

The Two Front War:

Jews, Identity, Liberalism, and Voting\*

Eric M. Uslaner

Department of Government and Politics

University of Maryland–College Park

College Park, MD 20742

[euslaner@gvpt.umd.edu](mailto:euslaner@gvpt.umd.edu)

<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/uslaner>

Mark Lichbach

Department of Government and Politics

University of Maryland–College Park

College Park, MD 20742

[mlichbach@gvpt.umd.edu](mailto:mlichbach@gvpt.umd.edu)

<http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lichbach>

## ABSTRACT

### The Two Front War:

#### Jews, Identity, Liberalism, and Voting

American Jews are more Democratic and more liberal than non-Jews. We compare American Jewish voting behavior and liberalism to non-Jews and white ethnic voters in 2004 using a survey of Jews from the National Jewish Democratic Coalition and the American National Election Study.

Jews and non-Jews base their votes on previous votes, direction of the country, and party identification. Positions on Israel pushed many Jews to the Republicans, but attitudes toward evangelicals led others back to the Democrats. For non-Jews and white ethnics, attitudes toward evangelicals are closely linked to a larger culture war, but for Jews this correlation is small. The Jewish reaction to evangelicals is more of an issue of identity and the close ties of evangelicals to the Republican party keeps many Jews Democratic. Attitudes toward fundamentalists are far more important to non-Jewish liberalism, especially for white-ethnics. Attitudes toward fundamentalists are far more important to Jewish voting behavior than for non-Jewish voters.

Jews in the United States have always lived dual lives. They rapidly assimilated and became “ordinary Americans.” Yet, they have also remained “a people apart” (Katznelson, 1995). Based upon a long history of discrimination, they band together in strong community institutions and they identify with other groups, such as African-Americans and gays, that continue to face discrimination (Fuchs, 1956, 175) *even as they are the most successful and visible group of outsiders in American life.*

The Jewish voter is very much like the Jewish citizen. On the one hand, s(he) is like every other voter, casting ballots based upon party identification, ideology, and the state of the economy (Sigelman, 1991). On the other hand, Jews are distinctive in their political views. Jews, together with white ethnics and African-Americans, were a key part of the Democratic coalition established in the 1930s with the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Over the next 70 years, white ethnics drifted away from the Democratic coalition, while Jews and African-Americans remained loyal (Stanley and Niemi, 2005). African-American loyalty is based on self-interest: Many blacks are poor and directly benefit from an activist government. Jews vote Democratic and identify as liberals *even though their economic self-interest as one of the wealthiest ethnic groups in the United States should make them conservative Republicans.*

Why are Jews the last white ethnic group standing in the New Deal Democratic coalition? Much of the explanation stems from greater Jewish support for social issues such as gay rights, abortion, gun control, and programs to end poverty. Jews are at one end of the “culture wars” in American politics with Christian fundamentalists at the other pole (Layman and Green, in press).

Attitudes toward fundamentalists have become linked with positions on issues such as gay rights, abortion policy, and feminism for the larger electorate since the 1980s and the connections have become increasingly tight since then (Bolce and DiMaio, 1999; Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth, 1991, 1139-1140).

Jews may be more liberal than other Americans, but the culture war thesis is not sufficient to account for why Jewish loyalty to the Democratic party is distinctive. Many Christians are on the opposite pole from evangelicals on social issues. Jews are far more united in their negative evaluations of evangelicals than are non-Jews –and this wariness toward fundamentalists is only weakly linked to attitudes on social issues. Non-Jews rate evangelicals positively on balance and those who have negative views are overwhelmingly on the left on social issues. Jews fear that born-again Christians pose a threat to their identity in the United States. Jews' widespread concern about evangelicals *is critical to understanding why Jews remained tethered to the Democratic party*. The rising influence of fundamentalists within the Republican party is a key factor in both why Jews voted Democratic in 2004—and why some Jews who strayed from this path in 2000 returned to the fold four years later. Jews continue to see themselves as “a people apart” and the fundamentalist insistence that people must accept Jesus to enter the kingdom of heaven reinforces Jewish feelings of insecurity.

The concern over evangelicals and over Israel (the other distinguishing issue for Jews) reflect the different schemas for Jews and non-Jews in American political life. Conover (1988, 65) argues that different groups see political life differently, focusing on issues that are at the core of their identities. Outgroups often form the focal point of group thinking about politics; when the in-group (Jews) believe that the outgroup threatens (or is “negatively interdependent”

with the in-group) its long-term fate, the outgroup may become a critical element in the in-group schema. For many years and across countries, Jewish political preferences have been shaped by perceptions of threat from other groups (Medding, 1977). In the United States today, Jews see Christian fundamentalists as posing a threat to their future as a religious minority. They see political life through the prism of the Christian right far more than will other groups.

Many American Jews have seen their fate as intertwined with the security of Israel and they will view political life through the prism of which party offers greater support for the Jewish state (cf. Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth, 1991). Support for Israel, as reflected *both* in the importance of Israel as a voting issue and in positions on Israel and the Palestinians, pushed many Jews toward the Republicans—at least in voting for President in 2004.

Since many fundamentalist leaders have been vocal supporters of Israel, we might expect that support for Israel and ratings of evangelicals would complement each other, rather than work in opposite directions. For a small share of Jewish voters, they do, but the overall correlation between the importance of Israel as a voting cue and support for evangelicals is small in the survey we analyze ( $r = .122$ ). *Even Jews who are the strongest supporters of Israel are skeptical about evangelicals. There is little evidence of a culture war within the American Jewish population on the role of evangelicals in political and social life.* Only six percent of our Jewish sample can be regarded as strong supporters of both Israel and evangelicals. Thirty percent of our sample, on the other hand, are less motivated by the Middle East conflict, less supportive of Israel against the Palestinians, and more negative toward evangelicals.<sup>1</sup> We see a different identity issue among American Jews: those who care most about Israel are more likely to vote Republican and those who are most fearful of the influence of evangelicals are more

likely to vote Democratic, *above and beyond the liberalism of Jews on social issues, the greater identification with the Democratic party, and the evaluations of the state of the country.*

We support these claims through an analysis of 2004 vote expectations, vote change from 2000 to 2004, and ideological self-identification for Jews in a survey conducted by Greenberg Research for the National Jewish Democratic Coalition (NJDC) in the summer of 2004. We then use the 2004 American National Election Study to compare, to the extent possible, Jewish voting behavior, vote change, and ideology in the NJDC survey with similar analyses for all non-Jews and for white ethnics. We find, following Sigelman (1991), that the traditional forces of party identification and the belief that the country is heading in the right direction matter for Jews as they do for non-Jews and white ethnics.

On these traditional variables shaping vote choice, Jews stand out as distinctive: They are more Democratic, less likely to see the country heading in the right direction under a Republican President, and more liberal. We then trace greater Jewish liberalism to positions on the Middle East, gay marriage, abortion, gun control, and support for assistance to the poor (or to African-Americans). Here again we see that Jews are like other Americans—but more so. The Jewish Democratic vote stems from stronger identification with the Democratic party, which in turn derives from greater liberalism, which in turn reflects higher levels of support for issues of discrimination and social justice. The impact of social values on ideology is as strong for non-Jews as it is for Jews, although the impacts for white ethnics are considerably smaller. Positions on Israel *only affect the vote choices of Jews*, though attitudes toward the Jewish state predict ideology for non-Jews as well.

