

Dear all,

Thank you very much for taking the time to read this chapter! I'm having a book conference in late October, but the participants are all IR types. By way of background, this is the third empirical chapter in my book. The larger theory looks at how culpability for a war affects the executive's behavior during the conflict and citizens' assessments of them. I define a culpable leader as any leader whom citizens can easily link to the decision to involve the state in the war. This definition includes all of the leaders who were in power when the war began, as well as those leaders who have a history of agreeing with the war (i.e., "supporters"), and "associates", or those leaders who share a partisan affiliation with a culpable predecessor.

For this chapter, I wanted to see whether culpability had an effect for legislators since both supporters and associates can be found there. I found support for my theory, but I have a few concerns:

1. I feel like this chapter is really dense with results. It has the findings from a survey experiment and those from a roll call analysis. This makes it kind of heavy on the "Tron speak", as Karen would say, with lots of discussion of hypotheses and research design. I'd like to lighten this up a bit, but I'm not sure how to proceed since the chapter is already fairly long.

One thing I thought to do would be interviews with people on The Hill who were around in 2002 and talk to them about why they changed their position on the war (or didn't). Any suggestions about how to approach this, who to talk to, what questions to ask would be great.

Another option would be a case study. I feel like the Clinton/Obama primary would be great for this, but I'm worried the book already has lot about Obama in it (the intro spends a long time contrasting him to Bush on the two wars). Any other ideas about people to look at would be awesome.

2. Towards the end of the chapter I talk about how primaries aren't really a concern for incumbents since re-districting has greatly reduced the threat of a viable challenger from the same party. This is largely based on a hunch and informal discussions I've had with Americanists in the past. Any cite suggestions would be great here, if this is, in fact, true.

3. I'm pretty sure I'll be dropping the regression tables eventually. I left them in there for now since most of the books I was using as models have them, and I thought people might want to see the full specification. I'd welcome any opinions on this.

4. I feel like the chapter ends abruptly, largely because I wasn't sure about the primary issue. I thought about reconnecting it back to the executive results, but this seemed to make it repetitive. Any thoughts on what to do here? Are there any other major pieces I should be citing? The books by Kriner and Howell and Pevehouse were great, but I feel like there must be a ton of stuff I'm missing.

Thanks!

CHAPTER 5

1.0 Introduction

The preceding two chapters demonstrated that culpability for a war has a powerful effect on both leader and citizen alike. Citizens are more likely to remove culpable leaders from office in the event of an unfavorable outcome, and culpable leaders, largely because of this heightened threat of punishment, are more likely to expend the effort and resources needed to avoid a loss. Recognizing how culpability affects the incentive structures of executives is critical since, as I argued earlier, the executive is the primary foreign policy actor in the vast majority of modern states. Therefore, if we wish to understand how and why wars end the way they do, appreciating the political pressures (or lack thereof) that affect the executive is vital to the process.

This does not mean, of course, that the executive is the only political actor of interest when it comes to explaining states' wartime behavior. Instead, he or she is one actor—albeit, a very important one—in a larger constellation of domestic political players. This point is especially pertinent in democratic states where the executive represents a single branch of a larger system with structural checks that prevent any one branch from monopolizing political authority.

The prominence of the executive in the realm of foreign policy also does not mean that he or she is the only actor subject to the pressures of culpability. As I asserted in earlier chapters, members of the legislature often have roles to play in the state's involvement in international conflicts. Although some roles consist of actions that link the legislator to the war more directly than others (e.g., voting to authorize continued funding for the war versus influencing public opinion subtly through an interview), the

fact remains that legislators are relevant players. Given this, it is worth exploring how culpability for a war affects legislator behavior. The goal of this chapter is to do just this by testing hypotheses both about how citizens assign culpability to members of the legislature and how culpable members behave differently than non-culpable members when faced with anti-war legislation.

Addressing these additional implications of the larger theory contributes to a growing literature on the role of legislature in times of war. In recent years, scholars have begun to explore the means by which Congress can constrain the president when a war becomes unpopular or unexpectedly costly. Contrary to the popular conventional wisdom, which often portrays the legislature as a little more than a spectator with minimal influence over the conduct of the war¹, scholars working in this vein have established that Congress has a variety of tools allow it to serve as a meaningful check.²

Proponents of this argument posit that the key predictor of whether and when Congress will decide to exercise this power is the partisan makeup of the chambers. When members of the president's party dominate, the president will enjoy a relatively free hand in conducting the war. This is true for at least two reasons. First, members of the president's party will have little reason to openly challenge the leader since their political fates are often intertwined with his. Since the executive is also commonly the head of the party, criticizing him detracts from the party's "brand" at the national level, hurting everyone's chances for re-election. Given this, while they may grow to disagree with the war or how the executive is handling it, they should generally refrain from

¹ E.g. Fisher (1995); Schlesinger (1973); Wildavsky (1966) and Gowa 1998 & 1999. For an in-depth discussion of this issue, see Kriner (2010: chapter 1).

² E.g., Clark (2000); Wang (1996); Kriner (2010) and Howell and Pevehouse (2010).

publically opposing him. Second, the president's co-partisans are likely to have similar worldview and positions on major issues to the executive simply by virtue of being in the same party. Because members of a party self-select into the group, major disagreements between the members are unlikely.

The argument I advance here builds on this earlier work by testing whether an earlier expression of support for the conflict has the same effect as partisan ties to the executive for members of the legislature. Members of the opposition who initially voted for the war may not feel constricted by their party affiliation, but may still refrain from adopting a position of dissent since the switch may strike voters as disingenuous and hurt the member's chances of re-election, especially if a challenger who has consistently opposed the conflict emerges.³ This argument harkens back to the typology of replacement leaders I established in Chapter 2. That is, there are two potential ways to become culpable for a war: have an associational connection to the executive who started it *or* support the conflict when it begins.

For the purposes of Chapters 3 and 4, I defined culpable replacement leaders based solely on their associational ties to earlier culpable leaders. This was the most practical way to approach this portion of the analysis since essentially all replacement

³ For more on the presumed costs of changing positions, see, Kinder et al (1980); McGraw et al. (1996); Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985); Poole (2007); Poole and Rosenthal (1997); Tomz and Van Houweling (2009). As I noted earlier, it is important to distinguish changes on a particular policy made over a short period of time from changes that politicians make to their general position on an issue over a longer period. As Karol (2009) argues, the latter type of change, or "conversion", is critical to the process by which parties evolve over time. My theory focuses on the former type—the quintessential "flip-flop"—since I am looking at elite behavior on a specific war.

leaders were either associates or people who came from outside the government who were clear opponents of the war (e.g., leaders of coups, etc.). There was not, in other words, reason to think that there were a large number of replacement leaders who were not associates but who *were* supporters.⁴ This is not the case when we consider the legislative branch, which often has a large number of members who vote for a war who are not members of the executive's party. Hence, it provides an ideal testing ground for exploring how these two means of acquiring culpability for a conflict compare to one another both in terms of predicting citizen assessments of legislators and legislator behavior. If the logic I presented in Chapter 2 is correct associates and supporters should both feel and respond to the pressures associated with culpability.

