

## **Presidential Success in Foreign and Domestic Policy Areas**

Elizabeth Freund  
Department of Government and Politics  
University of Maryland  
[efreund@gvpt.umd.edu](mailto:efreund@gvpt.umd.edu)

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## **Introduction**

What designates a successful president? This deceptively simple query continues to intrigue political scientists due to the variety of the potential ways to gauge presidential success. In the past, one measure of the success of a President was his ability to pass his policy agenda through Congress. More recently, researchers have begun to examine the presidency in an empirical manner. Bond and Fleisher (1990), Covington et al (1995), Edwards (1980) and Fleisher et al (2002) are just a few of many cases in this newer examination. These empirical studies focus on roll call votes or presidential concurrence rates<sup>1</sup> to determine how successful presidents were and how able they were to exert their influence with Congress. Past research has tended to focus on overall legislative success or highly aggregated policy areas, such as a simple division between foreign and domestic policy. (Bond and Fleisher, 1990; Covington et al, 1995; Wildavsky, 1966).

The goal of this paper is to examine what influences presidential success in Congress and to determine if certain presidents can be designated more successful in certain policy areas than others. Specifically, I examine different foreign and domestic policies from 1957 to 1996 (the 85<sup>th</sup> through the 104<sup>th</sup> sessions of Congress). By disaggregating issues into more specific foreign and domestic spheres, this paper will address the extent to which presidents have had influence in a number of different policy areas. This focus on legislative success allows for an empirical study of the presidency and can provide a lens for evaluating and comparing “modern” presidents.

## **Literature Review**

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<sup>1</sup> Concurrence rates are the percentage of members of Congress who agree with the president’s position on a roll call vote.

The relationship between the President and Congress is just one perspective in the examination of presidential success. Key to this perspective is the extent to which presidents have influence over their own legislative success (Bond and Fleisher 1990; Edwards, 1980). One of the earliest approaches at examining overall presidential success centered on the President's leadership characteristic, his negotiating and bargaining skills and the role these characteristics played in the President's ability to "get things done" (Neustadt 1960).

Other studies have examined presidential success based upon roll call votes in the House as well as in the Senate (Covington et al 1995, Fleisher et al 2002). Covington et al (1995) focused on additional measures of presidential support such as party leaders' support and whether the bills were on or off the agenda. Research has also looked at the impact of public appeals on legislative success finding that presidents promote issues with the most popular support (Canes-Wrone 2001).

In Congress, the goal of elected officials is reelection (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1989). This theoretical approach assumes that Members behave in a manner that will best enable them to achieve reelection, and that they will use the resources available to them in order to make the best decisions on policy issues. Research has found that party, ideology and constituency are the most important determinants in congressional roll call votes (Aldrich, 1995; Kingdon 1981; Matthews and Stimson 1975). Fenno (1978) and Mayhew (1974) find that constituents elect Representatives with both policy and partisan preferences that are compatible with their own. Despite a rise in individualism and a focus on constituency views, Representatives still tend to align with their party most

often. Party affiliation and loyalty still play a role in the voting decisions of Representatives as well as their potential re-election success (Cox and McCubbins 1994).

This theoretical framework provides a set of variables which may be important in the examination of what influences a President's success in Congress. One approach commonly taken in assessing presidential skill is to use a baseline to determine which presidents are more skillful (Edwards 1980; Bond and Fleisher 1990). Previous research has shown how the composition of Congress has affected a President's ability to pass his agenda. Other factors such as honeymoon period, public approval and overall size of the agenda also potentially influence success.

One of the main findings of past research is that the partisan and ideological composition of Congress often determines the President's success on roll call votes (Bond and Fleisher 1990). Members of the same political party share common policy goals and preferences. The expected impact of party is greater agreement on policy issues between the president and congressional members of the same party. Additionally, the legislative record of the president can be either an asset or an obstacle to members of the same party. Party has the potential to be a strong determinant of presidential legislative success. When the President and Congress are of the same party (unified), one would expect greater legislative success than when they are of different parties (divided). While Mayhew (1994) rejects the concept that divided government has a negative impact on legislative output, others have found that it can have an impact (Binder 1999; Krause 2000).

