

The University of Maryland

Who Wants Post-Materialist Land-Use Policies?:  
Evidence from Chicago's Suburbs

By

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## **Abstract**

*There is a growing literature on the emergence of post-materialism and a New Political Culture among individuals, cities, and countries. This study finds support for these theories among Chicago's suburbs. Larger municipalities with better-educated and wealthier residents adopt more land-use policies that are primarily concerned with the "quality of life" than other municipalities. Previous studies have not considered "proximity to nature" as a possible predictor of post-materialism. However, being further from the city center was found to have strong statistically significant results in addition to the effects of education and income. There is evidence to support the idea that overall post-materialism is more prevalent in some types of municipalities than others, but it is more difficult to predict which particular post-materialist policies will be adopted.*

## **Introduction**

In recent years political scientists have suggested that a fundamental shift in values is occurring in advanced societies and that these changes are creating new priorities for political actors. In a seminal work University of Michigan professor Ronald Inglehart argued that post-modernism has created new political dynamics at the international level. Instead of the former emphasis on class issues, material wealth, economic growth, and physical security that is characteristic of materialist values, the self-expression, cultural diversity and quality of life concerns characteristic of post-materialist values become predominant. Societies are transformed and “well-being values” replace “survival values” (Inglehart 1997, 77).

These shifts in values are found in countries that have experienced sustained economic security and material prosperity. People who can take their material well-being for granted can afford to shift their focus to items that are lower on the hierarchy of needs. Accordingly, Inglehart found that post-materialist values were disproportionately found among wealthier better-educated people and in nations that had wealthier better-educated populations. In addition, because aggregate value changes are the result of people with new values replacing those with older values, instead of individual value shifts, younger people who have grown up in relative prosperity are more likely to have post-materialist values than older people who grew up with relative scarcity. Thus, younger populations are more likely to hold post-materialist values (Inglehart 1997, 134).

Worldwide, countries with younger, wealthier, and better-educated populations have seen dramatic changes in their political agenda's over time. The rise of Green parties and environmental issues has begun to displace the older Labor/Socialist parties

and class issues (Inglehart 1997, 237). The decline of class politics, despite having its critics, is seen as a new political trend. In a similar vein, Terry N. Clark from the University of Chicago argues that a New Political Culture (NPC) is emerging. The traditional class cleavages are declining along with clientelism and hierarchy. He finds evidence to suggest that the “NPC views are more pervasive among younger, more educated, and affluent individuals, and societies” and that lifestyle issues come to the political forefront (Clark & Inglehart 1998, 13). “Lifestyle politics” emerge as individual identities replace group identities (Bennett 1998, 755).

The change toward NPC has been observed among political leaders like former American President Bill Clinton, former Vice-President Al Gore, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Japanese Mayor of Izumo City Tetsundo Iwakuni, French city-manager of Saint-Denis Jacques Marsaud, New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, and Chicago Mayor Richard M. Daley (Clark 2000, 24; Clark 1998, 86-7). Thus, the change in politics occurs at both the national and local level. Locally, NPC cities tend to have NPC tendencies if they are “larger and have citizens who are more affluent, more educated, and more often work in services, especially professional and high-tech occupations” (Clark 2000, 26). Indeed, Clark finds evidence that NPC is more prevalent in cities with exactly those characteristics (Clark 1996, 397). There, “lifestyle and amenity issues” gain in importance relative to economic issues (Clark 2000, 22).

One subject that has not been considered in the literature is the effect of being closer to a natural environment. It is not unreasonable to hypothesize that persons who are particularly concerned about quality of life and aesthetics should be those that are in closer proximity to nature. This may be because being closer to a natural environment

has an effect on one's values or because those with particular values move closer to natural environments. In either case, being further away from the city center should increase the post-materialism of individuals and cities.

The suburbs are the ideal governmental units to study to find evidence of post-materialist policies and NPC tendencies because of their unique nature. For one, a majority of Americans now live in suburban municipalities. Secondly, the suburbs are heterogeneous as a population but have a relatively homogenous group of residents within them. There are upper-class suburbs, middle-class suburbs, working-class suburbs, suburbs that are predominantly black, suburbs that are predominantly white, suburbs that are predominantly elderly, suburbs whose primary function is residential, and suburbs whose primary function is industrial or retail. But because of their relatively smaller size, each suburb has a far more homogenous population internally than larger cities (Harrigan 1993, 278-81).