1.1 Chapter Outline

I begin by investigating how the associate and supporter characteristics affect citizens' impressions of how culpable a legislator is for a conflict in Section 2. To do so, I rely on a national survey experiment I conducted in 2007 that sought to determine how American citizens attribute responsibility for the ongoing war in Iraq to members of the US Congress. The findings from this analysis provide strong support for the notion that citizens respond to both the congressperson's partisan affiliation *and* his or her earlier position on the war when attributing responsibility for US involvement in Iraq.

Having established that both cues are important in the eyes of citizens, I next examine how these two characteristics of culpability affect the behavior of individual

⁴ Importantly, even if it were the case that many of the leaders I classified as non-culpable were actually supporters, this would only mean that I *underestimated* the true effect of culpability in Chapters 3 and 4.

members of Congress in terms of their willingness to challenge a war once it has started. Using a set of ten roll call votes pertaining to the current war in Iraq—six in the US House of Representatives and four in the Senate—I test for whether a member’s culpability for the war—defined by either party membership or an earlier show support—influences their vote on these contentious pieces of legislation. As expected, members who voted for the war when the authorization bills came before Congress in 2002 and members who belong to the Republican party are significantly less likely to vote for bills that sought to curtail the conflict, even as it became increasingly unpopular. The findings from this analysis confirm the results from previous studies that found a strong effect for a legislator’s party, but also suggest that it is not the entire story. While party is certainly a key factor, and has the largest effect of the two cues, the legislator’s earlier position constrains her behavior as well. I conclude by briefly discussing the circumstances under which this earlier show of support is most likely to affect an incumbent’s electoral fortunes.

2.0 Citizen Perceptions of Culpability

An experimental design is well-suited for testing hypotheses about how citizens respond to certain aspects of a legislator since, as later sections will make clear, it allows all characteristics of the member presented in the treatment to remain constant except for the key manipulations of interest: his party and whether he supported the war in 2002. If the causal mechanisms specified in Chapter 2 are correct, citizens should hold members who are either Republicans or supporters more responsible than members who have no ties to Bush and/or who did not support the war.

Embedding an experiment in a survey makes two sets of insights possible. First, and most importantly, it sheds light on how *individual citizens* respond to leaders who express various combinations of the two types of responsibility. In Chapter 3, I could only *infer* from the higher rate of punishment for culpable, losing leaders that citizens assigned more responsibility for poor outcomes to leaders with a stronger connection to the war. The experiment allows me to look at the process of attribution more explicitly.

Second, since the design incorporates all four possible combinations of the two characteristics (i.e., cues), I can also explore whether there is an additive effect in certain combinations of them (i.e., are Republican supporters held more accountable than Democratic supporters?) This would not be possible using a traditional survey approach that is based on an observational design. For example, conducting a panel survey would not allow a researcher to determine the effect (if any) of the legislator's earlier position on the war or partisan affiliation since the new legislator will have either been for *or* against the war since it began and either a Democrat *or* Republican in 2002. Because this design only allows us to observe how citizens would respond to one type of legislator (say, a Democratic representative who supported the war in 2002), we cannot know with certainty which process is at work because we lack the necessary comparison groups.

2.1 Hypotheses Regarding Citizen Perceptions

The above discussion implies two sets of hypotheses: one centering on the individual effects of being a supporter or associate and another about how the cues work in combination. All of the hypotheses are framed in terms of how much “responsibility” for the war the respondent assigns to a particular legislator. The shift in terminology from

“culpable” to “responsible” is intentional. To avoid introducing bias into the survey as to whether the decision to invade Iraq was a wise one, “culpable” was not used in the treatment wording because of its negative connotation.

Individual Cue Effects

The first set of hypotheses examines the effects of cueing the respondent to the fact that the legislator is either an associate (H1) or a supporter (H2).⁵

H1: Respondents who believe the statement is from a *Republican legislator* will assign more responsibility to the legislator than respondents who believe the statement is from a *senator who is not a Republican*.

H2: Respondents who believe the statement is from a *legislator who voted for the war* will assign more responsibility to the legislator than respondents who believe the statement is from a *legislator who did not vote for the war*.

Combined Cue Effects

The second set of hypotheses examines whether certain *combinations* of cues affect respondents’ assessments of leaders in different ways. If, for instance, we have reason to suspect that cuing a respondent to a member’s earlier vote in favor of the war *or* their ties to Bush might lead the respondent to hold the member more responsible, assigning both cues simultaneously may increase a respondent’s assessment of the member’s responsibility even further. Respondents who are presented with a Republican

⁵ Since the rest of the chapter deals specifically with members of the US Congress and the war in Iraq, I will use the terms “associate” and Republican interchangeably. Doing so also reflects the language used in the treatments.

legislator, for instance, may infer from the partisan label that the member was a more enthusiastic supporter than a Democrat who voted the same way, and may have worked harder to make sure the bill passed.

More generally, because both cues suggest a dichotomy in the mind of the respondent (e.g., a member can either be a Republican *or* Democrat and either voted for the war *or* against it), we should not be surprised if cuing the respondent to one type leads her to subconsciously compare the senator to the two, hypothetical senators with opposite characteristics. If, for example, a respondent were asked to assess the responsibility of a Republican legislator who voted against the war, the relevant comparison types would be a Democratic legislator who also voted against it and a Republican legislator who voted for it. If we assume that an additive process is at work, we might expect this respondent to assign a middling degree of responsibility to the experimental legislator she was presented with since he is less responsible than the Republican who voted for it yet more responsible (by his partisan affiliation) than the Democrat who voted against it.

In the present survey experiment, the two cues create four possible combinations, which produce three different additive values (see Table 5.1). A 1 indicates the presence of the cue while a 0 signifies its absence.

Table 5.1: Cue Combinations

Treatment	Associate Cue	Supporter Cue	Additive Cue Total
1. Republican, voted for the war	1	1	2
2. Republican, voted against the war	1	0	1
3. Democrat, voted for the war	0	1	1
4. Democrat, voted against the war	0	0	0

As Table 5.1 illustrates, if the additive logic is correct, the Republican who voted for the war should be attributed the highest level of responsibility while the Democrat who voted against the war should receive the least. The remaining two senators represent the divergent cue combinations since both voted counter to their party's general position. They each only have one cue assigned to them and should, therefore, elicit similar reactions from respondents, assuming the cues are equally powerful. More formally:

H3: Respondents should assign more responsibility to a *Republican legislator who voted for the war* than any other type of legislator.

H4: Respondents should assign equal amounts of responsibility to a *Republican legislator who voted against the war* and a *Democratic legislator who voted for the war*.

H5: Respondents should assign less responsibility to a *Democratic legislator who voted against the war* than any other type of legislator.

2.2 Experimental Research Design

To test these hypotheses, I designed and embedded an experiment in a nationally representative survey. A professional survey research firm, Knowledge Networks, administered the experiment, using a randomly selected subset of a pre-assembled panel of respondents.⁶ Random assignment, coupled with a large and diverse respondent pool increases the generalizability of the results considerably. Instead of only being able to speak to population of college students (a common and convenient subject pool), the findings tell us something about a much broader population. More than 800 people responded over the course of June and July 2007. Respondents were asked to evaluate the degree to which a fictional senator, John Harris, was responsible for American

⁶ Respondents are recruited using a random digit dialing (RDD) process to ensure the panel is as representative as possible.

involvement in Iraq. This section describes the experimental procedure in more detail to illustrate how it will enable tests of hypotheses about how the cues regarding the legislator’s status as an associate or supporter affect respondents’ assessments of him.

