George W. Bush and the Evangelicals:

Religious Commitment and Partisan Change among Evangelical Protestants, 1960-2004*

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For more than two decades, students of American religion and politics have noted the political realignment of evangelical Protestants—those (mostly white) individuals holding, and belonging to churches espousing, traditionalist Protestant beliefs on matters such as the authority of Scripture, adult religious conversion, and the centrality of faith in Christ to salvation. Strongly Democratic throughout most of the post-New Deal period, the most committed evangelicals have become since 1980 the most loyal component of the Republican electoral coalition (Miller and Wattenberg 1984; Rothenberg and Newport 1984; Green et al. 1996; Oldfield 1996; Miller and Shanks 1996; Wilcox 2000; Kohut et al. 2000; Layman 2001; Leege et al. 2002).

Consistent with this long-term transformation were assessments both before and after the 2004 presidential election that evangelicals were critical to George W. Bush's re-election bid. Karl Rove, "the architect" of Bush's re-election campaign, frequently contended that evangelical votes were crucial to victory; and noted that the 2000 election had nearly been lost because four million evangelical voters stayed home on Election Day (Cooperman and Edsall 2004). After the election, evangelical leader Jerry Falwell recounted that "Hour by hour, we observed a 'slam dunk' as the Church of Jesus Christ made the difference in initiating the return of this nation to moral sanity and the Judeo-Christian ethic," and called evangelicals "as powerful a voting bloc as there is" (Falwell 2004).

Less consistent with a pattern of long-term realignment was commentary highlighting President Bush's unique attraction to evangelicals and suggesting that the 2004 election was a watershed for the emergence of religious and moral conservatives in politics. The fact that a plurality of respondents to election-day exit polls chose "moral values" as the most important factor in their voting decision created quite a stir among journalists and political observers (Harris 2004), and led many to herald the arrival of the "values voter" as a new force in American politics. One early election post-mortem argued that "a powerful new political creature was born—or born again—on Tuesday: the values voter" (Gorski

2004).[1] Similarly, Luis E. Lugo of the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life contended that "Evangelicals didn't emerge this election; they arrived. . . . I think you have the evangelical community being fully mainstreamed into American politics" (quoted in Eckstrom 2005). Some observers even expressed shock at the importance of this voting bloc. "Somewhere along the line, all of us missed this moral values thing," said CNN's Candy Crowley (quoted in Meyer 2004).

Despite the prolonged growth in committed evangelical support for the Republican party, much of the coverage of George W. Bush's relationship with the evangelical constituency has viewed it as unique, rooted in their shared spiritual experiences and group identification. Bush's formal affiliation is with the mainline Protestant United Methodist Church. However, most evangelicals view Bush as one of their own, pointing to his deep religious faith, his naming of Jesus Christ as his favorite political philosopher during the 2000 campaign, his discussion of his conversion experience, and his liberal use of religious rhetoric in his public remarks (Cooperman 2004; Green 2004; Suskind 2004). Exhibiting the tendency to attribute Bush's evangelical support to shared religion and group identity, Dallas reporter Wayne Slater declared that "I don't think any political president ever in the history of this country was able to harness and assemble the kind of organized and consistent evangelical religious support from the political side as George Bush. . . . One of the reasons that George Bush has the support of the evangelical community is because he's a true believer. He is one of them, and they see it" (Slater 2004). More succinctly, reporter Ron Suskind suggested that evangelicals believe that Bush is "a messenger from God" (2004, 46).

Thus, there is something of a disjuncture between scholarship on evangelical political behavior and popular commentary on evangelicals' support for George W. Bush. From the perspective of the former, the support Bush has received from evangelicals is a natural extension of a partisan realignment

[1] Political scientists initially voiced skepticism about the importance of "values voters" (Abramowitz 2004; Burden 2004; Hillygus and Shields 2005), though more recent work has suggested that Bush received a substantial, if not overwhelming, boost from these citizens (Campbell and Monson 2005; Guth et al. 2005).

that began at least two decades before Bush's national political career did. Any additional backing Bush may have received compared to previous Republican presidential candidates is probably due to the continuing growth of evangelicals' GOP loyalties and Bush's staunch conservatism on the cultural and moral issues that underlaid that growth. From the latter perspective, Bush's appeal to evangelicals is unique because it is based not just in shared policy positions and Republican affiliation, but also in religious experience and group identification. Thus, the support that Bush receives from evangelical Protestants—and the degree to which this group becomes more loyal to the GOP during his presidency—should exceed what we would expect based on political trends and policy attitudes.

In this paper we assess which of these viewpoints provides a better representation of the relationship between George W. Bush and evangelical Protestants by comparing evangelical political orientations during the Bush years and in the preceding four decades. Using the American National Election Studies (NES) from 1960 through 2004, we find that the answer depends on the level of religious commitment—specifically the frequency of church attendance—of evangelical adherents. While Bush's support among committed evangelicals largely represents a continuation of long-term developments, it does appear that Bush has been uniquely able to attract less-committed evangelicals into the Republican fold. We argue that the discrepancy between the political behavior of more- and less-committed evangelicals is due to differences in the factors that shape their political orientations. The devout members of the tradition are motivated principally by their highly conservative views on moral and cultural matters and their partisan orientations have closely followed the growing differences between the two parties on those matters. Less-devout evangelicals are less conservative on moral and cultural issues and care less about these concerns. Thus, their political behavior should be shaped more by other factors such as personal evaluations of Bush, evangelical group identification, and attitudes toward other types of policy issues. Our analysis of evangelical partisanship and presidential candidate support in 2000 and 2004 shows that moral and cultural attitudes are more important for devout

evangelicals, while attitudes toward social welfare and defense and foreign policy issues matter more for the less-devout members of the tradition.

Explaining Evangelical Political Behavior

There has been considerable debate over whether a "culture war" engulfs the United States. Some scholars suggest that contemporary American society is beset by deep-seated divisions between those with "orthodox" versus those with "progressive" religious and moral perspectives (Wuthnow 1988, 1989; Hunter 1991; White 2003). Others raise doubts about the relevance of such a conflict for American society as a whole and for many religious groups (e.g. Williams 1997; Baker 2005; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005).

Regardless of the overall veracity of the culture wars thesis, it appears to work rather well in explaining the political behavior of committed evangelical Protestants. Evangelical religious leaders have formed political organizations such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition that focus principally on advancing conservative positions on the issues at the heart of the cultural conflict—issues such as abortion, women's rights, homosexual rights, embryonic stem cell research, and the place of religion in the public square—and mobilizing ordinary evangelicals in support of these positions and the political candidates who advocate them (e.g. Oldfield 1996; Wilcox 2000). Committed evangelicals have more conservative attitudes on cultural issues and attach more importance to them than does any other religious group (Green et al. 1996; Kohut et al. 2001). They vote in overwhelming numbers for culturally-conservative candidates, identify strongly with the party on the conservative side of cultural issues (Wilcox 2000; Layman 2001), and support culturally-conservative measures on state and local ballots (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2003). In short, devout evangelical Protestants translate their traditionalist religious orientations and moral values into conservative attitudes on cultural policy issues

and connect these attitudes to strong support for the Republican party and its candidates (Layman and Green 2006).

The fundamental importance of cultural issue attitudes to the political behavior of churchgoing evangelicals suggests that changes over time in that behavior may be seen as a gradual response to growing party polarization on cultural issues (Layman 2001). Just as models of policy-based partisan realignment (Sundquist 1983; MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1987; Carmines and Stimson 1989) indicate, the growing distinction between the two parties' positions on cultural issues have been accompanied by devout evangelicals discarding their old loyalties to the Democratic party and gradually realigning to the GOP (Green et al. 1996; Wilcox 2000; Layman 2001).

