

Which Values Divide?

**The Impact of Competing Parenting Visions, Culture Wars Orientations,
and other Core Values on American Political Behavior***

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Introduction

“Contemporary American politics is about worldview. Conservatives simply see the world differently than do liberals, and both often have a difficult time understanding accurately what the other’s worldview is.”

--*Moral Politics*
George Lakoff

“The contemporary culture war is ultimately a struggle over national identity—*over the meaning of America*, who we have been in the past, who we are now, and perhaps most important, who we, as a nation, will aspire to become in the new millennium.

--*Culture Wars*
James Davison Hunter

In recent years, much has been written about the “values divide” in the United States—the differences between “red” and “blue” America. Political commentators routinely cover the implications of the cultural values differences between the “two Americas” and political consultants attempt to take advantage of or mute the effects of this cultural divide. The theory of “Moral Politics” is the most recent attempt to explain the values divide. In a series of influential articles and books, cognitive linguist George Lakoff (1996, 2002, 2004) has argued that the values that divide us reduce to a difference in worldview that is reflected in differences over the “proper” parental authority. Preceding differences based upon political affiliation or religious persuasion, Lakoff divides America into those who believe in “strict father morality” and those who believe in “nurturant parent morality.”

According to Lakoff, each individual has a “moral conceptual system,” and these systems are derived from the metaphors one uses to express moral concepts. In America, the family is the dominant metaphor for political life. Accordingly, one’s view of the proper functioning of the family and the role of parents gives structure to one’s beliefs about the proper functioning of government. Views are arranged on a uni-dimensional liberal-conservative

continuum. For liberals, the family exists to nurture those (especially children) within it. For conservatives, the family is the source of moral strength and order, and obedience to authority (particularly, the father) is the key to the proper functioning of the family.

It is a tidy, parsimonious theory, but is it supported empirically? A handful of recent articles and papers provide either direct tests of Lakoff's thesis or tests of closely related ideas with indicators that tap Lakoff's divergent parenting visions. The most direct test is provided in a recent article in the *American Political Science Review* by David C. Barker and James D. Tinnick (2006). Using data from the 2000 American National Election Survey (NES), Barker and Tinnick operationalize these visions by constructing an index of opinions "regarding the proper qualities that children 'should have' in relation to adults." Preferences for respectful, mannerly, and/or well-behaved children are, they contend, indicative of a disciplinarian or authoritarian approach to parenting. Preferences for curious, independent and considerate children reveal a nurturant parenting style. Their analysis shows that parenting values strongly and significantly predict policy attitudes across a range of categories and are highly predictive of presidential vote choice even when controlling for numerous attitudinal variables. It would appear that, consistent with Lakoff, divisions about candidates and governmental policies derive from divisions about parenting values.

Hetherington and Weiler (2005) view the "strict father morality" focused on by Lakoff as part of a broader authoritarian orientation. Although they employ the same set of indicators as Barker and Tinnick, Hetherington and Weiler interpret their measure more broadly as authoritarianism—a psychological disposition emphasizing convention and conformism, respect for tradition, obedience to authority, and aversion to difference (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Stenner 2005). They contend that authoritarianism is quite relevant for understanding contemporary

public opinion and political behavior, and has become more so as the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and increasing political attention to gay rights issues have increased the perceptions of threat in the minds of those with authoritarian tendencies. These scholars show that authoritarian/parenting orientations are strongly related to conservative attitudes and have begun to exert a stronger causal impact on citizens' party affiliations.

Mockabee (2005) also views authoritarianism as a component of a broader values divide in American politics. Using the same indicators of desirable child qualities, he shows that authoritarian tendencies are related to attitudes on cultural political issues as well as to broader political orientations such as liberal-conservative identification, patriotism, party identification, and the presidential vote.

The connection between parenting/authoritarian values and policy attitudes is logical and their empirical impact on political attitudes, identifications, and behavior is impressive. However, the empirical literature on these orientations has yet to subject them to a full-scale examination of the degree to which they shape political behavior as compared to other conceptualizations of the contemporary values divide. Both Mockabee and Hetherington and Weiler fail to include a number of politically-relevant core values and other key indicators of "moral politics" in their empirical models. Barker and Tinnick do include a full range of social and political values in their analyses. However, as we explain more fully in the section on measurement below, the way in which they do so for several of the most important values—by including multiple measures of these orientations while the indicators of parenting values are combined into a single scale—hinders their ability to explain variation in policy attitudes and political behavior. These scholars also do not examine changes over time in the political influence of parenting values.

In this paper, we try to provide a full-scale test of the degree to which parenting/ authoritarian values and other types of social and political values define the values divide in contemporary political behavior. In the next section, we discuss alternative conceptualizations of the values divide and preview our empirical analysis of the nature of the divide.

Alternative Perspectives on the Values Divide

Lakoff, of course, was not the first observer to identify a values divide in American politics. An older and even more influential theory posits not just a division over parenting style, but a full-fledged culture war. According to James Davison Hunter (1991), a cleavage based upon the clash between the religiously orthodox who hold traditionally conservative moral views and religious progressives with more permissive views of morality has replaced older class and social cleavages in American politics (see also Wuthnow 1988, 1989; Sobnosky, 1993; Merelman, 1994; White, 2003.) The orthodox side of the conflict believes in an absolute, unchanging morality based upon transcendent authority (i.e., a Supreme Being as revealed in religious texts), while the progressive camp believes in a more “situational” ethics. Moral law is neither self-evident, nor is it unchanging. Instead, it must and does adapt to changing human conditions and is best left to individuals to decide for themselves. The values “divide” and resulting disagreements over public policy and political candidates stem from fundamental differences in moral and religious values.

Like Lakoff’s argument about parenting visions, Hunter views the orthodox-progressive divide as likely shaping views on the whole range of political issues and, ultimately, having a powerful impact on political behavior. Hunter acknowledges that the culture wars are most relevant for “moral” issues (e.g. abortion, gay rights, “family values”), where the implications of orthodox-progressive religious differences are most clear. However, he argues that the

“rhetorical leadership” (1991: 281) of orthodox and progressive elites should extend the influence of this moral and religious divide to a wide range of issues, from social welfare to civil rights to environmental policy, thus creating an “isomorphism between religious conservatism and political preservationism . . . and between religious liberalism and . . . and political reformism” (1991:128).

Despite its prominent role in popular discourse on American politics, the culture wars thesis has been met with a great deal of scholarly skepticism. Most of the disagreement about the culture wars pertains to the degree to which the mass electorate is polarized along cultural lines, and to what extent this division affects ideological constraint across a wider range of issues beyond the culture wars rubric. Critics of the culture wars thesis argue that most Americans are not particularly concerned with cultural issues (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005), and that most Americans hold moderate or ambivalent views on these issues (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Wolfe 1998; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005). They are particularly skeptical of Hunter’s suggestion that the cultural divide may extend its influence to policy arenas other than moral issues, and they find few connections between the orthodox-progressive cleavage and attitudes toward non-moral issues (Davis and Robinson 1996; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Demerath and Yang 1997).

