

Black and White Americans and Latino Immigrants: A Preliminary Look at Attitudes in Three
Southern Cities

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Introduction

The period between the 1990 census and 2000 saw a dramatic increase in immigration into the United States and, as a result, a change in the demographics of some regions. Most of this increase is the result of Latino immigration and Latino immigration into the South has soared in the past decade and a half. A number of Southern states, such as North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia, reported substantial increases in the size of their Latino populations from 1990 to 2000 (U. S. Census 1990, 2000). Areas with increasing sizes of Latino populations include cities such as Atlanta, GA; Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston Salem, and Raleigh-Durham, NC; Nashville and Memphis, TN; and Greenville, SC, among others. Suro and Singer (2002) refer to these areas as new Latino destinations.

No other region of the country has been as defined by race as has the South. These new immigrants are moving into a region where race and race relations between blacks and whites have defined virtually every important outcome, e.g., life chances, educational opportunities, legal rights, violent treatment, among other things. Given the recent nature of Latino immigration into the South, it is not surprising that little scholarly attention has been paid to the topic. Some economists have begun to examine labor force effects of and the types of jobs Latino immigrants take in the South (Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill 2001; Mohl 2003; Ciscel, Smith and Mendoza 2003; Torres 2000; Kandel and Parrado 2004; Griffith 1993), and several social scientists have done or are doing ethnographic studies in selected Southern communities, for example, Helen Marrow (2005), Jaime Winders (2005), Ted Henken (2005), and Hernández-León and Zuñiga (2005, 2003, 2001, and 2000).

The changes in the racial dynamic of the South raise many questions that need to be addressed. For example, how are native-born black and white Americans reacting to the

presence of a third population, one with little or no history in the region? How do these new immigrants perceive relations with their new black and white neighbors? Research in the area of the effects of Latino immigration on intergroup relations in the South is very recent and not extensive (McClain et al. 2006, 2007; Marrow 2005). This paper will try to provide a glimpse at the context in which racial intergroup relations will be developed in three Southern locations—Durham, NC; Memphis, TN; and Little Rock, AR. These locations represent different Southern environments from a majority black city (Memphis) to one where blacks and whites are basically represented in equal proportions in the population (Durham) to one where blacks are a minority of the population (Little Rock). No attempt at this point is made to provide multivariate explanations for the attitudes that are identified. Our intent is to highlight the changing patterns of relationships and suggest potential points of tension or conflict, and also possible areas for cooperation.

White Attitudes toward Immigration ¹

Political scientists have presented assorted evidence regarding the determinants of white attitudes toward immigration. This evidence can be distilled into four parallel lines of inquiry: 1) number and type of immigrants; 2) economic perceptions; 3) cultural concerns; and 4) prejudice.

Number and Type of Immigrants

One important area of research examines the extent to which opposition to foreigners is influenced by the demographic balance between immigrants and native-born populations. For instance, in one study Tolbert and Hero (1996) examined county support for Proposition 187—California's 1994 anti-immigrant ballot measure. These authors find that net of party affiliation and economic conditions, the proportion of Latinos within a given county had a significant and

¹This section borrows heavily from Pérez (2008).

positive effect on county support for the ballot initiative. This relationship, however, is qualified by the racial/ethnic balance of counties. Counties where Anglos and Latinos comprise the bulk of the population strongly supported Proposition 187, whereas counties with a more heterogeneous racial/ethnic composition manifested weaker support for the anti-immigrant measure. Building on this finding, subsequent research has found that attitudes toward immigration policy are shaped by the number and type of immigrant populations. For instance, Hood and Morris (1998) find that individual support for increased levels of immigration decreases as one's proximity to large populations of undocumented immigrants increases.

Nevertheless, some studies fail to replicate the relationship between anti-immigrant opinion and proximity to large populations of foreigners. In this regard, Hood and Morris (2000) fail to find a relationship between the size of local Asian and Latino populations and white support for Proposition 187. Indeed, their main finding is that *contact* between whites and Asians, and whites and Hispanics, led to weaker white support for this ballot measure. Moreover, Hood and Morris (1997) discover that individuals who live in communities with substantial numbers of Asians and Latinos are supportive of less restrictive immigration policies (see also Stein et al. 2000).

To be sure, the disjuncture in findings yielded by this line of research is puzzling. On the one hand, one set of scholars finds that the number and type of immigrants does in fact boost support for immigration policies, while another set of analysts finds that it does not. This incongruence in evidence is less puzzling, though, if one considers that these different teams of researchers analyze different outcomes in their respective studies. For example Tolbert and Hero (1996) examine aggregate vote returns, while Hood and Morris (e.g., Hood and Morris 2000 and 1998) analyze support for immigration policy as captured by survey data. This is akin to the

difference between analyzing self-reported vote choice and actual turnout, such that some slippage in these quantities is expected to occur.

Economic Perceptions

In contrast to work on the number and type of immigrants, other scholars have paid special attention to the role that economic factors play in generating white opposition to immigration. A well-documented pattern of evidence in this area of research concerns the minimal role that economic self-interest plays in shaping white resistance to immigration. For instance, Citrin and colleagues (1997) find that one's personal economic situation is a poor predictor of one's position on immigration policy. Rather, one's view about *national* economic health, as well one's concern with immigrants' negative affect on job opportunities and taxes, strongly predict individual opposition to higher levels of immigration. This evidence falls in line with an earlier inquiry by Espenshade and Hempstead (1996), who record a positive relationship between perceived deterioration in the U.S. economy and individual approval of stricter immigration measures. Other scholars have contributed to this effort by marshalling evidence which shows that perceptions of direct economic competition with immigrants influence individual attitudes toward immigrant groups (e.g., Kessler 2001; Harwood 1983). Importantly, these subjective evaluations seem to respond to those economic conditions discussed above, such that weak economic performance can precipitate a sense of economic threat from immigrants (Alvarez and Butterfield 2000).

Cultural Concerns

While some scholars have focused on the economic threat posed by foreigners, other researchers have investigated the role of cultural threat in undermining support for immigration (Fetzer 2000). Indeed, a series of independent studies document that an individual's perception

that immigrants endanger national cultural identity is a key predictor of opposition to immigration (e.g., Sniderman et al. 2000; Citrin et al. 1997; Hood and Morris 1997; Hood, Morris, and Shirkey 1997). According to these analyses, immigrants are considered a threat because they imperil the integrity of national identity through their introduction of foreign customs, languages, values, and traditions to the adopted country. For instance, Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) find that such perceptions stimulate opposition to immigrant-related policies, such as bilingual education programs for children and voting rights for non-English speakers, because these policies imply immigrants' desire for separatism from the national mainstream. These separate streams of evidence dovetail with Fetzer's (2000) finding that the cultural marginality of immigrants outperforms other predictors—such as economic self-interest and proximity to foreigners—of opposition to immigration.

Prejudice

Finally, some researchers have focused their efforts on studying the role of prejudice in activating opposition to immigration. Like related work on racism's influence on white support for policies associated with blacks (e.g., welfare, affirmative action; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears et al. 1997), this line of inquiry finds that bigotry toward immigrants is a powerful predictor of white opposition to immigration.

In this regard, Citrin et al. (1997) discover that one's negative affect toward Latinos and Asians strongly boost individual support for restrictions on immigration. Yet, there is some debate about the nature of anti-immigrant prejudice, and the degree to which it shapes individual opposition to immigration. As far as the nature of anti-immigrant prejudice is concerned, some scholars find that prejudicial views of immigrant groups are part and parcel of a larger, more systematic tendency to denigrate racial out-groups, rather than animus toward a specific group,

e.g., Latinos (Burns and Gimpel 2000). This view comports with the work of Sniderman and his associates (2000). In a clever survey-experiment, these researchers ask respondents to register their views about several stereotypical traits, e.g., inclination toward violence, laziness, and intrusiveness, possessed by immigrants. Yet unbeknownst to their respondents, these researchers manipulate the ethnic identity of the immigrant group they are asked to evaluate. In spite of this subtle change in question wording, these authors find that insofar as individuals disparage one immigrant group, they systematically disparage others.