There is also strong theoretical support that timing is another explanation for a president's legislative success. The overall assumption is that the honeymoon period is

the time when a president's policy initiatives have the greatest success. The honeymoon is an early period of grace and good temper in which all presidents can expect at least a limited amount of success (Light, 1982). The historic precedent for the honeymoon period, or "first hundred days," goes back to March 4, 1933 through June 12, 1933 when Franklin Roosevelt introduced and passed dozens of programs through Congress. The honeymoon is generally a period of bipartisan cooperation that would enable a president, whether working with a divided or a unified government, to achieve legislative success. Overall, presidents tend to do better with Congress during the first hundred days of their inaugural year compared to the first hundred days in non-inaugural years (Dominguez, 2002). The literature has established that some presidents, like Reagan, have had more successful honeymoon periods, compared to others, like Carter, that have had less successful honeymoons (Bond and Fleisher, 1983).

Presidential capital is another factor that may influence legislative success. Light (1999) argues that several different indicators including number of same party seats in Congress, public approval, and margin of electoral victory influence presidential capital. Presidential capital typically tends to decrease throughout a president's term in office. Capital plays an important role in setting a presidential agenda and as a President's capital contracts, it directly affects the likelihood of passing his domestic agenda (Light 1999). Tied to capital is what Light refers to as the "cycle of decreasing influence". Presidential capital, time, and energy are the basis of this cycle. One example of this cycle is the traditional midterm loss of seats by those in the President's party.

Public approval plays a part in legislative success beyond the impact it has on a President's capital. Public approval and public prestige can be sources of influence for a

president (Neustadt, 1960). “Yet the prevalent impression of a President’s public standing tends to set a tone and to define the limits of what Washingtonians do for him or do to him” (Neustadt, 1960). In periods where a president’s approval is high, there is evidence showing that the president exerts some power over Congress. (Edwards, 1989) Past research has also found presidential approval to have a positive relationship with the President’s legislative approval rate. (Rivers and Rose, 1985)

The President is conventionally viewed as playing a prominent role in setting the policy agenda (Light, 1982; Kingdon, 1984; Neustadt, 1960). Richard Neustadt (1960) states that, “Congressmen need an agenda from the outside, something with high status to respond or against. What provides it better than the program of the President?” Past research finds that the president plays a role in determining the policy agenda and influencing Congress. In general, the President is viewed as the chief foreign policy leader while he shares leadership with Congress on issues of domestic policy. In setting the policy agenda, the president has an interactive relationship with congress in putting issues on the domestic agenda. This relationship allows the President to act as a policy entrepreneur and direct the attention of congress and the media to presidential initiatives (Edwards and Wood, 1999).

The literature also examines how presidential power plays a role in the difference between foreign and domestic policy. Wildavsky (1966) theorized that there are two presidencies, one for foreign policy and one for domestic, and that presidents exercise far more power with regard to foreign policy than domestic. However, since Wildavsky’s original article, international events and wars have weakened the power of the presidency in foreign affairs. Since 1966, the two presidencies theory has been both supported and

criticized by researchers (Fleisher & Bond 1988; Peterson 1994; Sigelman 1979).

Presidents can make foreign policy decisions and actions without Congressional approval far more easily than they can with domestic policies (Lindsay & Steger 1993). In Leloup and Shull's (1979) examination of the two presidencies theory, they take an initial examination of presidential success in different policy areas. While they continue to aggregate foreign policy, they disaggregate domestic policy for their analysis into five different areas. Their findings suggest that presidents are still more successful in passing proposals in Congress on foreign policy matters than in any of the domestic policy areas (Leloup & Shill 1979). Given Wildavsky's assumption that presidents work more closely with Congress on domestic policy, then those factors which influence presidential success in domestic policy may not be the same as those that influence success in foreign policy.

