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Dissertation Chapter Four

Beyond Democracy's Reach: Latino Segregation and Political Participation

Abstract

Although residential segregation has declined marginally for African Americans over the past 15 years, during the same period, residential segregation has skyrocketed for Latinos. In this chapter, I investigate the political consequences of residential segregation for Latino Americans. I argue that residential segregation constrains the development of participatory norms via its detrimental affect on socioeconomic mobility, social networks, civic engagement, and interest in U.S. political affairs. The trajectory of residential context for Latinos over the next few decades may become the difference between a thriving Latino community with a powerful voice in political affairs and a Latino political “underclass.”

Introduction

Citizens express their political preferences by voting in local, state and national elections, and engaging in numerous other political acts, like emailing or calling their elected officials, working for candidates who inspire them, and going to meetings to discuss community issues. It is through activities such as these that elected officials gauge the preferences of their constituents and are alerted to community problems in need of redress. Representational inequality festers when different groups express their political voices in different rates and at different decibels. Latino political voices remain relatively muted. They participate in all political activities at levels far below that of either African Americans or Whites and as a result, despite recent gains, Latinos remain under-represented before government institutions (Hajnal and Trounstine 2005; NALEO 2007).¹

Representation can translate into real benefits for minority populations, whether through the allocation of civil service jobs, city contracts, or the psychological, representational, and educational benefits that come from descriptive representation (Banducci, Donovan, and Karp 2004; Gay 2002; Leal, Martinez-Ebers, and Meier 2004; Mansbridge 1999). For these reasons

¹ <http://www.naleo.org/downloads/NALEOFactSheet07.pdf>

the historical participation-gap between Latinos and other Americans is important to understand as it may have important implications for all levels of the policy making process as well as the social mobility of the Latino population. Previous studies have investigated various reasons for Latino non-participation, including their aggregate lower socioeconomic status (Buehler 1977; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980); cultural characteristics, including English-language acquisition, recent immigration, and continuing attachment to homelands (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Jones-Correa 2006; Lien 1994; MacManus and Cassel 1988; Uhlaner, Cain, and Kiewiet 1989); and finally their social institutions and factors associated with mobilization (Shaw, de la Garza, and Jongho 2000; Skerry 1993; Wong 2006), but none that I know of have attempted to create a causal path that takes into account the relationship between each of these variables and the location in which Latinos live.

Where people grow up and, more importantly, whom they grow up with, is a determining factor of whether and how often they will participate in politics (Campbell 2006; Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003). As Robert Huckfeldt and John Sprague summarize,

A key idea is that the locally specific roots of national electoral politics lie in the environmentally contingent supply of political information. These environmental contingencies are both social and political, and they give rise to correspondingly distinctive interpretations of political affairs. Individual citizens make their choices subject to locally imposed information constraints (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, 5).

Contextual effects (i.e., the impact of environmental factors on participation and opinion formation) have become an increasingly prominent element of the literature over the last fifteen years, but the impact of residential context is understudied in the literature on Latino political behavior (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Gay 2004; Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; McKenzie 2004; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006; Welch et al. 2001).

In this paper, I explore the relationship between Latino residential context and political participation. I argue that residential segregation inhibits political participation because it constrains socioeconomic mobility and isolates Latinos from diverse discussion networks and civically active communities. Thus, residential segregation indirectly decreases participation by constraining socioeconomic mobility and social integration. This thesis directly challenges previous research that has found segregation to benefit the development of political participation (see esp., Campbell 2006; Putnam 2007) (but also see, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Hill and Leighley 1999)—research, which downplays the importance of socioeconomic mobility and social integration, and relies on the supposition that all homogenous contexts foster political and civic participation as a social norm (McClain 2003). Further, this research fails to consider how Latinos may behave differently from other racial groups.

This paper proceeds as follows. I begin by briefly reviewing the literature on Latino segregation and the historical detriment segregation has caused for minority populations. Drawing on the findings of Pearson-Merkowitz (2008) that showed that residential segregation has a strong negative effect on English language proficiency, citizenship acquisition, socioeconomic status, and social network diversity, I present a theoretical approach to the role of residential segregation in Latino civic engagement, interest in political affairs, and political participation. The data for this paper draws from two sources: (1) Interviews with elected officials, community activists and organizers in several Latino communities, and (2) quantitative data drawn Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000 and from the U.S. Census. My findings indicate that Latino political participation indirectly affects political participation via its negative effect on socioeconomic mobility, social network diversity, civic engagement, and political interest. These are the channels through which residential segregation decreases political participation in the Latino community—by constraining life choices, social networks, and the

development of civic engagement, Latinos are denied political information and do not develop the interest in politics that is necessary to stimulate meaningful political participation. I conclude with a discussion of how Latino residential segregation could lead to the development of a political underclass, and I offer potential policy responses.

Residential Segregation and Individual Behavior

According to the U.S. Census, as of the 2000, Latinos made up just fewer than 13 percent of the U.S. population² and census projections estimate that by 2006 the Latino population in the United States had increased by 25 percent, making Latinos the largest minority group in the nation. However, there are only 26 Latino members of Congress (about 5%)³ and despite a recent increase in representation, Latinos are also underrepresented in state and local government (NALEO 2007). One of the reasons for this representational lag most likely falls upon the low voter turnout of Latino citizens (Hajnal and Trounstein 2005, 531). According to the U.S. Census Current Population Study, fewer than 50% of Latino citizens reported voting in 2004, compared to just over 60 percent of the African American population and over 67 percent of the non-Hispanic white population.⁴ The gap between Latinos and African Americans and whites is even greater in regard to non-voting political and civic acts (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), and Latinos are more likely to report engaging in no political or civic activities than either African Americans or non-Hispanic whites (Calvo and Rosenstone 1989; Garcia, Falcon, and de la Garza 1996; Garcia 1997; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Wrinkle et al. 1996). According to the Social Capital Benchmark Survey, almost 60 percent of Latinos reported participating in no political activities (non-voting) compared to about 40 percent of whites and African Americans.

² SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates, July 1, 2000 to July 1, 2006.

³ <http://www.naleo.org/downloads/NALEOFactSheet07.pdf>

⁴ I use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably in this dissertation.