Experimental Design and Procedure

The experiment employs a fully crossed, 2x2 design, resulting in four treatment groups that represent the full set of cue combinations discussed above (see Figure 5.1).⁷

Figure 5.1: Experimental Design

Partisan Affiliation	Position on the War at Onset	
	Voted Yes	Voted No
Republican	Supportive Associate: John Harris is a Republican who voted for the war in 2002.	Unsupportive Associate: John Harris is a Republican who voted against the war in 2002.
Democrat	Supportive Non-Associate: John Harris is a Democrat who voted for the war in 2002.	Unsupportive Non-Associate: John Harris is a Democrat who voted against the war in 2002.

First, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the four treatment groups.⁸ This critical step allows for the comparison of the treatment effects across groups.

⁷ This design is similar to a survey experiment carried out by Kuklinski & Hurley (1994). In their study, all respondents were read an identical statement about affirmative action but the race and political ideology of the speaker varied across the different conditions.

⁸ In the initial survey, a control group was also included. Respondents assigned to this fifth group received no information about the senator’s partisan affiliation or how he voted on the war. Although this group is technically correct in terms of what a control group should do, further reflection led me to drop this group from the analysis since respondents in this group were forced to make an assessment of Senator Harris with *no* information (as opposed to neutral information) and, consequently, cannot easily be compared to respondents who were given information about Harris’ party and voting record. Respondents in the control group are most likely giving a

Because the respondents were assigned in a random way, we can be confident that any significant differences between the groups are the result of the treatments and not some other factor.⁹

Next, respondents were asked a short series of multiple choice questions regarding their position the Iraq war, their own partisan leanings and their feelings on whether force should be used to solve international problems.¹⁰ These respondent characteristics will serve as important robustness checks in the statistical analysis below.¹¹ Asking respondents for this information in the pre-treatment phase avoids bias; asking in the post-treatment phase (i.e., after they had read the statement from Senator Harris regarding the war) introduced the risk of biasing their response in light of the information they were given about the Senator and the war.

completely random response while respondents in the other treatment conditions have the relevant information they would expect to have when asked to evaluate a leader. In practice, respondents assigned to the control group reacted to their fictional senator in very similar ways to respondents assigned to treatment groups with divergent cue combinations, unsupportive associate and supportive non-associate (see Appendix C). Again, while this could be evidence of the divergent cues triggering similar degrees of confusion as a cue with no information about the leader, such comparisons should be interpreted with caution. More generally, the results of tests that included the control group mirrored the results of tests where the control was excluded.

⁹ Statistical tests confirm that the randomization was successful (i.e., a respondent's characteristics do not predict her assigned treatment group).

¹⁰ This final question was included to gauge whether the respondent tended towards the "hawkish" or "dovish" end of the spectrum. All pre-test questions regarding a respondent's party ID, and the degree to which they agreed with the war were based on question wording from the American National Election Study. The precise question wording is in Appendix C.

¹¹ The survey firm administering the experiment—Knowledge Networks—also provided several variables with basic demographic information (e.g., age, gender) about each respondent.

After the pre-treatment questions, respondents read a statement from a senator about the war in Iraq. The text for the unsupportive associate follows; italicized portions of the text varied across the treatments accordingly:

“Senator John Harris, a *Republican* who is a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and who *voted against* the war when it began in 2003, has just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.”¹²

Several aspects of the precise wording of the treatment are worth discussing in greater detail. First, a senator is the focus of investigation because of the Senate’s influential role in foreign policy and the higher prestige enjoyed by Senators as compared to members of the House. Second, the experimental senator was given the additional position on the Foreign Relations Committee both to lend credence to the idea that he was making an

¹² The actual wording of the treatment speaks to when the ground invasion began (March 2003) a date respondents are more likely to identify as “the beginning of the war”, even though the actual vote that granted President Bush the freedom of to use military force took place in October of the previous year. The 2002 vote, therefore, is technically a vote for or against the war that began in 2003. Although this particular choice is somewhat awkward (especially since so many Congressmen have come under fire for their vote), there is no reason to suspect respondents would have reacted to the treatments differently if 2002 was used instead. The second part of the statement, which suggests withdrawing American forces over the next three months, was included to test other hypotheses that not directly relevant to the issue at hand.

informed decision at the time and also to imply that he has considerable influence (relative to other member of the legislature) over foreign policy.

Holding *everything* about the treatments constant except for John Harris' party and position on the Iraq War ensures the manipulations of these characteristics are the only source of systematic variation in the respondent's answers across the treatment groups. Holding the senator's name constant, obviously, necessitated the use of a fictional name. Currently (and at the time of the vote in 2002), nobody by the name of John Harris serves in either chamber of Congress. Although all four possible combinations of associates and supporters existed in the Senate¹³, using a real person's name carries a high potential of undermining the effect of the experimental design. If, for instance, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) was used in the unsupportive non-associate treatment group, respondents may assess him based on the manipulations of interest the current study, but they also may evaluate him based on issues wholly unrelated to the matter at hand (e.g., his stances on health care or teaching evolution in schools). Because the survey does not allow me to ask the respondent *why* they are making particular choices, variation in wording across the different treatment groups had to be minimized.

After reading the treatment, respondents were asked the following question: "On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning "not at all responsible" and 5 meaning "very responsible" where would you place Senator Harris in terms of responsibility for American involvement in Iraq as a whole?" Once this brief post-treatment phase was complete, the

¹³ Although the vast majority of the Senate voted in favor of the war (77 to 23), 21 Democrats dissented along with one Republican—Senator Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island. One Independent also dissented: Senator Jim Jeffords of Vermont.


respondent was thanked for her time and debriefed of the fact that the entire statement she had just read and Senator Harris were both entirely fictitious.

2.3 Experimental Results

The first set of hypotheses (H1 and H2) posited that respondents who were cued with a senator who was either a supporter or an associate would assign more responsibility to that senator than respondents who were presented with a senator who did not fall into either of these groups. To determine the effect of each cue separately, I pool pairs of treatment groups by collapsing on the two different cues. To ascertain the effect of being an associate, for instance, I compare the mean attribution of responsibility of all respondents who were presented with a Republican senator to the mean attribution of all respondents who were presented with a Democratic senator. A similar process is used to determine the treatment effect of being cued with a supporter.

Comparing the means of these pooled groups provides strong support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. First, when comparing the assessments of the Senator from respondents cued with an associate to those who were cued with a non-associate, a sizeable and significant ($p < 0.00$) difference of eight points exists. A similar effect emerges comparing respondents who were cued with a supporter to those respondents who were cued with an opponent. The responsibility assessments from respondents who were presented with a supporter were, on average, 9 percentage points higher than respondents who were told the experimental senator did not vote for the war. This difference is also highly significant ($p < 0.00$). These comparisons are captured in Figure 5.2 (for ease of interpretation, the means have been rescaled to range between 0 and 1).

Figure 5.2



Importantly, the effects of the treatments are remarkably similar in terms of magnitude. While the relative heights of the bars in Figure 5.2 demonstrate this, a formal test of the null hypothesis that the effects of associate and supporter are equal cannot be rejected ($p < 0.848$).¹⁴

These effects are mirrored in Table 5.2, which present the estimates from a regression of the two treatments on the degree of responsibility attributed to Senator Harris. Both treatment dummies (Associate and Supporter) are positive and highly significant, suggesting the presence of true effect. As expected, the strength of these results holds, even in the presence of several controls that would, presumably, affect a respondent's assessment.¹⁵

¹⁴ I performed the F-test after estimating Model 2. When estimated after Model 1, the same result holds ($p < 0.990$).