Party may also play a role in greater success in one policy arena versus another. An examination of the period between 1953 and 1984 found that Republican presidents tend to win more often on foreign policy than on domestic policy (Fleisher & Bond 1988). While this paper does not aim to continue the debate regarding the two presidencies, the literature does aid in making a case regarding the role the president plays in the foreign policy process and illustrates that historically there have been varying rates of presidential success in areas of foreign and domestic policy.

The literature identifies ideology, presidential popularity, and time in office as influencing the presidential-congressional relationship (Kingdon, 1973; Neustadt, 1960; Edwards, 1980). Past examinations have focused mainly on the particular aspects of the relationship, where in the term, whether or not the government is unified or divided, or on examining overall presidential success or support in one or both chambers. Edwards

(1980) looked at average presidential support scores for domestic and foreign policies in the Senate and average support scores by president and party in the House between 1955 and 1970. While Edwards found that members of the president's party supported his policies more than members of the opposition party, he compared the average support scores and overall policy areas. The two presidencies literature contributes the additional perspective that presidents are at times more successful in certain policy areas than others.

In order to achieve the goal of this paper, I will take the literature on presidential success beyond overall support and apply variables used in the previously established models to examine presidential success in specific foreign and domestic policy areas as well as overall domestic and foreign policy success. This research adds to the already developed literature of presidential influence by further detailing what variables may or may not influence success in specific policy areas. This examination also adds empirical evidence in the examination of the two presidencies theory. I find that what influences presidential success with regard to domestic policy is different from those variables influencing success in foreign policy areas.

### **Methods**

For the purposes of this research, I will use the dependent variable of presidential support score or "concurrency rate" in the House of Representatives for each of the policy areas. The concurrency rate is the actual percentage of members who concurred with the president's position on the roll call (computed by and reported in *Vital Statistics on the Presidency*.) Because the primary interest here is the overall success of the president at gaining approval for bills he favors and preventing bills he is against, these scores are the

best option. Presidential support scores allow for a consistent measure of policy success over time, as well as in different policy areas over a longer period. Using member concurrence rates also provides a more precise measure of agreement between individual members of the House and the President (Ragsdale 1998). Previous examinations of presidential success use these scores (Lockerbie et al 1998; Bond and Fleisher 1980). Presidential support scores may have some weaknesses as all the votes have equal weight, considered equally important and may include multiple votes on the same issue (Edwards, 1985). Despite these weaknesses, support scores are still commonly used and are the best measure available for examining presidential success. Lockerbie et al (Lockerbie et al 1998) made a similar case for using support scores rather than alternative measures.

Presidential support scores are the percent of votes that the president wins out of all roll call votes on which he takes a position. This time period includes nine different administrations ranging from Eisenhower's second term to Clinton's first term. Five of the nine presidents were Republicans and three had second-terms.<sup>2</sup> The support scores used in this paper are the *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* percentage of support for the President on House Roll Call votes by policy area. These scores are available for all the presidents from 1957-1996. The foreign policy areas are foreign trade, foreign aid and defense. The domestic policy areas are social welfare, economic management and resources.<sup>3</sup> *Vital Statistics on the Presidency* (1998) uses these same topic areas for the

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<sup>2</sup> Dwight Eisenhower, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan all were elected to two terms during the time period.

<sup>3</sup>Policy topic areas include the following: Foreign trade – foreign trade, diplomacy, or immigration; foreign aid – various forms of assistance to other countries; defense – military, defense, veterans issues; social welfare- social welfare, civil rights, Indian affairs, and education; economic management – government and economic management, income tax issues; resources – energy, natural resources, environment, and transportation.

discussion of congressional relations. The topics within each of these six policy areas encompass a wide range of policies. Considering defense policy as part of the broader foreign policy category fits previous research on defense and foreign policy (Meernik 1993; Fleisher et al 2000). Between 1957 and 1996, the President took a position on an average of 7 foreign policy roll call votes per year and 17 domestic policy roll call votes. The overall average support score for foreign policy roll calls is 59.2 and for domestic policy areas, 55.7. Compared to domestic policy, areas of foreign policy (trade and aid) as well as defense have higher average support scores over time. While foreign policy may have a higher average support score, some presidents were less successful in overall foreign policy matters compared to domestic policy areas. As table one shows, the scores for each area vary greatly from president to president and from area to area.