However, other work identifies the orthodox-progressive cleavage as central to the recent “restructuring” of American religion (Wuthnow 1988, 1989; Himmelfarb 1999; White 2003) and finds strong links between that cleavage and political attitudes and behavior (Green et al.1996; Jelen 1997; Kohut et al. 2000; Layman 2001). The political impact of the orthodox-progressive divide is, in fact, quite powerful in the religious, policy, and political contexts that are most conducive to it (Layman and Green 2006).

While the literature on parental authority, culture wars and authoritarianism focuses largely on orientations towards moral and societal authority, there is a broader literature on the political impact of “core values.” This research shows that core values and beliefs—abstract views about the desirable qualities of human life, the proper relationship between groups in society, and the role of government in fostering these qualities and relationships—play an important role in shaping individuals’ attitudes on policy issues and ultimately, their political choices (e.g. Rokeach 1973; McClosky and Zaller 1974; Feldman 1988; Feldman and Steenbergen 2001; Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Jacoby 2006). In fact, recent work suggests that core values are politically more important for a wider segment of the citizenry than is ideology because the relationship between the values that are most relevant to a policy area and attitudes toward the issues within the policy area is not conditional on political sophistication (Goren 2004). Here we focus on three types of values that are available in all of the surveys we use for our analysis. These include egalitarianism—a belief in the fundamental value of equality in society, support for a limited role for government, and anti-black racism. Orientations toward these values have been shown to be quite relevant to attitudes on issues of social welfare and civil rights, and may be important for political behavior more generally (Feldman 1988; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Goren 2004). Here we focus on three types of values that are available in all of the surveys we use for our analysis. These include egalitarianism—a belief in the fundamental value of equality in society, support for a limited role for government, and anti-black racism. Orientations toward these values have been shown to be quite relevant to attitudes on issues of social welfare and civil rights, and may be important for political behavior more generally (Feldman 1988; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Goren 2004).

Thus, it seems clear that values matter. But which values? Parenting values? Moral and religious values? Values regarding social and moral authority? Values about the scope of government and its role in promoting equality? In this paper, we analyze the impact of various types of values divides on voter preferences regarding candidates and public policies. The remainder of this paper is essentially a contest between the operational indicators of the culture wars cleavage, the various incarnations of authoritarianism/parenting values, and other types of values to see which set of core beliefs does a better job explaining the American values divide. We begin with a description of our data, measurement, and modeling strategies, and then turn to our findings. Our results indicate that parenting styles divide the American people far less than religious and moral values, thereby leaving the culture wars thesis as the winner of our competition.

Data and Methods

To assess the nature of the values divide in contemporary political behavior, we turn to the American National Election Studies (NES) in 1992, 2000, and 2004. Since 1992, the presidential-year NES surveys have included indicators of a wide range of value orientations—moral traditionalism, anti-black racism, egalitarianism, support for limited government, and parenting values—as well as measures of religious orientations that are much improved over those in prior studies. We do not employ the 1996 NES in this study because the questions used in past work to measure parenting values (Barker and Tinnick 2006) or authoritarianism (Hetherington and Weiler 2005; Mockabee 2005) were not included in that survey.

Parts of our analysis examine differences across elections in the political impact of particular values orientations and thus employ the three surveys separately. Other parts use data pooled from the 1992, 2000, and 2004 surveys. Pooling data not only affords us a much larger

number of observations for analysis, but also allows us to assess the values divide in American political behavior from the perspective of the contemporary period generally rather than simply in a single, potentially idiosyncratic, election year.

Measurement Strategy

As we have argued, the recent literature on the political impact of parenting/authoritarian values suffers either from not including a range of other value orientations in empirical models or from including multiple measures of those orientations, thus forcing them to compete against each other empirically while the parenting/authoritarian items are combined into a single index. Thus, there are two key components to our strategy for the measurement of social and political values. First, our empirical models include as many measures of key values as is possible. Because much of our analysis is conducted with data pooled from the 1992, 2000, and 2004 NES surveys, we constructed our measures within this pooled data set, and the indicators used here are only those that were available in all three surveys. Thus, we assess the political impact of parenting/authoritarian values, moral traditionalism, religious traditionalism, egalitarianism, support for limited government, and anti-black racism. We are not able to include other key values such as militarism and humanitarianism in our analysis because there were not indicators of these orientations in all three surveys.

Second, when there is a legitimate argument for various indicators all tapping into the same broad value orientation, we combine those indicators into a single measure. There may be good arguments for why there are multiple dimensions to general orientations such as egalitarianism, moral traditionalism, and religious traditionalism (see Barker and Tinnick 2006), but there are equally good arguments for why each of these represents a single underlying construct. Moreover, a rigorous test of the political impact of parenting/authoritarian values

requires that other value orientations be allowed to compete empirically with them on an equal footing. That is not the case when there are multiple, highly correlated measures of orientations such as moral traditionalism, religious traditionalism, and egalitarianism having to compete with each other to explain variance in political attitudes and behavior, while parenting/authoritarian values are merged into a single scale. Thus, our general approach is to create single measures of these constructs.

Where possible, our measures of values, religious orientations, and policy attitudes are the scores from confirmatory factor analyses (using principal components extraction) of all of the indicators of a particular orientation. The results of those analyses are presented in the appendix. When there are only one or two indicators of a particular orientation, we did not employ factor analysis. We describe our measures below. To facilitate comparison of the effects of explanatory variables, we have coded all of the independent and dependent variables in our analyses to range from zero to one.

Parenting/Authoritarian Values. To measure the degree to which parenting orientations are strict or nurturant, Barker and Tinnick (2006) employ a series of questions in the NES about desirable qualities in children. Other scholars (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Hetherington and Weiler 2005; Mockabee 2005) use this same set of questions to measure authoritarianism. The specific wording of the question set is “Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. For each pair please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have: Independence or respect for elders? Obedience or self-reliance? Curiosity or good manners? Being considerate or well behaved?”