Characterizing political change among committed evangelicals as a long-term policy-based realignment implies that the traits and personalities of particular Republican candidates may be relatively unimportant for the political loyalties and decisions of this group, so long as the candidates support the GOP's culturally-conservative agenda. Thus, the presence of a fellow evangelical at the top of the Republican ticket in 2000 and 2004 may not have led them to be unusually more attached to the Republican party or more likely to vote Republican.

In contrast, those evangelical Protestants who are relatively uninvolved in their churches have not exhibited this pattern of steady Republican realignment based on cultural issues (Layman 2001). That, we argue, is because of their very lack of religious commitment. Participating in worship services and other religious activities exposes individuals to cues from clergy on moral and political issues, to social interaction with fellow congregants that may shape and reenforce moral and political views, and to appeals by groups seeking to use religious groups and congregations as a basis for political mobilization (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Wald, Kellstedt, and Leege 1993; Guth et al. 1997).

Within evangelicalism, such involvement encourages congregants to give prominence to cultural and moral issues, to hold conservative views on those issues, and to link those views to support for

culturally-conservative candidates and the Republican party. That is so for several reasons. Evangelical pastors are more likely than clergy in other faith traditions to attach importance to moral issues and to address them from the pulpit (Guth et al. 1997). Evangelical laity are more cohesive in their moral and cultural outlooks than members of other traditions (Wald, Owen, and Hill 1990). Organizations such as the Christian Coalition and, more recently, the Republican party, base their political mobilization strategies on evangelical congregations and expend considerable resources educating their members about which party and candidates take the right positions on moral issues (Oldfield 1996; see the chapter by Monson and Oliphant in this volume).

Lacking exposure to these factors, less-committed evangelicals should not connect their religious beliefs to politics as strongly as do their committed brethren, they should be less conservative on moral and cultural issues, and those issues should not be as relevant for their political loyalties. Thus, if this group has significantly increased its levels of Republican voting and attachments to the GOP during the George W. Bush era, then the explanation may lie somewhere besides Bush's moral conservatism.

One place it may lie is simply in less-committed evangelicals' attitudes on other types of policy issues. They may have been attracted by Bush's economic conservatism —exemplified by his efforts to privatize Social Security and his commitment to substantial tax cuts—or his aggressive use of the U.S. military in prosecuting the war on terror and the war in Iraq. Such an attraction might lie in the demographic characteristics of less-devout evangelicals. Like their committed brethren, they are much more likely than other whites to reside in the South, a hotbed of conservatism on both social welfare and defense and foreign policy issues (e.g. Black and Black 1987). Relative to high-commitment evangelicals, the low-commitment group includes a slightly higher proportion of men and has completed less education.[2] Men tend to have more conservative social welfare and foreign policy attitudes than do

[2] In the 1992-2004 presidential-year National Election Studies (pooled), 48.4 percent of evangelicals who attended church infrequently and 53.3 percent of evangelicals who attended church frequently resided in the South, compared to 24.9 percent of all other whites. The difference between both evangelical groups and other whites was

women (e.g. Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), and lower education levels are associated with greater conservatism on defense and foreign policy issues (e.g. Carmines and Layman 1997).

Another possibility is that the party loyalties and political behavior of less-committed evangelicals are based less in policy issue attitudes and more in candidate affect and group identification. Models of the voting decision long have highlighted the importance of these latter factors (e.g. Miller and Shanks 1996), and the traditional view of party identification is that it is a psychological attachment based, in part, on social group membership and assessments of which groups are associated with which parties (Campbell et al. 1960). The social identity perspective on party identification characterizes the rare change that does occur as driven by individuals' gradual recognition that more and more members of their social group adhere to a particular party (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).

Because evangelical Protestants consider George W. Bush as "one of us," they should find him quite attractive personally and may be significantly more likely to vote for him than for other Republican candidates. Moreover, having an evangelical at the top of the Republican ticket may send particularly strong signals that the GOP is the party of conservative Christians and that part of being evangelical is being a Republican. Those signals may be less consequential for committed evangelicals, who are consistently exposed to cues that the Republican party is "their party" and who, in the aggregate, already have realigned their party ties accordingly, than for less-committed evangelicals, who are less likely to have realigned to the GOP and to perceive their group identities and interests in terms of cultural issues.

In sum, less-committed evangelical Protestants are less likely than their more devout counterparts to base their political behavior and party attachments on cultural and moral issues and to have undergone a long-term realignment toward Republican identification based on those issues. To the extent that there

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highly statistically significant ($p<.001$). Meanwhile, 44.7 percent of infrequently attending evangelicals and 39.3 percent of frequently attending evangelicals were men (the difference is statistically significant at $p<.05$). Finally, the percentage of respondents with college degrees was 12.9 among infrequently-attending evangelicals, 22.3 among frequently-attending evangelicals, and 32.8 among all other whites. The difference between infrequently-attending evangelicals and each of the other two groups was highly significant ($p<.001$).

were substantial upturns in evangelical voting for and identification with the Republican party during the last two presidential elections, the gains should have come mostly from less-committed evangelicals and should have been based less on traditionalist religious beliefs and moral and cultural conservatism than on other types of political orientations.

Data and Measurement

In order to compare evangelical Protestants' party ties and electoral behavior in the two elections won by George W. Bush to those orientations over the last several decades, we turn to the American National Election Studies (NES) that were conducted from 1960 through 2004. Although the NES included few religious items prior to 1990, they have included religious affiliation indicators that make it possible to distinguish evangelical Protestants from other Protestant groups since 1960. Thus, they provide the best–and, in fact, only–means with which to assess trends in evangelical political behavior over the long run.

We define evangelical Protestants as those respondents belonging to the historically-white Protestant religions that emphasize beliefs such as the inerrancy of Scripture, the necessity of a "born again" conversion experience for salvation, faith in Jesus Christ as the sole path to salvation, and the importance of evangelizing by individual believers.[3] These include the Southern Baptist Convention and most other predominantly-white Baptist churches, Assemblies of God, Presbyterian Church in America, Missouri Synod Lutheran, Church of Christ, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Seventh Day Adventist, and

[3] Many Protestant denominations populated primarily by African-Americans share these core beliefs of evangelicalism. However, because of the historic racial segregation of American Protestantism, historically-black Protestant churches have developed theological perspectives and liturgical practices that are unique in many ways from those of predominantly-white evangelical churches. Thus, students of religion and politics tend to place these denominations in a separate "black Protestant" category (e.g. Kellstedt and Green 1993; Guth et al. 2005). Following this literature, we include only non-blacks affiliating with evangelical churches in the evangelical Protestant category.

several branches of Church of God (e.g. Kellstedt and Green 1993; Kellstedt et al. 1996; Wilcox 2000).[4] In appendix A, we list the religious affiliations contained in the evangelical tradition both for over-time analyses and analyses involving only the 2000 and 2004 NES.[5]

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[4] For analyses involving only the 2000 and 2004 NES, we included two other groups of respondents in the evangelical tradition besides those identified with specific evangelical Protestant denominations. The first group contains non-black respondents who indicated an affiliation with a general denominational "family" or religious "movement" that is evangelical in character. These affiliations include Adventist, Baptist, Holiness, Church of God, Independent-Fundamentalist, Pentecostal, and Churches of Christ. The second group contains non-black respondents who indicated a general Protestant or Christian affiliation or an affiliation with a denominational family–Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Brethren, or Reformed–that includes both evangelical and mainline Protestant denominations. If these respondents displayed a minimal level of religious commitment–received at least "some" guidance from religion in their lives, prayed at least a few times a week, and attended church at least "once or twice a month"–and indicated a belief that "the Bible is the actual Word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word," we included them in the evangelical tradition.