The attitudes toward evangelicals (or Christian fundamentalists in the ANES) are important determinants of both vote intention and vote change for both Jews and non-Jews, though not for white ethnics. However, the distribution of scores on the evangelical/fundamentalist feeling thermometers are sharply different for Jews and non-Jews. Non-Jews, on average, are favorable toward fundamentalists, while even ideologically conservative Jews rate evangelicals negatively.

For both non-Jews and especially for Jews, the importance of social values and attitudes toward evangelicals in shaping liberalism suggests that there is considerable support for the claim of a culture war. Liberals support gay marriage, abortion rights, gun control, and aid to the poor (or to African-Americans)—and do not see terrorism as critically important. Conservatives take the opposite positions. Liberalism shapes party identification, which in turn affects vote choice. While attitudes toward Christian fundamentalists loom large in shaping the culture war for non-Jews, including white ethnics, it is far less important in shaping the left-right identity of Jews.

### **The Jewish Vote and the Non-Jewish Vote**

We expect party identification, the direction of the country, and ideology to shape the behavior of both Jews and non-Jews (Sigelman, 1991). Stanley and Niemi (2005) estimate that 60 percent of Jews identified with the Democratic party in 2004, about the same as in 1956. Controlling for other individual-level attributes of partisanship, being Jewish made someone 35 percent more likely to claim Democratic identification in 2004, again about the same as in 1956. Other groups in the Democratic coalition, especially white Catholics, have moved away from the

Democrats: 52 percent of Catholics identified as Democrats in 1956, but just 33 percent did so in 2004.—the process of a long gradual decline that began in the late 1970s.

We suggest two different dynamics are at work in the persistence of Democratic voting among Jews. First, even when Jews and non-Jews base their votes on the same factors, they start from different base values. The issue bases of Jewish and non-Jewish ideological self-identification are similar, but Jews are considerably more supportive of feminists, racial minorities, civil rights, abortion rights, and gay rights (Glaser, 1997; Wald, 2003, 69).

Second, positions on Israel and attitudes toward evangelicals are have distinctive effects on the Jewish vote. Attitudes on the Middle East shape voting behavior *only for Jews*, although they also play a role in shaping ideology for non-Jews. Attitudes toward evangelicals are important determinants of the vote for both Jews and non-Jews, though not for white ethnics. However, for non-Jews and for white ethnics, attitudes toward evangelicals are: (1) not nearly as negative as they are for Jews; and (2) are linked to the wider “culture war” that encompasses both the religious/secular divide and the left/right ideological spectrum.

Candidates who are perceived to be strong supporters of Israel may reap more Jewish votes: 15 percent of Jews saw positions on Israel as the most important issue in the election. Only two of 1032 non-Jewish respondents to the ANES (.2 percent) rated Israel as one of the nation’s most important problems. Traditionally, support for Israel has been either bipartisan or more concentrated in the Democratic party. Most Jewish elected officials are Democrats and it was a Democratic President—Harry S Truman—who supported the establishment of the Jewish state. Jews historically voted Democratic, though concerns about Jimmy Carter’s positions on

the Middle East drove his 1976 share of the Jewish vote down to 64 percent and his 1980 share to 45 percent. Many Jews viewed George H.W. Bush as tough on Israel, so the traditional loyalty to the Democratic party was restored in 1992, when 60 percent of individual contributions to Clinton came from Jews (Friedman, 1993). Clinton and his successors Al Gore and John Kerry received between 75 and 80 percent of the Jewish vote. Gore selected Jewish Senator Joe Lieberman (D, CT) as his Vice Presidential running mate and Kerry's brother was a convert to Judaism and was active in pro-Israel groups as well as in Kerry's campaign.

The persistence of Jewish support for Democrat John Kerry in 2004 is surprising in one key respect. President George W. Bush worked hard to demonstrate his commitment to Israel, in contrast to his father. In the Democratic primaries, former Vermont Governor Howard Dean made some remarks that some Jewish leaders considered to be anti-Israel and many Democrats in the Congress, especially very liberal Democrats in the House, had veered from the party's traditional support for Israel (Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald, 2005). By 2004, support for Israel had become an issue favorable to the Republicans rather than to the Democrats even though Kerry had a history of strong support for the Jewish state—and a Jewish brother.

Kerry benefitted from Bush's identification as a born-again Christian and his support for much of its agenda. The Jewish electorate in 2004 was divided between the small share (15 percent) of Jews who cited Israel as a key voting cue and the larger bloc (37 percent) who were most hostile to evangelicals:<sup>2</sup> 55 percent of Jews who were strongly motivated by Israel voted for Bush (compared to 83 percent of other Jews), while 86 percent of those most fearful of evangelicals cast ballots for Kerry (compared to 72 percent of other Jews).

Many evangelical leaders have been vocal supporters of Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians. Evangelical groups proclaim their “love” for Israel and the Jewish people. Pat Robertson cites the common roots of Judaism and Christianity and God’s plan for Israel to be “a blessing to all the peoples of the earth” among the reasons why evangelicals support Israel and have an affinity for Jews.<sup>3</sup>

Nevertheless, Jews regard evangelicals with suspicion—and even fear. Jews now see the Christian right as one of the greatest threats to Jewish concerns (Wald and Sigelman, 1997, 141): Part of the hostility, though perhaps not the most critical reason, is the the Christian right social agenda that is diametrically opposed to the liberal values most Jews hold. While Jews may be especially liberal on these views, they are hardly alone.

For Jews, the major threat from evangelicals comes not from their social agenda, but rather in what many see as a zero-sum fight for identity. The Christian Right fights for the introduction of prayer in schools, whereas most Jews (over two-thirds in the NJDC survey) favor a high wall of separation between church and state and say that this is an important issue. Jews see the Christian right as threats to the religious liberty that has allowed Jews to flourish in the United States and believe that most fundamentalists are anti-Semitic (Wald and Sigelman, 1997, 155-156). In a 1996 survey conducted by Queens University, 87 percent American fundamentalists expressed the belief that it is very important to encourage non-Christians to become Christians, compared to 56 percent of non-fundamentalist Christians; 65 percent disagreed that all religions are equally true, compared to 41 percent of non-fundamentalist Christians.<sup>4</sup> In the 2004, there is not substantial evidence of anti-Semitism among evangelicals: The feeling thermometer for Jews is almost identical for evangelicals and other non-Jews (mean

scores of 67.09 and 66.66), These results hardly support the notion that evangelicals feel a special affection toward the Jewish people.

Nor is there much evidence of widespread support for Israel among the Christian right. Wald and Sigelman (1997, 157) note the close alliance between Christian fundamentalists and 1996 Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan, whose campaign was marked by a “clear anti-Israel thrust and veiled anti-Semitism.” Christian right members of Congress have not been loyal supporters of Israel either, often voting against the Jewish state’s annual appropriation (Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald, 2005; Wald and Sigelman, 1997, 157). In the 2004 ANES, evangelicals do show a slightly higher feeling thermometer for Israel (62.59 compared to 57.43 for other non-Jews,  $r = .105$  with evangelicalism,  $N = 957$ ). While evangelicals may not be dramatically more supportive of Israel, their positions on the Middle East are distinctive because of their negative views towards Muslims. Pat Robertson warns against “a fanatical religion intent on returning to the feudalism of 8th Century Arabia.”<sup>5</sup> In the 2004 ANES, evangelicals had a mean Muslim feeling thermometer rating of 46.93 compared to 55.48 for other non-Jews ( $r = .314$ ,  $N = 981$  with evangelicalism).