On the other hand, Pérez (2008) has experimental evidence suggesting that prejudice toward immigrants comes in explicit and implicit manifestations. The former concerns the type of prejudice individuals are willing and able to report, while the latter involves a manifestation of prejudice that is automatic and often beyond an individual's introspection. Pérez (2008) makes two important discoveries regarding the nature of prejudice toward immigrants. The first is that while explicit prejudice influences subjects' views of Latino and non-Latino immigrants, implicit prejudice is honed in on a specific target, namely, Latino immigrants. The second is that while individuals can suppress the influence of explicit prejudice on their judgments of immigration, these same individuals find it difficult to control the influence of implicit biases. Indeed, subjects in this study were able to suppress the influence of their explicit prejudice toward immigrants in judgments of immigration policy, yet their implicit bias against Latino immigrants shaped their judgments of both illegal and legal immigration policy. This pattern of controllability falls in line with earlier work by Maxwell (2004) (see also Devine 1989). He finds that the effect of prejudicial views about Latinos on judgments of immigration policy is qualified by one's level of political sophistication, such that high-sophisticates are less likely to rely on their explicit prejudicial views of Latinos to form a judgment about immigration policy. While no such effect

was discovered in the Perez (2008) study, these related lines of research encourage scholars to re-think the nature of prejudice and its targets.

Black Attitudes toward Immigration

Historically, blacks have expressed their opinions during each wave of immigration to the United States. Although immigration had been occurring in the US since the nineteenth century, European immigration at the turn of the twentieth century was particularly troublesome for blacks. In the face of European immigration, blacks were routinely excluded from employment opportunities in favor of White immigrants (Berthoff, 1951; Parker, 1948; Roediger, 1999; Hellwig, 1981; Higham, 1973; Rubin, 1978). Furthermore, the readiness with which European immigrants adopted anti-black racism and engaged in anti-black violence caused blacks to become concerned with their physical safety, as well as their economic and political standing (Ignatiev, 1997; Jacobson, 2001; Roediger, 1999). Consequently, blacks were generally ambivalent with respect to the idea of immigration (Diamond, 1998; Hellwig, 1981; Rubin, 1978).

Black opinion, however, was not limited to European immigrants. The black community frequently registered opinions concerning Asian and West Indian immigrants throughout the twentieth century. Although these immigrant communities were not European, there remained a great sense of uncertainty about these immigrants. These concerns were not about their race/color, but about whether these groups would be privileged relative to the native born black community. To a certain extent, these fears were confirmed as West Indian immigrants were seen as different, perhaps better than, African Americans by Whites. Likewise, Whites attempted to leverage the presence of Asian immigrants, particularly in the South, to thwart black claims for a greater stake in political and economic life.

Because immigrants usually settled in industrial regions of the country, immigration was far from a national phenomenon. As successive waves of immigration continued and immigration policy evolved, immigrants became increasingly non-White. The 1980s witnessed a boom in immigrants coming from Asia and Latin America. As in previous generations, concerns about immigration once again came to the fore. The 1990s culminated in a series of measures to ban undocumented immigrants and their children from receiving social services as well as reforming immigration to limit the number of (non-White) persons, especially Mexicans, from entering the country (Hood and Morris, 1997, 1998; Morris, 2000; Pantoja, 2006). Given the urban nature of immigration to the U.S., these immigrants were finding themselves residing in areas with blacks who were the most visible minority group at that time. As immigration continued, blacks found themselves in an increasingly heterogeneous racial context. Yet, the question of black attitudes toward immigration was largely unexplored (Cummings and Lambert, 1997; Diamond, 1998; Hellwig, 1981; Rubin, 1978; Thornton and Mizuno, 1999).

Cummings and Lambert (1997) were among the first to study black opinion in this era of immigration. In their study, the authors perform a comparison of Anglo and black attitudes toward Hispanic and Asian American communities. The authors found that blacks harbored no more negative sentiment toward Asian and Hispanic communities than their White counterparts. In fact, blacks that held negative feelings toward other communities of color, held similarly negative feelings toward their own in-group members. Moreover, the authors discovered that the issues that move black opinion are not the same as those that affect white opinion suggesting that black opinion on immigration is formed by different factors than those of the majority White community (Cummings and Lambert, 1997).

Diamond (1998) found much the same result--blacks hold somewhat milder attitudes than whites with respect to immigration, albeit with some caveats. For blacks "the economic costs associated with immigration," cause them to express more restrictionist sentiment with respect to immigration than their White counterparts (Diamond, 1998: 466). While, in the main, blacks should not be characterized as favoring the exclusion of immigrants, there is reason to suspect that restrictions on immigration would find support in the black community (Diamond, 1998). Whether blacks favor or disfavor immigration depends largely "on how public figures and the media present the issue of immigration, and also depending on how blacks perceived existing economic conditions" (Diamond, 1998: 466). In short, when the issue of immigration turns racial, blacks tend to modify their opinions and become less supportive of efforts to restrict immigration.

Another study detailing black opinion on immigration delved deeper into how concerns over black economic health would influence black opinion with respect to immigration and immigrant groups (Thornton and Mizuno, 1999). This study is a cross-group comparison of black attitudes with respect to different groups of immigrants (West Indian and Hispanic) and Whites. Using data from 1984, the authors find that blacks generally hold more positive attitudes toward immigrants. Additionally, black men were more likely than black women to feel closer to all groups involved. Other predictors, such as age and urbanicity influenced opinion with older people and rural dwellers feeling closer to Whites. Yet feelings of economic insecurity did not appear to make blacks feel more negatively toward West Indian and Hispanic immigrants (Thornton and Mizuno, 1999). Though the authors hypothesized that more economic insecurity would dampen black attitudes toward immigrants, they did not find consistent evidence to support this claim (Thornton and Mizuno, 1999).

Most recently, Carter (2007), in her work, looks at how race has shaped black opinion with respect to immigration. Specifically, she looks at blacks' perceptions of their place in American society as a result of their racial past and present and the effect of these sentiments on immigration. Carter finds some preliminary support for the idea that black attitudes are mediated by their perceptions of White discrimination. In particular, those blacks who feel that the promise of political inclusion, secured during the Civil Rights Movement, has yet to be realized are ambivalent about immigration. As a result, immigration for blacks becomes a vehicle for airing their grievances for this unfulfilled promise of American citizenship. The expression comes in terms of being, at best, ambivalent about immigration. Although blacks were fearful that continuing immigration could be harmful to their community, they were not in favor of a complete restriction on immigration. Thus, Carter (2007) suggests the sense that blacks still have along way to go in their acceptance and inclusion in American society as full citizens drives black opinion with respect to immigration.

What remains constant across these differing works is that blacks have an uneasy relationship with immigration. On the one hand, blacks are generally lukewarm in their support for immigration because of the losses incurred by their community (Scott, 1999). The range of opinion on immigration often reflected the nation's posture to certain communities of immigrants, such as Europeans, Asians, Mexicans, and West Indians (Hellwig, 1978, 1987; Scott, 1999). On the other, blacks were opposed to, and remain so in the present, supporting what they saw as racist efforts to harm other communities of color (Carter, 2007; Diamond, 1998). For example, efforts to restrict immigrants while seen as being a short-term solution to black unemployment or underemployment, there was a sense that supporting such efforts would, in effect, be sanctioning their own substandard treatment (Diamond, 1998). At present, black

concerns about racial progress remain a vital lens through which they view the issue of immigration (Carter, 2007).

We posit no specific hypotheses for this chapter, but want to explore the attitudes of blacks, whites, and, in some cases, Latinos on continued immigration, the perceived economic effects of continued Latino immigration, and the perceptions of the political effects of immigration for each group. We test for statistically significant differences in attitudes on several measures. [Note: Some of these tests have been completed by not all.]