[insert table 1 here]

[insert figure x here]

The measure used for presidential popularity is the annual average of presidential approval ratings from the longstanding Gallup Opinion Poll. Gallup asked the same question each year included in the sample “Do you approve or disapprove of the way the President is handling his job as president?” Average presidential approval ranged from 34.68 percent to 76.29 percent. Popularity is also included because of its connection to presidential capital. As approval goes down, capital decreases and a president’s ability to pass his agenda usually decreases as well. Also included in the model is a measure for presidential capital. The measure of capital is a continuous variable scaled one through eight for each year in a president’s term. I expect a decrease in success as a president’s time in office progresses.

To address the issue of whether or not a president has a mandate, or even a perceived mandate, the model includes the percent of possible Electoral College votes. This ranges from 55.2 percent to 97.58 percent. The expected result is that greater the percentage of the Electoral College, the larger the greater the success rate.

Like Lockerbie (1998), I include a measure of long-term trends in presidential influence. This variable tests to see if there is long-term decline in presidential success that would occur independently of the other variables. Past research has discussed the existence of this trend (Lockerbie 1998; Kernell 1986; Skorownek 1993) and while the measure used here is basic, the results allow for an initial examination into a possible decline in success.

Three independent variables are included to determine the impact of institutional factors. A set of dummy variables measures the party of the President coded as “0” for Republican and “1” for Democrat. The models also include a variable to measure a unified legislature, coded as “0” for divided legislature and “1” for unified. Since the Democrats controlled the House for all but two of the years (1995 & 1996) then this variable also serves as a democratically-controlled legislature. A variable for periods of war is also included in the models (1 for 1965-1973 and 1991, 0 for otherwise). Especially with regard to defense policy, the expected result is that during a war the President should expect greater success with Congress than during times of peace.

I will use an OLS regression to test each of the policy areas against a consistent set of independent variables. The first model tests for success against using aggregate foreign and domestic policy concurrence rates as the dependent variable. The second

model uses the disaggregated concurrence rates for the six policy areas as the dependent variable.<sup>4</sup>

### **Results and Findings**

The results of the regressions using Model One are reported in Table Two. As expected, the year variable measuring trend shows a decline over time in success for both foreign and domestic policy. While this is just a simple beginning in an examination to see if presidents are less powerful in setting their agenda with Congress, these preliminary results seem to support this case. The positive direction for war suggests that during periods of war presidents have higher success rates than during periods of peace. This was certainly expected in foreign policy given that especially during times of war one would expect Congress to defer to the President on all foreign policy concerns. Democratic presidents were more successful in domestic policy than their Republican counterparts were, while the party of the President is not significant for foreign policy. Assuming the two presidencies theory is correct, the lack of significance in presidential party for foreign policy would be because, regardless of party, Congress defers to the will of the president in foreign policy. The lack of significance for the party of the House and unified legislature in foreign policy would also support these assumptions.

Table Three reports the results from Model Two with the disaggregated policy areas as the dependent variables. Table Three shows that for each of the different policy areas, different variables are significant. Like overall foreign policy, the year variable was negatively related to success showing a downward trend in presidential success in defense policy. As predicted, war is positively related to defense success. Holding all

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<sup>4</sup> In order to test to see if individual president have an impact on success a model was tried introducing dummy variables for each of the presidents. Even after removing several of the independent variables there

else constant, during times of war presidents have better success in defense policy than during times of peace. A Democratic House has a positive relationship to defense policy. One possible explanation is the overwhelming dominance of the democratic control of the House during the period. An alternative explanation is that during periods of unified government the House's success increases and during periods of divided government, it is easier to cross party lines and support the President in some policy areas, specifically defense policy.

The results for foreign trade and foreign aid were very similar. In both cases, only year was statistically significant and negatively related to success. This result supports the concept of decline success rates, especially as it is consistently significant across all three foreign policy areas. Interestingly, no other variables were significant for foreign trade and foreign aid. This raises more questions than answers but one possible explanation is that in these two areas, the President can still act independently without Congressional interference. An unexpected result is that war was only significant for defense policy. One would have expected it to be significant for all three of the foreign policy areas. Of the three, this was the most predictable. However, the may be that presidents have to expend so much capital to ensure their defense policy is passed during times of war that little remains for trade or aid.

