executive magistrate, is regarded by the constitution as the supreme protector of the empire... He it is that has defended us from our enemies, and to him alone we are obliged to render allegiance and submission.
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	The law of nature, and the British constitution, both confine allegiance to the person of the king, and found it upon the principle of protection... Hence it is evident, that while we enjoy the protection of the king it is incumbent upon us to obey and serve him, without the interposition of parliamentary supremacy.
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	Thus there may be one [legislature] in Great Britain, another in Ireland, and another in New York; and still these several parts may form but one state. In order to do this there must indeed be some connecting, pervading principle; but this is found in the person and prerogative of the king. He it is that conjoins all these individual societies into one great body politic. He it is that is to preserve their mutual connection and dependence, and make them all co-operate to one common end?the general good. His power is equal to the purpose, and his interest binds him to the due prosecution of it.
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	The affairs of government might be conducted with the greatest harmony, and by the mediation of the king directed to the same end. He (as I before observed) will be the great connecting principle. The several parts of the empire, though otherwise independent on each other, will all be dependent on him. He must guide the vast and complicated machine of government, to the reciprocal advantage of all his dominions. There is not the least contradiction in this; no <i>imperium in imperio</i> , as is maintained: for the power of every distinct branch will be limited to itself, and the authority of his Majesty over the whole will, like a central force, attract them all to the same point.
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	I will go farther and assert that the authority of the British Parliament over America would, in all probability, be a more intolerable and excessive species of despotism than an absolute monarchy...
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	[Parliament] is not even requisite for preserving the connection between Great Britain and the colonies, for that is sufficiently secured in two ways: by being united under the same king, and by the important privilege of regulating our commerce, to which we have submitted.
Pre-War	Favorable	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	... I am a warm advocate for limited monarchy, and an unfeigned well-wisher to the present Royal Family.
Pre-War	Mixed	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	The dependence of the colonies on Great Britain is an ambiguous and equivocal phrase. It may either mean dependence on the people of Great Britain or on the king. In the former sense, it is absurd and unaccountable; in the latter, it is just and rational.
Pre-War	Mixed	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	The right of Parliament to legislate for us cannot be accounted for upon any reasonable grounds. The constitution of Great Britain is very properly called a limited monarchy; the people having reserved to themselves a share in the legislature, as a check upon the regal authority, to prevent its degenerating into despotism and tyranny.

Pre-War	Mixed	<i>The Farmer Refuted</i>	February 5, 1775	Perhaps, indeed, it may with propriety be said that the king is the only sovereign of the empire. The part which the people have in the legislature may more justly be considered as a limitation of the sovereign authority, to prevent its being exercised in an oppressive and despotic manner. Monarchy is universally allowed to predominate in the constitution. In this view, there is not the least absurdity in the supposition, that Americans have a right to a limitation similar to that of the people of Great Britain...
War	Mixed	<i>Hamilton to James</i>	September 3, 1780	All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the State in the hands of individuals. As these men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a monarchy and republic in our constitution.
War	Mixed	<i>Hamilton to Robert Morris</i>	1780	We want a Minister of War, a Minister of Foreign Affairs, a Minister of Finance, and a Minister of Marine. There is always more decision, more dispatch, more secrecy, more responsibility, where single men, than where bodies, are concerned. By a plan of this kind we should blend the advantages of a monarchy and of a republic in a happy and beneficial union.
War	Mixed	<i>The Continentalist: No. 2</i>	July 19, 1781	In a single state where the sovereign power is exercised by delegation, whether it be a limited monarchy or a republic, the danger most commonly is, that the sovereign will become too powerful for his constituents. In federal governments, where different states are represented in a general council, the danger is on the other side--that the members will be an overmatch for the common head; or, in other words, that it will not have sufficient influence and authority to secure the obedience of the several parts of the confederacy.
War	Unfavorable	<i>The Continentalist: No. 1</i>	July 12, 1781	Most of them had been originally governed by kings, whose despotism (the natural disease of monarchy) had obliged their subjects to murder, expel, depose, or reduce them to a nominal existence, and institute popular governments.
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Favorable	<i>Federalist No 75</i>	March 26, 1788	It has been remarked, upon another occasion, and the remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary monarch, though often the oppressor of his people, has personally too much at stake in the government, to be in any material danger of being corrupted by foreign powers...
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Favorable	<i>Speech in the Federal Convention (Madison Notes)</i>	June 18, 1787	...As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on republican principles... The English model was the only good one on this subject. The hereditary interest of the king was so interwoven with that of the nation, and his personal emolument so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad, and, at the same time, was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controlled to answer the purpose of the institution at home...
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Mixed	<i>Federalist No 09</i>	Nov. 21, 1787	So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in opposition to a general union of the states, that he explicitly treats of a confederate republic as the expedient for extending the sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of monarchy with those of republicanism.
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Mixed	<i>Federalist No 22</i>	Dec. 14, 1787	An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal interest in the government, and in the external glory of the nation, that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens of every other kind.
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Mixed	<i>Federalist No 26</i>	Dec. 22, 1787	But it was not till the revolution in 1688, which elevated the prince of Orange to the throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely triumphant.
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Mixed	<i>Federalist No 73</i>	March 21, 1788	If a magistrate, so powerful, and so well fortified, as a British monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under co[n]sideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected in a president of the United States, clothed, for the short period of four years, with the executive authority of a government wholly and purely republican?

Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Unfavorable	<i>Federalist No 26</i>	Dec. 22, 1787	The principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an hereditary monarch, were, by an injudicious excess, extended to the representatives of the people in their popular assemblies.
Post-War / Pre-Ratification	Unfavorable	<i>Federalist No 34</i>	Jan. 5, 1788 the expenses incurred in the prosecution of the ambitions enterprises and vain glorious pursuits of a monarchy
Post-Ratification	Favorable	<i>Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7, 1801: No. 17</i>	March 20, 1802	From the Constitution of the British monarchy, the thing chiefly to be apprehended is an overbearing influence of the crown upon the judges. The jealousy of executive influence resting upon more powerful motives in that country than in this, it may be expected to operate as a stronger obstacle there than here to an improper combination between the executive and legislative departments to invade the judiciary. Moreover, the British Executive has greater means of resisting parliamentary control than an American Executive has of resisting the control of an American Legislature; consequently the former would be in less danger than the latter, of being driven to a concurrence in measures hostile to the independence of the judges. And in both these ways, there would be greater security for the British than for the American judges.
Post-Ratification	Favorable	<i>Hamilton to ---</i>	May 16, 1793	...when I see an unfortunate prince [Louis XVI], whose reign was a continued demonstration of the goodness and benevolence of his heart, of his attachment to the people of whom he was the monarch, who, though educated in the lap of despotism, had given repeated proofs that he was not the enemy of liberty...
Post-Ratification	Mixed	<i>Americanus: No. 2</i>	February 8, 1794	No man, I believe, but will think it probable, however disadvantageous the change in other respects, that a monarchical government, from its superior force, would ensure more effectually than our present form our permanent unity as a nation...
Post-Ratification	Mixed	<i>Objections and Answers Respecting the Administration of the Government</i>	1792	... the republican theory ought to be adhered to in this country as long as there was any chance of its success; ... the idea of a perfect equality of political rights among the citizens, exclusive of all permanent or hereditary distinctions, was of a nature to engage the good wishes of every good man, whatever might be his theoretic doubts; ... it merited his best efforts to give success to it in practice; ... hitherto, from an incompetent structure of the government, it had not had a fair trial, and that the endeavor ought then to be to secure to it a better chance of success by a government more capable of energy and order.
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	<i>Eulogium On Major-general Greene</i>	July 4, 1789	Nathaniel Greene, descended from reputable parents, but not placed by birth in that elevated rank which, under a monarchy, is the only sure road to those employments that give activity and scope to abilities, must, in all probability, have contented himself with the humble lot of a private citizen, or, at most, with the contracted sphere of an elective office, in a colonial and dependent government, scarcely conscious of the resources of his own mind, had not the violated rights of his country called him to act a part on a more splendid and more ample theatre.

Table 4: Coding Justifications for Data Used for Charts 2 (a-d) (Hamilton on Republicanism)