Data

The analyses in this paper are based on two surveys—The 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations (DSIR) (n=500) and the 2007 Three City Survey of Intergroup Relations (TCSIR). The cities surveyed in the 2007 data are a resurvey of Durham, NC and the addition of Little Rock, AR and Memphis, TN. Both surveys were conducted specifically for our project by the Center for Survey Research of the University of Virginia using a Computer-Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, employing random digit dialing (RDD) and dialing of directory-assisted Hispanic surname sample.² The 2003 survey was conducted from May 4 through June 22, 2003 and interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish (32 percent of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, which translates into 95.8 percent of the Latino sample opting to be interviewed in Spanish).³ A race/ethnicity quota was implemented to achieve a

²We recognize the problems associated with drawing a sample from a listing of Hispanic surnames, for example, missing Hispanics with non-Hispanic last names, and those married to non-Hispanics. We also acknowledge that some Latino immigrants might not have phones in their homes. Given the recency of the Hispanic population in Durham and the high proportion of immigrants, however, we choose the sampling frame that would give us the highest probabilities of getting to a Latino respondent.

³We had the questionnaire translated by a Spanish-language organization in Chapel Hill, NC. In order to check the translation and to ensure that it tracked the English-language version, the survey organization drew a small sample of Latinos in Durham for the sole purpose of checking the translation. As a result, changes were made to the translation. The revised Spanish-language version was then pretested on another small sample of Latinos in Durham.

minimum of 150 whites, 150 blacks, and 150 Latinos; the remaining 50 respondents were not under this quota restriction and represent a number of racial/ethnic backgrounds. Interviews were completed with 500 residents of the City of Durham for an overall response rate of 21.6 percent.⁴ The sample of 500 consists of 160 whites (32 percent), 151 blacks (30 percent), 167 Latinos (34 percent), 6 Asians (1.2 percent), 12 who designated their race as Other (2.4%), and 1 respondent (0.2 percent) who did not indicate a racial category.⁵

The 2007 surveys in Durham, Memphis and Little Rock were conducted from April 6, 2007 to October 27, 2007 and interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish (more than 90 percent of the Latino sample in all three cities opted to be interviewed in Spanish). Again, a race/ethnicity quota was implemented to achieve a minimum of 300 whites, 300 blacks, and 300 Latinos in each city, with the ability to pick up other respondents not under this quota in the random digit dialing process. Interviews were completed with 977 residents of Durham, 825 residents of Little Rock and 978 residents of Memphis.⁶

⁴A total of 4208 phone numbers were attempted in the course of the survey and a total of 14,014 call attempts were made. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) rate was calculated using the full call history of each number that was recorded automatically by the CATI software. The response rate was calculated according to AAPOR suggested formula RR3, with $e1 = .50$ and $e2 = .78$. We estimated $e1$ and $e2$ based on an analysis of residency rates and the occurrence of out-of-area households in our sample. Partial interviews are not counted in the numerator of the RR3 formula.

⁵Due to the use of the Hispanic surname sample and racial/ethnic quotas, sampling error is more difficult to calculate. The sample may be viewed as part of two separate populations. Within the RDD sample, the source of 276 completions, the probability of selection is known and the margin of error is ± 5.9 percent. Within the surname oversample, providing 244 completed interviews, all households listed under a resident with a Hispanic surname were attempted; however, Hispanics were included in RDD calling and non-Hispanics were included in the oversample. Non-Hispanics with Hispanic surnames had a greater chance of selection than non-Hispanics in the RDD sample who do not have Hispanic surnames. If we assume this to be a more or less random occurrence, then the margin of error for each of the three-racial/ethnic groups is roughly 8 percent.

⁶ Interviewing in Little Rock proved particularly problematic as it was difficult to get blacks and Latinos to participate in the survey. CSR was successful in getting the full quota of blacks, but was not successful in filling the quota on Latinos. Thus, the size of the Latino sample in Little Rock is less than in the other two cities. [Insert more information on how the Latino sample was chosen and the error rate.]

In Durham, the sample of 977 consists of 317 whites (32.4 percent), 318 blacks (32.5 percent), 316 Latinos (32.3 percent), 23 Asians (2.4 percent), 21 who designated their race as Other (2.1 percent). In Little Rock, the sample of 825 consists of 348 whites (42.2 percent), 315 blacks (38.2 percent), 127 Latinos (16.6 percent), 13 Asians (1.6 percent), 13 who designated their race as Other (1.6 percent), and 2 respondents (0.2 percent) who did not indicate a racial category. In Memphis, the sample of 978 consists of 327 whites (33.4 percent), 338 blacks (34.6), 312 Latinos (31.9 percent), 4 Asians (.4 percent), and 13 who designated their race as Other (1.3 percent).⁷

Durham, North Carolina

The City of Durham, like many Southern locations, is undergoing demographic change. In 1990, Latinos were slightly more than one percent of the population, but by 2000, their percentage reached 8.6 percent. For decades, whites were the majority in Durham (51.6% in 1990), but the increasing Latino population, along with a smaller increase in the Asian population, have reduced the white proportion to the point where in 2000 blacks and whites were almost equal percentages of the population, 45.5 percent for whites and 43.8 percent for blacks.⁸ By 2006, both the white and black populations had declined as a proportion of the city's population, yet were still virtually equal in proportion, with whites declining to 39.9 percent and

⁷ A total of 28,209 phone numbers were attempted in the course of the survey in the three cities and a total of 150,444 call attempts were made. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) rate was calculated using the full call history of each number that was recorded automatically by the CATI software. The response rate was calculated according to AAPOR suggested formula RR4, with $e1 = .189$ and $e2 = .945$. We estimated $e1$ and $e2$ based on an analysis of residency rates and the occurrence of out-of-area households in our sample. Partial interviews are not counted in the numerator of the RR4 formula. [Note: Clarify and expand on this later, using methodological report.]

⁸ Both of these groups gained in absolute numbers of people, but lost as a proportion of the population from 1990 to 2000, and in the 2000 to 2006 time interval.

blacks declining to 41.3 percent. Latinos as a proportion of the population had risen from 8.6 percent in 2000 to 12.5 percent in 2006.

[Insert Table 1 About here]

As Southern cities go, Durham is a relatively “new city” having been incorporated in 1869. As white Durham developed, a parallel black community, Hayti, was developing just outside of “Durham proper” (Anderson 1990; Boyd 1925). Land in the Hayti district was recorded as being sold to blacks around 1877. Boyd (1925:284) estimates that the value of black property in Durham exceeded \$4 million in 1923. Anderson (1990) suggests that the strong black leadership in Durham and its connections to some of the major white leaders in Durham were important for maintaining peaceful relations between blacks and whites (See also Greene 1996, Brown 1997, and Houck 1941).

Despite a history of racial segregation extending back to the 1870s, Durham is a city that has historically had a very prosperous upper and upper-middle class black community. A successful black middle class that developed and grew substantially in the early and mid-twentieth century led to Durham’s Parrish Street business sector being dubbed as “black Wall Street.” The largest black-owned insurance company in the United States, North Carolina Mutual, was founded in Durham and is still headquartered there. In addition, Durham supports a number of black banks, libraries, hospitals, educational institutions, and numerous other businesses. Much of this black middle class is present and active in everyday Durham community today. For example, the median black family income in Durham in 2000 was \$33,447. Almost three-fourths, 72.3 percent, of the Durham black population age twenty-five and over have finished high school. By the same token, black poverty is significant in Durham.

Almost a quarter, 22.1 percent of the Durham black population lived below the poverty level in 2000 (U. S. Bureau of Census 2000).

Given the strength of this elite group that is the source of black political power in the city, black political power in Durham is in the hands of highly educated, oftentimes very wealthy, black citizens and they have been very successful in achieving their objectives, primarily through their political organization. Given blacks' political success and access to the ballot, Durham County was not one of forty North Carolina counties covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

[Although Durham's black community is best known for its more successful figures, the middle-class is far from representative of the black experience in the city. While black elites were the face of civil rights in the city of Durham, the movement would not have thrived without significant contributions from the black underclass (Davidson, 2007). Though the exigencies of racism made the coalition between poor and wealthy blacks necessary there were significant tensions between these communities (Davidson, 2007). Despite the inconveniences of race, wealthier blacks were able to navigate this terrain with slightly more comfort and a degree of certainty that their economic lives would be able to continue because of the market for segregated goods and services. Poorer blacks, on the other hand, were imperiled in their activism as employees of whites who could terminate radical employees for participating in unionizing activities, civil rights marches, and/or protesting unfair business practices (Davidson, 2007). Moreover, in their communities where black elites owned and operated the goods and services, poor blacks found that racial solidarity did not preclude other blacks from exploiting them.