Evangelicals are less strongly committed to Israel than they are opposed to its enemies. Jews, then, are uncomfortable with the Christian Right. They do not see it as a reliable ally on Israel. Many Jews are especially sensitive to the Christian Right’s belief that the renewal of the Jewish state is a prerequisite for the second coming of Jewish—and that the end of times, the final conflict between good and evil, will be played out in Israel, in Armageddon (the Israeli village of Meggido). The final conflict between God and the devil will end in a fiery battle in which Jews will either convert to Christianity and join others in leaving the earth or perish in the blaze that

consumes all non-believers. Neither of these choices, popularized in the series of Left Behind novels, appeal to Jews. Jews do worry about the Christian Right's social agenda. But most of all, they worry that a fundamentalist America will have no place for Jews.

We also investigate the roots of Jewish liberalism—and compare them with liberalism among non-Jews and white ethnics. While there are many explanations for why Jews are liberal—including a history of discrimination leading to identification with other victims, continuing feelings of vulnerability, the Jewish commandment to “heal the world,” the strong community ties that reinforce these values and lead to social action, and the historical identification of Jews with socialist causes in Europe (Legge, 1995; Levey, 1996; Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003). The survey we use here does not permit us to test any of these explanations.

To examine liberalism, we consider policy views on issues such as terrorism, the environment, gun control, gay marriage, abortion, and fighting poverty and assisting minorities—as well as religiosity. These issue positions may be effects of liberalism as much as they are “causes.” But here we treat them as determinants of liberalism: (1) to see whether support for other minorities as well as positions on controversial social issues are connected to liberalism; and (2) to examine whether the connections among these policy views (as well as religiosity) are similar for Jews and non-Jews. We find much similarity between Jews and non-Jews (although less for Jews and white ethnics). So while there is clear evidence that Jews have been “left behind” in the New Deal Democratic coalition, we cannot isolate here the factors underlying Jewish liberalism.<sup>6</sup> Yet, *there is one key distinction between Jewish and non-Jewish liberalism: the weaker relationship between evaluation of evangelicals and liberalism for Jews.*

This result suggests that Jewish support for the Democratic party goes beyond issue identification—and may be more of an issue of broader identity.

### **The Data Base**

We use two data sets to analyze vote choice in 2004. For Jews, we employ a survey conducted by the National Jewish Democratic Coalition in late July, 2004. This is an Internet survey of 817 likely Jewish voters conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research in Washington, D.C.. While there may be some concern about online surveys, they are becoming more common in survey research and the analysts who conducted the survey at Greenberg Quinlan Rosner assured us that their sample is representative of American Jews.<sup>7</sup> For non-Jews, we use the 2004 American National Election Study. We estimate models for vote choice in 2004, vote change from 2000 to 2004 based upon recall of previous vote, and ideology for Jews, non-Jews, and white ethnics. Question wording often differed between the two surveys, so our comparisons are approximate. But they are generally revealing and tell a story consistent with our theoretical expectations. We focus first on the political behavior and of Jews in 2004, the main focus of our inquiry.

We estimate models of vote choice in 2004 and change in vote choice from 2000 to 2004 (based upon recall of previous votes) first for Jews in the NJDC survey and then for all non-Jews and for white ethnics in the 2004 ANES. Since our primary concern is Jewish voting behavior and ideology, we formulate our models for Jews based upon the NJDC survey and present them first. We then move to an investigation of why Jews are more liberal than either non-Jews or white ethnics. Our models reflect the available questions in the NJDC. We estimate identical

models for non-Jews and white ethnics based upon questions that are as similar as possible to those in the NJDC survey.

We estimate the models of vote choice and vote change with probit analysis and for ideology by regression analysis. The ideology measure in the NJDC is a three-point measure and for the ANES, it is a seven point measure. We estimated the ideology equations by ordered probit as well, but found no differences. We experimented with simultaneous equation estimation (two stage least squares) to control for the endogeneity of ideology and party identification. However, the instruments available in the NJDC survey were very limited—and this led to models for vote choice, party identification, and ideology that were either too sparse or so similar to each other that key variables became insignificant in all of the models.

In probit models, the coefficients are non-linear, so they do not have straightforward interpretations as regression coefficients do. Instead, we estimate probit “effects” (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993)—changes in the probability of vote choice (or vote change) as we move from the minimum to the maximum values of each predictor. For some highly skewed independent variables, we restrict the ranges of the effects to values of the independent variables at less extreme bounds (at 20% and 80% of the distributions).

### **Vote Choice and Ideology Among American Jews**

We first examine vote choice among American Jews in 2004 using the NJDC survey. To see what makes Jewish voting distinctive, we must model Jewish voting behavior as we would vote choice for any voters. So our model includes previous vote choice (in 2000), party identification, ideology, retrospective evaluations (the direction of the country), religiosity, and

positions on key issues. The NJDC survey had a thin set of questions on issues, but it did have a wide range of questions on how important likely voters saw a range of issues in shaping vote choice. Petrocik (1996) has shown that the two parties “own” a range of issues, so voters who are especially concerned with terrorism, moral issues, or taxes should be more likely to vote Republican—issues the President’s party “owns”—while voters motivated more by Social Security, education, the environment, or health care should be more likely to cast Democratic ballots. The NJDC survey also includes questions on the importance of Iraq and the economy, and Israel. We believe that people who place greater importance on Iraq and the economy should be more likely to vote Democratic and those motivated more by Israel should be more likely to vote Republican. Each of the issue measures *except for health and the environment* are based upon a dichotomous coding of the standard questions of what are the most important and second most important issues in the campaign (combined into a single measure for each issue). Neither health nor the environment ranked highly enough, so we use a 10 point issue importance measure for these issues in the survey.

Israel is one of two issues that are distinctive to Jewish voters. We expect that Jews who see Israel as a central issue in the election *or* who are strongly pro-Israel and anti-Palestinian will be more likely to vote Republican. Since very few non-Jews see Israel as a critical issue, we do not posit a link between issue salience and vote choice for non-Jews: Only two respondents in the 2004 ANES cited Israel as the most important issue in the campaign, so this variable dropped out of our initial estimations.<sup>8</sup> We do investigate *pro-Israel sentiments*. For the NJDC survey, we subtract a respondent’s score on the Palestinian feeling thermometer from her score on the Israel thermometer, to get a potential range of -100 to 100; the mean for Jews is 48.4 with a standard

deviation of 35.1. In other words, *most Jews are strongly pro-Israel*. For non-Jews, the pro-Israel measure is the difference between the Israel thermometer and the Muslim thermometer for each respondent. The mean is 4.8 with a standard deviation of 24.9; for white ethnics the mean is 5.8 and the standard deviation is 24.1. Non-Jews are thus far less favorably “biased” toward Israel against the Palestinians/Muslims. Twenty-six percent of non-Jews are more favorable to Muslims than to Israel, 36 percent rate the two equally, and 39 percent rate Israel more highly. Only 3 percent Jews rate Palestinians more favorably than they do Israel, 14 percent are tied, and 83 percent tilt toward Israel (56 percent by 40 points or more and 22 percent by 80 points or more).

While historically support for Israel has been either bipartisan or an issue “owned” by the Democratic party, in more recent years, Republicans have been more vocal supporters of the Jewish state. President Bush stressed his strong support for Israel and many liberal Democrats in Congress pushed for a more “balanced” Middle East policy, while Republicans supported Israel (Oldmixon, Rosenson, and Wald, 2005).