Of course, some scholarship defines evangelicals based on religious beliefs (Miller and Wattenberg 1984; Kellstedt and Smidt 1991), and it is through beliefs, not affiliation, that President Bush is part of the evangelical community. We classify evangelicals based on belonging rather than beliefs for four reasons. First, it is through membership in a religious community that religious beliefs are formed and core values arise (e.g. Kellstedt and Green 1993). Second, membership in a faith community also facilitates the linkage between religious doctrine and values and political attitudes and behavior (e.g. Wald, Owen, and Hill 1988; Layman and Green 2006). Third, religious denominations, congregations, and organizations are the means through which political parties and candidates identify, appeal to, and attempt to mobilize people of faith (Green, Rozell, and Wilcox 2003). Finally, and most practically, while the NES has provided a means for identifying evangelical religious affiliation since 1960, it has included few, if any, measures of religious beliefs in its surveys. The only belief item included in most NES surveys–a question about the authority of Scripture–has appeared consistently only since 1980, and underwent a change in response options between 1988 and 1990.

[5] NES' coding of religious affiliations was not nearly as detailed before 1990 as it was thereafter. Thus, in order to make our coding of the evangelical tradition as comparable as possible over the two periods, we employ a different evangelical category in the NES surveys from 1990 to 2004 (excluding 2002) for over-time analysis. It includes all affiliations that would have been coded as evangelical based on the pre-1990 scheme and does not include any affiliations that would not have been coded as evangelical based on that scheme. For example, the American Baptist Churches U.S.A. are not included in the evangelical tradition (they are in the mainline Protestant tradition) in analyses involving only the 2000 and 2004 NES. However, because all non-black Baptists were included in the evangelical category before 1990 (there were only three categories of Baptists–Southern Baptist, Primitive/Free Will/Missionary Fundamentalist/Gospel Baptist, and "Baptist"–in the pre-1990 codes), we include ABCUSA in the evangelical tradition for over-time comparisons. In contrast, no Presbyterians (including Presbyterian Church in America, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Evangelical Presbyterian, and Reformed Presbyterian) are classified as evangelicals for over-time analyses because there was only one Presbyterian category before 1990. That category most likely consisted predominantly of members of the mainline Protestant Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. Respondents with general Protestant or Christian affiliations were not included in the evangelical category for over-time analyses. Fortunately, the correlation between the evangelical dummy variable created with this scheme and that containing all evangelical affiliations, and only those affiliations (step 1 in appendix A), was very high in all of the NES surveys from 1990 through 2004 (r=.85 or higher in each year).

Unfortunately, the 2002 NES did not provide the detailed coding of religious affiliations provided in all of the other NES surveys since 1990. We tried to make our definition of the evangelical tradition in 2002 as comparable as possible to those in the other years involved in over-time analyses.

The Partisanship and Presidential Voting Behavior of Evangelical Protestants, 1960 to 2004

To examine changes over time in the partisanship and presidential voting behavior of committed and less-committed evangelical Protestants, we divide evangelicals into two groups: frequent church attenders and infrequent church attenders.[6] Figure 1 shows the percentage of these two groups identifying themselves as Democrats, independents, and Republicans in all election years from 1960 to 2004.[7] Figure 2 shows the percentages of frequently-attending and infrequently-attending evangelical Protestants voting for the Republican presidential candidate from 1960 to 2004, and compares them to the same quantity for all white Christians outside of the evangelical tradition.[8]

Alongside these patterns, we provide assessments of whether changes over time in the party identification and voting behavior of the two groups were statistically significant. To make such judgements, we pooled the NES surveys in each of the five decades involved in the analysis. We computed mean values in each decade for both frequent attenders and infrequent attenders on three variables: the proportion of the group identifying with the Republican party, the seven-point party identification scale (ranging from 1 for strong Democrat to 7 for strong Republican), and the proportion

[6] Before 1970, frequent attenders are those respondents describing their worship attendance as "regular," while infrequent attenders are respondents who "never," "seldom," or "often" attend church. From 1970 to 2004, frequent attenders are respondents who attend church "almost every week" or more often, while infrequent attenders are respondents who attend "once or twice a month" or less often. The percentage of frequent attenders among evangelical Protestants was 40.3 in 1960 and 45.2 in 2004.

[7] Democrats and Republicans are defined as strong and weak partisans on the NES' seven-point party identification scale. The independent category includes pure independents and independent "leaners." There is not a data point for 1962 included in these figures because the religious affiliation variable in 1962 did not distinguish between different types of Protestants.

[8] The large majority of non-evangelical white Christians are either Catholics or mainline Protestants, but we also include non-traditional Christian groups such as Mormons in this category. We use other white Christians rather than all non-evangelicals as the comparison group because the non-evangelical group consists disproportionately of African-Americans and Jews, two overwhelmingly Democratic groups, and thus inflates the degree to which evangelical voters are unique from the rest of the electorate.

of the group voting for the Republican candidate in presidential elections.[9] We then conducted t-tests of the difference between the mean value for a group in a particular decade and the mean value for that group in each preceding decade. Table 1 shows these differences in means and indicates whether or not they are statistically significant.[10]

Party Identification. Among frequently-attending evangelicals, there is clear evidence of a sharp and long-term partisan realignment. Between 1964 and the early-to-mid-1970s, there was a noticeable decline in the percentage of committed evangelicals identifying with the Democratic party. Those Democratic losses, however, were not accompanied by Republican gains. Since it began after the 1964 election, when the national parties and their candidates first evinced clearly distinct stands on civil rights for African-Americans, and since evangelical Protestants were located disproportionately in the South, the beginning of this dealignment was likely part of the broader movement of southern whites out of the Democratic party in response to its racial liberalism. In the 1970s, however, the cultural liberalism of George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, and other Democratic notables likely became a force behind the continued growth of independence among committed evangelicals. With the Republicans not yet presenting a clear culturally-conservative alternative, there may have been stronger

[9] We compared mean values across decades for two different party identification variables because the two variables may capture different types of political change. Increases on the seven-point scale occur because group members become either more likely to identify with the Republican party or just less likely to identify with the Democratic party and more likely to identify as independents. The proportion identifying Republican, of course, increases only with growth in Republican attachment. So, while the former variable captures both realignment to the GOP and dealignment from the Democratic party, the latter taps only into Republican realignment.

[10] In an earlier version of this chapter, we assessed whether changes over time in the party ties and voting behavior of infrequently-attending and frequently-attending evangelicals were statistically significant through multivariate statistical models. The models included dummy variables for the two evangelical groups, dummy variables for different years, and interactions between the two sets of dummies. They also included controls for a host of demographic factors (education, income, gender, race, age, southern residence, and union membership) and interactions between these variables and the year dummies. The conclusions about the statistical significance of political changes over time among committed and less-committed evangelicals that were based on these models were very similar to those based on simple differences in means across decades.

incentives for conservative Christians to leave the Democratic fold than to identify with the GOP.[11]

The differences in means in table 1 support the notion of dealignment rather than realignment among churchgoing evangelicals in the 1960s and 1970s. While the mean party identification of this group in the 1970s was significantly ($p<.01$) less Democratic in the 1970s than in the 1960s, the proportion identifying with the GOP was no different in the two decades.