One of the great ironies of segregation was that it allowed many black businesses to flourish and prosper, as in the case of Durham. As segregation dictated, many blacks were not adequately serviced by white companies; therefore, black businesses had access to a captive market. While the common belief was that these black businesses were a great help to the black community, this was not something that could be universally claimed in Durham. Poorer blacks often found themselves exploited by fellow blacks who were more interested in fattening their coffers than providing the best services for their community members (Davidson, 2007: 42). For example, lack of safe and affordable housing was one of the most pressing issues of poor blacks in this city. Early efforts to achieve this goal left early organizers stunned that many of the slums in which poor blacks resided were owned by other blacks (Davidson, 2007). This showed only one of the fissures in what is often referred to as “the black community.”

In addition to economic exploitation, many poor blacks felt that they had been left out of many of the discussions concerning the progress of civil rights in the city. Although civil rights was part of the agenda for the black community in Durham, elite blacks often served as unelected members of the black community. As emissaries of the race, black elites often served in the role as “race-and-class buffer,” encouraging less fortunate members of the black community to be patient and wait for gradual progress (Davidson, 2007: 55). This was done to preserve the seemingly commodious relations between blacks and whites in the city. The situation for poorer blacks, however, was dire and calls for gradualism were unacceptable and caused poorer blacks to question the intentions and the loyalties of elite blacks who continued to benefit from the race and class inequalities in local society (Davidson, 2007).

Within the black community itself, black elites managed to control, not only, the major economic and financial institutions of the community, but they were also gatekeepers in the

major religious and educational institutions of the city. As a result, the elite class was able to reproduce itself and very little of their wealth neither trickled down to nor was shared by less fortunate segments of the community. This power imbalance from within and without the black community continued to be the source of great tension between poor and elite blacks and a continuing source of class inequality in this community (Davidson, 2007).]

Durham's Latino population is from economically depressed countries, e.g. Mexico, and Central America.⁹ As such, many of the immigrants have low education levels, and are mostly unskilled workers. Only 52.4 percent of Latinos age twenty-five and over in Durham have finished high school. Yet, Latino immigrants appear to be doing almost as well as black Americans in terms of family income with the median Latino family income in 2000 (\$30,439) being just \$3008 below the median for blacks. But, about a fifth, 21.2 percent, of Latino immigrants live below the poverty level. The low level of education and skills among Latinos means that many of them hold low-paying, unskilled jobs in Durham. As such, Latino immigrants and low-skilled blacks most likely come into competition for the same jobs and social services.¹⁰

Durham was the site of a pilot study, "St. Benedict the Black meets the Virgin of Guadalupe," that examined, among other things, the nature of relations among blacks, whites and Latinos as the demographics changed. As part of the study, The 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations was collected. I will draw on the results of the 2003 and the 2007 survey to

⁹The *News and Observer* (Raleigh, NC) identified that many of the Mexican immigrants into North Carolina come primarily from rural towns in the State of Puebla (November 29, 1998; November 30, 1998). For the most part, these immigrants are unskilled and poorly educated.

¹⁰In a series of articles throughout 2002 chronicling the lives of area residents living in poverty, *The Herald Sun* (Durham) provided a picture of life for Latinos in Durham. Fully 26 percent of the more than 16,000 Latinos in Durham live below the federal poverty level, and, in order to make a good living, it is necessary for them to work more than one job (Assis and Pecquet 2002: A12).

provide a picture of the emerging attitudes of the three groups in the throes of demographic changes from Latino immigration. Asian respondents are excluded from this analyses as there were only seven respondents, which makes it difficult to talk about Asian attitudes in Durham.

Table 2 shows the distribution of responses on questions about possible effects of immigration for both 2003 and 2007. The top portion of the table displays the responses to the question of how concerned respondents are about the growing Latino population in the United States in general.¹¹ Blacks in Durham appear to be the most concerned (combined categories of somewhat and a great deal) with slightly more than 61 percent expressing some level of concern in both 2003 and 2007. Whites in Durham appeared to be the least concerned in 2003 with 36.9 percent indicating they are not concerned at all, while another 21.7 percent indicate that they are a little concerned. But by 2007, more than three-fifths of whites (61.1 percent) were somewhat concerned or concerned a great deal about the growing Latino populations. Of particular interest is that fact that Latinos in Durham also appear to be concerned about the growing Latino population with more than a majority (58.3 percent) in 2003 and 55.4 percent in 2007 indicating they are either somewhat concerned or concerned a great deal. On the surface, this finding of increased concern on the part of Latino immigrants appears counterintuitive; yet, it is possible that Latino immigrants believe that increased Latino immigration might not be the best situation for those immigrants already here.

[Table 2 about Here]

This reasoning might be reinforced when the responses on the continued effects of Latino immigration will have on the economic opportunities of the various racial groups.¹² Almost half

¹¹ Question wording: The Latino population is rapidly growing in the United States. How do you feel about this shift, does it concern you: 1) a great deal; 2) somewhat; 3) a little; or 4) not at all?

¹² Question wording: What about economic opportunity? If immigration to this country continues at the present rate, do you believe [respondent's racial group] people will have more or less economic opportunity? Would you

(47.8 percent) of Latino immigrants in Durham in 2003 feel that continued Latino immigration will reduce economic opportunities for Latinos. Yet, by 2007 there appeared to be a slight shift. Only 34 percent believed that continued Latino immigration would reduce economic opportunities for Latinos, while 42.5 percent believed that continued Latino immigration would lead to increased economic opportunity for Latinos. The reasons for this shift are unknown at the moment, but it might suggest that the increased numbers of Latinos in Durham might have led to a comfort level that was not present in 2003.

The group that feels they have the most to lose economically is native-born blacks in Durham—in 2003, 61 percent believe that their economic opportunity will be a lot less or some less than now as a result of Latino immigration, and that number had decreased only slightly, 55.60 percent, by 2007. Whites in Durham believe that their economic opportunities will not be affected by continued Latino immigration as a majority (55 percent in 2003 and 56.6 percent in 2007) believes that they will have no more or less economic opportunities as a result of continued immigration. Thus, whites appear not to perceive an economic threat from Latino immigration.

Nevertheless, the picture changes when respondents are asked about their perceptions of the effect of continued immigration on their racial group's political influence. Whereas whites did not feel an economic threat from Latino immigration, they do perceive a political threat with exactly half (50 percent) in 2003 and a solid majority (56.5 percent) in 2007 feeling that whites would lose a lot or would have somewhat less political influence. On the other hand, about one-fifth of blacks believe that blacks will lose a lot of political power and rises to 49 percent when combined with those who feel they will have some less power than they have now in 2003.

say: 1) probably would have a lot more economic opportunity than now; 2) some more opportunity than now; 3) no more or less opportunity than now; 4) some less opportunity than now, or 5) a lot less opportunity than now?

The same pattern appears to exist in 2007 with 48.3 percent of blacks feeling that continued Latino immigration will result in a lot less or some less political power.

As one would expect, Latino attitudes differ substantially from those of blacks and whites in Durham--almost three-quarters of Latino immigrants (71.2 percent) in 2003 feel that they will gain political influence (combined some more and probably more) from the continuation of Latino immigration, rising to 77.2 percent in 2007. Of course, in terms of electoral power, Latino immigrants will have to become US citizens in order to exert electoral power, but, even in the absence of citizenship, blacks and whites perceive a loss of political power and Latino immigrants perceive major gains.

Blacks in Durham feel that Latino immigration threatens both their economic and political positions, while whites in Durham believe the threat is a political one only. Given these attitudes that might suggest a potential for conflict, what do blacks, whites and Latino immigrants think about each other and how do they relate to each other? Table 3 displays the frequencies for set of questions related the state of race relations in Durham in general in 2003 and 2007.

