

# Coalition Dissolution and Network Dynamics in the American Antiwar Movement

Michael T. Heaney

Assistant Professor  
Department of Political Science  
University of Florida  
234 Anderson Hall  
P.O. Box 117325  
Gainesville, FL 32611-7325  
e-mail: [mtheaney@ufl.edu](mailto:mtheaney@ufl.edu)  
<http://plaza.ufl.edu/mtheaney/>

Fabio Rojas

Assistant Professor  
Department of Sociology  
Indiana University, Bloomington  
Ballantine Hall 744  
1020 E. Kirkwood Ave.  
Bloomington, IN 47405  
e-mail: [frojas@indiana.edu](mailto:frojas@indiana.edu)  
<http://mypage.iu.edu/~frojas/>

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## Abstract

Social movement networks and coalitions are closely related phenomena. Networks are critical to forming and sustaining coalitions, while coalitions are contexts within which to strengthen or weaken network ties. This research examines the consequences of coalition dissolution on the mobilization and structure of social movement networks. We examine the collapsed coalition between United for Peace and Justice and the ANSWER Coalition in the contemporary American antiwar movement to illuminate the dynamic relationship between networks and coalitions. First, we find that coalition dissolution affects mesomobilization by making movement actors less able to mobilize the constituencies of their former coalition partners because of variation in information channels, political attitudes, and organizational contacts. Second, we find that the underlying structure of movement networks is robust in the wake of significant coalition rifts. Nonetheless, coalition dissolution weakens the ties surrounding the previous coalition partners and creates opportunities for actors uninvolved in the split to reaffirm and improve their opportunities for brokerage in the network.

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Social movement networks and coalitions are closely related phenomena (Diani and Bison 2004; Diani, Lindsay, and Purdue 2007). Networks are regularized patterns of relationships among social movement activists and organizations that develop as they struggle collectively to change society. Coalitions are formalized relationships among activists and organizations established ostensibly to achieve shared objectives within the broader goals of a social movement. They aid the mesomobilization of social movements by integrating the work of myriad organizations that mobilize individual participants into action (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). Rather than being distinct from networks, coalitions are a particular organizational form that participants seek to impose upon part of a network (Croteau and Hicks 2003: 254). By forming coalitions, activists and organizations attempt to establish rules of interaction, boundaries, goals, and stability on what are more typically unruly, unbounded, multipurpose, and dynamic structures.

Coalitions vary in temporal stability. They may be ad hoc and short-lived – sometimes formed exclusively for the purpose of staging a single event – or they may be highly institutionalized and enduring – formed with the intention of addressing a wide range of issues over a long period of time (Levi and Murphy 2006; Mahoney 2007; Staggenborg 1986; Tarrow 2005: 161-179). While the length of a coalition’s life may vary by design, it may also fluctuate with the vicissitudes of politics, including ideological disputes, altered political opportunity structures, dwindling resources, and personality conflicts (Meyer and Corrigan-Brown 2005; Krinsky and Reese 2006; Rochon and Meyer 1997; Staggenborg 1986; Van Dyke 2003; Zald and McCarthy 1987). Indeed, whether a coalition is to be ad hoc or enduring can only be known for sure in retrospect, as experience with its actual formation and operation causes participants to

revise their evaluations of the coalition's benefits and costs (Mische and Pattison 2000).

Preexisting social networks play a critical role in the formation and dissolution of coalitions by supporting (or undermining) trust and credible commitments (Levi and Murphy 2006). Networks provide information about which actors are likely to make desirable coalition partners that contribute to the collective tasks of the coalition (Corrigan-Brown and Meyer 2007; Heaney 2004a). In response, coalition politics feed back onto networks by helping “to structure concrete relationships in a changing political arena” (Mische and Pattison 2000: 167). Just as successful coalition work has an impact on network structures by helping to build bridges and forge long-term alliances, failed coalition work – or the dissolution of existing coalitions – influences network structures by weakening relationships and making future alliances more difficult to create.

What are the consequences of coalition dissolution for social movement networks? This question is important to activists who worry that disunity within a movement may be a cause of failure to achieve its goals (Gamson 1975; Mansbridge 1986). We contend that coalition dissolution affects the ability of movement actors to mobilize participants and shapes the resulting structure of movement networks. First, we argue that coalition dissolution affects mesomobilization by making movement actors less able to mobilize the constituencies of their former coalition partners. We consider constituency effects related to demographics, information channels, political attitudes and involvement, and direct organizational contacts. Second, we argue that the underlying structure of movement networks is likely to be robust in the wake of coalition rifts. Nonetheless, coalition dissolution weakens the ties of the previous coalition partners and creates opportunities for actors uninvolved in the split to reaffirm and improve their

opportunities for brokerage in the network. The end result is that preexisting network structures serve to cushion the effects of coalition dissolution on the social movement.

This research explores the interplay between coalitions and networks by examining the network consequences of a well-documented case of coalition dissolution in the contemporary American antiwar movement. We investigate the tense relationship between the two largest grassroots coalitions opposing the American invasion and occupation of Iraq: United for Peace and Justice (UFPJ) and the ANSWER Coalition (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism). The two groups formed a grand coalition to stage a major demonstration against the Iraq War that drew an estimated 300,000 participants to Washington, DC on September 24, 2005 (Dvorak 2005). Conflicts during the planning and execution of the demonstration led UFPJ to declare that it would not engage in future organizing work with ANSWER in the foreseeable future, thus effecting a permanent rift in the antiwar movement (United for Peace and Justice 2005). We examine the consequences of this rift using participant observation and surveys conducted at the September 24, 2005 rally and two later rallies in Washington, DC organized separately by UFPJ (January 27, 2007) and ANSWER (March 17, 2007).

We proceed, first, by discussing the theoretical relationship between coalitions and networks. Second, we explain the differences between ANSWER and UFPJ and the causes for the rift between them. Third, we present the results of our participant surveys at the ANSWER and UFPJ rallies and identify the differences in constituent mobilization. Fourth, we map the network consequences of the UFPJ-ANSWER split on the antiwar movement as a whole. We conclude by elucidating the implications of coalition dissolution for the antiwar movement and propose questions for future research.

## **Coalitions and Networks**

Social movements are built out of complex webs of overlapping networks that span a multiplicity of issues, ideologies, and social relations (Diani 1992, 2000; Mische 2003). Social movement organizations draw upon these networks when mobilizing for action (Gould 1995; McAdam, 1988). However, when undertaking large campaigns, the networks of any single movement organization are generally insufficient to meet its goals. Thus, multiple organizations working together through coalitions are often essential to secure the resources, attention, and participation necessary to make a large project successful (Staggenborg 1986). Mesomobilization is the process of bringing these actors into alignment by framing issues broadly and attending to the maintenance needs of individual organizations (Gerhards and Rucht 1992). This process is necessarily tenuous and difficult, in part, because movements are usually composed of moderate and radical strands that are regularly in conflict with one another (Ansell 2001; Haines 1988; Rucht 2004).

Coalitions are an increasingly utilized mechanism for resolving – or at least ameliorating – the differences that emerge during mesomobilization (Smith 2004). Coalitions are most likely to function successfully when their goals are defined in terms of enhancing political influence, when they face threats from their environments, and when individual organizations within the coalition are able to retain distinct identities in the collaborative process (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; McCammon and Campell 2002; see also Browne 1990; Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999). Coalitions are most likely to fail when they become plagued by ideological conflicts, framing disputes, or when individual members of the coalition possess sufficient resources to operate independently (Jones et

al. 2001; Rochford 1989; Staggenborg 1986). Problems may arise if participants begin to see the coalitions themselves as targets of activism (Clemens and Minkoff 2004).

Further, conflicting personalities and organizational imperatives may lead to coalition dissolution, “giving rise to recriminations among organizers about ‘who did what’ or who failed to carry out agreed-upon tasks” (Tarrow 2005: 171).

We argue that the mesomobilization process is significantly affected when coalitions dissolve. Elements of the social movement that had been in alignment become disjointed after dissolution. This change is unlikely to prevent the social movement from mobilizing entirely – since most of the original network connections from which the coalition was built are likely to remain in place – but organizers must now find new ways to reach the constituencies and resolve the conflicts that were addressed by the coalition.