After 1978, the pattern among regularly-attending evangelicals changed from dealignment to realignment. The Democratic decline continued through the 1980s and 1990s. However, as the Republican party staked out clearly conservative ground on cultural matters, it was accompanied by an enormous increase in Republican identification. By the mid-1990s, committed evangelicals were, as a group, very closely tied to the GOP.

Those ties grew even closer over the course of George W. Bush's first presidential administration. However, the increases in Republican loyalty and further decreases in Democratic identification that occurred during the 2000s were not at all inconsistent with those that took shape during the 1980s and 1990s. Both the proportion of committed evangelicals identifying themselves as Republicans and their mean position on the party identification scale were significantly higher ($p<.05$ or less) in the 2000s than in the 1990s, but the means in the 1990s were significantly higher than those in the 1980s, just as those in the 1980s were significantly higher than those in the 1970s. Both figure 1 and table 1 show a steady growth in the ties of committed evangelicals to the GOP over the last 25 years as the cultural conservatism of the party's candidates, leaders, and platforms has increased. It is clear, then, that President Bush is not principally responsible for drawing the most devout evangelical Protestants into identification with the Republican party.

[11] Lending support to the notion that the dealignment of the 1960s was largely race- and region-based, while Democratic cultural liberalism may have played a role in the continued dealignment of the 1970s, Layman (2001) shows that the Democratic losses among regularly-attending evangelicals were due almost entirely to losses among southerners between 1964 and 1972, but were due more to change among non-southerners than to further losses among southerners between 1972 and 1978.

The over-time story is a somewhat different one for infrequently-attending evangelicals. Through the 2000 election, the pattern for this group was largely one of dealignment from the Democratic party. Like their more-committed counterparts, infrequent attenders were overwhelmingly aligned with the Democrats in the early 1960s, but became much less Democratic and more independent over the course of the 1960s and 1970s. In keeping with the idea that the party ties of less-committed evangelical Protestants may be shaped by group identification or seeing a presidential candidate as "one of us," there were substantial rebounds in the group's Democratic attachments when the two recent Southern Baptist presidents from the South, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, sought reelection in 1980 and 1996, respectively. Those upturns in Democratic loyalty, however, were followed immediately by noticeable declines.

Unlike frequent attenders, less-committed evangelicals did not become noticeably more attached to the Republican party over the course of the 1980s and 1990s. This pattern of dealignment rather than realignment is reflected in table 1. The mean of infrequent attenders on the seven-point scale was significantly higher in the 1980s than in the 1960s and in the 1990s than in any of the three prior decades. However, the proportion of this group identifying with the GOP was no larger in the 1980s than in the 1960s or 1970s, and was only slightly larger in the 1990s than in the three preceding decades.

However, the ties of less-devout evangelicals to the Republican party grew dramatically during the first administration of George W. Bush. Between 2000 and 2004, the percentage of infrequent attenders identifying themselves as Republicans grew from 27.4 to 41.6. That represented the largest increase in GOP attachments over any four-year period to date, and it resulted for the first time in a plurality of infrequently-attending evangelicals identifying with the party. The proportion of the group expressing a Republican loyalty was significantly higher in the 2000s than in any of the earlier decades.

Only time will tell whether these Republican gains will be sustained after Bush leaves the political scene. However, while Bush's presidency has simply maintained the already strong loyalties of

committed evangelicals to the GOP, it appears to have drawn their less-committed counterparts into the party fold in a much greater way than had prior Republican candidates and presidents.

Presidential Vote Choice. For the most part, the voting behavior of frequently-attending evangelicals, infrequently-attending evangelicals, and non-evangelical white Christians follows the same general pattern based on the relative success of the Republican candidate in various years. In fact, outside of 1960 and 1972, when committed evangelicals—likely motivated by the Catholicism of the 1960 Democratic nominee and the association of the 1972 Democratic nominee with "acid, amnesty, and abortion"—were unusually supportive of the Republican standard-bearer, the voting patterns of the three groups were virtually indistinguishable through 1980.[12]

That began to change in 1984. While neither low-attendance evangelicals nor non-evangelical white Christians were noticeably more likely to vote for Ronald Reagan in 1984 than in 1980, churchgoing evangelicals—presumably attracted to Reagan's cultural and moral conservatism—increased their support for the president by nearly 20 percentage points. Although the difference in the voting behavior of the three groups declined in 1988, the gap between devout evangelicals and the other two groups was clearly in evidence in the two elections of the 1990s. While both low-attendance evangelicals and non-evangelical white Christians gave pluralities of their votes to Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996, over 60 percent of committed evangelicals voted Republican in both elections. Republican voting increased among all three groups in the 2000s, but the overwhelming level of support of evangelical churchgoers for George W. Bush in 2004 was significantly higher than that of either of the

[12] In 1960 and 1972, there was a statistically-significant ($p<.05$) difference in proportion voting Republican between high-attendance evangelicals and each of the other two groups, but not between low-attendance evangelicals and other white Christians. There were no other statistically-significant differences in proportion voting Republican between any of the three groups in any of the other presidential elections between 1960 and 1980.

other constituencies.[13]

Although devout evangelical Protestants were nearly unanimous in their support for George W. Bush in the 2004 election, their loyalty for the Republican standard-bearer was not at all unprecedented. Churchgoing evangelicals have unquestionably become the backbone of the Republican electoral coalition, and have outpaced the Republican voting levels of non-evangelical white Christians in every presidential election since 1984. Moreover, the 87 percent of committed evangelicals reporting a vote for Bush in 2004 was on par with the 87 percent voting for Nixon in 1972, the 81 percent supporting Reagan in 1984, and the 76 percent backing Nixon in 1960. As table 1 shows, the proportion of this group voting Republican in the 2000s was significantly higher than it was in the 1960s, but was not statistically greater than it was in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s.

While devout evangelicals were establishing themselves as the most loyal Republican constituency in the 1990s, the less-committed members of the tradition were delivering over 60 percent of their votes to candidates other than the Republican nominee in both 1992 and 1996. However, they moved strongly into the Republican camp in 2000 and 2004, giving George W. Bush more than 60 percent of their votes in both elections. As with their committed counterparts, this did not represent altogether new territory for infrequently-attending evangelicals. They simply returned to the levels of support for Republican presidential candidates that they had demonstrated in the 1970s and 1980s. However, it did represent a sharp and statistically-significant break with the 1990s, when the group was significantly *less* likely to vote Republican than it had been in the two preceding decades.

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[13] The proportion of high-attendance evangelicals voting Republican was significantly ($p<.05$) higher than that of non-evangelical white Christians in all of the presidential elections from 1984 to 2004. It was significantly higher than the proportion of low-attendance evangelicals voting Republican in all of those election years except 1988 and 2000. The difference in the proportion of low-attendance evangelicals and other white Christians voting Republican was not statistically significant in any of the elections.

Party Polarization on Cultural Issues and the Growth of Evangelical Republicanism

The developments in the partisan orientations of more- and less-committed evangelical Protestants are consistent with our argument about the nature of partisan change for the two groups. The steady growth in the Republican attachments of the most devout evangelicals and their consistent support of Republican candidates over several decades are suggestive of a long-term partisan realignment, based in religious orientations and likely spurred by gradual increases in party polarization on moral and cultural issues. The more sporadic nature of less-committed evangelicals' support for Republican candidates and the fact that their attachments to the GOP have grown only very recently imply that their partisan orientations have been less responsive to increases in party polarization on cultural issues.