[Table 3 about Here]

With regards to race relations in general, blacks and Latinos have far more favorable views of the state of race relations (somewhat positive and very positive) in Durham (50.6 and 50.9 percent respectively in 2003 and 53.3 percent and a whopping 71.20 percent in 2007), while whites were split with equal percentages (41.9 percent) believing that relations were either somewhat positive/very positive or somewhat negative/very negative in 2003 and only slightly different in their views in 2007 (45 percent somewhat or very positive and 39.4 percent very negative or somewhat negative. The reasons for the ambivalence of white Durham residents

about race relations are unclear, as they seem to be more positive on a number of other dimensions. For example, close to a half (46.3 percent) believe that relations between whites and blacks in general are either somewhat positive or very positive in 2003 and slightly more than half (53 percent) felt positively about relations with blacks in 2007. Only about one-quarter, 26 percent, in 2003 and only 20 percent in 2007 feel that black and white relations are either somewhat negative or very negative.

On the other hand, when whites are asked about relations between whites and Latinos in general, a slightly different picture emerges. Whites are more conflicted about their relations with Latinos than they are about their relations with blacks. Equal percentages in 2003, 40.1 percent, believe that relations between whites and Latinos are either very negative/somewhat negative or very or somewhat positive. By 2007, almost half, 49.5 percent, feel that relations between Latinos and whites are very or somewhat positive, but the number of whites who were not sure about the nature of relations between the two groups increased from 19.7 percent in 2003 to 28.6 percent in 2007.

Blacks appear to view their relations with whites more positively than whites view their relations to blacks, but only slightly so. A majority in 2003, 54.2 percent, of blacks believe relations with whites are somewhat or very positive, while approximately 26 percent feel relations are somewhat or very negative. By 2007, blacks are even more positive about their relations with whites with 63.7 percent feeling somewhat or very positive about relations with whites in Durham. When thinking about relations with Latinos, in 2003 blacks believed relations with Latinos were better than those with whites (63.7 percent somewhat or very positive). Less than a quarter, 23.2 percent, perceived relations to be very or somewhat negative in 2003, rising to 26.9 percent in 2007. Yet, Latinos perceive a more negative relation with blacks than blacks

perceive of Latinos. Almost a third, 31.5 percent, view relations as very or somewhat negative, rising to 45.3 percent in 2007, while one-half, 50.9 percent, viewed relations as somewhat or very positive in 2003, dropping to a paltry 23 percent of Latinos who viewed relations with blacks in a positive vein.

Latinos are slightly more positive about their relations with whites than whites are about their relations with Latinos. Only about one-third, 33.8 percent, feel that relations between Latinos and whites are very negative or somewhat negative, while a slight majority, 51.3 percent, feel that relations between the two groups is very or somewhat positive.

Memphis, TN

Memphis, TN sits in Shelby County, which is described as a diverse county (Kochhar, Suro, and Tafoya 2005), defined as a county that draws considerable income and employment from sectors other than the service economy, which was the dominate industry in 1990. It is a much larger city than the other two in the study, with a 2006 population of 643,122 people. Despite the size difference, Memphis is a majority-black city, 63.5 percent, with non-Hispanic whites making up 30.5 percent and Latinos, 4.7 percent. In 1990, there were only 4,455 Latinos in Memphis, but by 2006 that number had risen to 30,356 and the numbers continue to increase. The mayor and most of his administration are black, as are seven of the thirteen City Council members.

[Insert Table 4 About Here]

Political power did not come easily to black Memphians. From the early 1900s through 1954, Memphis was controlled by the Republican machine of E. P. Crump, who needed black votes to maintain his power base, but he refused to run black candidates. This extended exclusion from elective office made it extremely difficult for blacks to gain a foothold politically

(Wright 2000). The Memphis civil rights movement and, events, such as the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, increased tension between blacks and whites increased substantially. The first black ran for mayor in 1967, but blacks were not successful in electing a black mayor until 1991, in a racially divisive and polarizing campaign (Wright 2000:123-172).

While political power was late in coming, black Memphis developed the full range of black class structures similar to that of Durham and Greensboro. Blacks owned businesses, newspapers, banks and savings and loans, and an amusement park, and numerous other businesses (Wright 2000: 35). Thus, it resembles Durham in class structure, but differs in its level of cooperative race relations; resembles Greensboro in terms of class structure, but race relations were not as hostile the racial, but were still contentious. As a research site, Memphis is different again from the other four cities. A black majority city that is also experiencing significant Latino immigration presents another context in which to exam the effect of Latino immigration on black, white and Latino attitudes. In addition, it will be possible to see if Latino, black and white relations are different in a city where blacks, not whites, are the dominant population and have political power.

Table 5 shows the distribution of responses on questions about possible effects of immigration in 2007. The top portion of the table displays the responses to the question of how concerned respondents are about the growing Latino population in the United States in general. Unlike in Durham in both 2003 and 2007, whites in Memphis, 53.8 percent, appear to be more concerned about continued Latino immigration than do blacks, 48.7 percent. But the levels for both groups are not at the level of concern of blacks and whites in Durham. Again, of interest, is the extremely large proportion of Latinos who are concerned somewhat or a great deal about

continued Latino immigration (65.2 percent), a level that is greater than that of blacks and whites in Memphis.

The group that feels they have the most to lose economically is native-born blacks in Memphis, as is the case in Durham—a slight majority, 50.9 percent believe that their economic opportunity will be a lot less or some less than now as a result of Latino immigration. Whites in Memphis believe that their economic opportunities will not be affected by continued Latino immigration as almost a majority (49.10 percent) believes that they will have no more or less economic opportunities as a result of continued immigration. Thus, whites, for the most part, appear not to perceive an economic threat from Latino immigration. While almost two-thirds of Latinos are concerned about continuing Latino immigration, two-fifths (41 percent) feel that continued Latino immigration will reduce economic opportunities for Latinos, while a little more than one-third, 35 percent, believe they will have some more or probably more economic opportunity if Latino immigration continues. This suggests that, although marginal, Latinos in Memphis might be more concerned about their economic opportunities with continued immigration than Latinos in Durham.

[Insert Table 5 about Here]

Yet again, when the question of the loss of political influence as a result of continued Latino immigration, whites in Memphis are only slightly more concerned about the loss of political influence, 55 percent, than are blacks in Memphis, 50 percent. As was the case in Durham, and is to be expected, almost three-fourths of Latinos, 71.2 percent, believe that they will have some more or probably more political influence with continued Latino immigration. Thus, it appears that blacks in Memphis perceive both an economic and political threat, while

whites perceive more of a political threat from Latinos. Given that Memphis is a majority black city, whites might now perceive a threat on both fronts, from Latinos and from blacks.

There appears to be a real disconnect, however, between whites on the one hand and blacks and Latinos on the other when questioned about the state of race relations in Memphis in general. (See Table 6.) An overwhelming majority, 62.6 percent, of whites believe that race relations in Memphis are very or somewhat negative, compared to only 28.2 percent of blacks and 27.1 percent of Latinos. This pattern continues among white opinion when ask about relations between whites and blacks in Memphis. A majority of white, 57.5 percent, feel that relations between blacks and whites is very or somewhat negative, while only about one-third, 33.9 percent, of blacks feel this way. Maybe the dynamic of being a minority in the city creates a dynamic among whites, where their perception of the nature of relations with blacks is markedly different from blacks, who are in the majority, perceptions. On the other hand, both whites and Latinos believe that relations between the two groups is somewhat or very position, 49.6 and 59.2 percent respectively.

[Insert Table 6 about Here]

There also appears to be a divergence in opinion on the part of blacks and Latinos on the nature of their relations. More than three-fifths, 62.1 percent, of Latinos feel that relations between themselves and blacks in Memphis is very or somewhat negative compared to only 28.8 percent of blacks that perceive relations in this manner. Again, maybe it is the situation of being a small minority in a majority black city that creates this perception. But it might also be that since blacks are in the majority in the city, they are not as aware of the nature of relations with whites and Latinos who are minorities in the city. This is an interesting question that needs to be explored in more detail.