¹⁵ The models presented were estimated using OLS; the results hold under an ordered probit specification. This is true for all models presented in this chapter. Strictly speaking, thanks to the randomization of the treatment assignments, controls are not necessary. The randomization of the

Table 5.2: Treatment Effects

	<i>Model 1</i>	<i>Model 2</i>
<i>Treatment</i>		
Associate	0.335*** 0.0838	0.300*** 0.0791
Supporter	0.333*** 0.0837	0.322*** 0.0792
<i>Controls</i>		
Republican	-	-0.456*** 0.089
Hawk	-	-0.383*** 0.096
Disagree with War	-	0.294*** 0.091
Male	-	-0.151* 0.080
Age	-	-0.004 0.002
Attention to War	-	0.114 0.131
Constant	2.559*** 0.072	2.893*** 0.171
N	810	788


The inclusion of the controls in Model 2 also reveals several interesting things about how different types of *respondents* behave, holding the effects of the treatments constant. For instance, Republican respondents assign less responsibility, on average, than Democratic respondents, just as respondents who are more hawkish assign less responsibility than respondents who identify as doves. Respondents who disagreed with the decision to invade Iraq were more likely to attribute greater responsibility than respondents who agreed with or who were neutral on the decision. Taken together, none

treatment ensures that the differences between groups are a result of the treatments, and not any characteristic of a particular group of respondents. Their main purpose here is to serve a robustness check.

of these results is particularly surprising, especially since the three variables are highly correlated: Republicans are both less likely to disagree with the war and more likely to be hawks.¹⁶ If the word “responsible” is read with a negative connotation, and interpreted as “to blame” or “culpable,” then it makes sense that Republicans and hawks would be less likely to ascribe responsibility to Senator Harris while people who disagree with the war, eager to point a finger, would be likely to assign more.

The finding that supporters and associates trigger similar reactions among respondents, however interesting, is only the first step. To determine whether supporters are associated with different degrees of responsibility based on their party membership requires examining the treatment effects of the original four treatment groups. Figure 5.3 depicts the means for each group; as above, means have been rescaled to range between 0 and 1.

Figure 5.3



¹⁶ The pair-wise correlation coefficients are all highly significant (Hawk/Republican: 0.2775, $p < 0.00$; Hawk/Disagree with War: -0.335, $p < 0.00$; Republican/Disagree with War: -0.4020, $p < 0.00$.)

As the figure makes clear, Hypotheses 3, 4 and 5 receive strong support. As Hypothesis 3 predicted, the senator who was both an associate *and* a supporter received the highest level of perceived responsibility for the war. The effect of the “Republican supporter” treatment was a full 9 points higher than the effect for the Democratic supporter; this difference was very significant (p-value <0.003). This finding is striking since both senators are, from a technical standpoint, equally responsible for the war. The fact that respondents attribute more responsibility to the Republican suggests that a strong additive effect is at work. The support cue, however, is also clearly registering with respondents; if it were simply about associational ties, the two left-most bars would be the same height, as would the two bars furthest to the right. Yet, this is not the case. Democratic supporters are assigned more responsibility than Democratic non-supporters (p-value: <0.005), and Republican non-supporters are assigned less than their co-partisans who voted for the war (p-value <0.005).

This additive effect is evident in the multivariate models as well. As above, I estimated two models predicting how respondents would evaluate the different senator types. Once again, the supportive associate cue has the largest effect; indeed it is more than twice the size of the other treatment effects in the model.

Table 5.3: Effects of Cue Combinations

	<i>Model 3</i>	<i>Model 4</i>
<i>Treatment</i>		
Supportive Associate	0.669***	0.623***
	0.117	0.111
Unsupportive Associate	0.326***	0.268***
	0.121	0.114
Supportive Non-Associate	0.324***	0.292***
	0.121	0.109
<i>Controls</i>		
Republican	-	-0.457***
		0.089
Hawk	-	-0.386***
		0.097
Disagree with War	-	0.292***
		0.091
Male	-	-0.151*
		0.080
Age	-	-0.004
		0.003
Attention to War	-	0.114
		0.131
Constant	2.563***	2.910***
	0.082	0.176
N	810	788

Hypothesis 4, which posited that the two treatment conditions that involve either an associate or a supporter should produce treatment effects of roughly equivalent sizes, also received support. Although their equivalence is readily apparent when depicted graphically (Figure 5.3), evaluating this hypothesis more formally is accomplished with a simple test of whether the coefficients on “Unsupportive Associate” and “Supportive Non-associate” are equal; the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal cannot be rejected ($p < 0.995$ in Model 3 and $p < 0.830$ in Model 4).

The substantive significance of this finding should not be overlooked. That respondents are willing to assign equal amounts of responsibility to a senator whom they were *explicitly told did not vote for the war* and a senator who voted for it should be of interest to scholars of political behavior. Although one would expect respondents to “do the best they can with the information they have”¹⁷ and assume the Republican senator voted for the war in the *absence* of a cue as to how he voted, the voting cue is not only present in this case but runs directly counter to the expectation the heuristic would have suggested.

The comparison of the two non-supporter treatment effects follows a similar pattern. As Hypothesis 5 posited, the treatment group with the least number of cues (Unsupportive Non-associate) produces a smaller treatment effect, even when the actual level of support is identical across the two groups (i.e., neither senator supported it). The positive and significant coefficient on the Unsupportive Associate variables in Models 3 and 4, and the significant 8-point difference between the two non-supporter treatment groups, underscores further the notion that being linked to the culpable executive creates an especially strong link between the war and the legislator in the eyes of citizens.

3.0: Culpability and Legislator Voting Behavior

The results from the survey experiment demonstrate that citizens are willing to differentiate between leaders based on their culpability for the war, just as they were with executives. Either by cueing directly off of the member’s vote on the war or inferring the member’s level of support based on his or her partisan affiliation, citizens assign more

¹⁷ Malhotra and Kuo (2007:12).

responsibility to legislators whom they perceive as being are more connected to the war. Chapter 4 demonstrated that this attribution of responsibility has a powerful effect on executive behavior. What parallel effects might we expect for legislators? Although their position in the government, and the fact that they are part of a larger body that must make decisions collectively, dictate that individual legislators cannot shape the state's conduct in a war as directly as executive, their decisions are still consequential.

As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, scholars have identified several ways in which legislators can influence the war by constraining the executive. One of the primary means for doing so is introducing legislation that attempts to curtail the conflict in some way. By suggesting and supporting such legislation, members make their opposition to the war public and signal to the president (and any future electoral challengers) that they are willing to take a stand against the conflict. Which members would we expect to be most likely to engage in such behavior?

One characteristic of obvious importance would be the member's political party. As I argued above and in earlier chapters, members who share a partisan connection to the culpable executive are going to be less likely to challenge a war, even if they disagree with it. This argument has also received empirical support.¹⁸ This suggests the following hypothesis:

H6: Legislators who are members of the same party as the president who started the war (associates) should be less likely to vote for anti-war legislation than legislators who are not in the president's party (non-associates).