Finally, we believe that evaluations of evangelical Christians on the feeling the thermometer should be an important factor in vote choice. (For non-Jews, the thermometer is for “Christian fundamentalists.”)<sup>9</sup> We expect that people who rate evangelicals negatively will be more likely to vote Democratic, be they Jewish or non-Jewish. However, we also believe that the impact on Jewish vote choice should be *comparatively greater*—and that attitudes on evangelicals should be less central to Jews’ ideological self-identification than for non-Jews—so that reactions toward fundamentalists will reflect more about Jewish identity than about liberalism alone.

We present our model of vote choice for Jews in 2004 in Table 1. The model performs very well. The largest probit effects come from factors that are common to all voters: The direction of the country (positive coefficient indicates negative evaluation of the country's direction) and previous vote choice are the only variables to shift vote choice by more than 20 percent—but these are powerful effects for a sample where 79% of the sample in this estimation voted for Kerry. The next two largest effects are for party identification and for the evangelical thermometer. Controlling for other variables in the model, a Jewish voter who rates evangelicals at zero would have a probability of voting for John Kerry of .90; Jews who rate evangelicals at the maximum score (100) still are likely (.67) to vote Democratic. Only 12 voters in the NJDC sample (1.7 percent) rated evangelicals so highly and barely more than 10 percent were above the neutral score of 50. *Negative attitudes toward evangelicals played a central role in keeping Jewish voters in the Democratic fold.*

---

Table 1 about here

Attachment to Israel, on the other hand, pushed voters to the Republican party. Respondents who said that Israel was one of the two most important issues in the election—15 percent in total—were 9 percent more likely to vote for Bush. And voters who rated Israel far more highly than the Palestinians were 11 percent more likely to vote for Bush than those who had the opposite sympathies in the Middle East—an effect about the same as we find for the evangelical thermometer.

A voter who had a “perfect” 100 score on both the pro-Israel and evangelical thermometer and considered Israel to be one of the two most important issues in the campaign, had a .63 probability of voting for Bush.<sup>10</sup> But such voters constituted just .16% of the NJDC sample! A voter who had a pro-Israel score of 50 (still strongly supportive of the Jewish state), did not consider Israel to be one of the two top issues in the campaign, and rated evangelicals at zero had a .92 probability of voting for Kerry: 18% of the sample fell into this category (with ratings of 50 or lower on the pro-Israel measure). Only when voters placed Israel as one of their two most important issues was there evidence of any significant vote loss for Kerry—and they were but 15 percent of the sample, compared to the 37 percent who rated evangelicals at zero.

More religious Jews, like more religious Christians, were more likely to vote Republican. Attending synagogue weekly makes a person seven percent more likely to back Bush; contributing to a Jewish organization and being a member of a Jewish organization each lead to a three percent increment in voting Republican. Orthodox Jews were more likely to vote for Bush—51 percent did so. But Orthodoxy was highly correlated with the other religiosity measures and was not significant, so we excluded it from this analysis. Most issue positions don’t matter—neither does ideology.<sup>11</sup> People who see education and health care as critical are more likely to vote Democratic, as hypothesized, while concern for terrorism and taxes lead to greater support for Republicans.

Aside from the standard factors of previous vote, the direction of the country, and party identification, Jewish voting in 2004 was largely driven by attitudes toward the Middle East and toward evangelicals. We shift our attention to the 71 respondents who said that they voted one way in 2000 and another way in 2004 (see Table 2), with a dichotomous measure of vote change

(coded as 0 for shifting to Bush and 1 for changing to Kerry). Voters who say that taxes or terrorism were critical issues in 2004 were more likely to switch to the GOP (by about 7 percent), while respondents saying that health care was essential were about 7 percent more likely to turn to the Democrats. The two most important issues were the importance of Israel in the election (a shift of 9 percent to the Republicans) and the evangelical thermometer (a shift of 12 percent to the Democrats).

---

Table 2 about here

The story of vote change for Jews in 2004 is one of conflicting loyalties: Foreign policy issues and economic status pushed Jews to the right. Both concern over terrorism and the centrality of issues made the handful of Jews who shifted their Presidential vote choice in 2004 more willing to support Bush. The tax issue also worked to the Republicans's advantage. However, countermanding these reasonably powerful effects was concern over evangelicals. Bush had strongly identified himself as an born-again Christian and many Jews found these ties disturbing. Indeed, the Jewish voters who switched to the Democrats in 2004 from a 2000 Republican vote *rated evangelicals more negatively (15.4 on the thermometer) than Jews who voted Democratic in both elections (a thermometer rating of 20.2, see Table 7 below).*

Jews were tempted by the right in 2004. Their key foreign policy concern—Israel—led many Jews to be more favorable to the GOP. So did the issue of terrorism, which about 42 percent of both Jews (in the NJDC survey) and non-Jews (in the ANES) saw as a central issue in the campaign—and one that benefitted the President. Taxes also seemed to work in the GOP's

favor, although only a small share of Jewish voters (6.4 percent overall, but 15 percent of switchers) ranked this issue as central. Yet, in the end, it was concern over evangelicals that was the central issue that kept the 2004 Democratic margin at the same level as those of the 1990s and of 2000.

### **Vote Choice among Non-Jews**

American Jews vote Democratic most of the time because they identify as Democrats and have voted Democratic in the past. Their evaluations of the state of the country are colored by their partisanship, as are other voters. Only 18 percent of Jews identified as Republicans in 2004, so it is not difficult to explain Jewish vote choice in 2004. For the most part, Jewish preferences for Presidential candidates look very much like non-Jewish vote choice. We examine the bases of vote choice for non-Jews and white ethnics in particular in Table 3 below. White ethnics are an especially important “control group” since they joined the Democratic electoral coalition at the same time as Jews—during the New Deal realignment of the 1930s, but have fallen away from the party and from the liberalism strongly associated with Democratic identifiers. In the 2004 ANES, white ethnics (Irish, Italian, German, and Polish Catholics) are less liberal than Jews *and* marginally more conservative than other non-Jews. They are less Democratic than either Jews or other non-Jews, significantly so.<sup>12</sup> Jews and white ethnics were once political bedfellows. They now look quite different and how one group has stayed put while the other moved on may tell us much about why Jews remain Democrats.

We present the vote choice model for non-Jews and white ethnics in Table 3. The models are identical except that we include a variable for race (black) in the overall non-Jewish

model. We construct our issue importance variables from the most important issue question. The ANES asked only one question on the most important problem but it did ask about the importance of other issues (such as health care). Some issue importance questions (such as the environment) dropped out of our estimations while other issues did not register as central enough to many people. The importance of education variable dropped out of our estimation for white ethnics. So we have a more restricted set of issue importance questions. Instead of the “direction of the country,” as in the NJDC, the ANES has a measure of whether the country is on the right track.

---

Table 3 about here

The estimations for all non-Jews and white ethnics are generally very similar. The models once more are very successful. The key difference between Jews and white ethnics in 2004 are reflected in the null models, which are based upon modal vote choices. For Jews, the mode is Democratic (78 percent), for white ethnics it is *Republican* (68 percent).

For both groups, party identification overwhelms all other variables. Party identification is much more powerful for these groups than for Jews because there is more variation in partisanship. The powerful effects for party identification offset weaker impacts for direction of the country and previous presidential vote choice. However, ideology is more important role for non-Jews, while the importance of health care matters mightily for white ethnics. Most other measures of issue importance do not matter for either non-Jews generally or white ethnics. There are weak effects for the importance of terrorism and moderately strong effects for the importance

of health care for non-Jews. Attitudes toward Israel (compared to Muslims) did not matter for either non-Jews generally or for white ethnics in particular.