We hypothesize that coalition dissolution affects a movement’s ability to mobilize supporters along four dimensions: 1. demographics; 2. information channels; 3. political attitudes and involvement; and 4. direct organizational contacts. First, different coalition arrangements appeal to varied demographic constituencies. Indeed, coalitions may be organized around their ability to appeal to women, the elderly, youth, Latinos, the working class, college graduates, or other groups. A coalition that includes the National Organization for Women, for example, ought to have a comparative advantage in reaching out to women, since the invocation of a gendered organizational identity alters the mobilization process (Taylor 1999). When the organizational compositions of coalitions change, so should the capacity to reach targeted audiences in the population.

Second, different coalition arrangements vary in their infrastructure for and method of contacting potential supporters (Fisher et al. 2005). Organizations such as

MoveOn.org specialize in reaching people through the Internet, while other organizations such as AARP (formerly the American Association of Retired Persons) place a greater premium on the mass media. Coalitions generally divide the tasks of the coalition among members according to the possession of special skills and resources (Hula 1999). When coalitions dissolve, a movement's ability to tap into these skills and resources, and thus to reach out to supporters, is changed. Further, coalitions may vary in their geographic reach, with some coalitions drawing supporters from a specific geographic area and others boasting a broader regional, national, or international appeal (Brenner 2004; Fisher et al. 2005; Heaney and Rojas 2006).

Third, coalitions differ in their relationships with the wider political system. Some coalitions are poised to work closely with mainstream political institutions – including the major political parties – while others prefer an outsider posture (Heaney and Rojas 2007). Moreover, coalitions may face reinforcing or hostile political environments, with some benefiting from sympathetic public opinion and others targeted by a well-organized countermovement (Curtis and Zurcher 1974; Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). Coalitions embedded within reinforcing contexts should be more likely to mobilize individuals on the boundary of the movement and the broader political system, since they are more likely to draw support from the mainstream. Alternately, coalitions facing hostile political environments are more likely to attract support disproportionately from committed activists. We expect that coalitions should attract individual supporters that share their outlook toward the broader political system.

Fourth, direct organizational contacts are vital to mesomobilization. Coalitions differ in what kinds of organizations are able to make contacts on their behalf.

Organizational identities may be constructed based on the issue they focus on (such as nuclear weapons proliferation or civil liberties), the constituencies they represent (such as immigrants or African Americans), or the ideologies they espouse (such as progressive or communist) (Heaney 2004b). Organizations also differ in their accessibility to members through their geographic location and frequency of open meetings.

Because coalitions affect who is mobilized by the social movement, they consequently influence the network structure of the movement. However, we do not expect coalition dissolution radically to reconfigure the structure of movement networks. The underlying structure of movement networks is derived from the unfolding of social movements over time, as the advocates from allied movements gradually spill over into other arenas as issues and circumstances evolve (Meyer and Whittier 1994). This spillover connects organizations through multiple, overlapping networks of activists working across issue areas that are robust to perturbations in any one network (Diani 2004).

Despite the relative stability of movement networks, the experience of working together in coalition alters the nature of some relationships; positive relationships are strengthened and problematic relationships are weakened or severed. Divisions created between some organizations during coalition dissolution become opportunities for other organizations to enhance their brokerage potential in the network (Burt 1992; Simmel [1922] 1955). In particular, “actors who are adept at using strategic ambiguity . . . might become central actors in alliance networks” (Mische and Pattison 2000: 277; see also Padgett and Ansell 1993). As a result, actors that drive the dissolution of a coalition may find that they lose strategic position to organizations that are able to retain the appearance

of neutrality in the conflict. Coalition dissolution is, thus, an opportunity for key actors to rearrange their positions in the network. In the next section, we explain how conflict between UFPJ and ANSWER provided such an opportunity.

### **The Formation and Dissolution of a Grand Coalition**

The contemporary American antiwar movement emerged following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – which created expectations of a prompt American military response in Afghanistan or elsewhere – with the founding of International ANSWER on September 14, 2001. The establishment of ANSWER and the growth of the antiwar movement spurred a “spillout” from the global justice movement as antiglobalization activists began to redirect their attention to issues of war and peace (Bennis 2006; Hadden and Tarrow 2007).

The antiwar movement remained relatively small as long as U.S. military intervention remained focused on Afghanistan. However, as it became clear by mid 2002 that the Bush Administration had its sights set on Iraq, the movement grew significantly (Cortright 2004; Bennis 2006; Hayden 2007). UFPJ was founded on October 25, 2002 as part of an effort to assemble a broader coalition of activists from movements against previous wars, nuclear disarmament, and other aspects of U.S. foreign policy (Cortright 2004: 13).

We began observing ANSWER and UFPJ systematically in October 2002 and continued to observe them through the summer of 2007. Our fieldwork on UFPJ involved attendance at four rallies, participation in three lobby days, visitation of five planning meetings, and two interviews with key organizers.<sup>1</sup> Our fieldwork on

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<sup>1</sup> We attended the following UFPJ rallies: August 29, 2004 in New York, NY; March 19, 2005 in Fayetteville, NC; September 25, 2005 in Washington, DC; and January 27, 2007 in Washington, DC. We

ANSWER included attendance at six rallies and three interviews with three key organizers.<sup>2</sup> Additionally, we maintained subscriptions to the e-mail listservs of both organizations and monitored their Web pages regularly. Drawing upon these observations and documents, we outline below the principal similarities and differences between the two coalitions and expand upon the nature of the cooperation and conflict between them.

UFPJ and ANSWER are similar in that they are both large grassroots coalitions that regularly sponsor demonstrations opposing the U.S.-Iraq War. They mobilize substantially more participants than other coalitions, such as Not in Our Name or the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. Other active coalitions, such as Win Without War, the Iraq Coordinating Group, and the Americans Against Escalation in Iraq, mostly work behind the scenes in the legislative arena or by purchasing advertising in the mass media, rather than by staging street demonstrations (Corrigan-Brown and Meyer 2007). A side-by-side comparison of ANSWER and UFPJ is presented in Table 1.

The most significant difference between UFPJ and ANSWER is the nature of their issue foci. UFPJ aims to segregate the Iraq War from other foreign policy issues, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It argues that in order to build the broadest

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participated in the following UFPJ lobby days in Washington, DC: September, 26, 2005; May 22, 2006; and January 29, 2007. We visited the following planning meetings: July 20, 2005 in New York, NY; September 25, 2005 in Washington, DC; May 21, 2006 in Washington, DC; January 28 in Washington, DC; and June 22-24, 2007 in Chicago, IL (the 3rd UFPJ National Assembly). We interviewed Sue Udry, National Legislative Coordinator, on January 11, 2006 in Washington, DC and Judith LeBlanc, National Co-Chair, on June 29, 2007 in Atlanta, GA at the United States Social Forum.

<sup>2</sup> We attended the following ANSWER rallies in Washington, DC: October 26, 2002; January 18, 2003; March 15, 2003; January 20, 2005; September 24, 2005; and March 17, 2007 (march from Washington, DC to Virginia). We interviewed Sarah Sloan, National Staff Director, by telephone on January 25, 2005; Peta Lindsay, National Youth and Student Coordinator, on March 18, 2005 in Fayetteville, NC; and Eugene Puryear, National Student Organizer, on June 29, 2007 in Atlanta, GA at the United States Social Forum.