Until recently, Latinos were generally well integrated geographically and did not live in concentrated Latino environments (Massey and Denton 1993). That is changing. Latinos are now more likely than ever before to live in isolated Latino areas (or “barrios”) and there is good reason to believe that segregated living conditions will have detrimental effects on all forms of social mobility for the Latino community (Timberlake and Iceland 2007). Timberlake and Iceland (2007) found that if the trend toward Latino segregation continues, Latinos will surpass African Americans as the most segregated minority group in the United States by the end of the decade. Moreover, for the first time in history, Latinos have become hypersegregated in several cities in the U.S. (a categorization only applicable to African Americans in the past) (Wilkes and Iceland 2004).

Historical immigrant gateway cities, such as New York and Los Angeles have always housed large numbers of immigrants living in ethnic enclaves that facilitated ethnic social capital and group solidarity. However, these areas were transient. Immigrants dispersed as immigrants gained social mobility. Historically, the “spatial assimilation” model (often considered the traditional model or called the “Chicago School” of immigrant incorporation) (Alba 1990; Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Gordon 1964), fit consistently with the progression of Latinos in these cities. This model describes early waves of immigrant settlement. It assumes that upon arrival in the United States, immigrants cluster into relatively small neighborhoods. These neighborhoods, while not being the most desirable residences, often facilitate the building of ethnicity based social capital and access to housing, jobs, and social and material resources. This “self-segregation” disappeared as immigrants improved their economic status and moved out to the suburbs. Eventually neighborhood clustering all but disappeared as later generations gained social mobility.

This traditional immigrant integration model became outmoded, as immigration from Spanish speaking countries became the dominant source of new Americans for several reasons. For one, the “ethnic enclaves” of the past, while residentially clustered, were by no means cut off from the city at large. In addition, the immigrants of the past were primarily from European countries whose immigrants were distinguishable primarily only by their accents and native languages. Each successive generation looked and spoke more like the white majority. This is not true for Latinos. While some Latinos may “look” white, the majority has distinguishing characteristics, such as brown skin, dark hair, and dark eyes. This sets them apart from the white majority and places them in a distinct racial category—distinct from the majority of immigrants of the past. As segregation has increased for Latinos, they have become more isolated, residentially, linguistically, and socially, appearing to fit better with a model of African Americans isolation (Massey and Denton 1993) than the traditional immigrant model. This has led some scholars to fear that “large barrios...may prove more difficult to ‘escape’ than the smaller, more heterogeneous (with respect to nativity) ethnic enclaves of the past” (Timberlake and Iceland 2007).

But why might segregation negatively affect the likelihood of building a civically and politically engaged Latino citizenry? One reason to be pessimistic is the lessons learned from the Black experience with residential segregation. Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton (1993) argue that segregation among African Americans was the key component in the making of the “underclass.” Segregation created “barriers to spatial mobility” and these barriers created obstacles to social mobility because “where one lives determines a variety of latent factors that affect individual well-being: the quality of schooling, the value of housing, exposure to crime, the quality of public services, and the character of children's peers” (150). For African Americans, they argue, segregation has isolated them into bad schools, where children are likely

to gain lower quality educations and be exposed to fewer and more constrained life choices. This in turn decreases their chances of achieving socioeconomic success. For adults, segregation limits the accessibility of jobs and services as well as dampening support among Whites for programs that would help alleviate the poverty and rampant joblessness common in segregated African American communities (Massey and Denton 1993; Sugrue 1996). Moreover, concentrated poverty, a common side effect of racial segregation, appears to lead to social disorder and as a result impedes the development of vibrant civic institutions (Wilson 1996).⁵

It is clear from a plethora of literature on the black experience, as well as the extensive research on the consequences of housing and local policy, that segregation among African Americans concentrates poverty and people with similarly bleak life experiences into neighborhoods away from whites and those of moderate to higher incomes. This in turn creates lower levels of education and job skills, less access to quality and stable employment, and increased mental and physical health problems (Cutler and Glaeser 1997; LaVeist et al. 2008; Massey and Denton 1993; Popkin et al. 2004; Squires and Kubrin 2006; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996). The experience of Latinos is unlikely to be significantly different. The majority of immigrant Latinos enter the United States with less than a high school education and native-born Latinos have lower educational achievement rates than any other racial group (Pew Hispanic Center 2008).

Latinos are also at a disadvantage in that most are first or second generation immigrants. In fact, Latino-immigrants and their children make up more than two thirds of the total Latino population (Jones-Correa 2006, 44). Thus, many Latinos may not be citizens, and even large numbers of citizens may not have sufficient English language skills, which will limit the extent

⁵ Extensive involvement in civic institutions is also an American phenomenon (society of joiners), which should be foreign to Latinos and not necessarily intuitive. While African Americans have vibrant churches, other civic institutions in segregated African American communities have suffered due to the concentrated poverty segregation produces (Wilson 1996).

to which they are able to gather civic and political information. While Spanish language media use by politicians seeking electoral support from the Latino community has increased in recent elections, it is still relatively rare in all but a few states housing the largest and most established Latino populations (Ramos 2005). In effect, concentrated Latino neighborhoods are likely to house large populations of non-English speakers and non-citizens who have little experience with or information about American politics or democratic institutions, which can limit the likelihood of political discussion and as a result, political action.

Residential isolation would not be nearly as pernicious if its affect on social networks—the community of friends, colleagues, etc which individuals interact with—were not so extreme. Social networks continue to be constrained by residential location, particularly for the poor. The degree to which social networks engage in political discussions are critical to political engagement (Knoke 1990; Lake and Huckfeldt 1988). Through social networks, individuals gain access to political information and are encouraged and recruited to participate in civic and political activities (McClurg 2003; McKenzie 2004; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Research on social networks suggests that political information gained through casual conversations can enrich knowledge and understanding of otherwise complicated political information, such as the affects of public policies, candidate qualities, election news, etc (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt 2001; Mutz 2006; Parker, Paker, and McCann 2008; Walsh 2004). As Coleman (1990) notes people can “free ride” off of their more attentive peers. “[A] person who is not deeply interested in current events but who is interested in being informed about important developments can save the time required to read a newspaper if he can get the information he wants from a friend who pays attention to such matters” (Coleman 1990, 310).