Time Period	Code	Title	Date	Coding Justification
Pre-War	Mixed	Remarks On the Quebec Bill: No. 2	1775	Derisive statement about New England republicanism and probably (though not necessarily) republicanism in general
War	Favorable	Hamilton to Robert Morris	April 30, 1781	Banks are more easily established, and less likely to be abused through frequent wars, in republics
War	Favorable	Report on Impost Duty	December 16, 1782	Modern institutional political science has given us powerful means to enjoy benefits of republican government (e.g. security) while avoiding its imperfections
War	Favorable	The Continentalist: No. 6	July 4, 1782	Federal Republic a noble and magnificent vision
War	Mixed	Hamilton to Governor George Clinton	Feb. 13, 1778	Expression of doubt of republican government AND guilt over the feeling
War	Mixed	Hamilton to Robert Morris	1780	Implication that republic needs to incorporate monarchical principles in order to enjoy benefit of both
War	Mixed	Hamilton to James Duane	September 3, 1780	Implication that republic needs to incorporate monarchical principles in order to enjoy benefit of both
War	Mixed	Hamilton to John Dickinson	1783	Republican governments ESPECIALLY must protect themselves from mutiny / licentiousness of the army
War	Mixed	Hamilton to John Dickinson	1783	Republican governments ESPECIALLY must protect themselves from mutiny / licentiousness of the army
War	Unfavorable	Hamilton to Washington	March 25, 1783	Excessive republican jealousy leads to distrust of army (/ even of militia)
Post-War / Pre-Convention	Favorable	Letter from Phocion: No. 2	1784	Due process rights are core republican principles
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Federalist No 09:	Nov. 21, 1787	A few historical examples can give us hope that republics can protect civil liberty
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Federalist No 09:	Nov. 21, 1787	Modern institutional political science has given us powerful means to enjoy benefits of republican government (e.g. security) while avoiding its imperfections
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Speech to New York	1787	Desirable quality of republican government is that power is derived from consent of the people
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Federalist No 34	Jan. 5, 1788	Republics may avoid monarchical wars of ambition and vainglory
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Federalist No 66	March 8, 1788	Speaks of genius of republican government
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Speech at Convention of New York	June 21, 1788	American federal constitution well designed to protect the people's liberty
Convention / Ratification	Favorable	Speech at Convention of New York	June 24, 1788	Desire a republican government, so long as it stable
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Brief of Speech on Submitting His Plan of Constitution	June 18, 1787	If energetic executive is inconsistent with republican government, then republican government must be bad government
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Federalist No 09	Nov. 21, 1787	Implication that republic needs to incorporate monarchical principles in order to enjoy benefit of both
Convention /	Mixed	Federalist No 09	Nov. 21, 1787	Implication that republic needs to incorporate monarchical principles in order to enjoy benefit

Ratification				of both
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Federalist No 73	March 21, 1788	President certainly not too strong to overwhelm legislative -- if anything, it's too weak
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Speech at Convention of New York	June 20, 1788	Republics can survive, but none hitherto have on account of weakness in the head creating resistance in the members
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Speech at Convention of New York	June 21, 1788	Since laws in republics emanate from the "public wishes," it is fortunate that the American people are "exceedingly enlightened and refined"
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Speech at Convention of New York	June 21, 1788	Inevitable that property will become more unequal, and consequently the most meritorious will no longer be elected to serve regardless of their wealth
Convention / Ratification	Mixed	Speech at Convention of New York	June 21, 1788	Doubtful of its success/skeptical of theory/fearful of failure/not proven compatible with security and/or order, but wished it success/sought to give it a fair trial
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Brief of Speech on Submitting His Plan of Constitution	June 18, 1787	Commercial Republics NOT more pacific or just in dealings with other states
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Brief of Speech on Submitting His Plan of Constitution	June 18, 1787	Commercial Republics NOT more pacific or just in dealings with other states
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Brief of Speech on Submitting His Plan of Constitution	June 18, 1787	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 01	Oct. 27, 1787	Statement suggesting susceptibility of republics to tyrant or demagogues
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 22	Dec. 14, 1787	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 22	Dec. 14, 1787	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 28	Dec. 26, 1787	Republican theory is false in claiming rule by force of law alone is only legitimate admissible principle
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 28	Dec. 26, 1787	Republics prone to (cycle of) revolutions, anarchy, (and/or) despotisms
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 06	Nov. 14, 1787	Commercial Republics NOT more pacific or just in dealings with other states
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 09	Nov. 21, 1787	Derisive mention of ancient republics' propensity to exist between the extremes of anarchy and tyranny (between violent revolutions)
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Speech in the Federal Convention	June 26th, 1787	Republics prone to (cycle of) revolutions, anarchy, (and/or) despotisms
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Speech in the Federal Convention	June 22, 1787	Hamilton admits to not thinking highly of republican government
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Speech in the Federal Convention	June 18, 1787	No good executive can be established on republican principles
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Speech in the Federal Convention	June 18, 1787	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 29	Jan. 9, 1788	Excessive republican jealousy leads to distrust of army (/ even of militia)
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 68	March 12, 1788	Republics highly susceptible to cabal, intrigue, and/or corruption (general)
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 70	March 15, 1788	Republics susceptible to dissensions and factions

Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 70	March 15, 1788	Common republican belief that power is always safer if dispersed rather than if held by one man is false in the case of executive power and, if true, would not compensate for the other evils created by it (loss of energy)
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 70	March 15, 1788	Common republican belief that power is always safer if dispersed rather than if held by one man is false in the case of executive power and, if true, would not compensate for the other evils created by it (loss of energy)
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Federalist No 71	March 18, 1788	Tendency of republican government is for legislative aggrandizement of power relative to other departments
Convention / Ratification	Unfavorable	Speech at Convention of New York	June 24, 1788	Instability prominent and defective feature of republican systems
Post-Ratification	Favorable	Eulogium On Major-general Greene	July 4, 1789	In a republic persons are able to develop and employ their natural talents
Post-Ratification	Favorable	Americanus: No. 2	February 8, 1794	General statement favorable toward republicanism
Post-Ratification	Favorable	Hamilton to Washington Re: Opposition to Internal Duties	1794	Republics committed to securing compliance with law without force if possible
Post-Ratification	Favorable	Tully: No. 4	1794	Republics Moderate
Post-Ratification	Favorable	Hamilton to Jonathan Dayton	Jan. 6, 1799	General statement favorable toward republicanism
Post-Ratification	Favorable	Address to the Electors of the State of New York	1801	General statement favorable toward republicanism
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Catullus to Aristides: No. 3	September 29, 1792	Doubtful of its success/skeptical of theory/fearful of failure/not proven compatible with security and/or order, but wished it success/sought to give it a fair trial
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Hamilton to Colonel Edward Carrington	May 26, 1792	Doubtful of its success/skeptical of theory/fearful of failure/not proven compatible with security and/or order, but wished it success/sought to give it a fair trial
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Hamilton to Colonel Edward Carrington	May 26, 1792	Attached to the theory and want to see it succeed, but it must (/ fear that it won't) prove itself consistent with order and happiness in practice
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Hamilton to Colonel Edward Carrington	May 26, 1792	Attached to the theory and want to see it succeed, but it must (/ fear that it won't) prove itself consistent with order and happiness in practice
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Objections and Answers Respecting the Administration of the Government	1792	Doubtful of its success/skeptical of theory/fearful of failure/not proven compatible with security and/or order, but wished it success/sought to give it a fair trial
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Draft by Hamilton of Secretary of State Letter to Mifflin	1794	Doubtful of its success/skeptical of theory/fearful of failure/not proven compatible with security and/or order, but wished it success/sought to give it a fair trial
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Hamilton to Timothy Pickering	Sept. 18, 1803	Doubtful of its success/skeptical of theory/fearful of failure/not proven compatible with security and/or order, but wished it success/sought to give it a fair trial
Post-Ratification	Mixed	Hamilton to Timothy Pickering	Sept. 18, 1803	Attached to the theory and want to see it succeed, but it must (/ fear that it won't) prove itself consistent with order and happiness in practice
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Addresses on Behalf of Federalist Candidates	February 18, 1789	Statement suggesting susceptibility of republics to tyrant or demagogues
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Catullus to Aristides: No. 3	September 29, 1792	Statement suggesting susceptibility of republics to tyrant or demagogues
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Hamilton to Colonel Edward Carrington	May 26, 1792	Republics threatened by anarchy
Post-	Unfavorable	Objections and Answers	1792	Republics prone to (cycle of) revolutions, anarchy, (and/or) despotisms

Ratification		Respecting the Administration of the Government		
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Pacificus: No. 6	July 17, 1793	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Camillus: No. 1	July 22, 1795	Statement suggesting susceptibility of republics to tyrant or demagogues
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Camillus: No. 1	July 22, 1795	Commercial Republics NOT more pacific or just in dealings with other states
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Abstract of Points to Form Washington's Farewell Address	1796	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Camillus: No. 35	1796	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Hamilton's Draft of Washington's Farewell Address	September 1, 1796	Republics prone to (cycle of) revolutions, anarchy, (and/or) despotisms
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	The Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq, President of the United States	1800	Republics highly susceptible to foreign influence and corruption
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7, 1801: No. 15	March 9, 1802	Tendency of republican government is for legislative agrandizement of power relative to other departments
Post-Ratification	Unfavorable	Examination of Jefferson's Message to Congress of December 7, 1801: No. 15	March 9, 1802	Tendency of republican government is for legislative agrandizement of power relative to other departments
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