Little Rock, AR

For most Americans of a certain age cohort, Little Rock is seared in their memory as the site of the integration of Central High School in 1957. It is a city with a tortured civil rights history, a history that still appears to affect the attitudes of its residents. (The Center for Survey Research had the most difficulty in getting blacks, whites and Latinos to talk about issues of race and had to struggle to meet the black and white quotas and was unable to fill the Latino quota.) Little Rock is a city where non-Latino whites are still the dominant portion of the population, 50.1 percent, although their proportion is not as great as it was in past years. (See Table 7.) Blacks represent about two-fifths of the population, 41.9 percent, while Latinos are 4.7 percent. Among Latino immigrants, Mexico and other Latin American countries account for 67 percent of the state's immigrant population, 51 percent are estimated to be undocumented, and many Latinos are coming from initial immigration destinations—California, New Mexico and Arizona. [Add citations.]

[Insert Table 7 about Here]

Arkansas did not initially institute universal segregation, which partially contributed to the upward economic and social mobility of some blacks (specifically in cities like Little Rock). As the status of whites declined, however, in the face of this black mobility (particularly beginning at the end of the 19th century), whites increasingly called for solidification of white power status and racial segregation (Graves 1989:436). Little Rock has a history of both relative integration (from the 1870s to 1890s/1900s) and fierce segregation (particularly from the turn of the 20th century on). Public schools were widely segregated almost immediately after the end of the Civil War, though there had been some peaceful integration before 1957, as seen with the state university, some med and law schools, as well as some small colleges. Public

transportation became segregated under Jim Crow laws, though the bus system was integrated before 1957. Some of the race relations problems in Little Rock came out of the relative independence of the city's black community. This independence allowed for some black economic mobility, which was not acceptable to many whites (especially lower class whites) (Graves 1989).

Black independence also created increased tensions between blacks and white. These tensions came to a head with the forced integration of Central High School in September 1957. The struggle between Governor Orval Faubus and President Eisenhower over the use of federal troops created more tensions as the state National Guard was used to keep the nine black students out on one day and ordered to support and protect their integration the next. The presence of federal troops and their mixed record on protecting the black sAlthough federal troops were eventually called in to enforce the integration, their lack of action when white students targeted black students encouraged more anti-integration behavior. Additionally, once the troops left, the black students faced even more violent and non-violent backlash from white students, and the black students generally received harsher disciplinary action for the incidents they were involved in.[Add citations]

Latino immigrants have only recently begun to put down roots in Arkansas although there have been transient communities of Latinos in the state due to seasonal agricultural work since the 1890s (Leidermann, 2007; Urban Institute, 2007). Beginning in the 1980s and 1990s, however, the poultry industry in the northwestern and southeastern regions of Arkansas grew, demanding an increase of unskilled, cheap labor; these jobs were largely filled by Latino immigrants; many of which came from Mexico, but some also have moved from California, New Mexico and Arizona (Leidermann, 2007; The Economist, 1998).

Table 5 once again shows the distribution of responses on questions about possible effects of immigration in 2007 in Little Rock . The top portion of the table displays the responses to the question of how concerned respondents are about the growing Latino population in the United States in general. Whites in Little Rock appear to be more like whites in Memphis, with 56.6 percent appearing to be slightly more concerned about continued Latino immigration than do blacks, 53.4 percent. But, again, the levels for both groups are not as high as the level of concern of blacks and whites in Durham. This lower level of tension over Latino immigration may be due to the fact that the growing immigrant population has been a form of labor replacement (Urban Institute, 2007). The native-born Arkansan population did not grow between 2000 and 2005, but the Latino population grew approximately 60 percent. What is more, the author of the Arkansas 2020 study projects that by 2020 the number of Arkansans between the ages of 55 and 59 years old will increase by 49.6 percent (Broadway, 2007). An aging native-born population as well as the increasing proportion of the population approaching retirement essentially demands foreign-born workers.

Such a demand is best illustrated in sectors like manufacturing. Since 1995 manufacturing has been shedding jobs, but immigrants' labor has slowed down this decline. Additionally, studies show that without immigrant labor, the Arkansan manufacturing output would be reduced by about \$1.4 billion—nearly ten percent of the sector's contribution to the state economy (Urban Institute, 2007). The economic advantages for more lenient law concerning immigrants are substantial. Only about 20% of the \$2.7 billion after-tax income of immigrants is sent abroad while the remaining dollars have circulated throughout the state's economy. Additionally, while the costs of immigrant-related education, health services, and corrections is about \$237 million, these costs are well paid over by the \$257 million of direct and indirect tax

payments—a net surplus for the state (Urban Institute, 2007; Associated Press, 2008). It could be safely stated that immigrants are key to economic growth in Arkansas (Dixon, 1999). Despite this there are a number of anti-immigration organizations focused on removing immigrants, increasing legal penalties for undocumented immigrants, and making it difficult for undocumented immigrants to receive public benefits (i.e. Secure Arkansas, Keep Arkansas Legal) (Wiest,2008).

The political environment surrounding (undocumented) Latino immigrants is conflictual and contradictory. On one hand, there is an ambiguous support of undocumented immigrants on the part of the state. In 2007, a Mexican Consulate opened in Little Rock, which provides services to all Mexican citizens regardless of their immigration status in the United States. The consulate issues passports and identification cards, both of which are recognized by police agencies, employers and banks; additional consular functions include “assisting [Mexican] citizens who are arrested, helping arrange the return to Mexico of the dead and fostering trade and cultural ties” (Archibold, 2007; Hinkel, 2005). Attorney General Dustin McDaniel serves as one example of a statesman who anti-immigrants groups view as a roadblock to tougher state laws for undocumented immigrants; McDaniel, for example, persistently rejected a proposed ballot initiative that would hinder undocumented immigrants from receiving public benefits (Wiest, 2008; Lyon,2008). Arkansas Governor Mike Beebe also refuses to support initiatives like the one mentioned here. He is often reported to stress that “illegal means illegal,” but he also emphasizes that curbing illegal immigration is the responsibility of the federal, not state, government (Associated Press, 2008). In the same breath, the governor also called for an edict for the Department of Higher Education to make sure that undocumented immigrants were not paying in-state tuition to attend state colleges and universities (Moritz, 2008).

On the other hand, there is also some resistance towards immigrants, undocumented or otherwise. For example, in 2005, Arkansas made its first efforts toward complying with the REAL ID Act; the state legislature approved a bill that would allow the state to enter into agreements with other states to share driver license information; the legislature also made several changes to the license issuance process, aiming to increase security. Similarly, in 2008, Arkansas adopted the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) program, which allows sheriff's deputies and state troopers to enforce federal immigration laws (Associated Press, 2008). The primary ramification of ICE has been an increase of raids and arrests around the state.

Latinos in Arkansas face interpersonal and institutional discrimination. In 2001, Latino residents in Rogers, Arkansas filed a class-action lawsuit against the city and the police department for violations under the Fourth Amendment—more specifically, police discrimination. While this suit was settled in 2003, and the city agreed to conduct racial sensitivity training for its officers, since the enactment of the ICE program, many Latinos feel an increasing threat of racial discrimination (Associate Press, 2008). The law now essentially legitimates acts of discrimination. There have been reported incidences of racial and national origin discrimination as well as mass arrests and raids at places of employment in various Arkansan cities, including Little Rock (Treadway, 1995; Leidermann, 2007; Gambrell, 2007). In efforts to combat such discrimination and racism as well as to empower minority constituents, the Arkansan Black and Latino Caucuses signed an agreement to work together toward their common goals (Staff Writer, 2006). Nevertheless, if we begin examine how politics might look from the bottom-up, we find that less than one percent of Arkansan voters are Latinos (Gambrell, 2006).