Given that Latinos are less likely to participate in general, isolated Latino social networks are not likely to cultivate civic and political participation. Latino immigrants, more than any other group, may rely on “weak ties” (or ties to networks of people with a longer history in the United States) to inspire civic and political activity. There is little political socialization from within Latino social networks, largely due to the fact that so many Latinos in this country are first or second generation immigrants that do not have a tradition of participation in the United States or a knowledge of how the system works (Krasner and Pierre-Louis 2006). Also, concentrated immigrant neighborhoods will likely have a significant proportion of their population that is legally barred from voting and participating in politics through institutionalized means and may fear participation or feel they are not allowed to participate in other matters which involve government institutions (i.e. writing elected officials, protesting, etc.). This inability to participate should decrease political discussion, political knowledge and the potential for mobilization. In fact, recent studies of Latino participation show that Latinos often report little political discussion and/or interest among their peers (Garcia-Bedolla 2005; Gimpel, Lay, and Schuknecht 2003; Hardy-Fanta 1993; Lopez 2003).

Civic institutions, like community organizations, and PTAs are also helpful for increasing political knowledge, interest, and motivation to participate. Civic activities cultivate the discussion of community relevant issues and how they are affected by political decisions and government policies. Being in these settings makes the connection between the actions of politicians and government agencies and community outcomes easier to understand. In short, civic activity, while not political per say should increase political knowledge and interest and therefore participation. Moreover, civic activities increase both of the key factors associated with political participation: *motivation* and *capacity* (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1993, 3). Since political activity is voluntary in the U.S, all citizens must want to participate (i.e.

motivation) and have the skills necessary to participate (i.e. capacity). As Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1993) explain, each of these factors is associated with both socialization at young ages and the non-political institutions in which citizens can gain politically necessary information as an adult:

The foundations for future political involvement are laid early in life—in the family and in school. Later on the institutional affiliations of adults—on the job, in non-political organizations, and in religious institutions—provide additional opportunities for the acquisition of politically relevant resources and the enhancement of a sense of psychological engagement with politics. (p 3-4).

Unfortunately, as they note, the way in which motivation and capacity are gained confers supplementary advantages on already economically, socially, and politically advantaged citizens. Thus, those who have resources and knowledge to begin with gain more from their civic non-political institutions than resource poor individuals. But that does not have to be the case. African American civic institutions are strong enough to overcome the disadvantages the population faces in socioeconomic status⁶ (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Morris 1984; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). But that does not change the fact that higher SES individuals are simply more likely to be involved in civic organizations.

Latinos are less likely to be involved in formal civic activities than either whites or African Americans in and outside of church (Verba et al 1995, 317). In addition, both Latinos and African Americans are less likely to be involved in non-political civic activities in segregated neighborhoods. The more impoverished the neighborhood, the less likely it is to have thriving civic institutions. In the face of poverty, crime, and other factors associated with segregated neighborhoods, individuals withdraw from the community (Wilson 1995). As with African Americans, Latinos are more likely to settle in older, poorer neighborhoods than whites

⁶ Note Alex-Assensoh's (2002) finding that neighborhood poverty and isolation decrease participation among African Americans and that while the church is able to overcome some of this decline in participation, it is not able to surmount it all.

of equivalent SES (Massey and Denton 1993). They are also more likely to live in neighborhoods with poor quality services and, as a result, to distrust government institutions (Van Ryzin, Muzzio, and Immerwahr 2004, 625).⁷ Latinos also come from many countries that are undemocratic and in which community activity is discouraged and even dangerous.

Moreover, some civic institutions that Latinos are likely to participate in may be detrimental to acquiring motivation and capacity. Attending a heavily Latino church further isolates Latinos from the rest of the community, denying Latinos access to information their social networks do not possess (Foley and Hoge 2007), particularly if they attend a Spanish language service. As Martin Luther King Jr. once said, “Eleven O’clock on a Sunday morning is the most segregated hour in America.”⁸

Counter Arguments: “Homogeneity” and Civic Norms

The thesis of this article contradicts an idea that has gained a large number of scholarly adherents in recent years. This is the notion that residential “homogeneity” (i.e. sharing a neighborhood with all people who are alike) is critical to the “transfer” and development of civic norms (eg. Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Campbell 2006; Costa and Kahn 2003; Hero 2003; Hill and Leighley 1999; Masuoka 2006; Putnam 2007; Sanchez 2006). These theories posit that communication is more difficult in diverse settings. White residents living in all-white communities appear to have higher levels of trust and social capital, both of which increase the amount of communication that occurs between individuals. This in turn fosters the transfer of social and civic norms across members of the community, from one generation to the next. In short, racial segregation is better because it increases (1) communication, (2) trust, and (3) social

⁷ Although Latinos have historically trusted government more than other groups (despite racism and other institutional biases), that phenomenon is changing as Latinos become more acculturated and come become more experienced with American culture (Michelson 2003a; 2003b).

⁸ And this continues to be relatively true. Only about 7 percent of churches can be considered racially mixed, according to a recent survey (Michael O. Emerson "Multiracial Congregations in the United States: Promise and Limits for Transforming a Racialized Society." *Festschrift* (2006))

capital.⁹ However, most of the research to date has relied on datasets that contain only Whites or they have controlled for race instead of considering the interaction between race and context.

The argument that residential racial homogeneity facilitates greater levels of civic engagement relies on the supposition that *all homogenous contexts foster political and civic participation as a social norm*. Residential and network homogeneity certainly do promote the transfer of cultural norms—such as religious traditions and proper etiquette—as well as in-group affinity. However, residential isolation should not be expected to affect all racial and economic groups identically. Whites are part of the governing class. As the majority, they are socialized to feel as if they are a part of the process. Voting and civic engagement have long been an element of their shared experience as part of the dominant group, and homogeneity facilitates communication between those who already hold this norm to new members of the community. In other words, homogeneity facilitates a transfer of the norms the population holds at time 1 (t_1) to community members at time 2 (t_2).