To assess this argument more directly, we examine the relationship over time between the degree of polarization between Democratic and Republican elites on cultural issues and the aggregate party ties of high-commitment and low-commitment evangelical Protestants. For our measure of elite polarization on cultural issues, we turn to the U.S. Congress. In their roles as both policy initiators and responders to presidential initiatives, members of Congress provide important cues about each party's policy positions, while their roll-call votes detail the ebbs and flows of those stands. Our measure of party elite polarization derives from all of the roll-call votes pertaining to cultural issues in the House and Senate between 1970 and 2004. Those include any votes on abortion rights, homosexual rights and relationships, the Equal Rights Amendment and women's rights more generally, religious expression in public schools and other public places, government's relationship to religious schools, embryonic stem cell research, and the funding of pornographic or obscene art by the National Endowment for the Arts.[14] Our measure is the difference between the proportion of all Republican roll-call votes on cultural issues that were on the conservative side and the proportion of all Democratic cultural votes on the conservative

[14] See Layman (2001, pp. 407-409) for a list of all of the roll-call votes from 1970 to 1996 included in our measure. The votes that we included from 1997 to 2004 are available upon request. We start with 1970 because that was the first year in which there was at least one roll-call vote on a cultural issue in both the House and the Senate.

side in the House averaged yearly with that same difference in the Senate.

We compare this congressional party alignment to the party alignments of frequently and infrequently-attending evangelical Protestants—the difference between the proportion of each group identifying with the Republican party and the proportion of the group identifying with the Democratic party. Figure 3 shows these three series from 1970 to 2004,[15] and displays a clear difference in how each of the two evangelical series relates to the congressional alignment.

Devout evangelicals' growing loyalties to the GOP closely parallel the growing polarization of the congressional parties on cultural issues. After 1980 the two series track together extremely well. In fact, the correlation between first differences (the change from one election-year to the next) in the party alignment of committed evangelicals and first differences in the congressional alignment on cultural issues in the years after 1980 is strong (.50) and statistically significant (one-tailed p=.04) even in a tiny sample of 12 time points.

In contrast, the party alignment of less-committed evangelicals fluctuates considerably around the general trend in the congressional cultural alignment, and there is no relationship at all between year-to-year changes in the two series. The correlation between their first differences is -.04 (p=.44) over the whole time period and -.03 (p=.47) for the years after 1980. Clearly the party ties of committed evangelicals are following the degree of polarization between the two parties on cultural issues while those of less-devout evangelicals are not.

Linking Evangelicals to the GOP: Religious Orientations, Policy Attitudes, and Partisan Support

The fact that the aggregate party ties of less-committed evangelical Protestants have not been shaped by the level of party polarization on moral and cultural issues is not terribly surprising. Other

[15] Because the congressional and mass series are based on very different indicators and have different scales, we have standardized all three series to have a common mean (50) and standard deviation (25).

research indicates that less-committed evangelicals not only have much less conservative cultural attitudes than do committed evangelicals, but also find cultural issues to be less salient than do their more-devout counterparts (e.g. Kohut et al. 2000, pp. 36-41).

This is evident in a comparison of the policy attitudes of high- and low-commitment evangelicals in the 2004 NES. Table 2 shows the means of these two groups and, for comparison's sake, of non-evangelical white Christians on our index of moral and cultural attitudes—which combines both attitudes on cultural issues such as abortion and gay rights with the degree to which respondents exhibit traditionalist moral values (based on the NES' "moral traditionalism" battery)—as well as a variety of policy attitudes and political orientations. These include attitudes toward social welfare issues such as government providing health insurance and government responsibility to help African-Americans, as well as two sets of core political values—egalitarianism (coded here as anti-egalitarianism) and support for limited government—that are commonly associated with social welfare attitudes (e.g. Feldman 1988). They also include several types of defense and foreign policy attitudes—support for the Iraq war, support for the war on terrorism, and support for a strong military—as well as values and group evaluations—patriotism and affect toward Israel and the military—that should underlie these attitudes.[16]

It is on moral and cultural concerns where churchgoing and less-religious evangelicals most clearly differ. Like non-evangelical white Christians, low-commitment evangelicals have fairly moderate moral and cultural orientations, while high-commitment evangelicals are noticeably and significantly more conservative than both groups.

In contrast, the differences between the other political orientations of the two groups of evangelicals are generally quite muted. Frequent attenders are slightly more supportive than infrequent attenders of conservative positions on social welfare issues, anti-egalitarian values, and a limited role for

[16] With the exception of the two feeling thermometers, all of these variables are factor scores from principal-components factor analyses of several indicators. The specific items comprising each measure, the results of the factor analyses of the items, and the reliability of the measures are shown in appendix B.

government. However, none of these differences are statistically significant, and neither group differs from other white Christians on these variables. Meanwhile, it is on defense and foreign policy concerns where the evangelical groups are closest to each other and furthest from non-evangelicals. Frequent and infrequent attenders both display levels of support for the war on terror and for a strong military that are quite strong and significantly higher than those of other white Christians. Churchgoing evangelicals are more supportive than less-pious evangelicals of the war in Iraq, but the latter also favor the war more than do non-evangelical white Christians. All three groups display very high levels of patriotism and very positive evaluations of the military.

These patterns suggest that committed and less-committed evangelical Protestants may have supported George W. Bush and the Republican party over the past two elections for rather different reasons. Much like their realignment to the GOP, the continued attachment of devout evangelicals to the party and its candidates is likely based on their traditionalist religious beliefs and staunch conservatism on moral and cultural matters. However, because less-committed evangelicals are clearly less conservative than their churchgoing counterparts but are nearly as conservative in their orientations toward social welfare and defense and foreign policy, their greater Republicanism during the George W. Bush era likely resulted from factors other than religious traditionalism and "moral values." They may have been attracted by Bush's conservative stands on social welfare and foreign policy concerns, or by his identification with the evangelical community, or simply by personal affect for the candidate.

To assess these expectations, we pool data from the 2000 and 2004 NES surveys and estimate structural equation models of Republican party support—the combination of party identification, presidential vote choice, and comparative evaluations of the two major-party candidates—separately for frequently-attending and infrequently-attending evangelicals.[17] As illustrated in figure 4, our model is a

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[17] Comparative candidate evaluations are measured as the difference between the feeling thermometer rating of George W. Bush and that of his Democratic opponent. We use the Republican party support variable rather than estimating our models separately for each political orientation because of the strong theoretical and empirical

relatively simple, recursive system in which the orthodoxy of evangelicals' religious beliefs—measured by respondents' views on the authority of the Bible—may affect their support for Bush and the GOP both directly and indirectly through a number of other political orientations.[18] The first intervening variable is affect toward fundamentalist Christians, measured by respondents' ratings of them on a feeling thermometer. In lieu of more direct measures, we include this variable as an indicator of evangelicals' degree of group identification.[19] Of course not all evangelicals consider themselves to be fundamentalists, but those with stronger ties to the evangelical community should rate their fellow tradition members more favorably. Stronger group identification may produce greater support for fellow evangelical George W. Bush and stronger Republican attachments.