Of all the policy areas, social policy had the most variables that were significant. The model for social policy also explains 75% of the variance in the dependent variable, which is the best of all six models. Again, year and success had a negative relationship. Unlike the foreign policy models, the party of the President was significant for social policy. Democratic presidents were more successful than their Republican counterparts

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was a high level of multi-co-linearity.

were. Given the democratic control of the House during this period, this result is not surprising. Because social policy issues tend to be more partisan in nature, having a unified government would imply increased probability of presidential success.

Presidential party was also significant for resource policy, with Democratic presidents being more successful than Republicans were. Resource policies include the environment, energy and natural resources. Similar to social policy, Democratic presidents' resource agenda generally differs greatly from Republican presidents' resource agenda (i.e. Reagan versus Carter on environmental policy). The democratic House may be an asset in helping presidents of the same party to achieve their policy objectives in this area. Resource policies were the only area where the trend variable was not significant, showing that presidential success has not declined over time with regard to resource policies.

Economic policies were the only domestic policy area where war was significant and positively related. During times of war, presidents have greater success with economic policies than during times of peace. This could be due in part to the impact that war has on the overall economy of the country.<sup>5</sup>

The variable which was significant most often was the year variable. In five of the six policy areas there was a negative trend showing that concurrence rates have decreased over time in all three foreign policy areas and in two of the domestic policy areas. The decrease was largest for foreign trade policy. This is due to the change in the trade policy in the United States and the increasing role the global economy plays in manufacturing and trade issues. Holding everything else equal, there has been a

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<sup>5</sup> Future iterations of this paper will include a variable to measure the U.S. economy which would help to flush out the impact of the economy not only economic policy success but also in the other policy areas.

downward trend over time in presidential success. The overall trend towards decreased success may also be due to increasing partisanship and its impact on presidential success.

One unexpected finding is the direction of the Electoral College variable. It had a negative relationship with social and economic policy areas. It seems counterintuitive that the larger the proportion of the Electoral College a president receives, the less successful his policies. One possible explanation may be that presidents who come into office with the perception of a mandate from the public may feel that they are able to take positions on issues, which they may have otherwise avoided, in the belief that they can sway public, as well as congressional, opinion. Presidents who win under a landslide may think that overwhelming public support translates into complete support for their policy objectives. In other words, presidents who feel that they have a mandate and let that influence their decision making may in fact be committing the classic sin of hubris.

### **Conclusion**

The significance of presidential party in both resource and social policy reflects the president acting as a policy entrepreneur in overall domestic policy (table two) and in specific domestic policy areas. Democratic presidents take the lead on social and resource policy, and a democratic House supports their position. Presidential party also illustrates that viewing domestic policy in disaggregate areas provides additional information. While party was significant for overall domestic policy, it was not significant for economic policy. The benefit of viewing policy success by disaggregate areas is also illustrated when it is applied to foreign policy. War and overall foreign policy success have a positive relationship. However, when examining the specific areas, it does not hold true across the board. This is a preliminary start at narrowing the focus

of presidential success to specific policy areas. In looking at the individual policy areas, one starts to see a different story of what influences presidential success. This paper makes the case that there is a benefit to looking at both overall policy and specific policy areas and that the latter helps us have a fuller view of how presidential success varies from policy to policy.

This paper also begins to address the different factors that affect foreign policy success versus domestic policy. Most striking is that the variables that have a relationship with success in domestic areas, specifically presidential party, are not as significant to foreign policy. This fits within the existing research and supports previous assumptions that the President must work more deliberately with Congress on domestic concerns than with foreign policy matters. Another explanation is what makes a president successful in foreign policy areas is very different from successful in domestic policy areas. While some presidents may be very strong in one realm, they may not have the same success in another. An easy example of this is Johnson whose domestic policy success (Great Society programs) were greatly overshadowed by his foreign policy with regard to Vietnam.