Therefore, one should expect that the municipal government would more readily enact the policy preferences of the population of each suburb. The citizens and officials of lower, middle, and upper social class suburbs have been found to have very different policy preferences (Williams, et. al. 1965, 211). And although using aggregate level data to explain the reasons why policies are adopted is criticized (Erikson, et. al. 1993, 8-11), we can expect that socio-economic differences lead to different values and policy preferences and therefore to different types of municipal policies – especially in homogenous communities. Indeed, suburban communities may actually “pre-select” their clientele and citizens to attract those with the “appropriate income, lifestyle, and values” (Judd & Swanstrom 1998, 296).

According to Tiebout, municipalities exist in a kind of market so that individuals with different means and policy preferences compare municipalities looking for places to live where their individual preferences regarding public services are best fulfilled (Tiebout 1956, 418). There may be a group or class of people who, after achieving a certain degree of affluence, become primarily concerned with neighborhood or community aesthetics and move to towns that emphasize those qualities or try to bring the new concerns to the political agenda in their current community. As early as the 1970's suburbs were adopting plans that specifically regulated aesthetic features like landscaping (Harrigan 1993, 302). Williams and others have found that high social rank suburbs had less land zoned for industrial purposes and more land zoned for residential purposes, while low social rank suburbs had more land zoned for industrial use and less land zoned for residential properties. Those cities that were less pressured for revenue were also more likely to shun industrial development (Williams, et. al. 1965, 189).

Political and moral issues arise, however, when the drive for aesthetically pleasing environments comes at the expense of excluding some other class from the community. This "politics of exclusion" has been noted by many authors (Harrigan 1993, 318; Judd & Swanstrom 1998, 305). Zoning and other land-use policies can mandate that only large houses be built, that they be placed on large lots, and that only certain types of expensive building materials be used; this artificially increases the cost of housing and forces lower income people to live elsewhere. As Harrigan notes, wealthy suburbs often have strict building codes while those in poorer communities prefer lower standards for the sake of maintaining housing affordability (Harrigan 1993, 319). Medler and Mushkatel found that suburbs with higher median incomes were more likely to

support controlled growth (Medler & Mushkatel 1979, 345). This suggests that there are important disparities in the types of policies that are adopted in wealthier and poorer suburbs.

Previous studies of zoning and land-use policies in the Chicago metropolitan area have hinted at exactly these types of differences between suburbs. The debate about the aesthetic implications of land-use policies, “while most vigorous in affluent suburbs, has grown markedly more intense over the past several years” (Longoria & Schwieterman 2001, 28). Some suburbs have stringent controls while others take a more laissez-faire approach. For example, appearance review committees consist of a group of knowledgeable citizens or professionals, which ensure that new buildings maintain the municipality’s architectural standards. But appearance review committees are more likely to be found in wealthier suburbs. And, even where they exist, there may be a drive not to use the committee’s full power for fear of hindering economic development (Longoria & Schwieterman 2001, 41).

Similarly, “Many community development officials fear that heightened sign control would create a hostile business environment” (Walters & Schwieterman 2001, 70). Sign controls are used to prevent a “chaotic” streetscape and although the vast majority of suburban municipalities in the Chicago region have some form of sign control policy, the enforcement of those policies is far more aggressive in more financially successful municipalities. Even with appearance review committees, some suburbs were more likely to hire professional staff with expertise in planning and architecture, while other suburbs used citizen bodies that lacked such expertise (Walters & Schwieterman 2001, 76-7). In the case of development impact fees, fees that are designed to offset the

cost of infrastructure additions for new developments, many municipalities simply lack the technical resources to effectively collect the fees and manage the program (Schwieterman & Toth 2001, 106-7).

As a final example, the vast majority of licensed day care providers in Illinois operate their business from their homes. This can cause the same traffic and noise problems that other businesses create, except that they are located in residential areas. But, “municipalities with substantial resources, such as those with large populations or higher incomes, are more likely to have regulations directed at day care providers than other communities” (Schwieterman & Toth 2001, 136). One theme is becoming increasingly more apparent in Chicago’s suburban communities; those that are wealthier and have greater resources at their disposal are adopting and enforcing policies whose main concern is improving neighborhood aesthetics and citizens’ quality of life.

This study goes beyond simply analyzing the implementation of these land-use policies and attempts to discern whether there is large scale statistical evidence to support the claim that post-materialist land-use policies are more likely to be adopted in municipalities with younger, wealthier, and better educated citizens further from the city center. The theory expects that cities with these types of populations should be shifting toward the NPC. As this happens one should find that the municipal governments adopt policies that satisfy their citizens’ preferences.