The findings from the survey experiment, however, suggest that party connections might not be the whole story. Members of the opposition, or non-associates, who supported the

¹⁸ Kriner 2010 and Howell and Pevehouse (2010).

war still poses a considerable amount of responsibility for the war, and were distinguishable in the eyes of citizens from other non-associates. If being culpable for the war creates similar pressures for these legislators as it does for executives, we might expect these supportive non-associates to be reluctant to change their position and vote for anti-war legislation. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H7: Legislators who voted for the war when it began (supporters) should be less likely to vote for anti-war legislation than legislators who did not vote for the war (non-supporters).

3.2 Research Design

To test Hypotheses 6 and 7, I constructed two datasets comprised of ten roll call votes taken in the 108th-110th sessions of the US Congress; six from the House of Representatives and four from the Senate. All ten bills represented challenges to the Iraq war and the way President Bush was handling it. The key criterion for inclusion was that the bill had to represent a clear critique of or an attempt to halt or restrict the war. It could not, in other words, be a call for reviewing how Bush was conducting the war or a request for more information from the executive branch. I set this high bar for inclusion to ensure that any “yes” votes would be a clear signal of opposition against the war. Calls for revising the strategy or other non-binding requests require less political capital from the member.¹⁹

This setup is modeled closely on Kriner (2010), which examined Congress’ likelihood of challenging the president on foreign military operations during the Reagan (1980-88) and Clinton administrations (1992-2000). Like Kriner, I evaluate the House and Senate separately; the dataset for each chamber consists of a series of “stacked” roll

¹⁹ I list and describe the bills in more detail in Appendix C.

call votes, with one observation per member per vote. This gives me a total of 2,601 observations for the House and 400 for the Senate.²⁰ I clustered the observations by member to account for the fact that a member's set of votes on this type of bill are clearly not independent of one another. The dependent variable is binary and coded as 1 if the member voted yes for one of the aforementioned bills and 0 otherwise.²¹

The primary independent variables of interest are whether the legislator is a supporter or an associate. I considered a legislator a "supporter" if they voted for the joint resolution (H.J.Res 114) that granted Bush the authority to take action against Iraq in 2002 during the 107th session of Congress. The House of Representatives voted on October 10, with 296 voting yes, 193 voting no and 2 abstaining. In the Senate, the vote was held on October 11; 77 supported it, 23 opposed it and none abstained.²² Legislators who were members of the Republican party, regardless of when they came to power,

²⁰ The total number of observations for the House of Representatives is not 2,610 (6 x 435) for two reasons. First, 6 observations drop because the Speaker of the House does not vote on the vast majority of bills that come to the floor. Most of the missing observations, however, are due to seats that were left vacant when a member died, retired or resigned mid-term and the vote occurred before a special election could be held to elect a new representative.

²¹ I chose to highlight the "yes" votes and combine the other voting options since a yes vote is the only response that is unambiguous in signaling the member's position against the war. Legislators who abstain may also disagree with the war, but their unwillingness to go on the record as supporting the bill makes them qualitatively different than members who vote yes.

²² It is important to note that only legislators who were in Congress in 2002 who voted yes are counted as supporters. This measure does not take into consideration any members who took office after the 107th Congress who may have also been vocal supporters of the war. In practice, this underestimates the effect of being a supporter since members who came to power in the 108th Congress and later may also feel a need to continue backing the war if they expressed support at an earlier date.

were considered associates since George W. Bush, a Republican president, initiated the war.²³

I also added several control variables, which fall into two groups. The first group involves variables that capture how secure the member is in office. Seat safety is a necessary control variable since we might expect members who are secure in office to worry less about any fallout from either their colleagues or their constituents if they decide to adopt an unpopular position. I utilize three different measures: the amount of time a member has been in Congress; a dummy variable of whether they won their last election with more than 60% of the vote; and the percent of the vote in the district or state won by Bush in 2000 or 2004 (depending on Congressional session during which the particular vote took place).

The length of a legislator's tenure serves as a proxy for their long-term popularity within their district. Members who have been in power longer have necessarily won multiple elections against a variety of challengers. This is especially true in the House of Representatives where members must stand for re-election every two years. Given this, we should expect members who have been in office for longer to be more willing to take unpopular positions on controversial votes and care less about the negative repercussions of changing their position. Newer members, on the other hand, should be more concerned about the downside of appearing inconsistent and adhere to their earlier vote. Hence, the longer a legislator has served in Congress, the more likely they should be to vote for one of the aforementioned bills, *ceteris paribus*.

²³ Two members of Congress are officially registered as Independents: Bernie Sanders and Jim Jeffords, both from Vermont. Following the standard practice, I classified them both as Democrats since that is the major party they caucus with most often.

The size of a member's margin of victory also captures how secure a member might feel about openly challenging the president (and members of his party) or the war more generally. Members who took more than 60% of the votes in the most recent election should feel relatively comfortable doing so. Members who won election with less than 60% of the vote should feel less standing against the president. A small margin of victory in a recent election coupled with a flip-flop on the war could make the member an inviting target for a challenger. Given this, we should expect members who had won their most recent election by a significant margin to be more likely to vote in favor of bills that challenge the president's handling of the war.

Finally, the portion of the two-party vote Bush won in the 2000 and 2004 election should also correlate with the member's seat safety and their willingness to take a stand against him. As Kriner (2010: 255) explains, "the stronger the president's track record of success in a state or district, the more wary members, even of the opposition, will be to challenge him".²⁴ Therefore, after controlling for other important factors—most notably, the legislator's party—we should expect members from districts or states where Bush won larger percentages of the vote to be less likely to vote for anti-war legislation.

²⁴ As a robustness check, I also used percent of the vote won by their party's candidate in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections as an alternate measure of seat safety. The logic behind this is that a Democratic senator, for instance, is more likely to feel more secure in office than a Republican in districts where John Kerry did well in 2004. It also serves as a proxy for the general preferences of the district that is relatively independent of the individual member. A member may have been elected because of some characteristic that is idiosyncratic to her (e.g., she faced an usually weak opponent), even if her overall political stance does not reflect the attitudes of her constituency. The results did not change appreciably from those obtained with the Bush vote percentage models.

The second group of variables speaks to characteristics that are not related to a member's electoral history. The first is a dummy variable that is a 1 if the legislator was ever a member of the armed services (including reserve membership). As other scholars have argued, including this variable is important since veterans may be reluctant to vote for a bill that could potentially hamper the military's operations in the field.²⁵

I also include variables that indicate whether the member served on either the Armed Services or Foreign Affairs Committees at the time of the votes on the war. Controlling for membership on either of these committees is necessary since legislators in these positions are more involved in decisions regarding wars than other members. Consequently, they may feel more invested in the operation, and less likely to challenge the president once the conflict is underway. As Kriner (253) points out, however, it is also possible for these variables to have the opposite effect. Members of these committees could, for instance, "be more willing than others, *ceteris paribus*, to defend Congress' war powers and vote to constrain executive discretion." Their predicted effect, consequently, remains an open empirical question.

Finally, I also included a variable that is a 1 if the legislator was from a Southern state. Following the standard practice in the American politics literature, I define "the South" as the eleven states who were members of the Confederacy in the 1850's.²⁶ Including this characteristic of the member is important since, as Kriner (256) points out, "traditionally, the South has been more hawkish and supportive of military endeavors than other regions of the country, regardless of the partisan composition of its

²⁵ Feaver and Gelpi (2004); Holsti (2001); Kriner (2010).