**Table 1. Comparison of United for Peace and Justice and the ANSWER Coalition**

	United for Peace and Justice	ANSWER Coalition
<b>Politics</b>		
<i>Issue Focus</i>	Issue Segregation	Multi-issue Unification
<i>Ideology</i>	Progressive / Radical	Radical
<i>Decision Making</i>	Transparent and Open; 2/3 majority	Opaque / Informal
<i>Tactics</i>	Outside and Inside	Outside
<i>Engagement with Mainstream Political Institutions</i>	Moderate	Low
<i>Perspective on Unity within the Movement</i>	Unity is Desirable, but Competing Coalitions are Acceptable	Unity is Essential
<i>Opposition from Countermovement</i>	Moderate / Low	High
<b>Organization</b>		
<i>Founding Date</i>	October 25, 2002	September 14, 2001
<i>National Coordinator</i>	Leslie Cagan	Brian Becker
<i>National Headquarters</i>	New York City	Washington, DC
<i>Operating Budget</i>	\$1,189,482 in 2005	Not publicly available
<b>Membership</b>		
<i>Number of Member Organizations</i>	More than 1,300	Hundreds
<i>Prominence of Steering Committee Members within Movement</i>	High	Low
<i>Governing Bodies</i>	National Peace and Justice Assembly; Steering Committee	Steering Committee

*Source:* ANSWER Coalition (2005, 2007), ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee (2005), United for Peace and Justice (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2007a, 2007b), and personal observations from interacting with the two coalitions over the 2002-2007 period.

coalition possible, it should focus on the one issue about which the largest number of organizations can agree: ending the war in Iraq (United for Peace and Justice 2005b).

When it does address other foreign policy issues (such as nuclear proliferation), it does so

in distinct fora, so as to avoid alienating organizations that do not take a stand on the issue in question. For example, UFPJ organized a march for a “Just Peace in Palestine and Israel” on June 10, 2007, but very clearly distinguished this event from its anti-Iraq-War campaign.

In contrast to UFPJ, ANSWER maintains that opposition to the American occupation of Iraq must be linked to wider issues of U.S. militarism and imperialism around the globe, including intervention in places such as Haiti and Latin America. It references Martin Luther King, Jr.’s decision during the civil rights movement to oppose the Vietnam War, despite worries that doing so might have divided the civil rights movement (ANSWER Coalition 2005). It argues that only by showing solidarity with oppressed peoples everywhere – especially Arab American and Muslim peoples – is it possible to halt American imperialism.

Beyond their issue foci, ANSWER and UFPJ diverge along a number of dimensions, with ANSWER serving as the leader of the “radical flank” of the antiwar movement and UFPJ heading the “moderate flank” (cf. Haines 1988). ANSWER and its member groups generally embrace radical ideologies, while UFPJ and its member groups come from more diverse ideological perspectives, ranging across a spectrum from progressive to radical. From a rhetorical perspective, ANSWER almost always attempts to challenge American hegemony in its statements, while UFPJ and its member groups are more likely to attempt to harness American hegemony as a persuasive tool (cf. Maney, Woehrle, and Coy 2005). UFPJ’s decision-making process tends to be transparent and open, requiring a 2/3 majority, while ANSWER’s decision-making process is more opaque and informal. ANSWER favors outsider political tactics. When

asked about his organization's approach to lobbying, ANSWER's National Student Organizer, Eugene Puryear (2007), responded that "[w]e feel that the easiest way to lobby is to get in the streets." In contrast, UFPJ organized congressional lobby days in 2005, 2006, and 2007, and makes an effort to work with members of Congress who fight for the antiwar movement's positions, such as Lynn Woolsey (D-CA), Barbara Lee (D-CA), and Jim McGovern (D-MA).

UFPJ is more engaged with mainstream political institutions, such as the Democratic Party, than is ANSWER. UFPJ is willing to tolerate some degree of disunity within the antiwar movement and to allow multiple coalitions to oppose the war from different vantage points. ANSWER, however, sees disunity in the antiwar movement as an "abrogati[on of] responsibility" and an indignation to "the victims of empire and war" (ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee 2005: 4-5). ANSWER is regularly singled out for attacks by conservative media outlets and grassroots organizations, especially Free Republic, the Protest Warriors, and Rolling Thunder. UFPJ, for the most part, is spared from attacks by an organized countermovement.

The moderate and radical flanks of the antiwar movement have varied over time in their willingness to work together. Despite their differences, UFPJ and ANSWER found enough common ground to work together on several occasions, including the October 25, 2003 rally in Washington, DC and the March, 20, 2004 rally in New York City (ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee 2005). Nonetheless, the leaders of UFPJ initially decided not to work with ANSWER on the September 24, 2005 demonstration in Washington, DC due to the multi-issue nature of ANSWER's demands (including a focus on Israel-Palestine and Haiti) and difficulties the coalitions had in working together in the

past (United for Peace and Justice 2005b). Part of UFPJ's initial decision was grounded in the concern that the presence of ANSWER might alienate some of its supporters, thus reducing attendance at the rally and shrinking its coalition.

UFPJ's the decision not to work with ANSWER – which had announced a demonstration in Washington on the same day – was highly controversial within the organization because some activists worried that two separate demonstrations would be confusing and would make the antiwar movement appear divided. Moreover, ANSWER undertook an aggressive e-mail campaign to pressure UFPJ into forming a unified front on September 24. In light of these developments, UFPJ agreed to allow U.S. Labor Against the War to arbitrate a discussion with ANSWER, which ultimately led to an agreement to form a grand coalition between the two groups (United for Peace and Justice 2005c). UFPJ's leadership was ultimately persuaded that the political impact of the demonstration would be greater if the two groups worked together.

UFPJ's decision to coalesce with ANSWER remained controversial among rank-and-file activists, even as the planning for the September 24 demonstration was underway. For example, a heated discussion on this topic took place at the July 20, 2005 planning meeting in Winston Unity Hall in New York City. A typical exchange began with a middle-aged white male, who warned that:

I think the danger of working with other groups, particularly with ANSWER, is that the media could easily take their position and make it ours. And we don't want that. . . . It's very tricky, and I think that we have a lot more to lose than we have to gain. . . .

Judith LeBlanc, National Co-Chair of UFPJ, responded that “The story on September 24

is gonna be the numbers. . . . I think all of us in our minds know what the potential is to have a massive outpouring. . . .” A white male in his twenties chimed in that:

I really just think that . . . trying to get as large and as united a demonstration possible is the most important thing. . . . ANSWER is a serious antiwar coalition. They have Arab and Muslim groups and immigrant groups who are part of their coalition. We have to take that seriously. . . . [applause].

No deliberative resolution of the disagreement was reached at the meeting, though planning went forward in any case.

The September 24, 2005 demonstration was a success. It united the antiwar movement around the theme, “Stop the War on Iraq, Bring the Troops Home Now.” *The Washington Post* reported that it was the largest antiwar rally held in the nation’s capital since the 2003 invasion of Iraq (Dvorak 2005). After the rally, an “anti-war fair” and concert drew a sizeable audience and favorable media coverage. However, conflict erupted behind the scenes and on the stage, leading UFPJ to reject future organizing work with ANSWER. The organizations traded charges and counter charges about what had (or had not) taken place and who was responsible for how things transpired.<sup>3</sup> While the two coalitions had occasionally found common ground prior to the event, the outcome of the conflict on September 24 was a rift that remains in place as of the writing of this article in Fall 2007.

The coalition between ANSWER and UFPJ was a hybrid of Tarrow’s (2005: 167)

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<sup>3</sup> For a thorough presentation of each coalition’s position on the split, see ANSWER Coalition Steering Committee (2005) and United for Peace and Justice (2005d). We decline to present a point-for-point discussion of the charges and counter-charges, or to take a position on which side is “right” or “wrong.” Rather, we simply observe that the outcome of the conflict was that the two coalitions did not work together again, nor do they appear likely to do so in the foreseeable future.

two high-involvement coalition types: the “event coalition” and the “campaign coalition.” Ostensibly, the two organizations formed an event coalition for the purpose of the September 24, 2005 event. However, this event was part of a series of events on which they had collaborated, leading their collaboration to resemble a campaign coalition. The implication of UFPJ’s break from ANSWER was not to abort the September 24 event, but to rule out the continuation of the longer campaign. In the next section, we explain the methods that we employed to ascertain the effect of this rift on the mobilization of the antiwar movement.