### **Data and Methods**

The data for this study was compiled from the 2000 US Census, the Chicago Suburban Fact Book, and from the Compendium of Municipal Population and Land Area Information: The Chicago Metropolitan Area, 1850-2000. There are over 260 Chicago

suburbs in Cook, DuPage, Kane, Lake, McHenry, and Will Counties. Data has been collected for each municipality in the five counties of metropolitan Chicago. The primary variable of interest is municipal land-use policy. There are twenty different land-use policies that constitute the dependent variables and our interest is in whether these policies take on the post-materialist value in municipalities with specific demographic characteristics. The expectation is that some policies have a higher probability of being adopted in municipalities with certain kinds of residents.

These policies are: architectural review committees (ARC's), appearance regulations, building codes, child day care regulations, comprehensive plans, energy conservation policies, environmental protection policies, existing land-use information, fence regulations, flood hazard regulations, historic preservation policies, impact fees, noise controls, requirements for the disabled, sign regulations, zoning ordinances, allowing group homes, allowing mobile homes, allowing modular homes, and tax-increment financing (TIF). For each of these a dummy variable is used - the data is coded "0" if the municipality does not have the policy and "1" if it does have the policy.

Additionally, a variable to estimate the extent to which a suburb has policies consistent with post-materialist values and the NPC was created. The variable "Post-Materialist Policy Index" adds the number of land-use policies that are consistent with post-materialism and NPC values and aggregates them into a single parameter. A municipality with a zero for this variable has no policies that can be construed as supportive of post-materialism or NPC propositions. A municipality with a 20 for this variable has all of the land-use policies we considered consistent with post-materialist and NPC norms, that is each policy takes the "pro-quality of life" value. Ordinary Least

Squares Regression is used to measure the effect of demographic characteristics on the index.

The land-use policies are expected to be a function of the suburb's population, the suburb's distance from Chicago, the suburb's median income, percentage of the suburb's population that has a Bachelor's degree, and the median age of the suburb's residents in years.

$$\text{policy} = f(\text{population, distance, median income, percent B.A., median age})$$

Following post-materialist and NPC theory one would expect that some policies should be positively related with having wealthier, better educated, and younger residents, while other policies are inversely related. Population is used because municipalities with large populations often have additional resources that can be used for implementing additional, or "non-essential," policies. Distance from Chicago is used because some policies are predominantly used in the rapidly expanding collar counties of Chicago and because "proximity to nature" may have an effect in addition to the effect of income, education, and age. Architectural review committees (ARC's), for example, have the power to approve and disapprove of a proposed development's designs. Because "pretty buildings" are a luxury good, wealthier suburbs should be more likely to have ARC's.

Mobile homes, on the other hand, should be used pre-dominantly by poorer, less educated, and older residents. Thus the propensity for a suburb to allow mobile homes should be negatively related to each of the independent variables except distance from Chicago and median age. This is because these smaller settlement communities on the

outskirts of the suburban fringe should be attracted to the less expensive land furthest away from the city center. The logit equation for mobile homes is as follows:

$$\text{mobile\_homes} = \beta_0 + \beta_1\text{population} + \beta_2\text{distance} + \beta_3\text{median\_income} \\ + \beta_4\text{percent\_B.A.} + \beta_5\text{median\_age} + u$$

Similar equations were created for each of the 19 other land-use policies.

Because of our interest in post-materialism and the NPC the three variables that are most closely considered are median income, percent of residents with a B.A., and median age. Our first expectation is that policies that try to improve community aesthetics and focus on quality of life concerns are positively related to median income and percent of residents with a B.A. and negatively related to median age. Policies that try to maintain a supply of affordable housing and focus on economic well-being are expected to be negatively related to median income and percent of residents with a B.A. and positively related to median age. The second expectation is that population and distance from Chicago have a positive effect on the adoption of post-materialist policies.

Depending on the policy being considered the expectation may be that these demographic characteristics have either a positive or negative effect on the probability of adopting the policy. To evaluate the *ceteris paribus* effects of these three variables logit models are designed. These are used to overcome the heteroskedasticity problem inherent in using limited dependent variables. The 20 policies are defined in Appendix I. The first set of policies focus on quality of life concerns. Those municipalities that adopt these policies can be viewed as exhibiting post-materialism and the NPC. The second set focus on housing affordability and attracting development. To the extent that

municipalities have these policies they can be said to be emphasizing materialist concerns that are not features of the NPC.