The next two sets of intervening variables are, along with Republican support, latent variables, measured by confirmatory factor analyses of several observed indicators, each of which is treated as having measurement error. The first set of latent variables are moral attitudes, social welfare attitudes, and military and defense attitudes, each measured separately. The observed indicators of moral attitudes are positions on four cultural issues (abortion, homosexual anti-discrimination laws, homosexuals in the military, and women's rights) and the four "moral traditionalism" items in the NES. The indicators of social welfare attitudes are positions on government ensuring jobs, the tradeoff between government

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relationship between the three variables, because of the difficulties inherent in estimating structural equation models with a dichotomous endogenous variable such as vote choice, and because we ultimately are interested in evangelicals' overall support for the GOP and its candidates. We did estimate the models separately for party identification and comparative candidate evaluations and the results were very similar to those presented here.

[18] The model also includes controls for a number of demographic factors–sex, age, southern residence, and rural residence–that may be related to both Republican party support and religious traditionalism among evangelicals. Age is negatively related to positive assessments of Bush's personal traits and GOP support for both groups of evangelicals, and women rated Bush's traits more favorably than did men in the high-attendance group. Neither southern nor rural residence had statistically significant effects on either of these variables in either group. To account for the pooled nature of the data, we also allow a dummy variable for 2004 respondents to affect each endogenous variable in the model.

[19] The NES has not asked respondents for their religious identities (fundamentalist, evangelical, charismatic or sprit-filled, or moderate to liberal) since 1996. The 2000 survey did ask respondents whether they considered themselves to be born again Christians, but this question was not included in the 2004 survey.

services and spending, government responsibility to help improve the social and economic position of blacks, government providing health insurance, and federal spending on social security and programs to help the poor. Defense spending opinion and feeling thermometer ratings of the military combine to form our measure of military and defense attitudes. The final intervening variable is evaluation of Bush's personal traits, included to capture evangelicals' affect for Bush himself. The observed indicators are assessments of how well five different traits (moral, strong leader, cares about people like me, knowledgeable, and honest) describe George W. Bush.[20]

Figure 5 shows the statistically-significant (standardized) path coefficients for both groups.[21] Table 3 shows the direct, indirect, and total effects of belief orthodoxy, fundamentalist affect, and the three types of policy attitudes on GOP support.[22] The results provide considerable support for our expectations about the factors shaping Republican attachments for the two sets of evangelical Protestants.

In the model for committed evangelicals, belief orthodoxy has strong effects on fundamentalist affect, moral values and attitudes (both directly and indirectly through fundamentalist affect), and military and defense attitudes, and influences assessments of Bush and GOP support indirectly through those variables. Affect for Christian fundamentalists is also related to moral conservatism and is directly tied to positive assessments of Bush's personal traits. Such assessments in turn are tightly linked to Republican support. Military and defense attitudes affect GOP support through perceptions of Bush's traits, while social welfare attitudes exert both direct and indirect effects. Aside from evaluations of

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[20] To provide a scale for the latent variables, we constrain the factor loading for one observed indicator of each latent variable to be equal to one. All of the observed indicators of religious beliefs, issue attitudes, and assessments of Bush traits have been coded to range from -1 to 1, with higher scores representing more orthodox, conservative, or Republican orientations. The latent variables take on the same range of values.

[21] We do not exclude missing values from our analyses. We estimate our model using Amos 4.0, which computes full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimates even in the presence of missing data (Andersen 1957). Wothke and Arbuckle (1996) describe this FIML procedure and show that the estimates produced by it are more consistent and efficient than those produced by pairwise or listwise deletion of missing observations.

[22] The full set of measurement and structural coefficients for the models are available from the authors upon request.

Bush, moral attitudes are the strongest predictors of committed evangelicals' GOP support, operating directly as well as indirectly through assessments of Bush's traits. They clearly have the strongest total impact on Republican attachments of any of the policy attitudes in the model.

In contrast, moral values and attitudes have no effect at all on either assessments of Bush traits or Republican support among infrequently-attending evangelicals. Thus, while belief orthodoxy and feelings about fundamentalists are strongly linked to moral attitudes, their total impact on partisan orientations is much less for this group than for their churchgoing counterparts. It appears that the substantially greater Republicanism of less-committed evangelicals during the 2000s is due to neither moral values nor to evangelical group identification—at least as measured here. Of course, their assessments of Bush's personal traits are linked very strongly to their partisan orientations. However, the Republican support of infrequent attenders is based no more on personal like for Bush than is that of frequent attenders.

What is particularly important for the party attachments and candidate support of less-devout evangelicals are their attitudes on social welfare issues and on defense and military concerns. Both the direct effect of social welfare attitudes on GOP support and the indirect effect of these attitudes through Bush trait evaluations are much larger for this group than for committed evangelicals, and social welfare attitudes have the largest total effect on Republican loyalty of any variable in the model besides trait assessments. The impact of military and defense attitudes on GOP support is only indirect, but the indirect effect is very strong as their influence on evaluations of Bush traits is more than twice as large as that for churchgoing evangelicals. Military and defense attitudes also provide the only link between belief orthodoxy and fundamentalist affect and Republican party support for this group.

Defense and foreign policy attitudes seem to matter politically more for less-committed evangelicals than for their committed brethren and the 2004 NES provides an extensive array of questions about military, defense, and foreign policy concerns. Thus, we conclude our analysis by

examining the correlations between the attitudes and values considered in table 2 with our factor score of Republican party support for the two evangelical groups.[23]

The results, shown in table 4, again demonstrate that moral values and attitudes are more politically important for churchgoing evangelicals than for infrequent attenders, although the correlation with GOP loyalties is statistically significant for both groups. Social welfare attitudes are strongly and significantly related to partisan orientations for both groups. However, the values that underlie these attitudes seem to matter differentially for frequent and infrequent attenders. Anti-egalitarianism is significantly tied to GOP support for less-committed evangelicals but not for the committed group, while support for limited government has a significant correlation only for the regular churchgoers. In terms of defense and foreign policy concerns, support for the war in Iraq, the war on terror, and for a strong military are significantly related to Republican loyalties for both groups. However, patriotism, feelings about Israel, and affect for the military have statistically significant relationships with partisan orientations for less-devout evangelicals, but not for their committed counterparts.

So, we again see that the strong support that committed and less-committed evangelicals have provided to George W. Bush and the Republican party in the 2000s is based on different factors. Churchgoing evangelicals' support is based substantially on conservative moral values and cultural attitudes, as well as conservative attitudes on social welfare and some foreign policy issues. The support of the less-devout group is based more on social welfare conservatism, patriotism, and hawkish attitudes on defense and foreign policy issues.

[23] The principal-components factor analysis of comparative candidate evaluations, party identification, and the two-party presidential vote produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, and that factor explained 87.2 percent of the variation in the three indicators. Each variable had a factor loading of .9 or greater. We use simple correlations here due to the very small sample size within the religious groups in the 2004 NES.

Conclusion

George W. Bush has received nearly overwhelming support from committed evangelical Protestants in his two elections to the White House, and the group's already strong identification with the Republican party has continued to grow during the Bush years. However, because the attraction of committed evangelicals to Bush is based substantially on his highly-conservative stands on moral and cultural issues and the long-term realignment of this group to the GOP also has been driven by party positions on these issues, the level of Republican voting and identification by devout members of the evangelical tradition has not been remarkably higher during the Bush years than it was in previous eras.

In contrast, Republican voting and identification among less-committed evangelicals has reached substantially higher levels in the current decade than it did in earlier years. We argue that the sharp upturn in low-commitment Republicanism has occurred because this group was not a part of the evangelical realignment based on moral and cultural issues. Their party ties and political behavior are based more on social welfare attitudes, defense and foreign policy attitudes, and personal affect for political candidates. Bush has successfully appealed to them on all of those fronts. In short, Bush's election in 2000 and re-election in 2004 do appear to have been assisted by a growth in Republican support from evangelical Protestants. However, the gains did not come mainly from the "moral values" voters in the evangelical tradition, but from those evangelicals who do not base their political orientations on moral values.