While it is logical to assume that white homogenous communities will hold participatory norms at t_1 and will pass it along to whites at t_2 , we cannot assume that Latinos (as well as other minority groups), will behave in the same way with regard to the transfer of civic duty and the development of participation as a cultural norm. While at t_1 Latinos have cultural norms such as religious beliefs and practices and social etiquette, they do not necessarily have the civic norms that increase participation. Instead, at t_1 , Latinos are immigrants with little information about or

⁹ Due to limitations of most statistical datasets, most researchers have been forced to aggregate to the state, county, or metropolitan level, which can yield highly misleading representations of real minority segregation. There are few places in the United States that are majority-minority and can be considered homogenous that are larger than a census tract, but nonetheless, even at smaller contextual levels, minorities can be hyper-segregated to the point where their racial isolation is in effect no different than living in a racially homogenous state (Wilkes and Iceland 2004). Many studies that investigate the effect of diversity on participation focus either on the state (Hero 2003), county (Campbell 2006), or metropolitan area (Alesina and La Ferrara 2000; Rubenson 2006); however, the immediate social context is very important to group perceptions and behavior (Gimpel et al 2003; Huckfeldt 1986; Kenney 1992; Welch et al 2001). Thus, aggregating at these large levels can mask the contextual realities in which individuals live.

experience with democracy and U.S. civic institutions and are seen as outsiders and sometimes invaders. Furthermore, if they move into impoverished neighborhoods they may develop low efficacy, disenfranchisement, lack trust in government and democratic systems, and possess a heightened awareness of being outsiders to the political process (i.e. they may experience “downward assimilation” (Portes and Zhou 1993; South, Crowder, and Chavez 2005)). Whereas whites at t1 are more likely to start with a greater sense of efficacy, trust, etc. Each of these communities produces distinct cultural norms for their members that interact with civic and political participation in different ways. From where should participatory norms *originate* for Latino communities? The idea that they should magically bubble up from within, is contrary to the way in which socialization processes operate. Thus, without either 1) exposure to participatory groups (whites, African Americans, higher SES individuals) or 2) access to mobilizing institutions (civic institutions, education, etc.), it is unlikely that participatory norms will develop.

It also could be that Latinos could follow a path laid by African Americans in which residential isolation has led to the formation of a strong group identity and shared feeling of linked fate. Theoretically though, the idea that Latino isolation should work in a similar fashion to African American isolation overlooks the importance of historical context and experience. As Sears and Savalei (2006) note, the unique history of African Americans in their fight for political equality is not shared by the majority of Latinos or other racially distinct ethnic groups. “[T]he often malign treatment of the small pre-1965 Latino and Asian populations may not have produced the strong group consciousness analogous to that of African Americans among today’s far more numerous counterparts” (898-9).

Also, Latinos traditionally lack a sense of pan-ethnic identity despite the fact that their commonalities are highlighted by continued discrimination against Latinos in the United States

(Kaufmann 2003). Latinos constitute a vast array of sub-nationalities, cultures, economic classes, and, finally, immigration waves. This fact fractures and makes less predictable the course that identity formation will take for individual Latinos.¹⁰ The best comparison group, therefore, may be Asian Americans who have been found to be highly affected by residential concentration (Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006).

Finally, Latinos living in isolated residential neighborhoods are likely to live among many immigrants with vulnerable citizenship status. Whether living in the United States illegally, temporarily, in the midst of citizenship application, or with refugee status, many immigrants' situations are at the mercy of government authorities. These groups are unlikely to want to call attention to themselves for fear that they will put their status or the status of their acquaintances at risk. No one wants to risk nighttime raids on apartment complexes, the house next door, or the factory employing the majority of the neighborhood residents. Many Latinos may feel that the less attention brought to their neighborhoods (and themselves) the better.

To summarize, I posit that segregation constrains both socioeconomic, social outcomes, and political participation for Latinos. By isolating Latinos into neighborhoods with social networks holding relatively low levels of political knowledge or experience, Latinos living in segregated neighborhoods are denied the information necessary to participate in voting and other political activities. Figure 1 shows the path and makes clear that the majority of the impact of residential segregation on political participation should work indirectly via its effect on socioeconomic factors, social networks, and civic engagement as well as its effect on knowledge and interest in politics.

[Insert Figure 1. About here]

¹⁰ However, it is certainly possible that pan-ethnic identification will increase due to the heightened anti-Latino, anti-immigrant activity in the United States over the last few years.

Data, Methods, and Measurement

The data for this paper are derived from two sources. Qualitative evidence is drawn from interviews I conducted with Latino elected officials, Latino activists, and community organizers who work in Latino neighborhoods in the Washington, DC area and in Baltimore, Maryland. The interviews are part of a larger on-going project that will eventually include interviews from more diverse locations. The interviews for this chapter were conducted between January and August of 2008.

Quantitative analysis is drawn from restricted data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey 2000 (SCBS). The Saguaro Seminar of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University compiled this dataset in 2000. It includes a national survey of 3,000 people and an additional 42,000 respondents in 42 “communities” inside the United States. The dataset includes over 2,000 Latinos. The restricted data includes geographic codes enabling the researcher to link the individual respondents to the characteristics of their neighborhood as provided by the U.S. Census. For this chapter, because it is possible to do so, I maximize this information and use information generated from census tracts. While not a perfect indicator of neighborhoods, census tracts are usually a relatively good proxy for neighborhoods because they normally follow visible features, and often governmental unit boundaries and other non-visible features.

Following methodology used by Walker (2008), Brehm and Rahn (1997), Scheufele, et al. (2006), Asher (1988) and others, a structural equation model (SEM) using the statistical program EQS (Byrne 2006) was developed to test a theoretical model of Latino political participation. Structural equation modeling was chosen because it allows the researcher to see both direct and indirect effects of variables of interest. The heavy reliance on single equation, unidirectional OLS and MLE regression techniques have obscured the relative importance of

context and other variables whose effects are masked by the inclusion of such potent indicators as political interest and civic engagement. By using a SEM approach, we are able to parcel out how residential context restrains the development of these key mediating factors and thereby indirectly affect the likelihood of participation.

The relationships of the variables are portrayed graphically in Figure 1. Each arrow in Figure 1 represents an empirically tested hypothesis. As depicted the model contains eight endogenous variables—socioeconomic status, citizenship, English language ability, church attendance, friendship diversity, civic engagement, political interest, and finally political participation. The dichotomous nature of some of the dependent variables violates the assumptions of MLE and OLS regression used in many SEMs. EQS allows the analyst to notify the program as to which variables are categorical and take into account the non-linear distribution, which could otherwise produce biased estimates (Finney and DiStefano 2006, but also see Byrne 2006, Chapter 5).