## Results

The simple OLS regressions in Table 1 shows that population, median income, and percent B.A. all have statistically significant results in the expected direction on the post-materialist policy index, just as post-materialist and NPC theory would suggest. The simple regression also shows that median age and distance from Chicago are insignificant predictors of post-materialist land-use policy in the suburbs. The most consistent predictor of post-materialism was population. This predictor remained strongly

**Table 1:** *Simple Regressions of Post-Materialist Policy Index on Each Predictor.*

Post-Materialist Policy Index	Predictors				
	(Log) Population	(Log) Distance From CBD	(Log) Median Income	Percent B.A. +	Median Age
Coefficient	0.688***	0.432	1.963***	0.046***	0.023
Standard Error	(0.111)	(0.340)	(0.414)	(0.008)	(0.033)
N	264	264	264	264	264
R <sup>2</sup>	0.129	0.006	0.079	0.117	0.002
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.125	0.002	0.076	0.113	-0.002

\* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

statistically significant in both simple and multiple regressions. Because having more residents increases the resources available to municipalities the results of population can be interpreted to mean that municipalities with greater resources are likely to score higher on the post-materialist index. They have more policies whose primary objective is to improve the “quality of life.”

**Table 2: Multiple Regression of Post-Materialist Policy Index on Predictors.**

Post-Materialist Policy Index	Predictors				
	(Log) Population	(Log) Distance From CBD	(Log) Median Income	Percent B.A.+	Median Age
Coefficient	0.805***	1.168**	0.452	0.033*	0.006
Standard Error	(0.120)	(0.372)	(0.872)	(0.016)	(0.040)
N	264				
R <sup>2</sup>	0.165				
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.152				
* p-value < .05, ** p-value < .01, *** p-value < .001					

Intriguingly, the impact of median income disappears once percent B.A. is included. This is important because median income is strongly and positively related to both percent B.A. and median age individually, as should be expected. A 1% increase in the number of residents with a B.A. or higher increases median income by an expected \$1,275 (p-value < .000) and a 1-year increase in median age yields an expected increase in median income of \$2,555 (p-value < .000). The insignificance of median income in the multiple regression may be a product of aggregation. Having larger numbers of people increases the resources available to the municipality even if the residents tend to have lower incomes. Larger cities can undertake more projects even if a smaller city may have a population with higher median incomes.

This also suggests that it may be aggregate wealth and not personal wealth that increases post-materialism. Such a conclusion would support Medler and Mushkatel's findings. Municipalities with more resources and more educated residents, regardless of having citizens with a lower or higher median income, would still be expected to have more post-materialist land-use policies than municipalities with less resources and less educated residents. This lends credibility the idea that one's social environment shapes

one's values. However, this does not mean that median income has no effect on post-materialism, it simply means that median income has no effect independent of the effects of increased levels of education.

Median age did not have the anticipated effect. Indeed, previous research has also been unable to find the expected relationship between age and support for NPC propositions (Clark 1998, 102). This may stem from using aggregate instead of individual level measures or from the high correlations between age and other variables such as income, which has a strong positive relationship. The remaining coefficients require a brief explanation. Taken literally, a doubling of population would cause us to expect an additional .805 post-materialist land-use policies, or close to one additional policy. A doubling of college-educated residents would create an expected increase in the number of post-materialist land-use policies of .033. These are modest but important differences.

The most interesting result, however, is with distance from Chicago's central business district. Holding other factors constant, moving further away from Chicago increases the number of post-materialist land-use policies adopted by municipalities. Municipalities that are further from Chicago also tend to have residents with higher median incomes. But distance from Chicago has an effect after holding factors such as median income fixed, so that "proximity to nature" has an effect in addition to the effects of population, median income, education, and median age.

**Table 3: Logit Regression of Predictors on Each Land-Use Policy.**

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Comprehensive Plan	Zoning Ordinance	Building Code	Existing Land Use Information	Impact Fees
(Log) Population	0.378** (0.126)	0.013 (0.128)	0.457** (0.147)	0.543*** (0.127)	0.704*** (0.158)
(Log) Distance from CBD	0.824* (0.378)	-1.526*** (0.421)	0.473 (0.442)	0.274 (0.359)	4.065*** (0.587)
(Log) Median Income	0.471 (0.877)	-0.322 (0.930)	1.164 (1.001)	-0.832 (0.836)	1.402 (1.107)
Percent B.A.+	-0.008 (0.016)	0.032 <sup>†</sup> (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)	0.023 (0.016)	0.009 (0.020)
Median Age	0.037 (0.003)	-0.054 (0.041)	-0.006 (0.042)	-0.023 (0.034)	-0.021 (0.045)
<b>Prob. &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></b>	0.002	0.000	0.026	0.000	0.000
<b>N</b>	263	260	253	263	260