### **Surveys at Three Demonstrations**

The split between ANSWER and UFPJ occurred in the midst of a larger project that we are conducting on the politics and mobilization of the antiwar movement. We fielded surveys of participants at three rallies in Washington, DC: 1. September 24, 2005, jointly sponsored by UFPJ and ANSWER; 2. January 27, 2007, sponsored by UFPJ only and organized on the theme, “Tell the New Congress: Act Now to End the War”; and 3. March 17, 2007, sponsored by ANSWER only and organized on the themes, “March on the Pentagon: U.S. Out of Iraq Now; From Iraq to New Orleans, Fund People’s Needs Not the War Machine; End Colonial Occupation: Iraq, Palestine, Haiti, and Everywhere; Shut Down Guantanamo.” The March 17 rally encountered a sizeable counterprotest, numbering several thousand people, while the January 27 event met only a small counterprotest of a few hundred people. The pattern of these rallies fortuitously produces a quasi-experiment: we observed ANSWER and UFPJ working in coalition and then working separately. Given that only 48 days separated the January 27 and March 17 rallies and that they both began in the nation’s capital, we assume that the only major

difference between them was in their sponsoring coalitions.

The survey questions (reported in Appendix A) elicited basic demographic information (sex, age, race/ethnicity, income, education), attitudes toward political parties, organizational membership and contacts, source of information about and distance traveled to the rally, history of involvement in the movement, and reasons for coming to the event. At each rally, we hired a team of 8-10 individuals that spanned out geographically across the crowds to conduct surveys. Each surveyor was instructed first to choose an individual from the crowd to serve as an “anchor” for selection. The anchor was not approached by the surveyor or invited to participate in the study. Second, the surveyor counted five individuals in a line from the anchor and invited the fifth person to participate in the survey. The surveyor then counted five persons from that individual and made another invitation. The process continued until three respondents accepted surveys. The surveyor allowed all three persons to complete the surveys and then moved forward in the crowd to identify a new anchor.<sup>4</sup> This method is similar to the sampling techniques employed by other scholars studying protests (Fisher et al. 2005; Goss 2006; Walgrave 2007; Walgrave and Rucht 2007).

We supplemented the data provided by respondents with information available on the Web about the organizations that contacted them. We were able to locate Web pages (or other contact information) for 94.5% of the organizational-contacts reported by our

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<sup>4</sup> An analysis of response and nonresponse to the survey is presented in Appendix B. Although there may be biases in our initial selection of the anchors because of the spatial grouping of activists, we expect that these biases are reduced substantially by selecting only individuals close to the anchors (rather than the anchors themselves) and by distributing the surveyors widely throughout the crowd. The response rate to the survey was a favorably high 86%, which did not differ significantly across the three events. African American individuals were about nine percent less likely to respond to the survey than were whites and men were about six percent less likely to respond than women. However, because race and sex are insignificant variables in our analysis below (in Tables 1 and 2), we do not believe that these differences bias our statistical results.

respondents.<sup>5</sup> We used organizational mission statements or “about us” sections of the Web pages to code organizational identities in three dimensions: 1. Issue or cause (such as nuclear weapons proliferation); 2. Representation of a specific constituency (such as Latinos or Muslims); and 3. Ideology (Progressive or Radical). Further, we noted the location of the organization’s headquarters and whether or not it held open in-person meetings, as opposed to closed-door or on-line only decision-making procedures. We used complete-case imputation to estimate the values of missing observations (Wood et al. 2005).

### **A Comparative Analysis of Mesomobilization**

This section compares the relative ability of ANSWER and UFPJ to mobilize particular constituencies at the January 27, 2007 and March 17, 2007 demonstrations. We begin by examining difference of means tests to determine if the two rallies attracted significantly different types of participants. We then consider the effect of the same variables in a multivariate context using probit regression. If the protest involves essentially the same group of individuals moving back and forth between demonstrations regardless of who is the sponsor, then the differences between the two events should not be statistically significant (the null hypothesis). However, if two coalitions mobilize different constituencies, then statistically significant differences should result.

We expected to observe significant differences between UFPJ and ANSWER on several demographic variables. Given the relative prominence of women as leaders in UFPJ (such as Leslie Cagan, National Coordinator; Judith LeBlanc, National Co-Chair; and George Friday, National Co-Chair), we expected that it would be more likely to

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<sup>5</sup> In a few cases, we were able to make e-mail or phone contact with representatives of organizations that did not have Web pages in order to obtain basic information.

attract women to participate than would ANSWER. Given that ANSWER explicitly frames its identity as attempting to “end racism,” we expected that individuals with non-white racial and ethnic backgrounds would be disproportionately drawn to ANSWER. Further, given the relatively radical orientation of ANSWER, we hypothesized that it would more greatly appeal to young people and the working class. In contrast, we expected UFPJ to appeal to individuals with higher incomes and college educations. Rank-and-file activists often articulated these hypotheses; one respondent told us, for example, that he thought that the March 17 ANSWER rally had drawn more minorities and young people than had the January 27 UFPJ rally.

Contrary to our expectations, the results of the survey (reported in Table 2) revealed no significant differences in the demographic characteristics of participants at the UFPJ and ANSWER rallies.<sup>6</sup> Despite the stereotypes that many people have of the two coalitions, they are equally likely to attract the participation of women and men, whites and non-whites, the young and the old, those with and without college degrees, and people from various economic strata. Differences between the two coalitions flow more from the ways in which their members connect to the antiwar movement and to the political system as a whole.

We expected that participants at the ANSWER and UFPJ protests would learn about these events in different ways. Because UFPJ has a greater engagement with mainstream political institutions and less opposition from an organized countermovement,

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<sup>6</sup> We investigated the possibility that differences between ANSWER and UFPJ may be evident in the shape of the distributions of variables. For example, it is possible that both groups have the same mean age, but that one group attracts largely middle-age persons and the other attracts college students and retirees. We did not find that such differences are masked by our difference of means analysis. The age variable, for example, is similarly bi-modal for both UFPJ and ANSWER, with modes in the college years and in the late 50s.

**Table 2. Comparison of Participants at UFPJ and ANSWER Demonstrations in 2007**

	Entire Sample		UFPJ March <i>January 27, 2007</i>		ANSWER March <i>March 17, 2007</i>		Difference of Means Test	
	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>t-score</i>	<i>p value</i>
<b>Demographics</b>								
<i>Sex is Female</i>	0.542	0.499	0.552	0.498	0.525	0.500	0.780	0.435
<i>Race/Ethnicity</i>								
White / Caucasian	0.856	0.351	0.861	0.346	0.849	0.359	0.501	0.616
Black / African American	0.056	0.229	0.050	0.217	0.065	0.247	-0.984	0.325
Latino / Hispanic / Mexican	0.037	0.189	0.038	0.192	0.036	0.186	0.188	0.851
Asian	0.030	0.171	0.029	0.167	0.033	0.178	-0.341	0.734
<i>Age in Years</i>	39.989	17.771	40.533	18.074	39.141	17.281	1.123	0.131
<i>Educational Attainment</i> <sup>a</sup>	4.905	1.858	4.986	1.870	4.778	1.835	1.602	0.110
<i>Annual Income</i> <sup>b</sup>	3.170	1.834	3.253	1.885	3.040	1.748	1.667	0.096
<b>Information Channels</b>								
<i>Source of Information about Event</i>								
Personal Networks / Friends	0.362	0.479	0.399	0.487	0.305	0.459	2.810	0.005*
Contacted Directly by Organization	0.257	0.436	0.219	0.412	0.317	0.464	-3.254	0.001*
Internet / E-mail	0.349	0.475	0.357	0.477	0.336	0.471	0.651	0.515
Mass Media	0.118	0.321	0.138	0.342	0.087	0.281	2.261	0.024*
Flyers / Posters	0.033	0.177	0.029	0.167	0.039	0.193	-0.803	0.423
<i>Thousands of Miles Traveled</i>	0.387	0.652	0.338	0.574	0.462	0.752	-2.736	0.006*
<b>Political Attitudes and Involvement</b>								
<i>Political Parties</i>								
Agreement with Democrats <sup>c</sup>	4.351	0.778	4.413	0.767	4.254	0.785	2.947	0.003*
Member of Democratic Party	0.513	0.500	0.541	0.499	0.469	0.500	2.069	0.039*
Member of a Third Party	0.073	0.260	0.072	0.259	0.074	0.262	-0.097	0.923
<i>Past Political Involvement</i>								
Attended Protest in Past 5 Years	0.706	0.449	0.696	0.458	0.722	0.436	-0.837	0.403
Civil Disobedience in Past 5 Years	0.129	0.329	0.122	0.325	0.138	0.334	-0.685	0.493
<i>Reason for Attending Event</i>								
Anti-Bush / Anti-Republican	0.127	0.331	0.126	0.329	0.129	0.334	-0.099	0.921
Policy Specific	0.674	0.464	0.646	0.474	0.718	0.447	-2.249	0.025*
Politics / Movement Building	0.293	0.451	0.311	0.458	0.266	0.439	1.400	0.162
Personal or Family Issues	0.210	0.403	0.255	0.432	0.140	0.344	4.108	0.000*
<b>Direct Organizational Contact</b>								
<i>Organizational Identity</i>								
Focused on an Issue or Cause <sup>d</sup>	0.410	0.698	0.459	0.733	0.333	0.634	2.602	0.009*
Focused on Representation <sup>d</sup>	0.169	0.427	0.143	0.401	0.210	0.464	-2.271	0.023*
Focused on Progressive Ideology <sup>d</sup>	0.107	0.349	0.143	0.390	0.049	0.264	3.882	0.000*
Focused on Radical Ideology <sup>d</sup>	0.068	0.255	0.026	0.168	0.134	0.339	-6.219	0.000*
<i>Organization Located in New York</i> <sup>d</sup>	0.120	0.320	0.158	0.360	0.060	0.233	4.423	0.000*
<i>Organization Has In-Person Meetings</i> <sup>d</sup>	0.218	0.408	0.272	0.441	0.133	0.335	4.964	0.000*
Sample Size	862		525		337			