These indicators suffer from at least two potential problems. The first relates primarily to the use of these items as measures of parenting values. Each of the four pairs does appear to have one quality that is more in keeping with authoritarian values than is the other quality—respect for elders, obedience, good manners, and well behaved are the qualities that are more in keeping with authoritarianism. However, some of the items present pairs of traits that are both consistent with Lakoff’s strict father vision of morality. For example, individuals adhering to this version of parenting values seemingly would want their children to be obedient and self-reliant and to be both independent and respectful to elders.¹

Second, and more fundamentally, nearly all of the items force respondents to choose between two qualities that are both rather desirable. Most people would like their children to be both curious and have good manners, to be considerate and well behaved, and to develop a sense of independence while still showing respect for their elders. The difficulty that individuals have in choosing between these pairs of qualities is evident in the fact that extraordinarily high percentages of respondents volunteer that they would like their children to have both qualities. Whereas there are almost never more than three or four percent of respondents volunteering a response on a closed-ended attitudinal question in the NES, the percentage of respondents volunteering “both” to the child qualities questions in the 2004 NES was 9.8 on independence or respect for elders, 12.1 on curiosity or good manners, 13.3 on obedience or self-reliance, and 16.7 on considerate or well behaved.² The fact that such a high percentage of survey participants volunteer a response other than those provided in the question raises doubts about whether

¹ To be fair, Barker and Tinnick (2006) do contend that both obedient and self-reliant are qualities consistent with strict parenting values, and they restrict their measure to the other three items. However, they do include the item asking for a choice between independence and respect for elders in their measure.

² Besides the child qualities questions, there were 32 other attitudinal questions in the 2004 NES for which there were some volunteered responses. The average percentage of respondents volunteering an answer other than those provided in the response-options for these questions was 2.14.

respondents' understandings of the questions reflect what the questions are intended to capture—in other words, about the basic validity and reliability of the measure.

Of course, these volunteered responses may provide a useful indication that individuals do not clearly have strict or nurturant parenting values or authoritarian or non-authoritarian orientations, but are somewhere in between. However, the fact that an option of both traits being desirable is not presented to respondents probably means that the items greatly underestimate the proportion of individuals who are ambivalent between the two qualities. Nevertheless, it seems to us that it is appropriate to code the volunteered responses of “both” at the center of a scale with those choosing one of the two traits at the extremes. Some researchers employing these items have done just that (Hetherington and Weiler 2005; Mockabee 2005), while others have, in our view improperly, discarded these responses (Barker and Tinnick 2005). Our measure of strict parenting values is the score from a factor analysis of respondents' positions on the four indicators, with the volunteered “both” responses coded in between the non-authoritarian and the authoritarian choice.

Moral Traditionalism. We employ two distinct measures of the orthodox-progressive divide that lies at the heart of the culture wars thesis. The first and most direct measure is an index of moral traditionalism that sums respondents' levels of disagreement with two statements: (1) “The world is always changing, and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to those changes” and (2) “We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live according to their own moral standards, even if they are very different from our own.” The first item clearly captures the differences Hunter posits between the orthodox camp's commitment to a transcendent, unchanging source of moral authority and the progressive camp's view that the nature of moral authority changes with the circumstances of human existence. The second item

provides another clear gauge of individuals' beliefs in absolute or relative standards of moral behavior.

Both Hetherington and Weiler (2005) and Mockabee (2005) criticize the standard moral traditionalism measure in the NES on the grounds that it is too close to politics and thus is perhaps endogenous to political orientations rather than a cause of them. In fact, Mockabee contends that for this very reason, the authoritarianism (child qualities) battery provides a better indicator of the contrasting visions of moral authority at the heart of Hunter's (1991) culture wars than does moral traditionalism. However, they focus their criticism on only two of the four statements in the NES battery: "the newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society," and "this country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties." Hetherington and Weiler contend that the Republican party and political conservatives are closely associated with both ideas, making agreement or disagreement with them a function, as much as a cause, of partisanship and ideology (see also Goren 2004). Mockabee suggests that the former statement provides a clear reference to homosexuals, while the latter brings to mind the "family values" rhetoric of Republican elites.

These scholars may well be right about those two items in the moral traditionalism battery. However, we do not employ those indicators and the two that we do use do not make reference to contemporary political issues or debates. They tap into fundamental moral perspectives that likely are antecedent to politics, and, in our view, they provide a much more direct gauge of those perspectives than do questions about desirable qualities in children.

Barker and Tinnick (2006) incorporate these same two indicators into their analysis, but contend that they represent conceptually distinct orientations: moral absolutism (item 1) and moral tolerance (item 2). They suggest that Hunter conflates moral tolerance with moral

relativism, erroneously positing that the defining characteristic of progressives, the very group engaged in absolute moral deadlock with the orthodox camp, is their belief that there is no such thing as absolute moral truth. In reality, Barker and Tinnick contend, progressives are not truly relativists, as they adhere absolutely to at least one value, which is moral tolerance. Thus moral tolerance and moral relativism are two very different things and should be treated as such.

We agree wholeheartedly that cultural progressives are highly committed to the idea of moral tolerance. However, we disagree with Barker's and Tinnick's interpretation of Hunter's argument about moral relativism. The belief that moral authority derives not from transcendent sources, but from the circumstances of human existence, and thus changes as those circumstances change, does not necessarily suggest a rudderless lack of commitment to any set of moral values or a belief that all moral values are equally valid. So, while such individuals reject the idea that moral authority is forever unchanging and that the mores that applied to 19th century society are equally applicable to modern life, they may still view certain patterns of moral behavior as absolutely necessary to the maintenance of a good society within the contemporary era. In fact, progressives are likely to have an unqualified commitment to the view that traditional notions of morality—including the notion that modernist or non-mainstream moral perspectives should not be tolerated—are outdated and inappropriate for contemporary society. In other words, they may be absolutists in their rejection of moral absolutism and in their commitment to tolerance for those with differing moral perspectives.

That moral relativism and moral tolerance may well go hand-in-hand in defining cultural progressivism provides a conceptual justification for combining them into a single measure. The

fact that the correlation between the two indicators of moral traditionalism is relatively strong provides a clear empirical justification.³

Religious Traditionalism. As Mockabee (2005) notes, most empirical work on the culture wars does not directly measure the orientations toward moral authority that are central to contemporary cultural conflict, and instead uses the religious orientations that underlie those moral worldviews as indirect indicators of them (e.g. Davis and Robinson 1996; Green et al. 1996; Demerath and Yang 1997; Jelen 1997; Layman and Green 2006). We agree that culture wars research should employ direct measures of perspectives on moral authority when they are available. However, it should not abandon its attention to the religious bases of cultural conflict. The cleavages between religious “traditionalists” (individuals who adhere to traditional theology and practice their faith in traditional ways) and “modernists” (individuals who reject orthodox theology and traditional devotionalism) within the major American faith traditions gave rise to and fundamentally define the divide over moral authority (Hunter 1991; Wuthnow 1988). In fact, Hunter’s account of the contemporary cultural conflict focuses primarily on religion and when he does engage in empirical analysis, he uses only religious measures to operationalize the orthodox-progressive divide (Hunter 1991, 1994).