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10, \* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

**Table 3 (Cont.): Logit Regression of Predictors on Each Land-Use Policy.**

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Architectural Review	Appearance Regulations	Flood Hazard Regulations	Requirements For Disabled	Sign Requirements
(Log) Population	0.214 <sup>†</sup> (0.115)	0.396*** (0.120)	0.599*** (0.169)	0.870** (0.292)	1.404** (0.445)
(Log) Distance from CBD	-0.102 (0.354)	0.474 (0.360)	2.478*** (0.553)	-2.896 <sup>†</sup> (1.523)	-2.923 <sup>†</sup> (1.657)
(Log) Median Income	0.081 (0.823)	-0.531 (0.838)	-0.751 (1.153)	0.21 (2.347)	0.347 (2.975)
Percent B.A.+	0.025 (0.015)	0.028 <sup>†</sup> (0.016)	0.011 (0.021)	-0.023 (0.047)	0.039 (0.061)
Median Age	-0.021 (0.034)	0.037 (0.034)	0.043 (0.046)	-0.128 (0.103)	-0.175 (0.153)
<b>Prob. &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></b>	0.002	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
<b>N</b>	263	263	262	261	262

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10, \* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

**Table 3 (Cont.):** *Logit Regression of Predictors on Each Land-Use Policy.*

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Energy Conservation	Historic Preservation	Noise Controls	Fence Regulations	Child Day Care
(Log) Population	0.346** (0.119)	0.413** (0.134)	0.486** (0.168)	1.010** (0.375)	0.856*** (0.151)
(Log) Distance from CBD	-0.425 (0.352)	0.282 (0.391)	-0.289 (0.571)	-2.073 (1.350)	0.433 (0.412)
(Log) Median Income	0.758 (0.833)	-0.964 (0.900)	-0.495 (1.301)	-6.716* (3.128)	-1.328 (0.955)
Percent B.A.+	-0.008 (0.015)	0.024 (0.016)	0.022 (0.026)	0.193* (0.078)	0.040* (0.019)
Median Age	0.007 (0.034)	0.029 (0.037)	0.042 (0.056)	-0.493** (0.169)	-0.019 (0.038)
<b>Prob. &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></b>	0.008	0.003	0.002	0.000	0.000
<b>N</b>	263	262	263	263	261
† p-value < .10, * p-value < .05, ** p-value < .01, *** p-value < .001					

**Table 3 (Cont.):** *Logit Regression of Predictors on Each Land-Use Policy.*

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Environmental Protection	Group Homes	Mobile Homes	Modular Homes	Tax-Increment Financing
(Log) Population	0.520*** (0.123)	0.883*** (0.148)	0.191 <sup>†</sup> (0.110)	0.286* (0.116)	0.814*** (0.159)
(Log) Distance from CBD	0.834* (0.360)	0.403 (0.382)	0.451 (0.348)	0.804* (0.357)	-1.270** (0.430)
(Log) Median Income	0.929 (0.847)	-0.411 (0.884)	-0.537 (0.815)	-1.234 (0.848)	-0.294 (0.966)
Percent B.A.+	-0.009 (0.016)	0.014 (0.017)	0.000 (0.015)	0.011 (0.016)	-0.016 (0.018)
Median Age	0.014 (0.034)	0.02 (0.037)	-0.024 (0.033)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.064 (0.042)
<b>Prob. &gt; <math>\chi^2</math></b>	0.000	0.000	0.089	0.008	0.000
<b>N</b>	259	259	260	254	262
† p-value < .10, * p-value < .05, ** p-value < .01, *** p-value < .001					

Logit regressions were used to estimate the probability that a particular land-use policy would be adopted. Table 3 presents the log-likelihood coefficients along with the standard errors for each of the 20 land-use policies. Each figure in Table 4 can be read as the probability that a particular land-use policy will be adopted as the predictor moves from its lowest to highest value while other variables are held constant at their mean. For example, the probability of a municipality having existing land-use information increases by 72.6% as one moves from the least populous to the most populous municipality, every other variable held constant at its mean. Negative figures indicate that the probability of having the particular land-use policy declines as one moves from the lowest to the highest value of the predictor.