Source: Authors' surveys of participants in the March on Washington, January 27, 2007, and the March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007.

Notes: a. Seven-point scale where 7 indicates "Graduate or professional degree"; b. Six-point scale where 6 indicates "\$75,001 or more per year"; c. Five-point scale where 5 indicates "Usually agree with Democratic Party"; d. The number of organizations of this type which contacted the respondent to attend the march; \* denotes  $p \leq 0.05$  in a two-tailed test.

we expected that it would receive more favorable coverage in the mass media, thus allowing it to attract a greater proportion of its participants through this medium. We expected ANSWER, in contrast, to rely more heavily on organizing directly within the antiwar movement, thus making direct organizational contacts more important. Further, we suspected that the two groups might differ in the ability to tap into personal networks, to utilize the Internet effectively, or to reach people through disseminating flyers and posters. Finally, we anticipated that the UFPJ rally would draw participants from a broader geographic area than the ANSWER rally because UFPJ has a larger and more diverse organizational membership.

The survey results show, as expected, that the mass media was a more significant source of information at the UFPJ rally (where it was mentioned by 13.8% of respondents) than at the ANSWER rally (8.7%). Similarly, the expectation that ANSWER relies more on direct organizational contacts (31.7%) than UFPJ (21.9%) proved to be true. The survey revealed that participants in the UFPJ rally were more likely to draw upon personal networks in gathering information about the protest (39.9%) than ANSWER (30.5%), though we do not offer a theoretical explanation for why this may be the case. ANSWER and UFPJ are equally adept at attracting people using the Internet, e-mail, flyers, and posters. Contrary to expectations, ANSWER was more likely to draw participants from a long distance (the average was 462 miles traveled), than UFPJ (338 miles traveled). Part of the reason for this difference may be that UFPJ was more successful in attracting local residents of the Washington, DC metropolitan region to attend their rally than was ANSWER, which was reflected in the substantially larger

crowd drawn by UFPJ than by ANSWER.<sup>7</sup>

We expected that participants in the UFPJ demonstration would have a stronger connection with mainstream political institutions and a weaker connection to the antiwar movement; conversely, ANSWER participants would be more likely to reject mainstream political institutions and be more committed activists within the movement. The results of the survey provided mixed support for this proposition. UFPJ attendees were significantly more likely to say that they considered themselves to be members of the Democratic Party (54.1%) than ANSWER attendees (46.9%), and were more likely to say that they “usually agree” with the Democratic Party (4.413 on a 5-point scale) than were ANSWER attendees (4.254). Participants at the ANSWER rally were significantly more likely to cite a policy-specific reason for their attendance (such as stopping the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), while participants at the UFPJ rally were more likely to cite a personal reason for their attendance (such as the death of a friend or family member). However, there was no difference between the two groups in past political involvement. We expected, given ANSWER’s preference for outsider political tactics, that its participants would be more likely to have engaged in civil disobedience in the past, while UFPJ protesters would be more likely to be attending their first rally. Neither of these propositions was supported in the data.

The greatest difference between ANSWER and UFPJ participants was in the nature of their organizational networks. As anticipated, UFPJ and ANSWER drew from different pools of organizations that made contact on their behalf. UFPJ participants were more likely to be contacted by issue-oriented groups (0.459 contacts per person for

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<sup>7</sup> Estimates suggest that the UFPJ rally drew approximately 100,000 participants (Schreck, Khalil and Streitfeld 2007), while the crowd at ANSWER’s march was estimated to be between 15,000 and 30,000 people (Vogel and Chandler 2007).

UFPJ to 0.333 contacts per person for ANSWER) that built their identities around peace, for example. ANSWER participants were more likely to be contacted by representation-oriented groups (0.210 contacts for ANSWER to 0.143 contacts at UFPJ) that built their identities around representing communities such as Arab Americans. Thus, while there were not demographic differences in the people that attended the rallies, there were indeed demographic differences in the nature of organizations that made the contacts. Similarly, UFPJ participants were more likely to be reached by groups identifying with progressive ideologies (0.143 to 0.049), while ANSWER participants were more likely to be mobilized by groups identifying with radical ideologies (0.134 to 0.026). UFPJ attendees were more likely to be contacted by organizations headquartered in New York (0.158 to 0.060), which is the geographic center of its organizational network, and to be contacted by groups that held in-person meetings (0.272 to 0.133).

We used probit regression to assess the extent to which the basic differences between ANSWER and UFPJ are robust to multivariate analysis. We estimated a model in which the dependent variable took the value of one if the respondent was observed at the UFPJ rally and zero if the respondent was observed at the ANSWER rally. This setup assigns positive coefficients to factors making a respondent more likely to attend the UFPJ rally and negative coefficients to factors making a respondent more likely to attend the ANSWER rally. The results, reported in Table 3, exhibit a high degree of consistency with the difference of means tests reported in Table 2. Ten of the fourteen variables retain their statistical significance in the multivariate model and all variables maintain the same direction of effect. The multivariate analysis leaves unchanged the conclusions that UFPJ participants were more likely to learn about the protest through personal networks