Measurement and Coding of Variables

Residential Context

Generated from the census, I include a “*Latino Isolation*” measure to estimate the extent to which Latinos are isolated into segregated neighborhoods and lack exposure to other communities. The measure is a factor score of three tract level variables: percent Latino living in the census tract, percent of the Latino population in that tract that speaks *no* English, and the percent of the tract that is not a citizen (alpha .7).¹¹ This factor captures not only the extent to which the individual lives in a largely Latino area but the extent to which they are isolated among Spanish speakers and non-citizens (factors that should decrease the extent to which

¹¹ Each of these variables were included in the model separately, however, they are highly correlated and measure one theoretical concept.

outside institutions attempt to mobilize the neighborhood). *Latino Isolation* was created using principal components analysis (.pcf) in STATA.¹² I also include a dummy variable for if the neighborhood is located in the southern United States defined as the states of the confederacy and the natural log of the respondent's age.

Individual variables and Socioeconomic Status

I include 5 individual measures: citizenship status, English language ability, income, and education. Unfortunately the SCBS 2000 does not include any variable indicating if the Latino respondent is an immigrant. Thus, I can only control for if the respondent is a citizen. Citizen is coded 1 if the individual is a United States citizen. English language ability is measured by if they took the survey in Spanish or in English. This variable is coded 1 if they took the survey in English. While this measure is not a perfect indicator of how well the individual understands and is capable of speaking English, it at least should capture which language they feel more comfortable speaking. In any case, both the citizenship and the language variables used in this chapter should be seen as conservative tests of the theory given both should have increased measurement error, which should decrease the effect and the potential for them to be statistically significant. Originally, nation of origin was included in the models. The SCBS only has indicators for Puerto Rican, Mexican, Cuban, and "other." Interestingly, when they were included in the model, they were consistently insignificant, and given the limitations of the categories, they were dropped from the model.

Socioeconomic status is a factor score of two variables: Education and Income. It was generated using principal components analysis.¹³

¹² Eigenvalues 2.03, factor loadings: percent Latinos speaking no English in tract: .66; percent non-citizens: .91, percent Latino .89.

¹³ Education is measured as the number of years of formal education the respondent received. It ranges from less than a high school education to graduate degree. Income is measured as the respondent's answer to their household income and ranges from under \$20,000 to over \$100,000.

Social Network Diversity and Civic Engagement

To account for the potential effects of social network diversity, I include a variable that is measured 1 if the respondent indicated that they have at least one personal friend that is white. Church attendance is measured as 1 if the individual attends church and 0 otherwise. The variable to measure civic engagement is a composite score of the number of non-political groups and events the person participated in.

Political Interest and Participation

Political Interest is measured as the respondents answer to the question: “How interested are you in politics and national affairs? Are you very interested, somewhat interested, only slightly interested, or not at all interested?”

Political Participation is measured in three ways: voter registration, voting, and non-voting political activity. Voter Registration is coded as 1 if the individual indicated they were registered to vote. Models using this variable are run only on individuals who also indicated that they were citizens. Voting is coded 1 if the individual indicated that they voted in the 1996 presidential election. Models using this variable are only run on individuals who are citizens and registered to vote. Finally, political participation is measured as an index to 7 questions regarding non-electoral political activity including signing a petition, attending political meetings or rallies, joining in any demonstrations, protests, boycotts, or marches, involvement in local reform efforts, membership in political groups, ethnic, nationality, or civil rights groups, or labor unions.¹⁴

[Insert Figure 2. About here]

Methodology

¹⁴ This variable is the “Protest” variable provided in the Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000.

Figure 2 illustrates the nature of the SEM to be estimated. Following past efforts at developing causal models of participation, I separate my variables into six “causal stages.” In the first stage are the residential characteristics of the neighborhood, as measured by the Latino isolation factor and the southern state dummy variable. Age is also included in the first stage as a control variable. In the second stage are sociodemographic characteristics that are exogenous to social network diversity and civic and political participation. This includes socioeconomic status as well as citizenship and English language ability. The next two stages posit a causal ordering between various types of social and civic integration. Occupying the third stage is church attendance. The fourth stage is social network diversity. The fifth stage contains non-political civic engagement. The sixth stage is interest in political affairs and the seventh stage, or outcome, is political participation.

Although the figure includes causal arrows only from one stage to the stage immediately following it, I allow the variables in each causal stage to have direct and indirect effects on the variables in all of the subsequent stages, as in Figure 1. Based on these estimates, I compute the direct, indirect, and total effects of the various indicators on political participation and display those effects in Tables 1-3.

Findings

What drives Latino participation? Table 1 presents the direct effects of all the variables included in the SEM. By looking at this model we can see that Latinos who are citizens, have higher SES, are civically engaged, and who are interested in politics are more likely to participate in political affairs. Also, Latinos living in the South and older Latinos are much less likely to participate. As expected, the largest effects on participation are derived from civic engagement and political awareness. Like other racial groups, Latinos are most likely to be recruited to participate in political activities and to develop an interest in politics when they are

active in non-political civic activities (Walker 2008). The effect of this variable is considerable for a one-unit increase in civic activity, Latino political participation increases by .283, when holding all other variables at their means. Likewise, Latinos who have an interest in politics are much more likely to participate. A one-unit increase in political interest results in a .218 increase in political activity, holding all other variables constant. Given the large direct impact of these two factors on political participation, how Latinos gain political interest and become involved in civic activities is critical to understand.

[Insert Table 1. About here]

By including all variables in a single model without specifying the structural nature of the variables, this model overlooks the potential impact that contextual and individual characteristics have via their impact on the factors that appear the most relevant—SES, civic engagement, and political interest. By relying solely on the direct effects, we can not investigate the relationship between the contextual variables and the dependent variables of interest and how segregation constrains the causes of participation. Thus, the model is misspecified. The theory in this paper lays out that the variables included in Table 1 are related in a causal path. Thus, all the indicators in the model affect participation indirectly.

Table 2 presents the structural equation model for political participation. The models are presented in the order in which they appear in the specified path. First isolation, south, and age are used to predict, SES, citizenship, and English language ability. Next Each of these variables is included in a model predicting church attendance, then church attendance is added to the model to predict friendship diversity and so forth until all the variables are included in the model for participation. The variables in each model include their direct, indirect, and total effects for the endogenous variable.