We found no impact for any measure of religiosity for either group: Neither frequency of attending church, how active you are in church, or whether you donate to religious organizations shapes vote choice in our models. The fundamentalist feeling thermometer significantly predicts vote choice for both non-Jews and white ethnics, but the significance levels are far less than for Jews. The probit effect for the fundamentalist thermometer is  $-.127$  for all non-Jews, higher than the  $.119$  for the evangelical thermometer for Jews. But shifting the Jewish vote is far more difficult: With 78 percent of the sample in Table 1 voting for Kerry, a 12 point shift makes a Jewish respondent virtually certain to vote for Kerry. A 13 point shift for non-Jews leads to a  $.68$  probability of voting for Kerry, substantial but still not nearly as important as the effects for variables such as party identification, the direction of the country, ideology, or the importance of health care. For white ethnics, the fundamentalist thermometer has more modest effects on vote choice: Going from a rating of 40 (representing the “bottom” 20 percent of ratings) to 75 (the top 20 percent of ratings) leads to a shift of only 6 percent toward Bush.

Why do measures of religiosity matter more for Jews than for either all non-Jews or for white ethnics? Why do evangelical sentiments matter more for Jews than for others? We suggest that three dynamics are at work. First, the low impacts for white ethnics and all non-Jews reflect collinearity between fundamentalist thermometer scores and at least two of the measures of religiosity—frequency of attending services and how active you are in religious organization. This collinearity reduces the estimated impacts of both religiosity measures and the thermometer scores. For Jews, the correlations between our measures of religiosity and the

evangelical thermometer scores are minuscule (.10 or less). Second, for non-Jews and white ethnics, two of the measures of religiosity (service attendance, church activity) are also linked to ideology. This collinearity also reduces the impact of both ideology and religiosity, especially for white ethnics. Again, there are no powerful correlations with religiosity for Jews (the highest correlation is .15 for frequency of synagogue attendance). For non-Jews and non-ethnics in particular, religiosity and attitudes toward fundamentalists are part of a more general “culture war” where the effects interact with each other. For Jews, religiosity and attitudes toward the Christian right are *not* part of the same syndrome. Third, the overall ratings for evangelicals/fundamentalists are considerably higher for non-Jews and white ethnics. The mean evangelical thermometer score for Jews is 23.8; for non-evangelical non-Jews, it is 59.4 and for white ethnics it is 56.4.

The factor that played such a key role in keeping the Jews Democratic—attitudes toward the Christian right—loom less large for non-Jews and especially for white ethnics. There is little effect on non-Jews on the most important issue tilting Jews away from their historic party: evaluations of Israel relative to Muslims/Palestinians.

The forces leading to vote change were similar for both Jews and non-Jews (there were only 13 white ethnics who shifted their votes in the ANES). While attitudes on the Middle East played no role (see Table 4), both attitudes toward fundamentalists and on terrorism mattered mightily. In the ANES non-Jewish sample, approval of Bush’s handling of terrorism leads to a shift of 48 percent in the likelihood of a GOP vote, while people who said that terrorism was the most important issue were 35 percent more likely to back the President’s reelection—compared to just a 7 percent increment for Jews. Attitudes toward evangelicals mattered as well: A shift

from a thermometer rating of 100 to a score of 40 (the 20 and 80 percent bounds) would lead to a rise of 25 percent in voting for Kerry. This is a substantially greater impact than we found for Jews—but it is much smaller than for either terrorism measure.

---

Table 4 about here

The simple correlation between the direction of vote change and the evangelical/fundamentalist thermometer is more than twice as large for Jews as it is for non-Jews ( $r = -.308$ , compared to  $r = -.120$ , see Table 7). The simple difference in thermometer scores between Jewish voters who shifted to Kerry from 2000 to 2004 is 17.1 points on the 100 point scale. For non-Jews, it is five points—and non-Jews who shifted from Bush in 2000 to Kerry in 2004 still rated fundamentalists at 61.2. The differences between consistent Democrats and Republicans are 15 percent for all non-Jews and 21 percent for white ethnics—comparable to the 19 point gap among Jews. But white ethnics who voted Democratic both times are more than twice as favorable to the Christian right as are Jews—and all non-Jews are 2.5 times more favorable toward fundamentalists: 49.6 percent of Jews who shifted to the Democrats from 2000 to 2004 rated evangelicals at zero, compared to *no non-Jews on the fundamentalist thermometer* (Table 7). Seventy-five percent of Jews who shifted from the GOP to the Democrats rated evangelicals at 30 or less, compared to 8 percent of shifting non-Jews. Almost all Jews who changed their party vote rated evangelicals at the midpoint of the scale or less, compared to less than half of non-Jews.

There is also evidence that Jews are becoming polarized by the Middle East conflict. The correlation of pro-Israel sentiments with vote change for Jews is  $-.353$ , compared to  $.040$  (in the opposite direction) for non-Jews. Bush voters are more supportive of Israel compared to Muslims among both non-Jews in general and white ethnics. But the differences are not large (about 11 points on a 200 point scale). Jewish voters who either cast Bush ballots in both contests or shifted to the Republicans in 2004 are strongly pro-Israel, but Kerry voters are hardly strong critics of the Jewish state. *The differences on both the Middle East and on ratings of evangelicals seem far greater between Jews and non-Jews than between Jews who voted for Kerry and Jews who voted for Bush.*

### **Is It All a Culture War?**

We have shown that in most respects Jews vote like other Americans. Attitudes toward Israel and feelings toward evangelicals stand out as more critical to Jews than to non-Jews and especially to white ethnics. Yet, the comparisons of Jews to non-Jews does not answer two key questions: First, if the same factors that affect non-Jews also shape Jewish voting behavior, why are Jews so much more Democratic than non-Jews? Second, why are attitudes toward fundamentalists more critical for Jews than for non-Jews and especially white ethnics? It is easy to understand the attachment of Jewish voters to Israel and why this sets them apart from other voters. But orientations toward Israel will not suffice to explain the long-standing commitment of Jews to the Democratic party, since Jews have voted Republican in greater numbers when they perceived Democratic administrations to be hostile to the Jewish state (1980 stands out in particular)—and in 2004, greater support for Israel led to a greater likelihood of Jews voting Republican.

To understand Jewish attachment to the Democratic party, we need to investigate the roots of ideology. Even though ideology was not significant in the probit for vote choice in 2004 for Jews, there is an indirect link from liberalism to Democratic party identification to Democratic vote choice. So we ask whether the same factors drive liberalism among Jews and non-Jews. Jews, of course, are more liberal than either non-Jews or especially white ethnics. Much of the explanation for why white ethnics left the Democratic party is that they became more conservative. Can we learn anything about the roots of ideology among Jews and non-Jews (and white ethnics) that helps explain the puzzle of continued Democratic support among Jews? We know that Jews are on one side of the “culture war” in the United States—but we don’t know whether they are fighting the same battle with cultural conservatives as other liberals.

First, we estimate a regression analysis of liberalism for Jews using the NJDC survey and present the results in Table 5. Since the culture war is largely about social issues, we focus on such issues in predicting liberalism. Our model for liberalism includes positions on several key social issues that we did not include in the vote choice models: gay marriage,<sup>13</sup> gun control (proxied by the feeling thermometer for the National Rifle Association), abortion (proxied by the pro-life feeling thermometer), and the importance of poverty. Support for gay marriage and the importance of poverty should lead to greater liberalism, while higher thermometer scores for the National Rifle Association and pro-life forces should lead to more conservatism.