**Table 3. Probit Regression on Attendance at UFPJ and ANSWER Demonstrations in 2007**

<b>Dependent Variable</b> = 1 if respondent attended UFPJ event, =0 if attended ANSWER event.						
	dF/dX	Coefficient	Std. Err.	Z Score	p value	% Imputed
<b>Demographics</b>						
<i>Sex is Female</i>	0.013	0.033	0.097	0.343	0.732	0.0
<i>Race/Ethnicity</i>						
White / Caucasian	-0.063	-0.172	0.176	-0.973	0.330	0.0
Black / African American	-0.081	-0.209	0.240	-0.872	0.383	0.0
Latino / Hispanic / Mexican	0.007	0.018	0.264	0.069	0.945	0.0
Asian	-0.058	-0.149	0.299	-0.499	0.618	0.0
<i>Age in Years</i>	0.000	-0.001	0.004	-0.357	0.721	0.2
<i>Educational Attainment</i> <sup>a</sup>	0.001	0.004	0.033	0.116	0.907	4.2
<i>Annual Income</i> <sup>b</sup>	0.012	0.031	0.035	0.882	0.378	8.5
<b>Information Channels</b>						
<i>Source of Information about Event</i>						
Personal Networks / Friends	0.153	0.404	0.146	2.767	0.006*	1.0
Contacted Directly by Organization	-0.074	-0.197	0.148	-1.333	0.182	1.0
Internet / E-mail	0.055	0.146	0.144	1.013	0.311	1.0
Mass Media	0.190	0.502	0.180	2.782	0.005*	1.0
Flyers / Posters	-0.046	-0.121	0.272	-0.446	0.655	1.0
<i>Thousands of Miles Traveled</i>	0.056	-0.149	0.076	-1.960	0.050*	1.3
<b>Political Attitudes and Involvement</b>						
<i>Political Parties</i>						
Agreement with Democrats <sup>c</sup>	0.057	0.150	0.068	2.194	0.028*	7.1
Member of Democratic Party	-0.008	-0.022	0.115	-0.190	0.850	0.3
Member of a Third Party	-0.005	-0.015	0.196	-0.074	0.941	0.3
<i>Past Political Involvement</i>						
Attended Protest in Past 5 Years	-0.054	-0.144	0.110	-1.313	0.189	3.5
Civil Disobedience in Past 5 Years	0.008	0.020	0.153	0.134	0.893	3.5
<i>Reason for Attending Event</i>						
Anti-Bush / Anti-Republican	0.020	0.052	0.146	0.356	0.722	2.0
Policy Specific	0.029	0.075	0.138	0.547	0.584	2.0
Politics / Movement Building	0.087	0.230	0.126	1.823	0.068	2.0
Personal or Family Issues	0.192	0.508	0.146	3.475	0.001*	2.0
<b>Direct Organizational Contact</b>						
<i>Organizational Identity</i>						
Focused on an Issue or Cause <sup>d</sup>	0.083	0.220	0.160	1.374	0.169	5.5
Focused on Representation <sup>d</sup>	-0.239	-0.633	0.176	-3.586	0.000*	5.5
Focused on Progressive Ideology <sup>d</sup>	0.174	0.461	0.199	2.311	0.021*	5.5
Focused on Radical Ideology <sup>d</sup>	-0.414	-1.097	0.235	-4.666	0.000*	5.5
<i>Organization Located in New York</i> <sup>d</sup>	0.302	0.800	0.225	3.554	0.000*	4.8
<i>Organization Has In-Person Meetings</i> <sup>d</sup>	0.221	0.586	0.165	3.559	0.000*	5.5
<i>Constant</i>	0.000	-0.689	0.399	-1.73	0.084	
Sample Size = 862			Log Likelihood = -490.203			
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> = 0.150			LR $\chi^2$ (df=29) = 173.250			

Source: Same as Table 2.

Notes: Same as Table 2.

and the mass media, to attend the event for personal reasons, to agree with the Democratic Party, and to be contacted by organizations that espouse a progressive ideology, that are headquartered in New York, and that hold in-person meetings. ANSWER participants were more likely to travel a long distance to attend the protest and to be contacted by organizations that build their identities based on representing specific constituencies and that espouse radical ideologies.

The overall picture that emerges from these data is of two coalitions that mobilized very different networks after their grand coalition dissolved. Although the groups do not differ demographically, the two groups networked with different types of organizations and reached people with diverse political attitudes through varied media. In the next section, we consider the effect of these differences on the overall structure of the antiwar network.

### **The Dynamics of Network Structure**

UFPJ and ANSWER draw from different networks in mobilizing supporters. The question remains, however, as to how exactly this difference affects the patterns of connections among activists and organizations. Does the UFPJ-ANSWER divide split the movement in half? Or does it merely rearrange cliques within the movement? Are the strategic positions of organizations altered in any way?

We examine patterns of connections among activists and organizations by following Diani's (2004) suggestion that the overlapping relationships among activists constitute the basis of relationships among organizations. This approach implies that two organizations are connected if they have ties to the same activists (see also Brieger 1974). For example, if a respondent indicates that she or he is contacted both by the Friends

Committee on National Legislation (FCNL) and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), then there is a tie between these organizations because they have a common constituent. Our analysis is based on a *sample* of activists, so the structure of the network will depend on the exact individuals that are chosen for the survey. The implication is that the largest mobilizing organizations will have relatively stable positions in the network (because they have the highest probabilities of being selected), but the position of smaller mobilizing organizations will vary relatively more (because their inclusion is more random). Using this approach, we examine the co-mobilization of activists – individuals that are encouraged to participate by multiple organizations – to evaluate the changing structure of the antiwar movement. This approach gives us a view of networks in action, rather than the longer-term processes of organizational-membership relations.<sup>8</sup>


We begin by presenting the antiwar network as deduced from co-mobilization at the September 24, 2005 rally in Figure 1. Two organizations are tied in this network if they contacted the same individual to attend the event; the thickness of the ties is proportional to the number of co-contacts. The diagram immediately reveals a polycephalous structure with three regions, corresponding to UFPJ, ANSWER, and MoveOn. Each of these three organizations brought with it a particular following that it helped to co-mobilize. Code Pink: Women for Peace occupies a central position between these three factional heads.

The immediate effect of the UFPJ-ANSWER split is revealed by the co-mobilization network for the January 27, 2007 rally in Figure 2. The network retains its

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
<sup>8</sup> We intend to address the relationship between co-mobilization networks and co-membership networks in a future paper, though we skirt the issue here due to space constraints.

**Figure 1. Organizational Co-mobilization Network for the Joint UFPJ-ANSWER Rally in Washington, DC, September 24, 2005**



*Source:* Authors' surveys of 448 participants in the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally on September 24, 2005.  
*Notes:* Each node represents an organization that contacted people to attend the demonstration. A line between two organizations indicates that they contacted the same person. Thicker lines indicate more co-contacts. Only the main component of the network is presented here. The spring-embedding algorithm in Netdraw 2.046 was used to position organizations close to one another in the network if they have a similar pattern of contacts with activists (Borgatti et al. 2007). See Appendix C for the complete list of organization names corresponding to these abbreviations.

**Figure 2. Organizational Co-mobilization Network for the UFPJ-Sponsored Rally in Washington, DC, January 27, 2007**




*Source:* Authors' surveys of 525 participants in the UFPJ-sponsored rally held on January 27, 2007.  
*Notes:* Same as Figure 1.

polycephalous organization, though ANSWER falls out of the main component of the co-mobilization network. UPFJ and MoveOn retain their prominent positions, each mobilizing a particular clique of supporters. Code Pink continues to occupy a position between UPFJ and MoveOn, though the disappearance of ANSWER makes this ground appear less strategically useful.

When ANSWER organized the March on the Pentagon, UPFJ was pushed away from the center of the main component of the network, as indicated in Figure 3.<sup>9</sup> UPFJ remains in the main component because it listed ANSWER’s March on the Pentagon on its Web site and because it sent several e-mails to its supporters explaining why it was neither formally endorsing nor attempting to interfere with the ANSWER rally.

**Figure 3. Organizational Co-mobilization Network for the ANSWER-Sponsored March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007**



*Source:* Authors’ surveys of 337 participants in the ANSWER-sponsored rally held on March 17, 2007.  
*Notes:* Same as Figure 1.

<sup>9</sup> The lesser density of the network in Figure 3, as opposed to Figures 1 and 2, is partly a function of the smaller sample collected on March 17. We encourage the reader to take note of the changing structural pattern among groups and discourage attention to the issue of density.

However, UFPJ did not co-mobilize the rally with its traditional network of allied organizations, leaving it on the margin of the network, connected only to ANSWER. The newly established World Can't Wait (WCW), founded in the summer of 2005, assumed a prominent position in the network and served as ANSWER's most effective co-mobilizing partner. The nascent ANSWER-WCW relationship at this rally is one example of ANSWER's efforts to establish new allies in the wake of its split with UFPJ.


Comparison of Figures 1, 2, and 3 makes clear that the composition of coalitions significantly influences the mesomobilization process. When ANSWER and UFPJ worked together in a grand coalition, the antiwar movement had three clear leaders (ANSWER, UFPJ, and MoveOn). When the grand coalition dissolved, the network was reduced to only two principal leaders at each rally. Beyond the turnout at any particular demonstration, however, the divide between UFPJ and ANSWER should influence the underlying structure of antiwar networks. What is the nature of this effect?