Thus, a key variable in our analysis is an index of religious traditionalism that combines adherence to traditional religious belief (views on the authority of Scripture) with commitment to traditional religious practice (worship attendance, frequency of prayer, and religious salience).

While some analyses treat belief orthodoxy and religious commitment as separate variables (e.g.

³ The correlation between the two indicators is .42 and the reliability coefficient (alpha) for the moral traditionalism measure is .59. It is worth noting that our results change very little when we replace our moral traditionalism index with either of the individual indicators. In fact, even when we include both indicators in the same models, the direction and statistical significance of their effects are very similar to those presented here for the index. Meanwhile, none of the methodological decisions with regard to the moral traditionalism items has much effect on the political influence of parenting values.

Barker and Tinnick 2006; Layman and Green 2006), we believe that it is appropriate to combine them into a single measure of religious orthodoxy for three reasons. First, the orthodox-progressive divisions within religious traditions are defined by both religious beliefs and religious behaviors (Wuthnow 1988; Hunter 1991; Kellstedt et al. 1997). As Hunter notes “the words, orthodoxy and progressive, can describe specific doctrinal creeds or particular religious practices” (1991: 44). Second, past work has shown that, within the three largest American religious traditions (evangelical Protestant, mainline Protestant, and Catholic), beliefs and behaviors very rarely work at cross-purposes in creating moral, cultural, and political divisions. Rather, it is the combination of belief and behavioral differences that produces the clearest divisions within these traditions (Layman 2001). Finally, consistent with past work (Kellstedt et al. 1997; Layman 2001), our factor analysis of these items suggests that they all measure an underlying commitment to traditionalist beliefs and practices.⁴ Our measure of religious traditionalism is the factor score from this analysis.

Other Core Values. Our measures of egalitarianism (coded so that higher scores represent anti-egalitarianism) and support for limited government are the scores from the factor analyses of the NES batteries on these orientations. To measure anti-black racism, we summed respondents’ placement of blacks on two negative stereotype scales, one ranging from one for intelligent to seven for unintelligent and the other ranging from one for hard-working to seven for lazy.⁵

Policy Attitudes. Our analysis includes attitudes toward four major dimensions of policy issues: social welfare issues such as government ensuring jobs and providing health insurance,

⁴ This factor analysis produced only one factor with an eigenvalue greater than one, or even approaching one. As the appendix shows, the eigenvalue on that factor is 2.55 and it explains 64 percent of the total variance across the four religious indicators.

⁵ The correlation between these two scales is .52 and the reliability coefficient (alpha) for the measure is .69.

racial issues such as government's responsibility to help blacks and affirmative action for African-Americans, cultural issues such as abortion and gay rights, and defense and military issues. Attitudes toward the first three policy domains are the scores from factor analyses of all of the issues in those domains that were included in all three NES surveys. Defense and military attitudes are measured by the sum of respondents' attitudes toward defense spending and their feeling thermometer rating of the military.⁶

Other Political and Social Characteristics. We include party identification and ideological identification, each measured by the standard seven-point self-identification scales, in our analyses. We also include several demographic variables: education, income, sex (a dummy variable for women), race (a dummy for whites), age, and region (a dummy for southerners).

Estimation Strategy

We assess the values divide in contemporary political behavior through two types of empirical analyses. The first examines the degree to which the political impact of different types of values divides has changed over time or across different election contexts. It does so by estimating logit models of the two-party presidential vote separately for 1992, 2000, and 2004. The independent variables in these models are the values orientations described above, as well as policy attitudes, partisan and ideological identification, and demographic characteristics.

The second type of analysis is a path model of presidential candidate choice that assesses the factors shaping value orientations, the impact of those orientations on partisanship, ideology, and policy attitudes, and the effects of all of those factors on electoral choice. To facilitate the estimation and interpretation of the path model, we do not use the dichotomous vote variable as the dependent variable. We substitute it with comparative feeling thermometer ratings of the two

⁶ Because of the very different scales for these indicators, both were standardized before summing. The correlation between defense spending attitudes and military thermometer ratings is .39 and the reliability coefficient (alpha) for the measure is .56.

parties' presidential candidates (the rating of the Republican candidate minus the Democratic candidate's rating). Comparative candidate evaluations are very highly correlated with the vote—their correlation with the vote in our pooled NES data set is .80—and have been used as a proxy for the vote in other models of political attitudes and behavior (e.g. Page and Jones 1979).

Figure 1 illustrates the nature of our path model. Following past efforts at developing causal models of electoral choice (e.g. Miller and Shanks 1996), we separate our variables into five “causal stages.” In the first stage are the stable sociodemographic characteristics that are exogenous to political orientations and shape core values and political behavior. These include religious traditionalism and the various demographic variables.

The next two stages posit a causal ordering between various types of values and political predispositions. Occupying the second stage are value orientations toward objects and relationships that exist outside of politics. These values—parenting/authoritarian values, moral traditionalism, and anti-black racism—should come before political orientations and shape values and predispositions that are more explicitly political (e.g. Barker and Tinnick 2006; Hetherington and Weiler 2005; Kinder and Sanders 1996). The third stage contains the value orientations—egalitarianism and support for limited government—that more clearly tap into beliefs about the good society and the proper role of government in it. Based on theory and evidence that the direction of causality between party identification and policy attitudes flows largely from partisanship (Campbell et al. 1960; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Carsey and Layman 2006), we place party attachments in this third stage. Ideological identification also is included here (e.g. Miller and Shanks 1996).

Because core values and partisan and ideological attachments play a key role in shaping policy attitudes (Campbell et al. 1960; Feldman 1988; Goren 2004), we place attitudes toward

the major policy domains in American politics in the next causal stage. Occupying the last stage are comparative evaluations of the major party presidential candidates.

Although the figure includes causal arrows only from one stage to the stage immediately following it, we allow the variables in each causal stage to have direct effects on the variables in all of the subsequent stages. Because our model is fully recursive and all of the endogenous variables approach interval-level measurement, we estimate the path model with OLS regression. Tables 2 through 5 present the OLS estimates of models in which the variables in the second, third, fourth, and fifth stage, respectively, are the dependent variables. Based on these estimates, we compute the direct, indirect, and total effects of the various value orientations on policy attitudes and candidate evaluations and show those effects in table 6.

The Values Divide in the 1992, 2000, and 2004 Presidential Elections

We begin our analysis by examining the impact of various value orientations on the two-party presidential vote in 1992, 2000, and 2004. Table 1 shows the results of logit analyses of the vote for each of these years. To ease interpretation, we do not present the logit coefficients, but rather show the change in the probability of voting for the Republican candidate for a one-unit increase in each independent variable (an increase from each variable's minimum to maximum value given that all variables range from 0 to 1), with the t-scores from the logit models in parentheses. In order to isolate the effects of the various social and political values, we first present the results of a model (model A) that excludes party identification, ideology, and policy attitudes. We then show the estimates of the full model (model B) with these variables included.