We also include the importance of terrorism and taxes and the Israel feeling thermometer (conservative) and two measures of religiosity—frequency of attending synagogue and contributing to a Jewish organization (also leading to greater conservatism). We believe that more educated respondents should be more liberal, as should people who believe that the country

is heading in the wrong direction and who rate Palestinians or Labor party leader Shimon Peres highly. More positive ratings for the Palestinians and for Peres indicate a more dovish position on the Middle East conflict. Conservatives, on the other hand, should have lower ratings for both Peres and the Palestinians (and greater support for Israel).

We do not claim that these policy positions in some way *determine* liberal values. We are not in a position to determine what “shapes” liberalism from the NJDC survey. Some or even most of these policy positions may stem from a progressive ideology rather than being the “cause.” Our concern is whether the same values underlie liberalism for Jews and non-Jews.

We also expect that high ratings on the evangelical feeling thermometer will be associated with greater conservatism. And this is a key test of how liberalism may differ for Jews and non-Jews. Based upon our expectations—and our results so far—we predict that ratings of evangelicals should be part of the general liberal belief system for Jews, but not a critical component. The culture war for Jews is based upon social issues that go beyond the religious conflict over moral issues in American society. For non-Jews, we expect to find a much tighter relationship between social issues and evaluations of fundamentalists.

---

Table 5 about here

Almost all of the variables we discuss are significant: The importance of taxes is the only exception. The greatest effects (based upon t ratios) are the Palestinian feeling thermometer and positions on gay marriage, gun control (National Rifle Association feeling thermometer), and abortion (prolife thermometer). For Jews, liberalism is most clearly tied to progressive positions

on social issues and on peace. The importance of poverty as an issue pushes people to the left, religiosity and concerns for terrorism and for Israel push them to the right. There is a modest effect for the evangelical feeling thermometer. Moving from a very high rating for evangelicals to a very low rating moves a citizen only .2 on the three point NJDC ideology scale. Moving from the lowest score (about zero) to the highest value (about 4) on the gay marriage variable would have 2.5 times the effect of the evangelical thermometer.

Similar models for non-Jews and white ethnics show strong impacts for social issues for these groups as well: Attitudes on guns seem to be most important for all non-Jews. There is a significant impact for white ethnics, but is substantially smaller. Gay marriage is also a central factor in shaping liberalism for both non-Jews and white ethnics. Abortion is also important, but the t ratio for Jews is substantially higher than for non-Jews and white ethnics. There is no question on the importance of poverty in the ANES, but a question on the importance of aiding African-Americans is not significant for either non-Jews or white ethnics. Middle East issues don't matter at all for white ethnics, though support of Israel is linked to conservatism for non-Jews (more than for Jews).

---

Table 6 about here

Two results stand out in Table 6. First, the cluster of social issues (gun control, gay marriage, abortion) we found for Jews also holds for non-Jews—but this cluster seems to reflect a religious moral dimension rather than social activism. Aid to those less well off is part of the syndrome of liberalism for Jews, but not for non-Jews. Second, attitudes toward

fundamentalists are far more important to non-Jews and especially for white ethnics than they are for Jews. While attitudes toward evangelicals barely move Jewish positions on liberalism (.2 on a three point scale), the impacts are much stronger for non-Jews and for white ethnics (1.1 and 1.5 on a 7 point scale). For Jews, the impact of a shift from highly negative to highly positive scores on the evangelical thermometer (from zero to 100) represent a movement of 6 percent on the ideology scale; for non-Jews, it represents a gain of 16 percent for conservatism, and for white ethnics an increase of 21 percent. In Table 7, we show that Jewish conservatives give evangelicals a mean score of 35.3 on the thermometer, compared to 16.4 for Jewish liberals. Non-Jewish liberals rate fundamentalists at 66.9, liberals at 43.5; white ethnic conservatives score fundamentalists at 65.3 compared to 35.8 for liberals. The gap in rating the Christian right is greater for ideology than it is for vote choice in 2004.

---

Table 7 about here

We have some suggestions about the endurance of Jewish liberalism: First, it is linked to a wider range of values, including the need for social justice (as reported by Weisberg and Sylvan, 2003, among others) than simply the newer social issues of gay rights and abortion. Second, the Jewish community is not split over the Christian right, as are non-Jews and especially white ethnics. Indeed, it seems as white ethnics have shifted to the right as part of a larger theological split between liberals and conservatives. White ethnics are divided by key moral issues and especially the role of the Christian right. Fundamentalist ratings is the most important factor shaping ideological identification in our model for white ethnics. Jews, on the

other hand, are not badly divided on either social issues or on evaluation of evangelicals. The mean thermometer score for the National Rifle Association is 20.5, for prolife groups 20.0; 81 percent of Jews believed in 2004 that the country was heading in the wrong direction; 76 percent favored gay unions; and the mean rating of the importance of poverty on a ten point scale is 7.11. Non-Jews and white ethnics are more divided on these issues: Fifty eight percent of non-Jews favor stronger gun control, 34 percent favor gay marriage, and 57 percent believe that abortion should generally be legal (with similar results for white ethnics).

### **Reprise**

Why do Jews vote Democratic? Mostly for the same reasons others vote Democratic –they are liberal. Jewish voters generally respond to national events in much the same way as non-Jews (Sigelman, 1991). Even when Jews follow the crowd, they do it to a different beat. When other groups deserted the Democrats, the Jews have mostly remained loyal. Jews may vote for Democrats less frequently from time to time, but they usually give more support to their favored party than non-Jews. Like the cat that always came back, Jews seem to boomerang back to the Democratic party.

Much of this is traceable to Jews' greater liberalism. We have documented this continuing commitment to liberal positions on social issues (though our survey does not allow us to explain its roots here). But we maintain that there is something more than issue positions. We believe, following Medding (1977) that Jewish political loyalties depend at least in part on how secure they feel in their surroundings. When Jews feel that their identity is threatened, they turn against the parties that they perceive to be threatening.

In recent years, even though Republicans have moved closer to Jews on Israel than in the past, they have not romanced the Jews as the Democrats have for many years. Many of Bill Clinton's Cabinet and close advisers were Jewish, as were *both* of his Supreme Court appointees. Clinton learned a few words of Hebrew ("*Shalom, haver,*" or "goodbye, friend") to speak at the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Al Gore's Vice Presidential running mate was the first Jew on a national ticket—and all but three of the 37 Jewish members of Congress are Democrats. No Jews were among the appointees to Bush's first Cabinet.

Bush may have been a strong supporter of Israel, but he followed the Texas maxim, "Dance with the folks who brung you" and they were the Christian fundamentalists. The identity issue helps to explain why John Kerry won the votes of 48 percent of Jewish conservatives and 77 percent of Jewish moderates in 2004, while gaining only 18 percent of non-Jewish conservatives and 58 percent of non-Jewish moderates (and 8 percent of white ethnic conservatives and 45 percent of white ethnic moderates). At a meeting of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the major lobbying arm of American Jews, in November, 2005 Republican National Committee chair Ken Mehlman (himself Jewish) said that the Republicans' stronger position on terrorism would better protect Israel. Democratic National Committee Chair Howard Dean held that Democrats "believe that Jews should feel comfortable in being American Jews' without being constrained from practicing their faith or be compelled to convert to another religion" (Tobin, 2005).