Just as the multiple regression model for overall post-materialism predicts, median age and median income do not provide statistically significant results. The single exception is for the policy of fence regulations. In that single case median age and median income has an effect even when other factors are held constant. Age has a strong negative effect, meaning that as median age increases the probability of having fence regulations declines dramatically. In this case having a younger population increases the probability of having fence regulations by 77.9%. However, having a poorer population also increases the probability of having fence regulations. As median income increases, the probability of having fence regulations decreases by 60.1%. Municipalities with younger and poorer residents are most likely to be concerned with the quality of life issue of having aesthetically pleasing fences. This is a mixed result from the standpoint of post-materialist and NPC theory.

**Table 4:** *Expected Percent Change from Lowest to Highest Value of Predictor.*

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Comprehensive Plan	Zoning Ordinance	Building Code	Existing Land Use Information	Impact Fees
(Log) Population	49.4%**	1.70%	48.1%**	72.6%***	85.3%***
(Log) Distance from CBD	35.4%*	-57.3%***	14.50%	14.40%	97.5%***
(Log) Median Income	22.60%	-16.30%	41.60%	-46.70%	66.30%
Percent B.A.+	-12.70%	45.0% <sup>†</sup>	-18.80%	45.50%	16.70%
Median Age	-25.50%	-36.40%	-2.50%	-18.70%	-15.60%

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10, \* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

**Table 4 (Cont.):** *Expected Percent Change from Lowest to Highest Value of Predictor.*

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Architectural Review	Appearance Regulations	Flood Hazard Regulations	Requirements For Disabled	Sign Requirements
(Log) Population	35.2% <sup>†</sup>	58.3%*	55.8%***	22.2%**	33.0%**
(Log) Distance from CBD	-5.40%	24.30%	66.1%***	-7.8% <sup>†</sup>	-1.4% <sup>†</sup>
(Log) Median Income	4.80%	-31.00%	-15.10%	0.30%	0.10%
Percent B.A.+	48.70%	33.0%**	6.80%	-1.90%	0.30%
Median Age	-16.90%	29.40%	11.30%	-5.40%	-2.10%

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10, \* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

**Table 4 (Cont.):** *Expected Percent Change from Lowest to Highest Value of Predictor.*

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Energy Conservation	Historic Preservation	Noise Controls	Fence Regulations	Child Day Care
(Log) Population	51.2%**	49.7%**	40.0%**	5.1%**	91.0%***
(Log) Distance from CBD	-21.80%	12.00%	-4.40%	-0.40%	19.00%
(Log) Median Income	41.50%	-44.50%	-8.80%	-60.1%*	-57.60%
Percent B.A.+	-16.50%	41.10%	11.40%	11.1%*	49.9%*
Median Age	5.50%	19.40%	10.20%	-77.9%***	-12.60%

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10, \* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

**Table 4 (Cont.): Expected Percent Change from Lowest to Highest Value of Predictor.**

Predictors	Land-Use Policy				
	Environmental Protection	Group Homes	Mobile Homes	Modular Homes	Tax-Increment Financing
(Log) Population	71.6%***	91.1%***	33.0% <sup>†</sup>	47.3%*	83.1%***
(Log) Distance from CBD	41.6%*	21.10%	23.40%	40.1%*	-57.9%**
(Log) Median Income	51.20%	-24.20%	-31.00%	-61.80%	-16.50%
Percent B.A.+	-18.00%	28.00%	0.80%	21.60%	-29.00%
Median Age	11.50%	16.20%	-18.90%	-6.10%	-44.90%

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10, \* p-value < .05, \*\* p-value < .01, \*\*\* p-value < .001

The percentage of residents with a Bachelor’s degree or higher only affects two specific policies: child day care, and once again fence regulations. Having a higher percentage of college-educated residents increases the probability that a municipality will have child day care regulations by 49.9%. Municipalities with a more educated population are more likely to have their own day care regulations in addition to the regulations that statewide agencies provide. Towns with a more educated population also have an 11.1% higher probability of having fence regulations than other towns. There is a feature of having poorer, better educated, and younger residents that make municipalities adopt controls for the types and appearance of fences in their community. Although consistent with NPC propositions, having a better-educated population only helps in predicting two specific policies.

Distance from the City of Chicago is a useful predictor for as many as seven land-use policies. Five of these are in the expected direction and two results are unexpected. As expected municipalities that are further from Chicago are more likely to have comprehensive plans, impact fees, flood hazard regulations, environmental protections, and are less likely to have TIF’s. The probability of having environmental protections

increases by 41.6%, the probability of having a comprehensive plan increases by 35.4%, and the probability of having flood hazard regulations increases by 66.1% as a city is further away from Chicago. This lends some credibility to the hypothesis that being further from the city center increases the probability of adopting post-materialist policies.