We explore the effect of the ANSWER-UFPJ split on the antiwar movement as a whole by merging the data from the separate UFPJ and ANSWER rallies as if they were one rally, representing a unified movement in 2007. This merger allows us to visualize "what if" we could observe both ANSWER and UFPJ simultaneously. Of course, we did not observe them simultaneously – but at different events – so there are some limits to this analysis. First, UFPJ drew a substantially larger crowd of supporters on January 27 than did ANSWER on March 17. Estimates of crowd size are notoriously imprecise, but most accounts estimated the UFPJ rally in the hundreds of thousands, roughly an order of magnitude higher than the ANSWER rally, estimated in the tens of thousands. Second, we collected a larger sample at the UFPJ rally (525 respondents) than at the ANSWER

rally (337 participants). Both of these differences distort the degree to which the two networks can be combined seamlessly. Nonetheless, a cautious interpretation of the merged networks yields substantial insights on the dynamics of antiwar networks.

The merged networks are presented in Figure 4, which are readily comparable to the network of the unified rally on September 24, 2005, presented in Figure 1. The unified 2007 network retains a polycephalous structure similar to the 2005 network. ANSWER, UFPJ, and Moveon continued to head factions of the network, while Code Pink retained its central position and WCW moved between UFPJ and ANSWER. The substantial similarity between Figures 1 and 4 suggests that the split between ANSWER and UFPJ did not fundamentally alter the structure of the underlying networks among antiwar activists, even if mesomobilization for individual rallies was notably different.

**Figure 4. Hypothetical Joint UFPJ-ANSWER Co-mobilization Network for 2007**



*Source:* Authors' surveys of 525 participants in the UFPJ-sponsored rally held on January 27, 2007 and 337 participants in the ANSWER-sponsored rally held on March 17, 2007.  
*Notes:* Same as Figure 1.

**Table 4. Brokerage Potential of Leading Antiwar Organizations**

	<b>September 24, 2005 (UFPJ-ANSWER)</b>	<b>January 27, 2007 (UFPJ)</b>	<b>March 17, 2007 (ANSWER)</b>	<b>All 2007 (UFPJ-ANSWER)</b>
<i>Betweenness Ranking</i>	1. MoveOn 2. UFPJ 3. ANSWER 4. CodePink 5. Prof. Staff Congress	1. UFPJ 2. MoveOn 3. CodePink 4. The Nation 5. NOW	1. ANSWER 2. MoveOn 3. CodePink 4. WCW 5. PeaceAction	1. MoveOn 2. UFPJ 3. CodePink 4. ANSWER 5. WCW

*Source:* Authors' surveys of participants in the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally held on September 24, 2005, the March on Washington, January 27, 2007, and the March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007.

*Notes:* Betweenness was computed following Freeman (1979) in Ucinet 6.146 for Windows (Borgatti et al. 2007). See Appendix C for the complete list of organization names corresponding to these abbreviations.

Nonetheless, significant changes in the network are apparent. The degree of co-mobilization between MoveOn and ANSWER was substantially weaker in 2007 than in 2005, and the strength of the link between UFPJ and ANSWER was weakened as well.

The rift between ANSWER and UFPJ provides opportunities for other organizations in the antiwar movement to move into strategic position. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001: 26) define “brokerage” as a mechanism that links “two or more previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another.” An actor has more opportunities for brokerage when it stands between two other actors that are disconnected from one another. Thus, we assess opportunities for brokerage by ranking the betweenness scores (Freeman 1979) of the leading organizations in each network in Table 4.

When UFPJ and ANSWER led their own demonstrations in 2007, they each occupied the position with the most betweenness, reflecting their brokerage of the events. However, when ANSWER and UFPJ are brought together (both in 2005 and 2007), their tense relationship creates brokerage opportunities for other organizations uninvolved in the conflict. Most notably, MoveOn plays the role of a silent partner within both coalitions and thus achieves the position of greatest betweenness in the antiwar

movement as a whole. Since MoveOn stands between groups like the National Organization for Women (NOW) and UFPJ, it has more potential to broker connections within the antiwar movement than do other organizations. MoveOn is much more closely allied with the Democratic Party than either UFPJ or ANSWER and takes a more conservative approach to ending the war (Heaney and Rojas 2007). Ironically, the clearest network effect of the dispute between UFPJ and ANSWER – during their tenuous coalition in 2005 and after its dissolution – is to augment the strategic position of MoveOn. Code Pink (pictured in Figure 5), which is willing to work inclusively with the radical, moderate, and conservative flanks of the movement, similarly gained ground after UFPJ and ANSWER split, even achieving a slightly more desirable position than ANSWER in the overall network.

**Figure 5. Code Pink Activists cross into Virginia to March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007**



*Source:* Sam Freund.

## **Moving Beyond the ANSWER-UFPJ Split**

The leading coalitions in the antiwar movement parted ways even further in the months following the January/March 2007 events. ANSWER announced plans for another March on Washington on September 15, 2007 and, in a change of tactics, endorsed lobbying and actions in the halls of Congress during the week of September 17-21. Its collaboration with organizations such as Code Pink and Grassroots America on congressional actions reflects that it has solidified new alliances in the wake of the split with UFPJ. In contrast, UFPJ called for ten regional demonstrations around the United States on October 27, 2007. This move was an attempt to capitalize on its expansive grassroots base and to capture the public's attention in ways other than marching on Washington.

The two coalitions, by self-consciously diverging from one another, appear to be broadening the audiences that the movement as a whole is able to reach. For this reason, we conclude that there appears to be enough "room" in the antiwar movement for two major, competing coalitions. To some extent, ANSWER and UFPJ are vying for the attention, energies, and resources of the same supporters. But to a larger extent, both groups are more urgently attempting to reach out to a mass public that has remained largely quiescent throughout the entire U.S.-Iraq conflict.

The muted negative effects of the UFPJ-ANSWER split may partially be a function of the movement's expanded political opportunities coinciding with declining public support for President George W. Bush (cf. Kriesi 2004). Public disapproval of the president's handling of the Iraq War rose modestly from 53% in September 2005 to 58% in March 2007 (*New York Times/CBS News* 2007). If public opinion were trending in

favor of the president, or even remaining stable, the conflict between ANSWER and UFPJ might have been more detrimental to the movement as its base of support shrank.

Beyond UFPJ and ANSWER, the effects of coalition dissolution on network dynamics are likely to depend, in part, on the nature of the underlying networks. If a coalition is formed among groups that are closely allied with one another, the effect of dissolution may become evident only gradually due to the persistence of multiple, overlapping relationships. If a coalition is formed among groups that are initially more disconnected, then the effect of dissolution may be a more immediate impact on networks, since the coalition plays a critical role in sustaining these ties. Similarly, the consequences of coalition dissolution may depend on the longevity of the original coalition. If an event coalition dissolves, then the effects on the underlying networks may be minimal, since the coalition had little time to influence the structure of networks in the first place. If a campaign coalition dissolves, the effects may be more substantial, since the disappearance of the coalition is more likely to interrupt the day-to-day interactions in the network. We believe that the ANSWER-UFPJ break up more closely resembles the dissolution of a campaign coalition, since the two organizations had collaborated on a series of significant events over several years. Further empirical research on coalition dissolution would help to specify these conditions more precisely.

## **Conclusion**

Coalition politics are a vital component of social movement dynamics. While much is known about why coalitions form and dissolve, less is known about the consequences for movements when coalitions dissolve. This study moves to fill this gap in knowledge by examining how dissolution of the coalition between ANSWER and

UFPJ affected the mesomobilization and network structure of the contemporary American antiwar movement. We find that the organizational composition of coalitions does make a difference in what kinds of supporters turn out at a demonstration; they bring out people with different information channels, political attitudes, and organizational affiliations. The split between UFPJ and ANSWER did not radically restructure the antiwar network, which is cushioned by robust network ties among activists and organizations. The split, however, did allow groups with more flexible and ambiguous identities – notably MoveOn, Code Pink, and WCW – to occupy more advantageous positions in the network. Divisions between the moderate and radical flanks of the movement thus expanded the ground available to the conservative flank of the movement, embodied by MoveOn. We expect this shift to have a path-dependent effect on the structure of the antiwar network as it evolves through continued opposition to the American occupation of Iraq (cf. Pierson 2004).