The two presidencies literature has generally looked at overall foreign and domestic policy success rather than specific policy areas. While the intent of this paper was not to continue the debate on the two presidencies, the differences found between what influences success on the various foreign and domestic policy areas may serve as a starting point for a more detailed examination to see if the two presidencies exists in specific foreign and domestic policy areas.


The difference in what influences success in foreign and domestic policy may also be the different role that Congress plays in these two arenas. If Congress differs with the President in areas of foreign policy and plays a greater role in determining domestic policy and setting the domestic agenda, then the factors that influence success in these two policy areas will differ. Another explanation for the difference in success with foreign and domestic policy is the role the public plays in influencing decisions in these two policy areas. The model at use here does not determine which factors may affect foreign policy. This is certainly a goal for future research. Also interesting is a further examination of the impact a mandate, or perceived mandate, has on the issue choices a president makes and whether that leads to pushing issues that have a lower possibility of success.

This paper looks at what influences both foreign and domestic policy success, rather than the aggregate of all policy decisions, to determine what factors have a relationship to presidential success in these areas. While the use of percent support in the House on roll calls does not give a direction on who initiated the bill, the House or the President, it does allow for a broad examination of what possible relationships influence the President getting his way on a policy preference.

**Table 1: Percentage of Support for the President on House Roll Call by Issue Area  
1957-1996**

President	Year	Foreign	Domestic	Foreign Trade	Foreign Aid	Defense	Social	Economic	Resources
Eisenhower	1957	58.37	56.20	70.1	54.4	50.6	56.9	56.3	55.4
Eisenhower	1958	70.23	59.13	70.1	60	80.6	63.2	62.8	51.4
Eisenhower	1959	73.07	56.87	99.5	70.3	49.4	55.6	69	46
Eisenhower	1960	53.57	48.53	56.1	58.3	46.3	55.6	34.8	55.2
Kennedy	1961	80.30	59.20	84.2	71.6	85.1	70.1	55.6	51.9
Kennedy	1962	72.17	69.03	71.7	61.7	83.1	78.8	70	58.3
Kennedy	1963	65.23	67.73	69.9	54.5	71.3	74.9	62.7	65.6
Johnson	1964	62.73	70.97	74.3	64.5	49.4	65.3	63	84.6
Johnson	1965	73.03	73.67	81.5	68.9	68.7	72.7	66.6	81.7
Johnson	1966	66.17	71.20	75.5	69.9	53.1	69.4	67.1	77.1
Johnson	1967	65.97	66.87	59.7	58.7	79.5	69.9	68	62.7
Johnson	1968	71.93	69.87	68.6	70	77.2	72.5	61.7	75.4
Nixon	1969	76.07	54.93	85.9	56.2	86.1	59.3	59.9	45.6
Nixon	1970	69.77	73.80	76.3	64.8	68.2	58.1	82.8	80.5
Nixon	1971	60.97	65.30	66.1	51.2	65.6	61.7	73.5	60.7
Nixon	1972	71.10	61.27	80.1	65.2	68	55.9	61.7	66.2
Nixon	1973	56.00	51.87	51.3	72.5	44.2	47.6	57.5	50.5
Nixon	1974	43.77	59.87	33.3	49.4	48.6	54.9	57.7	67
Ford	1975	61.47	44.00	69.9	61.8	52.7	30.5	49	52.5
Ford	1976	56.43	45.73	52.5	60.3	56.5	45.2	43.1	48.9
Carter	1977	59.47	63.37	67.7	49.2	61.5	73.6	56	60.5
Carter	1978	54.23	61.87	55	52.8	54.9	58.5	64.3	62.8
Carter	1979	59.80	57.77	60.7	53.9	64.8	59.9	58	55.4
Carter	1980	59.67	61.80	72.8	50.8	55.4	66.2	59.9	59.3
Reagan	1981	47.33	61.47	54.7	31.7	55.6	52.3	59.1	73
Reagan	1982	65.03	48.27	67.7	61.6	65.8	47.6	41.1	56.1
Reagan	1983	52.87	36.43	43.3	57.5	57.8	38.8	39.8	30.7
Reagan	1984	54.20	42.43	56.5	50.6	55.5	38.7	47.4	41.2
Reagan	1985	51.83	40.00	51.7	53.6	50.2	28.9	48.5	42.6
Reagan	1986	42.40	43.33	37.4	40.3	49.5	40.9	47.3	41.8
Reagan	1987	45.47	34.13	39.5	43.5	53.4	39.3	28.3	34.8
Reagan	1988	53.57	30.30	39.4	68	53.3	32.4	27.3	31.2
Bush	1989	55.03	49.00	58.4	55.2	51.5	48.9	58.5	39.6
Bush	1990	46.23	39.60	34	47.6	57.1	42.5	43	33.3
Bush	1991	51.30	46.77	52.1	43.2	58.6	48.5	48.5	43.3
Bush	1992	41.30	46.67	32.5		50.1	46	45.4	48.6
Clinton	1993	62.03	64.00	68.6	62.2	55.3	73	62.5	56.5
Clinton	1994	61.30	67.40	66.2		56.4	52.7	50.7	98.8
Clinton	1995	46.20	49.57	50	48	40.6	53	50.4	45.3
Clinton	1996	51.63	57.63	71	43.4	40.5	53	58.5	61.4