Again, of interest, is the extremely large proportion of Latinos who are concerned somewhat or a great deal about continued Latino immigration (56.2 percent), a level that is on par with those of blacks and whites in Little Rock. The group that feels they have the most to lose economically is native-born blacks in Little Rock, as is the case in Durham and Memphis—a majority, 54.7 percent believe that their economic opportunity will be a lot less or some less than now as a result of Latino immigration. As in Memphis, whites in Little Rock believe that their economic opportunities will not be affected by continued Latino immigration as almost a majority (53.4 percent) believes that they will have no more or less economic opportunities as a result of continued immigration. Thus, whites, for the most part, once again appear not to perceive an economic threat from Latino immigration. While a majority of Latinos are concerned about continuing Latino immigration, only one-fifth, 29.2 percent, feel that continued Latino immigration will reduce economic opportunities for Latinos, while close to half, 45 percent, believe they will have some more or probably more economic opportunity if Latino immigration continues. It appears from this simple analysis that Latinos in Memphis and Little Rock see an economic positive from Latino immigration. Thus, their concern about increased Latino immigration might be a positive rather than a negative concern.

An interesting shift in patterns present in Durham and Memphis, when the question of the loss of political influence as a result of continued Latino immigration, whites in Little Rock are not concerned at all about a loss of political influence, with only 6.1 percent perceiving a loss of political power as a result of immigration. Blacks, on the other hand, are concerned about a loss of political power, with a solid majority 54.7 percent expressing concerns. As was the case in Durham and Memphis, three-fourths of Latinos, 75.2 percent, believe that they will have some more or probably more political influence with continued Latino immigration. Thus, it appears

that whites in Little Rock are not concerned about economic losses and are definitely not concerned about a loss of political influence from Latino immigration. Blacks, as in Durham and Memphis, are concerned about a loss of both.

Despite differences in their perception of the effects of Latino immigration in their economic and political outcomes, blacks and whites in Little Rock believe that race relations in general are good (54.7 and 56.9 percent respectively), and that black and white relations in particular are also somewhat or very positive, 60.4 and 56.9 percent respectively. (See Table 6.) Latinos also believe that race relations in general are somewhat or very positive (47.6 percent), and both whites and Latinos believe that relations between the two groups is somewhat or very positive, 58.4 and 55.9 percent respectively. The difference appears to be between black and Latino perceptions of relations between the two groups. A solid majority of blacks, 55.5 percent, feel that relations between blacks and Latinos in Little Rock are somewhat or very positive, while almost two-fifths of Latinos feel that relations are either somewhat or very negative. Given the overall general feeling of positive relations among the groups, with the possible exception of the perception of Latinos about relations with blacks, it is puzzling as to why the survey firm had a difficult time to get residents of Little Rock to answer questions about race. This paradox will have to be explored further in future research.

Discussion

DRAFT

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Table 1. Durham Population Characteristics, 2006

Demographic	Raw Total	Percentage of Durham
City population	201,204	100%
non-Hispanic Whites	80,189	39.9%
African Americans	83,170	41.3%
Hispanics/Latinos	25,209	12.5%
Mexican	17,615	8.8%
Puerto Rican	733	0.4%
Cuban	112	0.06%
Dominican	276	0.1%
Central American	5,000	2.5%
South American	862	0.4%
Other	611	0.3%
Asians	8,916	4.4%
Male	97,785	48.6%
Female	103,419	51.4%

Notes: Data obtained from due to rounding. Hispanics/Latinos can be of any race.
the U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey. Data may not total 100%

Table 2. Durham Attitudes on Concern About and Effects of Latino Immigration, 2003 and 2007

Concern About Growing Latino Population	Whites		Blacks		Latinos	
	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007
Not at All	36.90%	21.60%	28.90%	24.00%	33.50%	33.20%
	[58]	[65]	[43]	[72]	[57]	[102]
A Little	21.70%	17.30%	20.10%	14.30%	8.20%	11.40%
	[34]	[52]	[15]	[43]	[14]	[35]
Somewhat	24.20%	28.90%	30.20%	31.00%	25.90%	17.90%
	[38]	[87]	[45]	[93]	[44]	[55]
A Great Deal	17.20%	32.20%	30.90%	30.70%	32.40%	37.50%
	[27]	[97]	[46]	[92]	[55]	[115]
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=157)	(n=301)	(n=149)	(n=300)	(n=170)	(n=307)
Immigration Continues/ Effect on Economic Opportunity for Your Racial Group						
A Lot Less Than Now	7.90%	9.10%	22.70%	16.60%	13.00%	7.10%
	[12]	[27]	[32]	[54]	[21]	[21]
Some Less Than Now	24.50%	24.90%	38.30%	39.00%	34.60%	26.90%
	[37]	[74]	[54]	[113]	[56]	[79]
No More Than Now	55.00%	56.60%	24.80%	26.60%	21.60%	23.50%
	[83]	[168]	[35]	[77]	[35]	[69]
Some More Than Now	11.90%	7.10%	12.10%	14.10%	24.10%	31.30%
	[18]	[21]	[17]	[41]	[39]	[92]
Probably More Than Now	0.70%	2.40%	2.10%	1.70%	6.80%	11.20%
	[1]	[7]	[3]	[5]	[11]	[33]
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=151)	(n=297)	(n=141)	(n=290)	(n=162)	(n=294)

Immigration Continues/How Much Political Influence will Your Racial Group Have

	Whites		Blacks		Latinos	
	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007
A Lot Less Than Now	3.90%	13.60%	19.30%	16.80%	3.70%	0.70%
	[6]	[40]	[28]	[48]	[6]	[2]
Some Less Than Now	46.10%	42.90%	29.70%	31.50%	8.00%	5.90%
	[70]	[126]	[43]	[90]	[13]	[17]
No More Than Now	41.40%	36.40%	29.70%	30.80%	17.20%	16.30%
	[63]	[107]	[43]	[88]	[28]	[47]
Some More Than Now	6.60%	4.80%	20.00%	17.50%	36.80%	54%
	[10]	[14]	[29]	[50]	[60]	[156]
Probably More Than Now	2.00%	2.40%	1.40%	3.50%	34.40%	23.20%
	[3]	[7]	[2]	[10]	[56]	[67]
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=152)	(n=294)	(n=145)	(n=286)	(n=163)	(n=289)

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Table 3. Attitudes of Durham Blacks, Whites, and Latino Immigrants toward each Other, 2003 and 2007

Race Relations in Durham	Whites		Blacks		Latinos	
	2003	2007	2003	2007	2003	2007
Very Negative	4.50%	5.30%	3.30%	3.60%	6.30%	2.00%
	[7]	[16]	[5]	[11]	[10]	[6]
Somewhat negative	36.40%	34.10%	28.00%	28.10%	24.50%	11.40%
	[56]	[103]	[42]	[85]	[39]	[35]
Not positive or negative	18.20%	15.60%	18%	14.90%	18.20%	15.40%
	[28]	[47]	[27]	[45]	[29]	[47]
Somewhat positive	37.70%	42.10%	47.30%	47.00%	46.50%	69.60%
	[58]	[127]	[71]	[142]	[74]	[213]
Very positive	3.20%	3.00%	3.30%	6.30%	4.40%	1.60%
	[5]	[9]	[5]	[19]	[7]	[5]
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=154)	(n=302)	(n=150)	(n=302)	(n=159)	(n=306)
Relations between Whites and Blacks in General						
Very Negative	4.40%	4.30%	4.60%	2.00%	****	****
	[6]	[13]	[6]	[6]		
Somewhat negative	30.10%	26.70%	21.40%	18.00%	****	****
	[41]	[80]	[28]	[57]		
Not positive or negative	19.10%	16.00%	19.80%	15.50%	****	****
	[26]	[48]	[26]	[47]		
Somewhat positive	41.20%	48.30%	49.60%	59.10%	****	****
	[56]	[145]	[65]	[179]		
Very positive	5.10%	4.70%	4.60%	4.60%	****	****
	[7]	[14]	[6]	[14]		
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	****	****
	(n=136)	(n=300)	(n=131)	(n=303)		

Relations between Whites and Latinos in General

Very Negative	8%	1.70%	****	****	6.50%	1.00%
	[11]	[5]			[10]	[3]
Somewhat negative	32.10%	20.20%	****	****	27.30%	9.80%
	[44]	[56]			[42]	[29]
Not positive or negative	19.70%	28.60%	****	****	14.90%	31.30%
	[27]	[82]			[23]	[93]
Somewhat positive	35.00%	42.90%	****	****	46.10%	53.90%
	[48]	[123]			[71]	[160]
Very positive	5.10%	6.60%	****	****	5.20%	4.00%
	[7]	[19]			[8]	[12]
Total	100%	100%	****	****	100%	100%
	(n=137)	(n=297)			(n=154)	(n=297)