The relationship between social movement coalitions and network dynamics merits further investigation. Our findings that a split between the two leading members of a grand coalition affects mesomobilization and, thus, network structures, are suggestive of a wider range of dynamics between coalition organizers and individual activists. Coalition work affects how individual activists think about movements and their links with other activists, yet little is known about the mechanisms that shape these connections. Further, coalitions differ on whether they focus on staging street demonstrations (e.g., ANSWER), are more attuned to direct contacts with legislators (e.g., Win Without War), or attempt to do both (e.g., UFPJ). When multiple coalitions are working as part of the same movement, but in alternate venues, how, if at all, do they

coordinate their work? Who are the brokers and how does their brokerage affect their activism? How do the tensions inherent in these processes lead to the formation of new coalitions and the rearrangement of alliances within existing ones? Investigations along these lines would do much to advance the understanding of how the interaction of networks and coalitions spurs the evolution of social movements.

## Appendix A. Survey Questions

This appendix contains all the survey questions that were asked and used in the data analysis presented in this paper. Questions not included in the analysis are not reported here (as indicated by skipped numbers), but may be obtained from the authors upon request.

1. Circle your sex. (Male, Female)
2. What is your age?
3. What is your ZIP code? (If you don't live in the U.S., please tell us your city and nation.)
4. What is your race/ethnicity? Circle as many as apply: (White / Caucasian; Black / African American; Latino / Hispanic / Mexican; Asian; Other).
6. Do you consider yourself to be a member of a political party? (Yes, No) If "Yes," which political party are you a member of? (Examples: Republican Party / Democratic Party / Green Party / Reform Party / Socialist Party)
8. Are you a member of any civic, community, labor, or political organizations? (Yes, No) If "Yes," which organizations are you a member of? (list as many as you can)
9. How did you hear about this event today?
10. Were you contacted to attend today's event by any particular organization? (Yes, No) If "Yes," which organization? (list as many as contacted you)
11. What are the most important reasons you came to this event?
13. In the past five years, which of the following kinds of events have you attended? Please check all that apply: (Anti-Iraq War Protests; Lobby Day on Capitol Hill; Antiwar Training Sessions, Films, etc.; Civil Disobedience; Other)
16. We are interested in knowing whether you tend to agree more with the Democratic Party or with the Republican Party. (Please check one.) (5. Usually agree with Democratic Party; 4. Sometimes agree with Democratic Party; 3. Rarely agree either party; 2. Sometimes agree with Republican Party; 1. Usually agree with Republican Party; Don't know)
20. Could you please tell us the highest level of formal education you have completed? (Please check one) (1. Less than high school diploma; 2. High School diploma; 3. Some college; 4. Associate's degree or technical degree; 5. College degree; 6. Some graduate education; 7. Graduate or professional degree)
21. Could you please tell us your level of annual income? (1. \$0 to \$15,000 per year; 2. \$15,001 to \$30,000 per year; 3. \$30,001 to \$45,000 per year; 4. \$45,001 to \$60,000 per year; 5. \$60,001 to \$75,000 per year; 6. \$75,001 or more per year)

## Appendix B. Response Rate by Event, Race, and Sex

Event	Respondents	Nonrespondents	Response Rate	t score
<i>Joint UFPJ-ANSWER Rally, September 24, 2005</i>	448	70	86%	0.630
<i>UFPJ-Sponsored Rally, January 27, 2007</i>	525	97	84%	-0.719
<i>ANSWER-Sponsored Rally, March 17, 2007</i>	337	55	86%	0.282
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,310</b>	<b>222</b>	<b>86%</b>	
<b>Race/Ethnicity</b>				
<i>White / Caucasian</i>	1,111	183	86%	0.255
<i>Black / African American</i>	71	21	77%	-3.621*
<i>Hispanic / Latino / Mexican</i>	52	8	87%	0.502
<i>Asian</i>	45	6	88%	1.167
<i>Other</i>	71	4	95%	4.887*
<i>No Answer</i>	17	NA	NA	
<b>Sex</b>				
<i>Male</i>	578	128	82%	-2.374*
<i>Female</i>	731	94	88%	2.186*
<i>Transgendered</i>	1	NA	NA	
<i>No Answer</i>	6	NA	NA	

*Source:* Authors' surveys of participants in the joint UFPJ-ANSWER rally held on September 24, 2005, the March on Washington, January 27, 2007, and the March on the Pentagon, March 17, 2007.

*Note:* \* denotes statistical significance at  $p \leq 0.050$ .

## Appendix C. Organizations in Main Components of Co-mobilization Networks

Abbreviation	Organization's Full Name	Year Founded	Location of Headquarters
AbolitionNow	Abolition Now	2000	New York
ACLU	American Civil Liberties Union	1917	New York
AFSC	American Friends Service Committee	1917	Pennsylvania
AirAmerica	Air America Radio	2004	New York
AmeriWay	People for the American Way	1981	Washington, DC
ANSWER	International ANSWER / ANSWER Coalition (Act Now to End War and Stop Racism)	2001	Washington, DC
Bates	Bates College	1855	Maine
BostonM	Boston Mobilization	1977	Massachusetts
CallAction	Call to Action	1976	Illinois
CFOW	Concerned Families of Westchester	2004	New York
ChurchWomen	Church Women United	1941	New York
CodePink	Code Pink: Women for Peace	2002	California
CPJ	Coalition for Peace and Justice	1982	New Jersey
CTUFPJ	Connecticut United for Peace and Justice		Connecticut
Dem4Amer	Democracy for America	2004	Vermont
Democrats	Democratic Party	1828	Washington, DC
DemRising	Democracy Rising	2001	Washington, DC
DemUnder	Democratic Underground	2001	Washington, DC
FCNL	Friends Committee on National Legislation	1943	Washington, DC

## Appendix C continued. Organizations in Main Components of Co-mobilization Networks

Abbreviation	Organization's Full Name	Year Founded	Location of Headquarters
GRIM	Grassroots Impeachment Movement	2006	North Carolina
ImpeachBush	ImpeachBush.org	2000	Washington, DC
IPS	Institute for Policy Studies	1963	Washington, DC
JobsJust	Jobs with Justice	1987	Washington, DC
JustFP	Just Foreign Policy	2006	Washington, DC
LAMBDA	LAMBDA		Texas
LMFCT	Love Makes a Family of Connecticut	1999	Connecticut
LUCHA	Latin United Community Housing Association	1981	Illinois
MFSO	Military Families Speak Out	2002	Massachusetts
MGJ	Mobilization for Global Justice	1999	New York
MoveOn	MoveOn.org	1998	Washington, DC
Nation	<i>The Nation</i> Magazine	1865	New York
NCPJC	North Carolina Peace and Justice Coalition	2004	North Carolina
Nicaragua	Nicaragua Solidarity Movement		
NJImpeach	North Jersey Impeach Group	2006	New Jersey
Northwood	Northwood Peace		
NOW	National Organization for Women	1966	New York
NUJP	Neighbors United for Justice and Peace	2001	Virginia
PaxChristi	Pax Christi	1972	Pennsylvania
PDA	Progressive Democrats of America	2004	Arizona
PeaceAction	Peace Action	1957	Maryland
PeaceNow	Peace Now	1981	Washington, DC
PeaceTeam	Peace Team		
PJVote	Peace and Justice Voters	2004	Illinois
Plowshares	Plowshares	1974	California
ProgMajor	Progressive Majority	1999	Washington, DC
Quaker	The Religious Society of Friends	1660	London, England
Rochester	Rochesterians Against War		New York
SKJPAG	South Kingston Justice and Peace Action Group	2001	Rhode Island
StudEndWar	Students for Ending the War in Iraq		
Suffolk	Suffolk Peace Network		New York
TCC	TCC		
Tikkun	Network of Spiritual Progressives	1986	California
TroopsOutNow	Troops Out Now	2004	New York
Truemajority	True Majority	2001	Washington, DC
Truthout	Truthout.org	2001	California
UCC	United Church of Christ	1957	Ohio
UFPJ	United for Peace and Justice	2002	New York
Unitarian	Unitarian Universalist Church	1961	Massachusetts
UPFree	United for Peace and Freedom	2002	Pennsylvania
VAIW	Veterans Against the Iraq War	2002	New Jersey
VoteVets	Votevets.org	2006	New York
WCW	World Can't Wait	2005	New York
Wespac	WesPac – Securing America's Future	1977	New York
Workcircle	Workmen's Circle	1900	New York

*Source:* Organizational Web pages and correspondence with organizations.

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