How does residential segregation affect the political participation rates of Latinos in the United States? In order to understand this question, we must understand the impact of residential segregation on the critical factors associated with participation.

[Insert Table 2. About here]

As shown in Pearson-Merkowitz (2008), residential isolation drastically decreases Latino socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English language acquisition. Controlling for age and southern residency, a one unit increase in residential isolation results in a decrease of .03 in socioeconomic status, a decrease of .8 in the likelihood of knowing English, and a .07 decrease in the likelihood of becoming a citizen. Looking at church attendance, the model shows that Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are more likely to attend church, although the impact of segregation on church attendance is largely indirect via the negative effect of segregation on individual socioeconomic status, citizenship, and English ability. As Model 4 shows, higher socioeconomic status Latinos are less likely to attend church, as are citizens and those who speak English well. Since residential segregation decreases these factors, it has a strong *indirect* positive effect on church attendance.

As hypothesized, despite technological innovations and the relative ease of modern transportation, Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are also less likely to have diverse friendship networks (Model 5). In addition to the direct effect of isolation on social network diversity, residential isolation also indirectly constrains friendship diversity because higher SES individuals, citizens and English speakers are all more likely to have diverse social networks.

Model 6 in Table 2b shows how residential segregation impacts civic engagement. Civic engagement is critical to the vitality of neighborhoods (Putnam 2000). When citizens are involved in non-political community activities, social capital grows and neighborhoods are safer and individuals within them are healthier, happier, and less at risk for economic hardship. This

data suggests that residential isolation will have a negative affect on the vitality of Latino neighborhoods. Residential isolation directly decreases civic engagement. Controlling for all other factors, a Latino living in an isolated neighborhood is less likely to participate in civic affairs. The indirect effect of isolation is extremely large. By constraining socioeconomic mobility, citizenship, English language acquisition and friendship diversity, segregation further decreases civic engagement. The total effect of a one-unit increase in segregation is a decrease of .294 in civic activity.

[Insert Table 2b. About here]

Being interested in politics is the foundation for political participation. Individuals who are interested in politics tend to follow the news more and discuss politics more, which increases both their knowledge about political affairs and their ability to use heuristics and to understand political information (Neuman 1986; Nicholson, Pantoja, and Segura 2006). The impact of residential segregation is entirely indirect. Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods are less likely to be interested in politics, but it is due to the effect of isolation on other critical factors including friendship diversity, SES, citizenship, and English proficiency. Friendship diversity appears to be very important to the development of political interest. Latinos who have diverse social networks are much more likely to be interested in political affairs. This gives support to the idea that isolated Latino social networks lack access to political information. Latinos with access to bridging social ties—social connects that “bridge” to social networks otherwise inaccessible—are able to access political information that their social networks otherwise lack. Civic engagement is also critical to the development of political interest. Latinos involved in civic activities are more likely to be involved in conversations about political affairs and to gain an understanding of the link between community concerns and politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Model 8 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of each variable in the SEM model on political participation. The direct effects are identical to those presented in Table 1. When socioeconomic status, political interest, and civic engagement increase, so does political participation. Latinos who are engaged in non-political civic activities are likely to be recruited to participate in political affairs (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wong 2006). The effect of friendship diversity is also critical, but its effect is indirect. Since Latinos with more diverse social networks are more likely to be engaged in civic activities and to be interested in politics, they are more likely to participate in politics. The same is true for residential isolation. While it does not directly decrease political participation, its negative impact on the factors that are critical to participation are severely detrimental to the potential for participation in Latino neighborhoods. Residential segregation denies Latinos the ability to learn about politics and to come into contact with politically active social networks. Thus, instead of residential homogeneity increasing the civic norms associated with high levels of political participation (Campbell 2006), it denies Latinos the ability to become active participants in the democratic process.

Table 3 presents a summary view of how residential isolation affects all of the critical indicators in the path to participation. Either indirectly or directly, segregation negatively affects socioeconomic mobility, and social and political incorporation.

[Insert Table 3 About here]

Table 4 presents the direct, indirect, and total effects of the SEM on voter registration and voting. In model 9, the dependent variable is voter registration. This model includes only Latinos who are citizens. The dependent variable in model 10 is voting in the 1996 election. This model includes only Latino citizens who are registered to vote. The effects of residential segregation are consistent in these models as well. Although largely indirectly, Latinos living in

isolated areas are less likely to register to vote and to vote once they are registered. Although voting is the most equal and accessible political act (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), it is critical to the future of the Latino political voice. Neighborhoods with high voter turnout receive more attention from elected officials and parties (Gershtenson 2003), as such there is a reciprocal relationship—neighborhoods that participate receive more attention, which increases their participation in the future. Local and state elected officials, particularly in one party areas, bend at the will of “supervoters”—voters with a history of participation in primary elections. These elected officials hold the purse strings for critical public services important to the Latino community. Without their ear, Latinos are unlikely to see funding for the policies they need most.

[Insert Table 4 About here]

Briefly, it is important to consider why the factors that residential segregation constrains are important for political participation. Doing so paints a picture of the conditions of the Latino population in the United States. As discussed in-depth in Pearson-Merkowitz (2008) and as replicated here, immigrant Latinos in isolated areas are less likely to become citizens.

Citizenship’s effect on Latino participation is significant, but also only indirectly. Citizens are more likely to have non-Latino friends, and to be involved in civic activities. Citizenship also has an additional indirect effect on civic engagement, channeled primarily through its effect on social network diversity. Since citizens are more likely to have diverse social networks, they are recruited more frequently into civic activities. Although there is no direct effect on political interest, citizenship does indirectly increase political interest via its positive impact on both network diversity and civic engagement.

The consequences of English language proficiency are also important and almost identical to that of citizenship. Latinos with proficient English skills are more likely to have

non-Latino friends and to be involved in civic activities. English skills also have a critical indirect effect on civic activities. Channeled through these factors, English increases the likelihood of being interested in politics and participating. The fact that there is no direct effect of English skills on political interest indicates that Latinos, who do not have full access to English language news and discussion, do still develop an interest in politics. This may be a result of the new investment in Spanish language media advertising (Ramos 2005), the extensive political coverage in the Spanish language news (television, radio, and print media) and the recent attacks on immigrants, which has shown to increase political awareness even among recent immigrants (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001).