Zoning ordinances and modular homes require additional comment because they don't fit the model as one would expect. The results show that the probability of having zoning ordinances declines as one moves further from away from Chicago. The model does not include a control for the partisanship of the municipal government in part because partisanship should not affect one's post-materialism in the US.<sup>1</sup> But municipalities that are closer to Chicago are more likely to be Democratic, while municipalities that are further away are more likely to be Republican. The lower probability of having zoning ordinances may be the result of a more laissez-faire market driven approach to planning in the outer ring suburbs, a factor that is not captured in this analysis.

In addition, the probability of having modular homes increases by 40.1% in municipalities that are further away. This may be only because other factors have been held constant. The inexpensive nature of modular homes makes them less likely to appear in the wealthier suburbs further from the city center, but income was held fixed in the model. Only then does the probability of having modular homes increase with distance. The standard modular home is the length of two trailers. The larger lot sizes of outer ring suburbs makes it more likely that one could have a modular home in the outer

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<sup>1</sup> In European countries post-materialists may join increasingly stronger Green parties, while in the US a post-materialist may join the Democratic Party for environmental reasons or the Republican Party for tax related reasons (wealthier persons are more likely to be post-materialist). Even more so, post-materialists may be Independents if neither party adequately captures their multi-faceted concerns.

suburbs than in the inner ring suburbs. This is not related to any particular post-materialist concern.

Two other results regarding distance do fit the “proximity to nature” hypothesis but require additional comment. The probability of having impact fees increases by 97.5% and the probability of having TIF’s decreases by 57.9% as distance from Chicago increases. Both of TIF’s and impact fees are used to finance infrastructure improvements. But inner ring suburbs are more likely to use a policy that essentially taxes the resident, while those suburbs that are further out impose a fee on the developer. It is likely that inner ring suburbs fear alienating developers for much needed investment while those further out, in prime growth areas, are less concerned about that issue and can afford to lose a potential investor that’s unhappy with municipal policies.

Strikingly, population affects nearly every policy just as NPC theory would suggest. It increases the probability of having existing land-use information by 72.6%, impact fees by 85.3%, child day care regulations by 91.0%, and environmental protection by 71.6%. The fact that population positively effects as many policies as it does suggests that this may be the most useful predictor of post-materialist policies for suburban municipalities. However, it also has a positive impact on the probability of having policies that are more materialist in nature. This result can best be explained by the proposition that lifestyle and aesthetic concerns emerge “in addition to classic economic concerns” (Clark 2000, 22). A municipality with policies whose focus is community aesthetics is likely to have them in addition to having policies that focus on material well-being. But a municipality with policies that focus on material well-being may not necessarily have policies that focus on aesthetics.

## Discussion

There is some evidence to support the hypothesis that larger cities with wealthier, better-educated residents have more post-materialist land-use policies. Population, median income, and percent B.A. all had statistically significant results in the expected direction in simple regressions. Median age, however, was not a useful predictor. The difficulty may arise in part because people with higher incomes also tend to be older. Additionally, the effect of median income became statistically insignificant once other factors were controlled for.

This does not mean that median income did not have the expected effect on the adoption of post-materialist land-use policies. It suggests that median income has no effect that is separate from the effect of percent B.A. and the other variables. This may be because living in a wealthy environment is more important than being personally wealthy in terms of one's level of post-materialism, but the result does not necessarily undermine the hypothesis that municipalities with higher income residents have more policies that address "quality of life" concerns. It may also be that the suburbs surrounding Chicago have some peculiar characteristic that would affect their post-materialism in an unidentified manner.

However, the data does show that being further away from the city center has a positive effect on the adoption of post-materialist land-use policies once other factors are controlled for. Other studies have not considered "proximity to nature" as a possible predictor of post-materialism or an NPC. This study finds that being further from an urban environment increases the probability of adopting policies whose primary focus is

quality of life or community aesthetics. Thus being closer to a natural environment may be expected to produce increases in post-materialism for cities and individuals.

Although the model does fairly well in predicting overall adoption of post-materialist land-use policies, it does less well in attempting to predict the adoption of any particular land-use policy. Median age, median income, and percent B.A. cannot be used to predict very many policies. Distance from Chicago performs somewhat better as a predictor of individual policies, but only population consistently has significant results for the vast majority of land-use policies.