Relations between Blacks and Latinos in General

Very Negative	****	****	[12]	8.70%	[8]	2.80%	5.70%	12.00%
							[9]	[36]
Somewhat negative	****	****	[20]	14.50%	[68]	24.10%	25.80%	33.30%
							[41]	[100]
Not positive or negative	****	****	[24]	17.40%	[75]	26.60%	17.60%	31.70%
							[28]	[95]
Somewhat positive	****	****	[54]	54.30%	[118]	41.80%	47.80%	22.00%
							[76]	[66]
Very positive	****	****	[16]	5.10%	[13]	4.60%	3.10%	1.00%
							[5]	[3]
Total	****	****		100%		100%	100%	100%
			(n=138)		(n=282)		(n=159)	(n=300)

Table 4. Memphis Population Characteristics, 2006

Demographic	Raw Total	Percentage of Memphis
City population	643,122	100%
non-Hispanic Whites	196,016	30.5%
African Americans	408,480	63.5%
Hispanics/Latinos	30,356	4.7%
Mexican	22,542	3.5%
Puerto Rican	792	1.2%
Cuban	929	0.1%
Dominican	120	0.02%
Central American	4,556	0.7%
South American	271	0.04%
Other	1,136	0.2%
Asians	9,499	1.5%
Male	307,737	47.9
Female	335,385	52.1%

Notes: Data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey. Data may not total 100% due to rounding. Hispanics/Latinos can be of any race.

Table 5. Memphis and Little Rock Attitudes on Concern About and Effects of Latino Immigration, 2007

	Whites	Memphis Blacks	Latinos	Whites	Little Rock Blacks	Latinos
Concern About Growing Latino Population						
Not at All	25.30%	32.30%	25.90%	25.60%	30.50%	32.20%
	[79]	[100]	[79]	[85]	[91]	[39]
A Little	21.20%	19.00%	8.90%	17.00%	16.10%	11.60%
	[66]	[59]	[27]	[59]	[48]	[14]
Somewhat	26.90%	23.50%	19.00%	30.70%	28.90%	25.60%
	[83]	[73]	[58]	[102]	[86]	[31]
A Great Deal	26.90%	25.20%	46.20%	25.90%	24.50%	30.60%
	[84]	[78]	[141]	[86]	[73]	[37]
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=312)	(n=310)	(n=305)	(n=332)	(n=298)	(n=121)
Immigration Continues/ Effect on Economic Opportunity for Your Racial Group						
A Lot Less Than Now	7.70%	17.20%	11.00%	5.80%	17.10%	10.00%
	[23]	[51]	[33]	[19]	[49]	[12]
Some Less Than Now	31.10%	33.70%	30.00%	30.40%	37.60%	19.20%
	[93]	[100]	[90]	[99]	[108]	[23]
No More Than Now	49.10%	31.30%	24.00%	53.40%	30.70%	25.80%
	[147]	[93]	[72]	[174]	[88]	[31]
Some More Than Now	10.40%	14.10%	26.00%	8.90%	12.90%	31.70%
	[31]	[42]	[78]	[29]	[37]	[38]
Probably More Than Now	1.50%	3.70%	9.00%	1.50%	1.70%	13.30%
	[5]	[11]	[27]	[5]	[5]	[16]
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	(n=299)	(n=297)	(n=300)	(n=326)	(n=287)	(n=120)

Immigration Continues/How Much Political Influence will Your Racial Group Have

	Memphis			Little Rock		
	Whites	Blacks	Latinos	Whites	Blacks	Latinos
A Lot Less Than Now	12.70% [38]	17.20% [51]	3.20% [9]	1.80% [6]	17.10% [49]	2.50% [3]
Some Less Than Now	42.30% [127]	33.70% [100]	11.40% [32]	4.30% [14]	37.60% [108]	6.60% [8]
No More Than Now	35.70% [107]	31.30% [93]	14.20% [40]	37.40% [122]	30.70% [88]	15.70% [19]
Some More Than Now	7.70% [23]	14.10% [42]	52.70% [148]	46.30% [151]	12.90% [37]	42.10% [51]
Probably More Than Now	1.70% [5]	3.70% [11]	18.50% [52]	10.10% [30]	1.70% [5]	33.10% [40]
Total	100% (n=300)	100% (n=297)	100% (n=281)	100% (n=326)	100% (n=287)	100% (n=121)

Source: 2007 Survey of Inter-Group Conflict

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Table 6. Attitudes of Memphis and Little Rock Blacks, Whites, and Latino Immigrants toward each Other, 2007

	Whites	Memphis Blacks	Latinos	Whites	Little Rock Blacks	Latinos
Race Relations in Memphis/Little Rock						
Very Negative	21.60% [68]	1.90% [34]	4.10% [12]	4.80% [16]	5.00% [5]	4.00% [5]
Somewhat negative	41.00% [129]	26.30% [82]	23.00% [68]	17.20% [57]	22.50% [68]	24.20% [30]
Not positive or negative	13.30% [42]	17.90% [56]	40.50% [120]	21.10% [76]	17.90% [54]	24.20% [30]
Somewhat positive	22.20% [70]	38.10% [119]	30.40% [90]	52.40% [174]	47.40% [143]	40.30% [50]
Very positive	1.90% [6]	6.70% [21]	2.00% [6]	4.50% [15]	7.30% [22]	7.30% [9]
Total	100% (n=315)	100% (n=312)	100% (n=296)	100% (n=332)	100% (n=302)	100% (n=124)
Relations between Whites and Blacks in General						
Very Negative	16.50% [52]	9.50% [30]	****	2.70% [9]	5.60% [17]	****
Somewhat negative	41.00% [129]	24.40% [77]	****	20.40% [68]	21.80% [66]	****
Not positive or negative	12.70% [40]	11.40% [36]	****	20.10% [67]	12.20% [37]	****
Somewhat positive	27.60% [87]	50.50% [159]	****	52.30% [174]	53.50% [162]	****
Very positive	2.20% [7]	4.10% [13]	****	4.50% [15]	6.90% [21]	****
Total	100%	100%	****	100%	100%	****

	(n=315)	(n=315)	(n=333)	(n=303)
Relations between Whites and Latinos in General				
Very Negative	2.20% [6]	****	1% [3]	17.00% [5]
Somewhat negative	17.90% [49]	****	9.70% [20]	14.20% [18]
Not positive or negative	30.30% [83]	****	30.10% [90]	14.20% [29]
Somewhat positive	43.80% [120]	****	53.80% [161]	45.70% [58]
Very positive	5.80% [16]	****	5.40% [16]	10.20% [13]
Total	100%	****	100%	100%
	(n=274)	(n=299)	(n=291)	(n=127)
Relations between Blacks and Latinos in General				
Very Negative	****	6.30% [18]	20.90% [64]	3.80% [10]
Somewhat negative	****	22.50% [64]	41.20% [126]	16.50% [43]
Not positive or negative	****	20.70% [59]	22.90% [70]	24.10% [63]
Somewhat positive	****	42.10% [120]	15.00% [46]	49.40% [129]
Very positive	****	8.40% [24]	****	6.10% [16]
Total	****	100%	100%	100%
		(n=338)	(n=285)	(n=261) (n=126)

Source: 2007 Survey of Inter-Group Conflict

Table 7: Population by Race/Ethnicity and Gender: Little Rock, AR

Demographic	Raw Total	Percentage of Little Rock
City Population	187,535	100%
Non-Hispanic Whites	93,947	50.1 %
Non-Hispanic African-Americans	78,516	41.9%
Hispanics/Latinos ¹	8,748	4.7%
Non-Hispanic Asians	4,442	2.4%
Male	90,618	48.3%
Female	96,917	51.7%

Notes: Data obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey. Data may not total 100% due to rounding. Hispanics/Latinos can be of any race.

¹No figures for individual ethnic groups within the Latino population were provided by the U. S. Census in the 2006 population update.

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