**Figure 1: Average Percentage of Support for the President on House Roll Calls by Issue Area, 1957-1996.**



**Table 2: OLS Regression Results for Presidential Success by Average Domestic & Foreign Policy**

	Average Foreign	Average Domestic
Popularity	0.040 (0.37)	-0.109 (1.00)
Electoral College	-0.089 (1.06)	-0.149* (1.77)
Trend	-0.863 (1.35)	-0.943 (1.46)
Year	-0.484*** (4.24)	-0.418*** (3.65)
War	5.076* (1.93)	6.680** (2.53)
President Party	3.345 (1.20)	10.152*** (3.63)
House Party	2.965 (0.46)	0.725 (0.11)
Unified Legislature	-0.563 (0.16)	-0.781 (0.22)
Constant	1,018.722*** (4.41)	897.231*** (3.86)
Observations	40	40
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.571	0.679

*Note:* Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

**Table 3: OLS Regression Results for Presidential Success by Policy Area**

	Defense	Foreign Aid	Foreign Trade	Social	Resources	Economic
Popularity	0.008 (0.05)	-0.050 (0.36)	0.140 (0.74)	0.027 (0.25)	-0.229 (1.08)	-0.124 (0.90)
Electoral College	-0.190 (1.52)	0.136 (1.27)	-0.222 (1.51)	-0.164* (1.98)	-0.042 (0.25)	-0.241** (2.27)
Trend	-0.871 (0.91)	-0.301 (0.37)	-1.446 (1.29)	-0.165 (0.26)	-1.382 (1.10)	-1.280 (1.58)
Year	-0.348** (2.05)	-0.354** (2.26)	-0.768*** (3.86)	-0.430*** (3.81)	-0.355 (1.59)	-0.469*** (3.25)
War	6.731* (1.72)	3.465 (1.02)	4.848 (1.06)	4.145 (1.59)	7.235 (1.40)	8.659** (2.60)
President Party	2.649 (0.64)	3.348 (0.91)	2.679 (0.55)	14.786*** (5.37)	13.642** (2.50)	2.029 (0.58)
House Party	18.262* (1.92)	-0.565 (0.07)	-10.139 (0.91)	1.747 (0.28)	5.224 (0.42)	-4.641 (0.57)
Unified Legislature	-4.725 (0.91)	5.825 (1.28)	-2.417 (0.40)	2.083 (0.60)	-1.792 (0.26)	-2.636 (0.60)
Constant	747.108** (2.17)	743.051** (2.34)	1,604.136*** (3.98)	907.294*** (3.96)	768.130* (1.70)	1,015.783*** (3.47)
Observations	40	38	40	40	40	40
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.354	0.254	0.474	0.754	0.310	0.512

*Note:* Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

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