What of the role of evangelicals in the 2008 presidential contest and beyond? Given that committed evangelicals have become strongly loyal to the GOP not only in their voting behavior, but also in their party attachments, the party should be able to rely on support from this group, at least so long as they top their ticket with a culturally conservative, not necessarily evangelical, candidate. Party identification and vote choice displays somewhat more volatility among less-committed evangelicals. Running a cultural conservative or an evangelical hardly appears a requirement for this group's support

since these factors have relatively little impact on its partisan orientations. What appears more important for keeping it in the Republican fold is the continued presentation of clearly conservative positions on social welfare and defense and foreign policy issues.

Of course, what is probably the most gripping question for political observers about evangelical Protestants and the 2008 presidential election is whether or not they will accept Senator John McCain as the nominee of the Republican party. Evangelicals helped George W. Bush to defeat McCain for the 2000 nomination, and McCain made headlines in that campaign with his sharp critiques of the Christian Right and its role in GOP politics. However, it strikes us that while McCain may not be evangelicals' first choice for president, he is likely to enjoy their support if he does emerge as the clear front-runner for the nomination and the eventual nominee. Committed evangelicals are devoted Republicans who will support the party's nominee, at least as long as he or she does not run afoul of the conservative orthodoxy on cultural issues. Despite his criticism of the Christian Right, McCain's positions and voting record on cultural issues such as abortion are quite conservative. Less-committed evangelicals attach more importance to economic and foreign policy matters, and thus may be attracted to McCain's noted fiscal conservatism and his well-earned reputation as a hawk on foreign policy issues.

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Figure 1: Party Identification of Evangelical Protestants, 1960-2004



Source: 1960-2004 National Election Studies

Figure 2: Voting for Republican Presidential Candidates among Evangelical Protestants and Non-Evangelical White Christians, 1960-2004



Source: 1960-2004 National Election Studies

Figure 3: Party Alignments of Frequently and Infrequently Attending Evangelical Protestants and the Congressional Party Alignment on Cultural Issues, 1970-2004



Source: 1970-2004 National Election Studies and *Congressional Quarterly*
Note: All three series are standardized (mean = 50, standard deviation = 25). The evangelical party alignment is the percentage Republican minus the percentage Democrat. The congressional alignment is the percentage of Republican members voting on the conservative side on all cultural issues minus the percentage of Democratic members voting conservative on cultural issues in each year.

Figure 4: Structural Model of Republican Party Support



Note: Each variable represented by an oval is latent and has its own measurement model with observed indicators. The rectangular variables are observed.

Figure 5: The Impact of Belief Orthodoxy, Fundamentalist Affect, and Policy Attitudes on Evangelicals' Assessments of Bush Traits and Support for the Republican Party, 2000-2004

Frequent Attenders



Infrequent Attenders



Source: 2000 and 2004 National Election Studies (pooled)
Note: Only statistically significant ($p < .05$, one-tailed) paths are shown. Entries are standardized coefficients. Latent variables are represented by ovals, observed variables by rectangles.

Table 1: Differences in Party Identification and Presidential Vote Choice Across Decades among Evangelical Protestants

Variable, Level of Church Attendance, and Decade	Decade			
	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000s
Proportion Identifying with GOP				
Frequent Attenders				
1960s	-.004	.09***	.18***	.23***
1970s		.10***	.18***	.24***
1980s			.08***	.14***
1990s				.06*
Infrequent Attenders				
1960s	-.003	.003	.05*	.12***
1970s		.006	.05*	.13***
1980s			.04*	.12***
1990s				.08**
Seven-point Party Identification Scale				
Frequent Attenders				
1960s	.26**	.66**	1.04***	1.40***
1970s		.40***	.78***	1.14***
1980s			.38**	.74***
1990s				.36**
Infrequent Attenders				
1960s	.35***	.37***	.60***	1.04***
1970s		.03	.25**	.69***
1980s			.22**	.66***
1990s				.44***
Proportion Voting Republican for President				
Frequent Attenders				
1960s	.09*	.09*	.04	.12**
1970s		.004	-.04	.03
1980s			-.05	.03
1990s				.08
Infrequent Attenders				
1960s	.15***	.16***	-.04	.15**
1970s		.004	-.19***	-.001
1980s			-.19***	-.005
1990s				.19**

Source: 1960-2004 National Election Studies
Note: Entries are differences in the mean values of variables in one decade and in preceding decades. The level of statistical significance of the difference between the two means is denoted as follows: ***p<.001; **p<.01; *p<.05. All tests are two-tailed.

Table 2: Political Attitudes and Orientations of Evangelical Protestants and other White Christians

	Evangelicals, Frequent Attenders	Evangelicals, Infrequent Attenders	Other White Christians
Moral and Cultural Attitudes	.65*+	.49	.45
Social Welfare Attitudes	.52	.46	.47
Anti-Egalitarianism	.44	.39	.40
Support for Limited Government	.53	.42	.46
Support for Iraq War	.64*+	.51#	.44
Patriotism	.83	.81	.80
Support for War on Terror	.84+	.81#	.76
Support for Strong Military	.73+	.72#	.66
Israel Feeling Thermometer	.66*+	.58	.59
Military Feeling Thermometer	.88+	.85	.82

Source: 2004 National Election Study
Note: Entries are mean scores on variables ranging from 0 for the most liberal position to 1 for the most conservative position. All variables except the two feeling thermometers are scores from factor analyses. The variables involved in each analysis and their factor loadings are shown in appendix B. The number of observations used in computing means ranges from 60 to 87 for high-attendance evangelicals, from 63 to 101 for low-attendance evangelicals, and from 364 to 493 for other white Christians.
* Mean for high-attendance evangelicals significantly different from that for low-attendance evangelicals at p<.05 (two-tailed).
+ Mean for high-attendance evangelicals significantly different from that for other white Christians at p<.05 (two-tailed).
# Mean for low-attendance evangelicals significantly different from that for other white Christians at p<.05 (two-tailed).

Table 3: The Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Belief Orthodoxy, Fundamentalist Affect, and Policy Attitudes on Support for the Republican Party among Evangelical Protestants, 2000-2004

Variable	Frequent Attenders	Infrequent Attenders
Belief Orthodoxy		
Direct effect	0	0[a]
Indirect effect	.27	.02
Total effect	.27	.02
Fundamentalist Affect		
Direct effect	0	0
Indirect effect	.27	.07
Total effect	.27	.07
Moral Attitudes		
Direct effect	.19	0
Indirect effect	.30	0
Total effect	.49	0
Social Welfare Attitudes		
Direct effect	.19	.34
Indirect effect	.15	.24
Total effect	.34	.58
Military and Defense Attitudes		
Direct effect	0	0
Indirect effect	.19	.42
Total effect	.19	.42
(N)	(194)	(202)
χ^2 (df=393)	714.25	575.18
χ^2/df	1.82	1.46
Δ_1/Δ_2[b]	.94/.97	.94/.98
ρ_1/ρ_2[c]	.92/.96	.93/.98