²⁶ These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

congressional delegation. As such, Southern legislators may face stronger pressure than other members...to oppose any congressional efforts potentially seen as hampering military flexibility.”

3.3 Roll Call Data Results

Hypotheses 6 and 7 both posited that members of Congress who had a connection to the war—either by vote or by party affiliation—would be less likely to vote for bills that attempted to limit the war or curtail the executive’s authority in conducting the conflict. There are two ways to test these hypotheses. The first is to estimate a model with the associate and supporter variables coded as described above to ascertain their effect on a member’s vote. The second is to create a set of dummy variables that capture the possible combinations of the cues (e.g., supportive associate, supportive non-associate, etc.) to determine if the various types of members behave in qualitatively different ways. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 present the estimates for both of these specifications for the House and Senate.

Turning first to the model that just examines the effects of the individual cues, Hypotheses 6 and 7 both find broad support. Supporters are always less likely to vote for the anti-war bills than non-supporters, though this effect is muted somewhat in the Senate when the full battery of control variables is included in the model.²⁷ Associates are also significantly less likely to support bills that attempt to curtail the war or the executive’s authority in conducting that war. What is remarkable about the set of findings in Table

²⁷ The effect (and significance) of being a supporter is dependent on the model specification. When the “Bush Vote” variable is excluded from the model, the size of the effect becomes much larger and the difference between supporters and non-supporters is significant at the 0.078 level.

5.4, however, is how large the associate effect is relative to the effect of being a supporter. In Model 6, for instance, the effect of being an associate (i.e., a Republican) in the House of Representatives is nearly *ten times* the size of the effect of being a supporter. On the face of it, it appears that, while the political costs of reversing one's position (i.e., voting for an anti-war bill after supporting the war when it started) exist, they are dwarfed by the effect of a member's partisan affiliation.

Table 5.4: The Effect of Being a Supporter or Associate on a Member's Vote on Anti-War Bills

	<i>Model 5</i>	<i>Model 6</i>	<i>Model 7</i>	<i>Model 8</i>
<i>Member Types</i>				
Supporter	-0.558***	-0.379**	-0.711**	-0.391
	0.124	0.158	0.348	0.370
Associate	-4.193***	-3.739***	-5.171***	-4.688***
	0.258	0.259	0.734	0.6883
<i>Controls</i>				
Bush Vote	-	-0.027***	-	-9.225***
		0.005		2.144
60+ Vote Share	-	0.189	-	0.238
		0.158		0.375
Time in Congress (logged)	-	-0.025	-	0.028
		0.022		0.052
Veteran	-	0.0519	-	0.094
		0.185		0.398
Foreign Affairs Committee	-	0.112	-	0.255
		0.224		0.441
Armed Services Committee	-	-0.378**	-	-0.995**
		0.181		0.423
Southern State	-	-0.135	-	-1.075**
		0.132		0.497
Constant	1.06***	2.221***	0.961***	5.409***
	0.067	0.339	0.734	1.206
N	2601	2601	400	400

Examining the effect of the cues in combination with one another allows us to explore this possibility further. Doing so also provides a more accurate model of reality since legislators must base their vote on both characteristics simultaneously. No legislator for instance, is solely a supporter. Instead, they are a supporter who is *also* either an associate (or non-associate). Including variables that represent all of the possible

combinations of cues also provides a straightforward means of evaluating whether one type of member is less likely to support an anti-war bill than another.²⁸ Models 9-12 include three of the four possible member types; the excluded type—a non-associate who did not support the war—serves as the model’s baseline. The effects of the other types should therefore be interpreted relative to a Democratic legislator who did not vote to authorize the war when the bills came before Congress in 2002.


Table 5.5: The Effect of Being a Supporter or Associate on a Member’s Vote on Anti-War Bills

	<i>Model 9</i>	<i>Model 10</i>	<i>Model 11</i>	<i>Model 12</i>
<i>Member Types</i>				
Supporter (D)	-0.602***	-0.387***	-0.709**	-0.351
	0.117	0.127	0.358	0.382
Supporter (R)	-4.655***	-4.107***	-5.902***	-5.336***
	0.265	0.280	1.027	1.033
Non-supporter (R)	-4.391***	-3.773***	-5.150***	-4.244***
	0.523	0.519	1.048	0.963
<i>Controls</i>				
Bush Vote	-	-0.027***	-	-9.255***
		0.005		2.168
60+ Vote Share	-	0.188	-	0.247
		0.162		0.379
Time in Congress	-	-0.025	-	0.028
		0.021		0.052
Veteran	-	0.0523	-	0.107
		0.184		0.405
Foreign Affairs Committee	-	0.114	-	0.209
		0.218		0.437
Armed Services Committee	-	-0.378**	-	-0.997**
		0.181		0.423
Southern State	-	-0.134	-	-1.091**
		0.130		0.130
Constant	1.075***	2.221***	0.960***	2.221***
	0.067	0.344	0.248	0.344
N	2601	2601	400	2601

²⁸ Obtaining these effects would also be possible using the results from Models 5-8. I utilize the alternative specification in Models 9-12 to make the comparisons of the different types more straightforward.


Not surprisingly, the coefficients in Table 5.5 tell a similar story to those in the previous table: namely, while supporters are generally less likely to support anti-war legislation, it is very unlikely that an associate would ever vote yes on such bills, regardless of whether they voted for the war when it started. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 provide a better sense of what the difference in the magnitude of these two cues means in real terms in both the House and Senate, respectively. The bars represent the change in the likelihood of a member voting for the anti-war bills compared to the baseline, a Democratic non-supporter.²⁹

Figure 5.4



²⁹ I calculated these differences by moving one variable at a time while holding the others at their modes, or, in the case of continuous variables, means.

Figure 5.5



As is plainly evident from both figures, the effect of being an associate seems to dominate the effect of being a supporter. While there are important differences among non-associates—Democrats who voted for the war are less likely to vote for the anti-war measures than Democrats who did vote to authorize the war—the effect is only significant in the House and is fairly small. Supportive non-associates are only 9% less likely to vote for the anti-war bills than their counterparts who never expressed support for the war.

The right-most pairs of bars in the figures tell a different story. The effect of being an associate is much larger—all Republican members are at least 60% less likely to vote for the anti-war bills than the baseline—and the magnitude of the effect remains the

same regardless of whether the legislator was also a supporter.³⁰ Put differently, it appears that for Republicans their partisan affiliation is the primary driver of their vote choice, not their track record of support.

In practice, this lack of a difference among associates is likely the result a combination of the non-random nature of the set of Republicans who were in a position to run for national office in the 2004 or 2006 elections and strong party discipline among Republicans generally. With regards to the first point, any Republican who was interested in holding office in either the House or the Senate any time after the war in Iraq began was more than likely a supporter of the war. Even after the elections in 2004 and 2006, especially, where the war was taking a toll on Republican vote shares, it is unlikely that the party leadership would endorse a candidate who was openly against the war that George W. Bush was culpable for. Hence, the candidates that were likely to run would be those who would have also been supporters had they been in Congress in 2002. Given this, it makes sense that the difference between those Republicans that are formally counted as supporters and those that are “non-supporters” is negligible.