In model A, parenting values have a significant effect on the vote in each year. And, just as Hetherington and Weiler (2005) show for the impact of authoritarianism on partisanship, their

influence on vote choice appears to be increasing over time. The change in the probability of voting Republican when we move from the most nurturant to the strictest parenting values increases from .19 in 1992, to .29 in 2000, and to .32 in 2004 respectively.

While the impact of parenting visions on vote choice may have increased, the electoral power of the culture wars divide certainly has not waned. Both religious and moral traditionalism have statistically significant effects within model A in each election year, and the size of their influence on the vote continues to be about as great as that of parenting values throughout this time period.

Also important for voting behavior are values related to the role of government in society and in championing equality. Orientations toward limited government have a highly significant effect on vote choice in each year, and their substantive impact is either greater than or about equal to those of parenting values and moral and religious traditionalism in each year. Meanwhile, the impact of anti-egalitarianism is not only highly significant in each year, but also is larger than that of any of the other variables in model A in 1992 and 2004 and any variables except support for limited government in 2000. Interestingly, anti-black racism no longer appears to be very relevant to American electoral behavior. Its influence on the presidential vote does not even approach statistical significance in any of these years.

The results of model A suggest that the values divide in contemporary presidential election is a variegated phenomenon, with Lakoff's parenting divide, Hunter's moral and religious divide, and cleavages based on egalitarian and anti-government values all shaping voting behavior. However, when we bring partisanship, ideology, and policy attitudes into the mix in model B, the picture that emerges is rather different.

Not surprisingly, party identification has the largest impact of any variable in the model in all three years. Ideological identification rivals partisanship in 1992, but, interestingly, does not even have a statistically significant influence on the vote in 2000 and 2004. Attitudes toward the various policy domains are clearly important for vote choice, but the influence of each of them is inconsistent over time. Social welfare attitudes, surprisingly, do not have a significant effect on the vote in any of the three years. Military and defense attitudes shape vote choice in 2000 and 2004, cultural issue attitudes influence voting behavior in 1992 and 2000, and racial attitudes have a significant effect in 2004.

In terms of the various values orientations, the only one that has a statistically significant influence in model B is moral traditionalism. Its effect on vote choice is significant in 1992 and 2004, and its impact in 2004 is larger than that of any other variables besides party identification and military and defense attitudes. Importantly, these were the two presidential elections over the past two decades that have been most well-known as “values elections.” The 1992 election was the one in which “cultural wars” entered the popular lexicon due to Pat Buchanan’s cultural call to arms at the Republican National Convention and in which the Bush campaign tried to emphasize “family values” and cultural conservatism in general in order to shift the focus from poor economic conditions (Layman 2001). The 2004 election has become famous for the emergence of “moral values voters” after election-day exit polls showed “moral values” ranking first in respondents’ rankings of the most important issues in deciding their votes. So, in the elections that are the most known for their focus on values, there is only one operational definition of the values divide that is relevant to vote choice. That is moral traditionalism—the definition that, we have argued, is most in keeping with the values divide posited by the culture wars thesis.

Racism interestingly is not significant in any year in either model. Beliefs about limited government, anti-egalitarianism, and religious traditionalism are significant only in Model A. The changes in probability for each variable are .38, .57, and .27 respectively for limited government, .78, .56, and .74 for anti-egalitarian sentiment, and .31, .37, and .23 for religious traditionalism.

The Values Divide in a Path Model of Political Behavior

Tables 2 through 5 present OLS regression analyses of each step in our path model. We have placed each value where we believe it logically falls in the path. We present coefficients for each step of the process. The data for these models include the 1992, 2000, and 2004 ANES respondents.

Table 2 presents the first stage in the path—the effects of demographics and religious traditionalism on parenting values, moral traditionalism, and racism. Religious Traditionalism has a significant effect on both parenting values and moral traditionalism, but not with regard to racism. Education has a strong and negative effect on strict parenting, and a small and negative effect on racism. Race has a strong negative effect on parenting values, and a strong positive effect on moral traditionalism and racism. This indicates that whites are less likely to be strict parents but more likely to be morally traditional and racist against blacks. Gender only has a significant relationship with parenting. Women appear to be less strict than their male counterparts. Income is significant for each of the dependent variables. Income has a negative effect on parenting values and a positive effect on moral traditionalism and racism, indicating that as income increases, respondents were less likely to be strict parents but more likely to be moral traditionalists. The effect of income on racism is relatively small, with a coefficient of .03. Southerners appear to be more likely to be strict parents, but region appears to have no effect on

the other two social values. 2000 was significant for moral traditionalism and racism and 2004 for all three models. However, 2004 had a different relationship with each variable—negative for moral traditionalism and racism, and positive for parenting values. We forgo discussion of the demographic characteristic variables for the rest of the models because they merely control for the effects of the variables of particular interest to the values divide.

Table 3 presents the impact of socio-demographic characteristics and social values on political values. This takes us to the next step in our path. The dependent variables in this model are limited government, anti-egalitarianism, partisanship, and ideology. Parenting values have a statistically significant effect on each of the political values. The impact is fairly small on each and is negative on limited government, but positive on all the others. Stricter parents prefer slightly bigger governments, are less egalitarian, and are more Republican and conservative. Moral traditionalism has a much larger effect on these variables. For each of the dependent variables, the effect of moral traditionalism is strong and positive. Moral traditionalists appear to be much more in favor of limited government, much more anti-egalitarian, strong Republicans and ideologically conservative. Racism is also significant in each model except in the model predicting ideology. As racism increases, so to does belief in limited government, anti-egalitarianism, and Republican identification. At this stage in the path, the significance of religious traditionalism begins to drop out. Religious traditionalism is only significant for party and ideological identification and the coefficients are fairly small (.03 and .04 respectively).

Table 4 presents the impact of socio-demographic characteristics, social values, and political values on policy attitudes. The dependent variables for this model include attitudes about social welfare, defense and the military, culture, and race. Social welfare attitudes are strongly affected by each of the political values—limited government, anti-egalitarianism, party

ID, and ideology. More conservative individuals on each of the political values are more likely to hold conservative social welfare attitudes. Strict parenting has a very small and negative impact on social welfare attitudes. This indicates that strict parents are somewhat less likely to support conservative social welfare policies. Social welfare attitudes are somewhat more strongly affected by moral traditionalism and racism. Moral traditionalists are more likely to have conservative social welfare attitudes. Racism also has a significant positive relationship with social welfare attitudes. Religious traditionalism, however, fails to significantly affect social welfare attitudes.