Overall, it would not be unreasonable to suggest that larger municipalities with better-educated and wealthier residents adopt more land-use policies that are primarily concerned with the “quality of life” than other municipalities. Proximity to nature is a useful predictor that has not been previously considered in past analysis. And while there is evidence to support the idea that overall post-materialism is more prevalent in some types municipalities than others, as the theory suggests, it is more difficult to predict which particular post-materialist policies will be adopted.

## Appendix I

### **NPC Policies**

Architectural Review Committees (ARC's). These consist of a group of residents or hired experts that have the power to review a proposed development's designs and approve or disapprove their use.

Appearance Regulations. These are conceptually similar to ARC's and are used to manage the appearance of private buildings and landscaping.

Building Codes. These regulations are used to ensure that structures are safe and meet minimum community standards. Some municipalities have extensive building codes and require that only certain premium building materials be used.

Child Day Care Regulations. The majority of licensed day care providers in Illinois operate from their homes. Neighbors may be faced with hordes of young children throughout the day and traffic congestion on residential streets at peak hours. This prompts some municipalities to adopt policies limiting the practice of providing home day care.

Comprehensive Plans. Comprehensive plans are documents designed to layout a city's developmental goals. Adopting a comprehensive plan requires additional resources such as municipal staff with planning expertise and policies to monitor new development.

Energy Conservation Policies & Environmental Protection Policies. Energy conservation is often linked with environmental protection because the consumption and/or production of many fuels may harm the environment. In addition to limiting energy use other environmental protection policies may be adopted by municipal governments.

Existing Land-Use Information. This measure pertains to whether a municipality keeps records on land-uses in their jurisdiction. Such measures aid in regulating and managing land-use in a community.

Fence Regulations. This is almost purely a quality of life issue. Fence regulations limit the style, placement, and height of fences in a community. Fences may contribute to the community's ambiance and character.

Flood Hazard Regulations. Flood hazard regulations, while helping to preserve property values, are costly to implement because they may require property upgrades for existing residents and businesses. Nevertheless, such policies provide "peace of mind" for residents.

Requirements for the Disabled. Requirements for the disabled improve the quality of life and make it easier for disabled residents and visitors to navigate through a community.

Historic Preservation Policies. Historical sites may be part of what gives a city its "charm" and provide the "ambiance" that is preferred by some citizens.

Impact Fees. Often municipalities must extend sewer lines and roads and contribute to the building of new schools when new homes are built. These fees are designed to offset the costs of new development. Poorer suburbs may be willing to "flip the bill" to attract new development, but wealthier suburbs who are less pressed for capital investments may ask developers to pay for the expansion of public services, even at the cost of repelling them. Attracting development should not be a priority for NPC suburbs.

Noise Controls. This is another classic quality of life issue. Many people find noisy environments less pleasant than quieter ones, but these simple measures can be easily enforced by any municipality with a police force and therefore the probability of having noise controls may related only to population, which acts as a proxy for resources.

Sign Regulations. This policy is often used to prevent “sign pollution.” Businesses often use signs to mark their location and advertise to roadway users, but an overabundance of signs can lead to a sense of clutter and chaos on the streetscape. Poorer cities may be less willing to impose sign regulations for fear of repelling new businesses, while wealthier cities should be more concerned with maintaining scenic throughways.

Zoning Ordinances. Zoning ordinances are fairly standard land-use policies, but not all municipalities have them. Zoning ordinances help manage a municipality’s land-uses.

### **Materialist Policies**

Allowing Mobile Homes, Group Homes, & Modular Homes. Group homes (i.e. community residences), mobile homes, and modular homes (i.e. factory built homes) are only permitted in some municipalities. Because these types of housing attract lower income residents (who have disproportionately more social problems), persons interested in high qualities of life would rationally choose to ban this type of land-use. The probability that a municipality allows these types of development should decrease as residents become more prone to exhibit the NPC. Residents who are more concerned with maintaining affordable housing should prefer to have these options available in their town.

Tax-Increment Financing. Tax-increment financing is a system of property taxation whereby initial government expenditures in development are offset by increased property tax revenues from that development in the future. This type of government financing scheme was developed during the recession of the 1970's and is still used by municipalities that lack the ability to make infrastructure improvement expenditures directly from their coffers. Although there are many types of TIF's, these special districts should be more prevalent in municipalities actively seeking capital investment in their community. Wealthier suburbs can make capital improvements without relying on special financing schemes. In addition, an Industrial TIF District's sole purpose is economic revitalization and does not directly improve residential living conditions.

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