Socioeconomic status remains critical to the development of all factors associated with political participation. The total impact of low SES is large and significant for every indicator of social and political integration. Latinos with low SES are less likely to have non-Latino friends, to be active in civic activities, and to develop political interest. They are also less likely to participate in politics. This finding presents a pessimistic vision of the future of Latino communities. Socioeconomic segregation in the United States is rampant. The rich and poor are even less likely to live together than individuals of different races. Local land ordinances, once designed to prevent racial minorities from purchasing or renting homes in towns, counties, and suburbs, left a legacy of class segregation that is unlikely to disappear in the future (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2001). However, many lower SES white communities participate far more than their socioeconomic status would indicate. Particularly rural towns with large amounts of political agreement appear to have a dedication to civic engagement and as a result political activity (Campbell 2006).

The situation for low SES Latino communities does not appear to be as bright. Latino communities with aggregately low SES are likely to experience a fair amount of poverty.

Latinos suffer from poverty rates similar to that of African Americans. About 22% of Latinos were living in poverty as of 2005, compared to 25% of African Americans and 8.3% for non-Hispanic whites (Current Population Survey 2005).¹⁵ These numbers are likely to increase with the recent downturn in the economy. Latinos are more likely to be employed in the construction industry than any other racial group (Kochhar 2006).¹⁶ As new home construction has plummeted and home improvements have slowed due to a fluctuating economy, many Latinos have lost their employment or have become underemployed working only incrementally. Thus, low SES Latinos are likely to live among many impoverished people as it is and are likely to see increases in neighborhood poverty if the economy continues to flat line (or to further decline). Given the effect of SES on civic engagement poor Latino neighborhoods may begin to mirror the social disorganization seen in African American neighborhoods with concentrated poverty historically (Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1990; Wilson 1996). Gang activity and crime thrive in poverty ridden, densely populated areas. If neighborhoods are unable to bond together and fight off these threats and provide help and assistance to each other, collectively each individual is likely to suffer (Putnam 2000).

Friendship diversity is also critical for cross-cultural understanding. Diverse social networks not only provide for the spread of information, but also help groups understand each other and feel less threatened by the presence of “others” (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004; Mutz 2006). So, on the one hand, segregation decreases Latinos access to information about job advancements, innovations, and other information not present in Latino communities, it also leads to the development of misunderstandings and stereotypes held by the white community.

¹⁵ *Source:* U.S. Bureau of the Census, Aug. 2005 supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS). Web: www.census.gov.

¹⁶ <http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/70.pdf>

The evidence presented in this paper regarding Latino church attendance is troubling. Churches have long been an incubator of community, and often of political activity. The role of religion and the church in American politics is critical to understanding American political behavior. But while the church has been a mobilizer for African American communities, the research presented herein suggests that the churches Latinos attend further isolate them from the broader community—fostering strong bonding (within group) ties, but prohibiting bridging (between group) ties. When Latinos are active in church communities, they appear to be simply less likely to participate in non-church political activities and to come into contact with diverse social networks.

Discussion

The total effects of segregation on the cumulative elements presented in this paper—socioeconomic mobility, friendship diversity, civic engagement, and political interest—present a pessimistic view of the future vitality of Latino political participation. This statistical analysis presented in this paper is based on data from 8 years ago. Since that time, segregation has been on the rise, not the decline (Timberlake and Iceland 2008), and the poverty level within Latino communities has increased due to increased unemployment and a down turning economy (Torrens 2008). This chapter has shown that the more isolated Latinos are from non-Latinos the less likely they are to be civically engaged, to be interested in political affairs, and to participate in politics. As one interview subject noted, Latinos living in isolated neighborhoods live in constant fear of deportation and refrain from participating in civic activities. “Words of raids spread fast...Even citizens fear deportation because of loopholes in the law. So people just stay out of the public, they stay quite. Fear is a big issue.”

This disinterest and non-participation has the potential to have a further negative effect on Latino communities as federal, state, and local elected officials write them off as unnecessary

electoral constituencies. Unfortunately, as poverty in Latino communities increase, Latino neighborhoods will need significant investment from policy makers if they are to escape the social unrest that typifies so many high poverty neighborhoods. Several of the activists I interviewed lamented the corrosive effects of poverty and isolation on second generation Latinos--in particular, the increased presence of gangs in majority Latino schools. The general consensus of each of these interviews appeared to be that Latino children in integrated schools, especially those integrated with more white and upper socioeconomic students gave Latino children more options—more choices as to where to take their lives. One interview subject noted that the Latino children in concentrated Latino schools were very likely to drop out to help support the family or join gangs because the pressure was so intense and their options so limited. Alternately, he had seen Latino children in integrated schools, when asked to drop out by their parents to support the family, explain to their parents that they wanted to stay in school and found ways to work part time

Latino neighborhoods will require significant investment in their schools and social services if they are to escape poverty. This support is likely to be dampened the more isolated they are from the rest of the community. Since local and state governments operate under significant financial constraints, communities and groups compete for services and money for pet projects (Kaufmann 2004). In these competitions, the loudest voices tend to win (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady). Environmentally hazardous chemical plants are placed in minority communities, particularly immigrant communities (Hunter 2000), because of NIMBY rejections by politically engaged white neighborhoods (Hamilton 1995). New schools and community facilities are built in already advantaged neighborhoods because they were organized and are

rewarded for their support of local officials who wish to avoid political backlash by placing coveted new money in neighborhoods without a critical electoral constituency.¹⁷

Latinos living in isolated conditions are also likely to become disaffected with government and lack reasons to participate. As Melissa Michelson (2003a; 2003b) finds, the longer Latinos live in the United States the far more cynical and disaffected they become. If they are isolated into poor, Spanish speaking communities, this effect is likely to be far greater. As Latinos suffer from neglect from government institutions they may be even less likely to participate because they feel that the government is not representative of them, does not care about them, and will not respond to their needs.

The increase in anti-immigrant/anti-Latino ordinances at the local level is also troubling for the future of the Latino community. Ordinances that target, Latino (or potential Latino) homeowners such as maximum occupancy legislation—particularly outlawing extended families from living within the same house—and the Latino public, such as, English only laws, and attempts to deputize local government officials, and sometimes local residents themselves, to become immigration enforcement agents, only serve to isolate the Latino community further. Moreover, recent evidence suggests that Latinos are considerably more likely to face housing discrimination by private agents. Recent statistics suggest that Latinos face discrimination in 4 out of 5 visits to a rental agent (National Fair Housing Alliance 2003), and that Latinos are more than twice as likely as Whites to be given a subprime, high cost loan—making Latinos more likely to face foreclosure and lose what may be their only investment.