Attitudes about defense and the military are negatively related to limited government, and positively related with anti-egalitarianism, party identification, and ideology. Strict parenting is somewhat stronger in this model indicating that stricter parents are stronger supporters of the military and defense spending. Moral traditionalism has a small positive effect. Racism has a slightly larger negative effect and religious traditionalism is significant in this model but the coefficient is fairly small. The most striking finding of this model is the strong relationship between parenting and defense and military attitudes. This is the one model in which the direct effect of parenting values is larger than that of moral traditionalism.

Cultural attitudes are negatively affected by a belief in limited government, but the coefficient is fairly small. Anti-egalitarianism has a very strong effect and party identification and ideology also have fairly large effects. Parenting values most strongly influences cultural attitudes. With a coefficient of .11, the effect of strict parenting values is slightly larger than that of party identification. Moral traditionalism is also fairly large, even larger than parenting values ($b=.15$). Racism fails to reach statistical significance, but religious traditionalism appears to affect cultural attitudes rather strongly.

Racial policy attitudes do not appear to be affected by limited government beliefs, but are strongly affected by anti-egalitarianism. Party identification and ideology, as expected also contribute to these attitudes. Parenting values and moral traditionalism are both statistically significant indicating that both strict parents and moral traditionalists are more likely to hold conservative racial attitudes when holding all other variables constant at their means. Racism, as expected, has a powerfully significant impact on racial policy attitudes. Religious traditionalism, interestingly, has a slight negative effect on racial attitudes, indicating that religious traditionalists are less likely to have conservative beliefs about racialized policies.

Finally, Table 5 shows the impact of each of these areas—socio-demographics, social values, political values, and policy attitudes—on comparative candidate evaluations. This table measures the direct effects of each of the variables on candidate evaluations for the path model discussed in the final section of this paper. Social welfare attitudes, defense and military attitudes and cultural attitudes each positively and significantly affect candidate evaluations in the expected direction. Partisanship has the strongest independent effect on candidate evaluations (the coefficient is almost three times the size as any other variable in the model). Ideology also has a large statistically significant effect. Strict parenting values have a small but statistically significant impact, and moral traditionalism is also significant, with a somewhat larger coefficient than parenting, but still relatively small. Neither racism, nor religious traditionalism are statistically significant at this stage, indicating that whatever potential effects these variables have on candidate evaluations is indirect. This is also potentially true for moral traditionalism and parenting. We now turn to a fuller discussion of these results.

Based on the path model estimates in tables 2 through 5, we computed the direct, indirect, and total effects of religious traditionalism and the various value orientations on policy attitudes

and comparative candidate evaluations. Those effects are presented in table 6. Because anti-egalitarianism and support for limited government come immediately before policy attitudes in our causal model, they have only indirect effects on those attitudes. All of the other variables potentially have both indirect and direct effects on issue positions and candidate evaluations.

Just as our longitudinal analysis of the presidential vote did, this table clearly demonstrates that to the extent that there is a values divide in contemporary political behavior, it is primarily a divide between moral and religious traditionalists on the one hand and moral and religious modernists on the other hand. In other words, it is a political cleavage very much like the one posited by the culture wars thesis.

As other research (e.g. Goren 2004; Sniderman and Piazza 1993) shows, the influence of limited government orientations and anti-black racism is largely specific to particular policy domains. Racial prejudice leads directly to conservative attitudes only on racialized issues, its total effects on policy attitudes are substantial only for the racial dimension, and its total effect on candidate evaluations is essentially zero. Support for limited government is, by and large, relevant only to attitudes on social welfare issues. Anti-egalitarianism has stronger and more consistent effects on issue attitudes, but its overall influence on candidate evaluations is much smaller than that of religious or moral traditionalism.

To some extent, parenting values do live up to their promise as factors shaping a wide range of policy attitudes. Strict parenting visions are directly related to pro-Republican candidate evaluations and to conservatism on three of the four policy dimensions. They are indirectly related to conservative attitudes on all four types of issue attitudes, and the combination of their direct and indirect effects on candidate evaluations is clearly larger than that of racism, anti-egalitarianism, or support for limited government.

However, the political impact of parenting values is clearly smaller than that of religious and moral traditionalism. These factors play the primary role in shaping attitudes toward cultural issues, their total effect on social welfare orientations is clearly greater than that of parenting values, and religious traditionalism is slightly more important than the parenting variable even for explaining defense and military attitudes. Moreover, the total effects of religious and moral traditionalism on candidate evaluations are clearly greater than those of any of the other values orientations, even if the influence of each variable is considered separately. If religious and moral traditionalism are considered together as joint indicators of the orthodox-progressive divide, then the culture wars thesis that proposes such a cleavage appears to have a better handle on contemporary American politics than does Lakoff or others who posit alternative values divides.

Conclusion

This paper represents the first step towards reconciling the debate over which values are primarily responsible for dividing the electorate in contemporary American politics. We discover that religious and moral values divide the American electorate to a far greater extent than do parenting values. While our results are statistically robust, the task of more fully explaining *why* religious and moral values are more prominent to candidate evaluations and opinion towards public policy than authoritarianism and parenting styles remains unfinished. We conclude with a suggestion for how we may most satisfactorily explain these results in the future.

One way to reconcile the differential impacts of moral and religious values versus authoritarianism and parenting styles is to recognize that the former set of values are more directly connected by elite cues to the political world for the mass electorate than the latter.

Particularly since 1992, and most especially by the Republican party, campaigns have strategically portrayed their candidates as representative of traditional moral values and cultural symbols (Leege, Wald, Krueger, and Mueller 2002). Perhaps these results would be different if candidates made a concerted effort to paint a portrait of American society as a family unit. In short, religious and moral values are more explicitly tapped in campaign advertisements and speeches than are appeals to parenting styles. In this respect, Lakoff's (2004) call for Democrats to *frame* their party's platform in moral language is more useful than is the application of his argument linking the family as metaphor to ideological constraint. While debate over the ways to properly measure the concepts tested in this literature are surely non-trivial, what we need most at this point is a firmer grasp on why some values weigh more heavily on the political behavior of voters than others.