Why do we see big impacts of support for Israel and for opposition to the Christian right in 2004? The push to the right for strong supporters of Israel is neither surprising nor new. While only 15 percent of American Jews ranked Israel of preeminent importance, they tend to be

Jews with a very strong sense of identity and of greater religiosity (Wald and Williams, 2005). These are groups with more conservative political views independent of their positions on Israel. The Republicans courted the Jewish vote heavily—and their single party control of the legislative and executive branches gave them a greater opportunity to claim credit for support for the Jewish state—and to point to some of the most liberal Democrats as stronger critics of Israel. The Jewish vote had tilted more to the Republicans in 1980 and in 1988 when Republicans charged Democrats with being insufficiently supportive of Israel. The Republicans hardly have established a “lock” on the Jewish vote: Jewish attachment to the Democrats was solidified under Franklin D. Roosevelt, whom many Jews saw as responsible for the survival of their people by fighting Hitler (Fuchs, 1956, 110) and Harry S Truman, who supported the establishment of the state of Israel—and in opposition to Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon, and George H.W. Bush, all of whom were seen as less sympathetic to Israel. There is a long-standing sympathy for the Democratic party among Jews: In our NJDC survey, two-thirds of respondents said that Kerry would be better for Israel than Bush. This is, however, less than the 78 percent who voted for Kerry and it provided an opening for the Republicans in 2004 that was simply not available even in 2000, when the Democratic ticket included a long-time friend of Israel as the Presidential nominee (Al Gore) and the first Jew ever on a national ticket for Vice President (Joseph Lieberman).

We have no way of tracing the impact of the Christian right on the Jewish vote in previous elections. But we do have some indirect evidence as to why attitudes toward evangelicals mattered more in 2004 than in the past. Jewish concern about evangelicals is hardly new: A 1964 survey of anti-Semitic attitudes in the United States by the fraternal organization

B'nai Brith (Glock, Selznick, Stark, and Steinberg, 1964) revealed much stronger negative attitudes toward Jews among fundamentalists than among other Americans. Fundamentalists scored significantly higher than other Americans on two overall measures of anti-Semitism (by 54 to 27 percent anti-Semitic on the first scale and by 58 percent to 28 percent on the second), were more likely (by 58 to 48 percent) to say that Jews were responsible for the death of Christ, were more likely to say that Jews are shady (by 60 percent to 41 percent), to say that Jews controlled international banking (by 68 to 49 percent), to say that Jews push themselves into places where they are not wanted (by 37 to 26 percent), and that Jews are so tricky that others don't have a fair chance in dealing with them (by 48 to 35 percent)—and were almost 20 percent more likely (67 to 49 percent) to say that they have no close Jewish friends.

Yet Jews were hardly preoccupied with Christian fundamentalists in 1964 for at least two reasons. First, Jews could hardly find reassuring the overall level of anti-Semitic attitudes revealed in the B'nai Brith survey. Secondly, and more critically, fundamentalists did not constitute a political threat to American Jews. Jews were heavily Democratic in 1964: 92 percent said that they voted for Lyndon B. Johnson, the Democratic nominee, and 85 percent identified with the Democratic party. Yet, 68 percent of fundamentalists also said that they voted for Johnson and 65 percent identified as Democrats. *In 1964, fundamentalists did not pose a political threat to American Jews.* Both groups were on the same side and there was thus no stimulus to provoke an identity-based vote.

Even in 1980, Jews seemed less polarized in how they rated party-leaning groups than others. Jews rated “Democratic groups” at a mean thermometer rating of 50.8, compared to 44.8 for “Republican groups,” including anti-abortionists and Christian fundamentalists (Miller,

Wlezien, and Hildreth, 1991, 1146). Throughout the 1980s, evangelicals became a more prominent force within the Republican coalition, *but the leaders of the Republican party were not clearly identified with the Christian right*. Ronald Reagan was sympathetic to many of the fundamentalists' goals, but he put little effort into pressing for its agenda and, through his Hollywood ties, was comfortable in his dealings with Jews. George H.W. Bush was a mainline Protestant (Episcopalian) who was not close at all to the Christian right. Senator Bob Dole ( R, KS), the 1996 nominee, was even further removed from the fundamentalists. George W. Bush was the first Republican nominee to identify closely with the Christian right—and this identity mobilized even less committed fundamentalists to stronger Republican party identification than in previous years (Layman and Hussey, 2005). In 2004, more than in any other election, the schema of competing identities (Jewish versus fundamentalist) was activated—leading some Jews to defect from the party of the Christian right. Many other Jews, of course, were motivated more by the traditional economic and especially social issues that have long kept them Democrats.

American Jews are fighting two culture wars. One is familiar, the conflict over social issues that we hear about every day, where Jews are minor players. The other is less familiar, over the struggle for identity, that keeps the Jews a voting people apart.

TABLE 1  
The Jewish Vote in 2004: NJDC Survey

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Presidential vote choice 2000	1.789****	.264	6.78	.235
Party identification	-.224***	.063	-3.54	-.141
Ideology	-.002	.178	-.01	-.002
Direction of country	1.973****	.239	8.25	.286
Pro-Israel sentiments	-.008**	.003	-2.32	-.109
Evangelical thermometer	-.013****	.004	-3.33	-.119
Importance of Israel	-.960***	-2.97	-2.97	-.089
Importance of terrorism	-.864***	.290	-2.98	-.070
Importance of health care	.082*	.057	1.44	.073
Importance of environment	-.069	.048	-1.44	-.048
Importance of taxes	-.823**	.399	-2.06	-.076
Importance of Iraq	-.028	.343	-.08	-.002
Importance of moral issues	-.456	.476	-.96	-.038
Importance of economy	.061	.288	.21	.005
Importance of Social Security	-.014	.338	-.04	-.001
Importance of education	1.150***	.455	2.53	.076
How often attends synagogue	-.298***	.126	2.36	-.074
Contributes to Jewish organization	-.369*	.259	-1.43	-.029
Member Jewish organization	-.418*	.264	-1.58	-.032
Constant	-1.498	.927	-1.62	

\* p < .10 \*\* p < .05 \*\*\* p < .01 \*\*\*\* p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except constant)

N = 719 Estimated R<sup>2</sup> = .881 -2\*Log Likelihood: 201.548

Percent predicted correctly: Model: 94.2; Null: 78.7

TABLE 2

Changes in the Jewish Vote 2000-2004: NJDC Survey

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>MLE/SE</b>	<b>Effect</b>
Evangelical thermometer	-.015**	.009	-1.76	-.119
Importance of Israel	-2.194****	.530	-4.14	-.089
Importance of terrorism	-1.232***	.290	-2.79	-.070
Importance of health care	.082*	.057	1.44	.073
Importance of taxes	-1.484**	.632	-2.35	-.076
Constant	1.592***	.413	3.85	

\* p < .10 \*\* p < .05 \*\*\* p < .01 \*\*\*\* p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except constant)