This same logic also helps explain why a relatively small difference (albeit, a significant one) remains between supporters and non-supporters within the Democratic ranks. For this group, an incentive to run on an *anti-war* platform existed for members who campaigned in 2004 and 2006. Indeed, the election of Nancy Pelosi—a Democrat who had always been against the war—to the position of Speaker of the House in 2006 is indicative of the shift in position against the war the Democratic leadership was trying to

³⁰ An F-test confirms that the coefficients on “Supporter (R)” and “Non-Supporter (R)” are not statistically different from one another in either the House or the Senate, although the former is larger than the latter in both chambers.

achieve as the war became increasingly unpopular with the electorate. Therefore, we should expect the differences between supporters and non-supporters to grow over time in the opposition party and remain relatively small for members in the party of the culpable executive.

4.0 Discussion

The preceding analyses illustrate several important points about how a legislator's culpability for a conflict—gained either by an earlier vote in favor of the war or a partisan connection with the executive who started it—affects both citizens' perceptions of her and her likelihood of challenging the war once it is in progress. First, the survey experiment results and the findings from the roll call analysis suggest that a leader's political affiliation has the stronger effect of the two sources of culpability. Citizens attributed the most responsibility to Republicans who supported the war, but held Republicans who had explicitly voted *no* just as culpable as Democrats who supported it. Party ties to the president also had an effect on how the members voted. When faced with legislation that attempted to challenge the president's authority or otherwise limit the conflict, Republican support was nearly non-existent. The member's track record vis-à-vis the conflict appeared to have little effect; almost without exception, Republicans vote against the bills, even though only less than a third of them, in both the House and Senate, voted for the initial authorization.

The dominance of the presidential associate cue mirrors Kriner's (2010) findings. In his study of Congressional challenges during the Reagan and Clinton administrations, Kriner finds that members of the president's party are significantly less likely to support

legislation that attempted to curtail the conflict. The results presented here build on these earlier findings by demonstrating that the effect of being associated with the president persists even in protracted wars. The conflicts in Kriner's analysis (e.g., Bosnia, Lebanon, Somalia, Grenada, etc), while certainly important foreign policy events at the time, were all relatively short. Indeed, none of them extended beyond a single Congressional session.

The Iraq war, by contrast, spanned five sessions. This longer timeframe is significant because it gives associates more time to reconsider their position, especially if the war becomes unpopular. Three of the anti-war votes in the House, for instance, took place in mid-2007, when less than 40% of the country approved of the war.³¹ While approval figures among Republicans were higher, the war was taking a toll on the Republican party's brand nevertheless.³² The fact that so many Republicans continued to support the war for such a long time and under these conditions is a testament to the political costs an associate would face if they defected.

The relative strength of the associate cue, however, does not imply that we should discount the importance of being a (non-associate) supporter entirely. Democrats who voted for the war in the House of Representatives were still significantly less likely to support anti-war legislation than their colleagues who had opposed the conflict. Moreover, this difference persisted long after the public had clearly turned against the war and, importantly, after the 2006 midterm elections ushered in a Democratic majority. This shift in the balance of power in the House, and the Democratic leadership's self-proclaimed mandate to follow through on the American people's desire for "a new

³¹ Berinsky 2008.

³² "Collateral Damage".

direction in Iraq”³³, would have increased the pressure on Democrats who had initially supported the war to change their position. Yet, some held their ground and continued to vote against anti-war resolutions. This behavior, importantly, is not without precedent. Kriner also controls for an early show of support in his analysis and finds that it is strong and significant predictor of members who will vote no on bills that attempt to challenge the president on the war.³⁴

Why, then, is the magnitude of the effect so different from that of being an associate? The lack of a large difference among non-associates in their willingness to vote for anti-war bills suggests that a large number of those who supported the war originally do not fear reversing their course once the war becomes unpopular. Given the presumed costs of flip-flopping, what explains this brazen behavior?

One reason could be the relatively favorable electoral prospects a non-associate supporter enjoys. To understand this, we need to consider the two possible arenas where this member type will face possible challengers for her seat: the primary elections and the general elections. Of the two, the primary represents the largest threat to the member’s incumbency since it is the scenario under which they are likely to face their toughest challenger: a member of their own party who did not support the war. This type of challenger represents the most significant threat since they have neither a partisan link to the culpable executive nor a history of supporting the conflict. Compare this to the general election where the incumbent’s challenger would be from the executive’s party

³³ Pelosi 2006.

³⁴ Kriner (2010: 263) Indeed, in half of the models Kriner estimates, a previous vote to authorize is *larger* than the effect of being in the president’s party. Again, this is probably due to the shorter duration of the conflicts in his analysis.

and, in all likelihood, have a track record of supporting the war. Given this, *provided the incumbent makes it to the general election round*, they will likely still be the preferred candidate for an anti-war electorate, even if they are only a recent opponent, since the other candidate will have difficulty arguing that he will be more willing to end the war.

Work by Grose and Oppenheimer (2007) lends credence to this causal logic. In their study of the 2006 midterm elections they found that Democrats who voted for the war in 2002 were no more likely to be removed from office than Democrats who had voted against the war. Republican incumbents who had supported the war, on the other hand, were significantly more likely to lose their seats. Given this, switching positions and taking a stance against the war is not necessarily an ill-advised strategy for *non-associates*. Doing so brings them closer in line with the (likely) preferences of their constituents and allows them to put more distance between themselves and the culpable executive. Voters may be displeased with the flip-flop, but the incumbent will still be preferable to the challenger.

Taken together, this suggests that the only electoral hurdle where a history of supporting the war could hurt a supportive non-associate is primary with a credible challenger. Due in large part to redistricting, such elections are relatively rare in American politics. Given this, it makes sense that a history of supporting the war, while still relevant, should have less of an effect than being an associate.

Appendix C

Table 5.1: Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Treatment Group Assignment

	Coefficient	S.E.	P-value
<i>Treatment: Supportive Associate</i>			
Republican	-0.17	0.22	0.46
Hawk	-0.12	0.24	0.62
Disagrees with Iraq War	0.14	0.23	0.54
Male	0.23	0.20	0.25
Age	0.01	0.01	0.34
Attention to War	0.02	0.34	0.96
Constant	-0.38	0.42	0.37
<i>Treatment: Unsupportive Associate</i>			
Republican	-0.25	0.23	0.28
Hawk	-0.33	0.25	0.18
Disagrees with Iraq War	-0.18	0.24	0.45
Male	0.11	0.21	0.61
Age	0.00	0.01	0.81
Attention to War	0.07	0.34	0.84
Constant	-0.04	0.42	0.93
<i>Treatment: Supportive Non-Associate</i>			
Republican	-0.27	0.22	0.22
Hawk	-0.39	0.24	0.10
Disagrees with Iraq War	-0.25	0.23	0.28
Male	0.24	0.20	0.24
Age	0.00	0.01	0.60
Attention to War	-0.08	0.32	0.80
Constant	0.16	0.40	0.69
Excluded Category: DNV			
N=799			
Log Likelihood: -1100.47			

Following the example set by Tomz (2007), I use major respondent characteristics as predictors of treatment group assignment. If the randomization worked, none of the respondent characteristics should be significant predictors of the respondent's group (e.g., hawkish respondents should not be more likely to be assigned to the Supportive Associate treatment than the Non-Supportive Associate. None of the coefficients' p-values approach .05, so we can be confident that the randomization process was

successful and that treatment effects are the result of the treatments themselves and not a result of the attributes of the respondents in the groups.