Source: 2000-2004 National Election Studies (pooled)
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients for direct effects. Indirect and total effects are based on standardized coefficients. Estimates are computed by full-information maximum likelihood, correcting for measurement error in the observed indicators of moral attitudes, social welfare attitudes, Bush traits, and electoral choice, with Amos 4.0. Controls for demographic characteristics and year of study affect all endogenous variables.
[a] Direct effects of zero indicate that the effect is not statistically significant. All non-zero direct effects are statistically significant ($p<.05$, one-tailed). Only statistically significant paths are used to compute indirect and total effects.
[b] Bentler and Bonett's (1980) normed fit index/Bollen's (1989) incremental fit index
[c] Bollen's (1986) relative fit index/Bentler and Bonett's (1980) non-normed fit index

Table 4: Correlations Between Political Attitudes and Support for the Republican Party among Evangelical Protestants

	Frequent Attenders	Infrequent Attenders
Moral and Cultural Attitudes	.49***	.39***
Social Welfare Attitudes	.55***	.54***
Anti-Egalitarianism	.20	.26**
Limited Government	.26**	.04
Support for Iraq War	.70***	.71***
Patriotism	.08	.32**
Support for War on Terror	.65***	.60***
Support for Strong Military	.31**	.37***
Israel Feeling Thermometer	.10	.21*
Military Feeling Thermometer	-.02	.31**

Source: 2004 National Election Study
Note: Entries are correlations between attitudes (ranging from most liberal to most conservative) and Republican support (the factor score of party identification, comparative evaluations of Bush and Kerry, and the two-party presidential vote). See table 2 for an explanation of measurement. The number of observations used in computing correlations ranges from 48 to 66 for high-attendance evangelicals and from 48 to 63 for low-attendance evangelicals.
***p<.01; **p<.05; *p<.10

Appendix A: Identifying Evangelical Protestants

1. Evangelicals in analyses involving only the 2000 and 2004 NES: Seventh Day Adventist, American Baptist Association, Baptist Bible Fellowship, Baptist General Conference, Baptist Missionary Association of America, Conservative Baptist Association of America, General Association of Regular Baptist Churches, National Association of Free Will Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Reformed Baptist, Southern Baptist Convention, Mennonite Church, Evangelical Covenant Church, Evangelical Free Church, Congregational Christian, Brethren in Christ, Mennonite Brethren, Christian and Missionary Alliance, Church of God (Anderson, IN), Church of the Nazarene, Free Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Wesleyan Church, Church of God of Findlay, OH, Plymouth Brethren, Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod, Congregational Methodist, Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, TN), Church of God (Huntsville, AL), International Church of the Four Square Gospel, Pentecostal Church of God, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Church of God of Prophecy, Apostolic Pentecostal, Cumberland Presbyterian Church, Presbyterian Church in America, Evangelical Presbyterian, Christian Reformed Church, Adventist (NFS), Baptist (NFS), Holiness (NFS), Church of God (NFS), Independent-Fundamentalist (NFS), Pentecostal (NFS), Churches of Christ (NFS)[24]

2. Evangelicals in the 1960-1988 NES: Reformed, Dutch Reformed, or Christian Reformed; Baptist; Mennonite, Amish; United Missionary; Protestant Missionary; Church of God, Holiness; Nazarene; Free Methodist; Plymouth Brethren; Pentecostal; Assembly of God; Church of Christ; Salvation Army; Primitive, Free Will, Missionary Fundamentalist, and Gospel Baptist; Seventh Day Adventist; Southern Baptist, Missouri Synod Lutheran; Other fundamentalists

3. Evangelicals in the 2002 NES: Baptist, Church of Christ, Church of God, Assembly of God, Holiness, Pentecostal, Seventh Day Adventist

4. Evangelicals for Over-Time Analyses in the 1990-2000 and 2004 NES: Seventh Day Adventist, American Baptist Association, American Baptist Churches U.S.A., Baptist Bible Fellowship, Baptist General Conference, Baptist Missionary Association of America, Conservative Baptist Association of America, General Association of Regular Baptist Churches, National Association of Free Will Baptists, Primitive Baptists, Reformed Baptist, Southern Baptist Convention, Mennonite Church, Church of God (Anderson, IN), Church of the Nazarene, Free Methodist Church, Salvation Army, Church of God of Findlay, OH, Plymouth Brethren, Independent Fundamentalist Churches of America, Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Assemblies of God, Church of God (Cleveland, TN), Church of God (Huntsville, AL), Pentecostal Church of God, Pentecostal Holiness Church, Church of God of the Apostolic Faith, Church of God of Prophecy, Apostolic Pentecostal, Christian Reformed Church, Adventist (NFS), Baptist (NFS), Holiness (NFS), Church of God (NFS), Independent-Fundamentalist (NFS), Pentecostal (NFS), Churches of Christ (NFS)

[24] The affiliations with the "NFS" (no further specification) label are those that are not with specific evangelical denominations, but with general denominational families that are evangelical in character.

Appendix B: Results of factor analyses used to compute factor scores in tables 2 and 4

Moral and Cultural Attitudes

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Abortion	.66
Tolerant of different moral	.65
standards	.70
Emphasis on traditional family ties	.45
Adjust morals to changing world	.72
Newer lifestyles cause breakdown	.50
Women's role	.57
Homosexuals in military	.58
Homosexual discrimination laws	
Eigenvalue	2.99
Proportion of variance explained	.37
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	.75

Social Welfare Attitudes

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Government ensure jobs	.78
Government services/spending	.73
Government health insurance	.70
Social Security	.55
Spending to help the poor	.68
Government help for blacks	.68
Eigenvalue	2.86
Proportion of variance explained	.48
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	.75

Anti-egalitarianism

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Society ensure equal opportunity	.54
Gone too far in pushing equality	.66
Big problem – don't give equal chance	.61
Should worry less about equality	.73
Not problem if some have more chance	.68
Fewer problems if treated all equally	.64
Eigenvalue	2.51
Proportion of variance explained	.42
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	.72

Limited Government

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Govt. bigger because doing things people should do for themselves	.79
Free market can handle complex economic problems	.77
Less government the better	.82
Eigenvalue	1.90
Proportion of variance explained	.63
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	.71

Support for Iraq War

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Approval of Bush handling of war	.91
Iraq war worth the cost	.90
Iraq war decreased terror threat	.76
Eigenvalue	2.20
Proportion of variance explained	.73
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	.81

Patriotism

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Seeing U.S. flag makes feel good	.75
Things about America that make feel ashamed	-.54
Things about America that make feel angry	-.54
How strong is love for country	.78
How important is being American	.76
Eigenvalue	2.33
Proportion of variance explained	.47
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	.71

Support for War on Terrorism

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Importance of goal of combating terrorism	.63
Approve of Bush handling of war on terrorism	.78
Federal spending on war on terrorism	.71
War in Afghanistan worth the cost	.75
Eigenvalue	2.08
Proportion of variance explained	.52
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	

Support for Strong Military

Variable	*Factor Loading*
Spending on national defense	.83
Importance of having strong military	.76
Solve foreign policy problems with military force or diplomacy	.75
Eigenvalue	1.83
Proportion of variance explained	.61
Reliability coefficient (alpha)	

Source: 2004 National Election Study

Note: All factor analyses use principal components extraction. All of the analyses produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, except for those for moral and cultural attitudes, anti-egalitarianism, and patriotism. Each of these produced two factors with eigenvalues greater than one. However, in each case, the second factor had a much smaller eigenvalue than did the first factor, it explained only half as much (or less) of the total variance in the observed items as the first factor did, and its eigenvalue was very close to one. Because of this and because we have strong theoretical reasons for believing that the observed indicators tap into a single underlying dimension, we formed our measures based only on the first (unrotated) factor.