¹⁷ In one interview that I conducted, a community activist noted that even though the community had finally elected a Latino county councilman, that the Latino area of town would not get the new health center that was planned for the district. Instead, she argued it would be placed in the African American side of town because that was where all the voters were, despite where the most sensible place would be to place it given the population the center would serve.

As segregation increases in the Latino community, it is likely that any relative increase in the socioeconomic status of second and third generation Latinos will be inhibited and as a result the potential voice of the Latino community will be muted. Without significant investments in enforcement of the Fair Housing Act, increased coverage and funding of the Community Reinvestment Act, and state and local policies that increase opportunities for minorities to live in diverse environments, the future of Latino politics is bleak.

Figure 1. Conceptual Model of the Residential Segregation –Political Participation Connection




Figure 2: Causal Stages in the Model of Latino Political Participation




Table 1
Direct Effects of All Variables on Political Participation

	Coefficient	Standard Error
Political Interest	.218**	.023
Civic Engagement	.283**	.012
Friendship Diversity	-.028	.043
Church Attendance	.045	.046
SES	.078**	.031
Citizenship	.091	.051
English	.088	.050
South	-.274**	.051
Age (logged)	-.170**	.062
Residential Isolation	.002	.014
N	1903	

Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.

Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.

**Significant $p < .05$

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Table 2. Structural Equation Model of Latino Political Participation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4			Model 5		
	SES Direct	Citizenship Direct	English Direct	Church Direct	Attendance Indirect	Total	Friendship Direct	Diversity Indirect	Total
Friendship Diversity									
Church Attendance							-.04 (.02)		-.035
SES				-.09** (.01)		-.090**	.09** (.01)	.003	.090**
Citizenship				-.13** (.02)		-.132**	.09** (.03)	.005	.092**
English				-.10** (.03)		-.102**	.18** (.03)	.004	.187**
South	.03 (.06)	-.13** (.03)	-.16** (.03)	-.06** (.03)	.031	-.090**	-.01 (.03)	.036**	-.045
Age (logged)	.07 (.06)	.14** (.03)	-.01 (.03)	-.11** (.03)	-.023**	-.131**	.03 (.03)	.020	.047
Residential Isolation	-.03** (.06)	-.07** (.01)	-.08** (.01)	.004 (.007)	.030**	.034**	-.02** (.007)	-.034**	-.050**
N	1907								
Fit									

Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.

**Significant $p < .05$

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Table 2b. Continued

	Model 6 Civic Engagement			Model 7 Political Interest			Model 8 Political Participation		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Political Interest							.22** (.02)		.218**
Civic Engagement				.07** (.009)		.074**	.28** (.01)	.016**	.299**
Friendship Diversity	.57** (.20)		.568**	.19** (.03)	.042**	.230**	-.03 (.04)	.210**	.183**
Church Attendance	-1.03** (.12)	-.020	-1.05**	-.16** (.05)	-.085**	-.239**	.05 (.05)	-.348**	-.303
SES	.69** (.08)	.144**	.834**	.22** (.027)	.093**	.312**	.08** (.03)	.297**	.375**
Citizenship	.32** (.14)	.188**	.504**	.10 (.05)	.075**	.174**	.09 (.05)	.172**	.263**
English	.48** (.14)	.212**	.688**	.03 (.06)	.102**	.133**	.08 (.05)	.213**	.301**
South	.03 (.14)	-.088	-.058	.03 (.06)	-.019	.007	-.27** (.05)	.038	-.312**
Age (logged)	.30 (.16)	.245**	.544**	.29** (.06)	.097**	.384**	-.17** (.05)	.247**	.077**
Residential Isolation	-.08** (.04)	-.213**	-.294**	.02 (.015)	-.075**	-.056**	.002 (.014)	-.116**	-.114**
N	1907								
Fit									

Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors. Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.

**Significant $p < .05$

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Table 3. Effects of Isolation on Political Participation

<i>Direct effects of Isolation</i>		<i>Indirect Effects of Isolation</i>		<i>Total Effects of Isolation</i>	
SES	-0.135 ** (.013)			-0.135 **	
English Ability	-0.079 ** (.007)			-0.079 **	
Citizenship	-0.071 ** (.007)			-0.071 **	
Church Attendance	.004 (.007)	.030 **		.034 **	
Friendship Diversity	-0.016 ** (.007)	-0.034 **		-0.05 **	
Civic Engagement	-0.078 ** (.038)	-0.216 **		-0.294 **	
Political Interest	.019 (.015)	-0.075 **		-0.056 **	
Political Participation	.002 (.014)	-0.116 **		-0.114 **	

Note: Cell entries represent AGLS estimates in EQS. The entries are unstandardized coefficients and standard errors.

Models were also run using MLE with Robust Standard Errors, but the results were not substantively different.

**Significant $p < .05$

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Table 4. Structural Equation Model of Latino Voter Registration and Voting

	Model 10 Registration			Model 11 Voted		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Political Interest	.07** (.01)		.072**	.07** (.01)		.074**
Civic Engagement	.005 (.004)	.005**	.010**	.01** (.005)	.004**	.015**
Friendship Diversity	.001 (.03)	.021**	.023	.07 (.04)	.019**	.084**
Church Attendance	-.05** (.02)	-.022**	-.074**	-.04 (.03)	-.026**	-.068**
SES	.05** (.01)	.030**	.080**	.06** (.02)	.040**	.101**
English	.12** (.03)	.029**	.144**	.21** (.04)	.034**	.242**
South	.02 (.03)	.005	.026	-.006 (.04)	-.005	.011
Age (logged)	.21** (.03)	.034**	.245**	.42** (.04)	.007	.423**
Residential Isolation	-.005 (.008)	-.016**	-.021**	-.01 (.01)	-.027**	-.038**
N	1277			902		
Fit						

Note: Cell entries represent MLE estimates in EQS with Robust Standard Errors. The entries are unstandardized coefficients.

**Significant p<.05

Source: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

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