Treatment Wording

Treatment 1: “Senator John Harris, a Republican who is a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and who voted for the war when it began in 2003, has just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.”

Treatment 2: “Senator John Harris, a Republican who is a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and who voted against the war when it began in 2003, has just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.”

Treatment 3: “Senator John Harris, a Democrat who is a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and who voted for the war when it began in 2003, has just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.”

Treatment 4: “Senator John Harris, a Democrat who is a senior member of the Foreign Relations Committee and who voted against the war when it began in 2003, has just released the following statement: “Despite the fine efforts of our armed forces, careful analysis of the current situation in Iraq has led me to conclude that our continued presence is unlikely to achieve the goals set in 2003 and will likely make an already bad situation even worse. Given this assessment, it is my opinion that all US forces should be withdrawn from Iraq over the next three months.”

Question Wording

Question wording for all questions (except for dependent variable questions 1 and 3 and background question 2) is based on questions taken from the American National Election Study. Background question 1 is based on a similar question asked in the 1970s regarding American involvement in Vietnam.

1. Based on the proposal you just read, how do you feel about the way Senator Harris is handling the current war in Iraq?

- A. Strongly approve
 - B. Approve
 - C. Neither approve nor disapprove
 - D. Disapprove
 - E. Strongly disapprove
 - F. Don't know
2. Think about Senator Harris and the proposal you just read. In your opinion, does the phrase 'He provides strong leadership' describe Senator Harris extremely well, quite well, not too well, or not well at all?
- A. Extremely well
 - B. Quite well
 - C. Not too well
 - D. Not well at all
 - E. Don't know
3. On a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 meaning "not at all responsible" and 5 meaning "very responsible" where would you place Senator Harris in terms of responsibility for American involvement in Iraq as a whole?
- A. 1
 - B. 2
 - C. 3
 - D. 4
 - E. 5
 - F. Don't know
4. How much attention have you been paying to what is going on in Iraq?
- A. A good deal
 - B. Some
 - C. Not much
 - D. Don't know
 - E. Refused
5. Do you approve or disapprove of the decision to use military force against Iraq?
- A. Strongly approve
 - B. Approve
 - C. Neither approve nor disapprove
 - D. Disapprove
 - E. Strongly disapprove
6. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
- A. Republican
 - B. Democrat
 - C. Independent
 - D. Other

E. Don't know

7.

[If Respondent considers self a Republican]

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?

A. Strong Republican

B. Not very strong Republican

[If Respondent considers self a Democrat]

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat?

A. Strong Democrat

B. Not very strong Democrat

[If Respondent's party preference is Independent, Other or Don't Know]

Do you consider yourself closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

A. Closer to Republican Party

B. Closer to Democratic Party

8. Some people believe the United States should solve international problems by using diplomacy and other forms of international pressure and use military force only if absolutely necessary. Suppose we put such people at 1 on this scale. Others believe diplomacy and pressure often fail and the US must be ready to use military force. Suppose we put them at number 7. And of course others fall in positions in-between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

A. 1

B. 2

C. 3

D. 4

E. 5

F. 6

G. 7

H. Don't know, haven't thought much about it

I. Refused

List of Bills Used in the Roll Call Analysis³⁵

Chamber/Date	Bill Information	Summary
1. House: 10/16/2003	Fiscal 2004 Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan/Reconstruction Funds (HR 3289)	Amendment introduced by Waxman (D-CA) that would reduce Iraq reconstruction funds in the bill by \$250 million.
2. House: 5/25/2005	Fiscal 2006 Defense Authorization -- U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq (HR1815)	Amendment introduced by Woolsey (D-CA) that would express the sense of Congress that the president should develop a plan for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq and submit the plan to the appropriate congressional committees
3. House: 11/18/2005	Immediate Iraq Withdrawal (HRES571)	Adoption of the resolution that would express the sense of the House of Representatives that deployment of U.S. forces in Iraq should be terminated immediately.
4. Senate: 6/22/2006	Fiscal 2007 Defense Authorization -- Iraq Troop Withdrawal (S2766)	Amendment no. 4442 put forward by Kerry (D-MA) that would require the president to begin redeploying U.S. troops from Iraq this year and to complete the withdrawal by July 1, 2007, according to a schedule coordinated with the Iraqi government. It would stipulate that only the minimal number of forces needed to train Iraqi security forces, launch targeted counterterrorism attacks and protect the forces could remain in Iraq.
5. Senate: 6/22/2006	Fiscal 2007 Defense Authorization -- Iraq Troop Withdrawal (S2766)	Amendment no. 4320 put forward by Levin (D-MI) that would express the sense of Congress urging the president to begin phased redeployment of U.S. troops from Iraq starting in 2006 and to submit to Congress by the end of 2006 a plan with estimated dates for continued phased withdrawal.
6. House: 2/16/2007	Iraq War (HCONRES63)	Adoption of the concurrent resolution that would express support for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq, while disapproving of President Bush's decision to deploy more than 20,000 additional U.S. combat troops to that
6. House: 2/16/2007	Iraq War (HCONRES63)	Adoption of the concurrent resolution that would express support for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq, while disapproving of President Bush's decision to deploy more than 20,000 additional U.S. combat troops to that
³⁵ All summaries are taken from the CQ Press Congressional Collection website.		

7. House: 5/10/2007	Iraq Troop Withdrawal (HR2237)	Passage of the bill that would require the withdrawal U.S. troops and contractors in Iraq with funds provided by the Defense Department within 90 days of the bill's enactment. The withdrawal would have to be completed within 180 days. The bill would prohibit any funds made available to the Defense Department from being used to increase the number of U.S. troops serving in Iraq in excess of the number serving there as of Jan. 1, 2007, unless the increase has been specifically authorized in advance by Congress.
8. House: 7/12/2007	Iraq Redeployment (HR2956)	Passage of the bill that would require the Defense secretary to begin redeploying U.S. troops and contractors out of Iraq within 120 days of the bill's enactment. The redeployment, except for a "limited presence", would have to be completed by April 1, 2008. It would require the president, no later than Jan. 1, 2008, to transmit to Congress a comprehensive U.S. strategy for Iraq that includes a justification of the minimum force levels required to protect U.S. national security interests in Iraq after April 1, 2008, a description of the specific missions of U.S. forces to be undertaken, the cost of maintaining such a force and the expected duration of the missions.
9. Senate: 10/3/2007	Fiscal 2008 Defense Appropriations Troop Withdrawal (HR3222)	Amendment no. 3164 put forward by Feingold (D-WI) that would bar the use of funds for deployment in Iraq of members of the U.S. armed forces after June 30, 2008, with limited exceptions, including providing security for U.S. government personnel and infrastructure, training the Iraqi security forces and conducting limited targeted operations against members of al Qaeda and other international terrorist organizations.
10. Senate: 3/15/2007	Iraq Mission – Passage SJRES9	Passage of the joint resolution that would establish a more limited mission for U.S. forces in Iraq and set a non-binding goal of withdrawing most combat troops by March 2008. Within four months of enactment, the measure would require the president to limit the U.S. mission to counterterrorism efforts, training Iraqi forces and protecting U.S. assets.