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Table 1: The Impact of Social and Political Values on the Presidential Vote in 1992, 2000, and 2004

Independent Variables	1992		2000		2004	
	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B	Model A	Model B
Strict Parenting	.19* (2.38)	-.07 (-.42)	.29*** (3.23)	.11 (.49)	.32*** (3.41)	-.20 (-.96)
Moral Traditionalism	.33*** (4.28)	.43** (2.48)	.37*** (4.31)	.10 (.39)	.39*** (3.86)	.69*** (3.47)
Racism	.12 (.88)	.20 (.72)	.04 (.25)	-.38 (-1.1)	-.07 (-.42)	-.03 (-.09)
Limited Government	.38*** (6.51)	.16 (1.24)	.57*** (9.91)	-.04 (-.23)	.27*** (4.05)	-.01 (-.07)
Anti-Egalitarianism	.78*** (7.74)	.35 (1.39)	.56*** (4.74)	.20 (.53)	.74*** (6.85)	-.03 (-.08)
Party ID	—	.90*** (8.34)	—	.89*** (5.79)	—	.92*** (7.18)
Ideological ID	—	.67** (3.01)	—	.38 (1.34)	—	.36 (1.09)
Social Welfare Attitudes	—	.40 (1.16)	—	.41 (1.11)	—	.60 (1.85)
Military/Defense Attitudes	—	.21 (.75)	—	.58* (2.19)	—	.71** (2.9)
Cultural Issue Attitudes	—	.58** (2.80)	—	.64* (2.05)	—	.29 (1.18)
Racial Issue Attitudes	—	.27 (1.20)	—	.32 (.99)	—	.58* (2.29)
Religious Traditionalism	.31*** (3.64)	-.07 (-.33)	.37*** (3.89)	-.01 (-.04)	.23* (2.30)	.04 (.21)
Education	.30*** (3.23)	.34* (1.89)	-.07 (-.66)	-.18 (-.62)	-.01 (-.13)	-.11 (-.47)
White	.19** (2.90)	-.03 (-.20)	.31*** (5.03)	.39* (2.37)	.33*** (5.29)	-.04 (-.3)
Sex	.03 (.58)	.03 (.32)	-.02 (-.43)	.06 (.45)	-.07 (-1.36)	.02 (.15)
Income	.09 (.91)	-.29 (-1.38)	.34* (2.39)	.22 (.6)	.25* (2.25)	-.01 (-.04)
Age	-.30*** (-3.45)	-.36* (-2.13)	-.37 (-3.50)	-.49 (-1.81)	-.28** (-2.57)	-.31 (-1.27)
South	-.10* (-1.11)	-.11 (-1.22)	.12* (2.42)	.13 (.81)	.09* (1.70)	.00 (.04)
(N)	(847)	(483)	(814)	(264)	(651)	(410)
Prob > chi2	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00
Pseudo R2	.31	.69	.36	.64	.29	.69

Source: 1992, 2000, and 2004 National Election Studies

Note: Entries are the change in probability of voting Republican an increase from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable; z-scores are in parentheses. All variables range from 0 to 1. Party identification, ideological identification, and policy attitudes all range from the most liberal/Democratic position to the most conservative/Republican position.

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Table 2: The Impact of Sociodemographic Characteristics on Social Values

Independent Variables	Strict Parenting Values	Moral Traditionalism	Racism
Religious Traditionalism	.29*** (.002)	.38*** (.02)	-.02 (.009)
Education	-.35*** (.02)	.03 (.02)	-.03* (.01)
White	-.07*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.08*** (.02)
Gender	-.07*** (.01)	.005 (.01)	-.02 (.01)
Income	-.07*** (.02)	.17*** (.01)	.03** (.01)
Age	.04 (.02)	.04* (.02)	.06*** (.01)
South	.03*** (.01)	-.02 (.01)	.005 (.005)
2000	.003 (.004)	.09*** (.004)	.01** (.004)
2004	.01*** (.003)	-.01*** (.001)	-.02*** (.001)
Constant	.88 (.03)	.23 (.020)	.40 (.02)
N	3860	3947	3823
Adjusted R ²	.26	.18	.05

Source: 1992, 2000, and 2004 National Election Studies (pooled)

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All variables range from 0 to 1.

*p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 3: The Impact of Sociodemographic Orientations and Social Values on Political Values

Independent Variables	Limited Government	Anti-Egalitarianism	Party ID	Ideological ID
Strict Parenting Values	-.06*** (.01)	.06** (.02)	.06*** (.02)	.10*** (.01)
Moral Traditionalism	.29*** (.02)	.14*** (.01)	.26*** (.03)	.16*** (.03)
Racism	.14** (.05)	.16*** (.00)	.10** (.03)	.02 (.01)
Religious Traditionalism	.02 (.02)	.008 (.02)	.09*** (.01)	.14*** (.02)
Education	.09** (.03)	-.07*** (.01)	.06* (.03)	-.02 (.02)
White	.13*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)	.19*** (.02)	.06*** (.01)
Gender	-.13*** (.01)	-.03*** (.01)	-.05*** (.01)	-.05*** (.01)
Income	.14*** (.03)	.05*** (.01)	.12*** (.02)	.08* (.040)
Age	.14** (.05)	.07*** (.02)	-.14*** (.01)	.02*** (.004)
South	.004 (.01)	.02* (.01)	.00 (.02)	.01 (.01)
2000	.11*** (.01)	.06*** (.002)	.04*** (.01)	.04*** (.01)
2004	.06*** (.01)	.03*** (.001)	.05*** (.004)	.02*** (.001)
Constant	-.03 (.01)	.09 (.02)	.07 (.03)	.30 (.03)
N	3404	3668	3651	3194
Adjusted R ²	.16	.17	.16	.17

Source: 1992, 2000, and 2004 National Election Studies (pooled)

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All variables range from 0 to 1. Party identification and ideological identification range from the most liberal/Democratic position to the most conservative/Republican position.

*p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 4: The Impact of Sociodemographic Characteristics, Social Values, and Political Values on Policy Attitudes

Independent Variables	Social Welfare Attitudes	Defense/Military Attitudes	Cultural Attitudes	Racial Attitudes
Limited Government	.13*** (.01)	-.03*** (.003)	-.01*** (.001)	.02 (.03)
Anti-Egalitarianism	.24*** (.03)	.09*** (.02)	.21*** (.03)	.28*** (.01)
Party ID	.09*** (.01)	.09*** (.02)	.10*** (.01)	.08** (.03)
Ideological ID	.09*** (.03)	.09*** (.01)	.09*** (.02)	.11*** (.01)
Strict Parenting Values	-.01* (.005)	.06*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.07*** (.02)
Moral Traditionalism	.06*** (.01)	.01* (.01)	.15*** (.003)	.05*** (.01)
Racism	.03* (.01)	-.05** (.02)	.04 (.03)	.20*** (.01)
Religious Traditionalism	-.01 (.01)	.06*** (.01)	.24*** (.01)	-.08*** (.02)
Education	.06*** (.01)	-.12*** (.02)	-.13*** (.01)	-.09*** (.02)
White	.03** (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.01 (.01)	.13*** (.02)
Gender	-.03*** (.01)	-.02*** (.001)	-.10*** (.01)	.01 (.004)
Income	.07*** (.01)	.06*** (.01)	-.06* (.03)	.13*** (.03)
Age	.03* (.01)	.06* (.03)	.05*** (.01)	-.01 (.01)
South	-.01*** (.002)	.04*** (.01)	.02 (.01)	.01 (.01)
2000	-.01*** (.002)	.14*** (.001)	-.10*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)
2004	-.06*** (.002)	.14*** (.003)	-.11*** (.002)	-.02*** (.00)
Constant	.05 (.03)	.42 (.03)	.24 (.03)	.21 (.02)
N	2111	2517	2462	2425
Adjusted R ²	.51	.30	.48	.34

Source: 1992, 2000, and 2004 National Election Studies (pooled)

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All variables range from 0 to 1. Party identification, ideological identification, and policy attitudes range from the most liberal/Democratic position to the most conservative/Republican position.

*p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 5: The Impact of Sociodemographic Characteristics, Social Values, Political Values, and Policy Attitudes on Comparative Candidate Evaluations

Independent Variables	Coefficients
Social Welfare Attitudes	.12*** (.02)
Defense/Military Attitudes	.14*** (.03)
Cultural Attitudes	.06*** (.01)
Racial Attitudes	.04 (.03)
Limited Government	.01 (.01)
Anti-Egalitarianism	.05** (.02)
Party ID	.34*** (.05)
Ideological ID	.09** (.03)
Strict Parenting Values	.03* (.01)
Moral Traditionalism	.05*** (.01)
Racism	-.05 (.03)
Religious Traditionalism	.006 (.006)
Education	.00 (.01)
White	.02 (.01)
Gender	.02*** (.01)
Income	.02 (.02)
Age	-.07*** (.01)
South	.01 (.01)
2000	.004 (.01)
2004	.01 (.01)
Constant	.04 (.03)
N	1587
Adjusted R ²	.60

Source: 1992, 2000, and 2004 National Election Studies (pooled)

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All variables range from 0 to 1. Party ID, ideological ID, policy attitudes, and candidate evaluations range from the most liberal/Democratic position to the most conservative/Republican position.

*p<.05; **p<.01; *** p<.001


Table 6: Direct, Indirect, and Total Effects of Religious, Social, and Political Values on Policy Attitudes and Candidate Choice, 1992-2004

	Direct Effect	Indirect Effect	Total Effect
<u>Religious Traditionalism</u>			
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>			
Social Welfare	0	.13	.13
Cultural	.27	.17	.44
Racial	-.09	.12	.03
Defense/Military	.10	.10	.20
<i>Candidate Evaluations</i>	0	.20	.20
<u>Moral Traditionalism</u>			
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>			
Social Welfare	.08	.16	.24
Cultural	.16	.08	.24
Racial	.06	.09	.15
Defense/Military	0	.07	.07
<i>Candidate Evaluations</i>	.07	.20	.27
<u>Parenting Values</u>			
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>			
Social Welfare	-.02	.06	.04
Cultural	.14	.05	.19
Racial	.09	.06	.15
Defense/Military	.09	.05	.14
<i>Candidate Evaluations</i>	.04	.08	.12
<u>Racism</u>			
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>			
Social Welfare	0	.06	.06
Cultural	0	.03	.03
Racial	.15	.04	.19
Defense/Military	-.04	.02	-.02
<i>Candidate Evaluations</i>	-.04	.04	0
<u>Limited Government</u>			
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>			
Social Welfare	.27	--	.27
Cultural	-.01	--	-.01
Racial	0	--	0
Defense/Military	-.05	--	-.05
<i>Candidate Evaluations</i>	0	.02	.02
<u>Anti-Egalitarianism</u>			
<i>Policy Attitudes</i>			
Social Welfare	.25	--	.25
Cultural	.16	--	.16
Racial	.23	--	.23
Defense/Military	.10	--	.10
<i>Candidate Evaluations</i>	0	.05	.05

Source: 1992, 2000, and 2004 National Election Studies

Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients for direct effects. Indirect and total effects are based on standardized coefficients. Direct effects of zero indicate that the effect is not statistically significant. All non-zero direct effects are statistically significant ($p < .05$).

Figure 1: Causal Stages in the Model of Political Attitudes and Behavior



Appendix: Results of factor analyses used to create measures of religious traditionalism, social and political values, and policy

	<i>Factor Loading</i>
Religious Traditionalism	
<i>Frequency of Prayer</i>	.85
<i>Guidance from Religion</i>	.87
<i>Worship Attendance</i>	.78
<i>View of the Bible</i>	.69
<i>Eigenvalue (on first factor)</i>	2.55
<i>% Variance Explained (by first factor)</i>	.64
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.81
Anti-Egalitarianism	
<i>Society should ensure equal opportunity</i>	.51
<i>Gone too far in pushing equality</i>	.66
<i>Big problem if we don't give everyone equal chance</i>	.64
<i>Should worry less about equality</i>	.70
<i>Not problem if some have more chance than others</i>	.65
<i>Fewer problems if treated all equally</i>	.64
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	2.42
<i>% Variance Explained</i>	.40
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.70
Social Welfare Issue Attitudes	
<i>Government ensure jobs</i>	.64
<i>Government services/spending</i>	.73
<i>Government provide health insurance</i>	.59
<i>Spending for public schools</i>	.57
<i>Spending for social security</i>	.53
<i>Spending for welfare</i>	.60
<i>Spending for child care</i>	.67
<i>Spending to help the poor</i>	.69
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	3.17
<i>% Variance Explained</i>	.39
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.76
Racial Issue Attitudes	
<i>Preferential hiring of blacks</i>	.76
<i>Government help for blacks</i>	.77
<i>Death penalty</i>	.64
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	1.58
<i>% Variance Explained</i>	.53
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.54

Limited Government	
<i>The less government, the better</i>	.83
<i>Free market can handle problems</i>	.79
<i>Government involved in things people should do for themselves</i>	.78
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	1.95
<i>% Variance Explained</i>	.65
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.80
Strict Parenting Values	
<i>Individualism/Respect</i>	.66
<i>Obedience/Self Reliance</i>	.75
<i>Curious/Good Manners</i>	.75
<i>Considerate/Well Behaved</i>	.60
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	1.54
<i>% Variance Explained</i>	.51
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.64
Cultural Issue Attitudes	
<i>Women's Role</i>	.58
<i>Abortion</i>	.60
<i>Laws to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination</i>	.72
<i>Gays in the Military</i>	.76
<i>Homosexual Adoption</i>	.74
<i>Eigenvalue</i>	1.58
<i>% Variance Explained</i>	.53
<i>Reliability (alpha)</i>	.71

Source: 1992, 2000, 2004 National Election Studies (pooled)

Note: Higher scores on all indicators represent more conservative/traditional orientations.