N = 71 Estimated R<sup>2</sup> = .701 -2\*Log Likelihood: 51.618

Percent predicted correctly: Model: 81.5; Null: 52.1

TABLE 3

Presidential Vote Choice in 2004: Non-Jews and White Ethnics: 2004 ANES

Variable	Non-Jews			White Ethnics		
	Coefficient	Std. Error	Effect	Coefficient	Std. Error	Effect
Presidential Vote Choice 2000	1.013****	.282	.127	1.245**	.615	.123
Party identification	-.396****	.077	-.403	-.528***	.165	-.487
Ideology	-.234**	.125	-.146	-.175	.276	-.077
Country on right track	-1.168****	.243	-.139	.454	.523	-.032
Pro-Israel sentiments	.002	.028	.026	-.011	.014	-.163
Fundamentalist thermometer	-.013**	.006	-.127	-.024*	.016	-.197+
Importance of terrorism	-.412*	.289	-.037	-.513	.580	-.035
Importance of health care	1.424**	.641	.153	2.956**	1.166	.371
Importance of Iraq	.447	.354	.040	.216	.709	.014
Importance of moral issues	-1.110	1.255	-.096	-.745	2.183	-.046
Importance of education	-.650	2.230	-.054	NA	NA	NA
Frequency of attending church	-.120	.103	-.041	-.246	.216	-.063
Active in church	.130	.342	.011	.095	.675	.006
Donate to religious organization	-.016	.353	-.001	.449	1.139	.028
Black	.909**	.420	.090	NA	NA	NA
Constant	2.628**	.836	.090	1.985	1.723	

\* p < .10 \*\* p < .05 \*\*\* p < .01 \*\*\*\* p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except constant)

Non-Jews: N = 465 Estimated R<sup>2</sup> = .854 -2\*Log Likelihood: 148.126

Percent predicted correctly: Model: 93.5; Null: 55.7

White Ethnics: N = 161 Estimated R<sup>2</sup> = .893 -2\*Log Likelihood: 38.143

Percent predicted correctly: Model: 96.7; Null: 68.3

+ Effect = -.060 for fundamentalist thermometer between 40 and 75 ( 20% and 80% limits)

NA Not applicable (not in equation).

TABLE 4

Changes in the Non-Jewish Vote 2000-2004: ANES

Variable	Coefficient	Std. Error	MLE/SE	Effect
Fundamentalist thermometer	-.031**	.013	-2.39	-.678+
Pro-Israel sentiments	.012	.010	1.19	.561++
Approval of Bush handling terrorism	-1.693****	.476	-3.55	-.482
Importance of terrorism	-1.293***	.474	-2.73	-.347
Constant	3.557**	1.092	3.25	

\* p < .10 \*\* p < .05 \*\*\* p < .01 \*\*\*\* p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except constant)

N = 54 Estimated R<sup>2</sup> = .556 -2\*Log Likelihood: 50.736

Percent predicted correctly: Model: 75.9; Null: 50.0

+ Effect = -.247 for fundamentalist thermometer between 40 and 100 (20% and 80% limits)

++ Effect = .032 for Pro-Israel sentiments between 0 and 20 (20% and 80% limits)

TABLE 5

## Sources of Jewish Liberalism 2004: NJDC Survey

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Coefficient</b>	<b>Std. Error</b>	<b>t Ratio</b>
Direction of country	.180***	.053	3.37
Evangelical thermometer	-.002**	.001	-2.10
Israel feeling thermometer	-.002**	.001	-2.22
Palestinian feeling thermometer	.006****	.001	6.66
Shimon Peres feeling thermometer	.002**	.001	2.16
Importance of terrorism	-.030***	.011	-2.76
Importance of taxes	-.090	.080	-1.12
Support gay marriage (imputed)	.120****	.025	4.76
National Rifle Association feeling thermometer	-.003****	.001	-4.38
Pro life feeling thermometer	-.003****	.001	-3.48
Importance of poverty	.020**	.009	2.21
Education	.048***	.019	2.58
How often attends synagogue	-.298***	.126	2.36
Contributes to Jewish organization	-.037**	.019	-1.90
Constant	1.887****	.205	9.18

\*  $p < .10$  \*\*  $p < .05$  \*\*\*  $p < .01$  \*\*\*\*  $p < .0001$  (all tests one tailed except constant)

$N = 817$   $R^2 = .323$  Adjusted  $R^2 = .312$  S.E.E. = .550

TABLE 6

Sources of Liberalism 2004 among Non-Jews and White Ethnics: 2004 ANES

Variable	Non-Jews			White Ethnics		
	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio	Coefficient	Std. Error	t Ratio
Country on right track	.609****	.101	6.06	.525***	.185	2.84
Fundamentalist thermometer	.011****	.002	5.04	.015****	.004	3.53
Israel feeling thermometer	.009****	.002	3.52	.005	.004	1.20
Muslim feeling thermometer	-.004	.002	-1.94	-.004	.004	-.91
Importance of terrorism	.188	.097	1.93	.411**	.174	2.37
Importance of environment	.093	.051	1.83	.084	.088	.95
Importance of aid to blacks	-.034	.046	-.76	-.025	.091	-.28
Favor access to guns	.309****	.046	6.78	.205***	.080	2.54
Frequency of attending church	.081***	.032	2.53	-.120	.103	-.04
Oppose gay marriage	.313****	.057	5.50	.314***	.102	3.07
Favor abortion as legal	-.085**	.048	-1.75	-.188**	.093	-2.03
Education	.093+	.030	3.11	.038	.051	.76
Constant	1.675***	.386	4.33	2.391**	.737	3.24

\* p < .10 \*\* p < .05 \*\*\* p < .01 \*\*\*\* p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except constant)

Non-Jews: N = 661 R<sup>2</sup> = .395 Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .384 S.E.E. = 1.155

White Ethnics: N = 208 R<sup>2</sup> = .457 Adjusted R<sup>2</sup> = .424 S.E.E. = 1.120

+ Sign not in predicted direction, p < .05 for a two-tailed test.

TABLE 7  
Summary of Descriptives for Three Samples\*

	NJDC	All Non-Jews (ANES)	White Ethnics (ANES)
Party identification*	1.7	2.9	3.3
Ideology*	2.09	1.82	1.76
Evangelical thermometer*	23.8	59.4	56.4
Pro-Israel sentiments*	48.4	4.9	5.5
<b>Evangelical thermometer</b>			
Switch to Democrats 2004	15.4	61.2	
Democratic both elections	20.2	51.1	42.8
Republican both elections	39.1	66.4	63.8
Switch to Republicans 2004	32.5	66.2	
<b>Correlation with vote change</b>	-.308	-.120	
<b>Vote change to Democrats:</b>			
Evangelical thermometer = 0	49.6	0	
Evangelical thermometer < = 30	75.1	8.0	
Evangelical thermometer < = 50	94.8	49.0	
<b>Vote change to Republicans:</b>			
Evangelical thermometer > = 70	14.1	58.8	
<b>Evangelical thermometer mean</b>			
Conservative	35.3	66.9	65.3
Moderate	23.8	56.9	54.7
Liberal	16.4	43.5	35.8
Bush voters 2004	38.0	64.9	63.8
Kerry voters 2004	19.9	53.3	43.6
<b>Pro-Israel sentiments</b>			
Bush voters 2004	61.1	11.5	12.1
Kerry voters	45.3	-.2	-1.9
Change to Bush from Gore 2000	69.8	6.1	
Change to Kerry from Bush	43.9	7.7	
<b>Correlation with vote change</b>	-.353	.040	

\* Party identification ranges from 0 (strong Democrat) to 6 (strong Republican). Ideology is a trichotomy (1: conservative, 2: moderate 3: liberal); Evangelical thermometer ranges from 0 to 100; Pro-Israel is the difference between the Israel thermometer and the Palestinian or Muslim (ANES) thermometer, theoretically ranging from -100 to 100.

## REFERENCES

- Bolce, Louis and Gerald DeMaio. 1999. "Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and Antipathy Toward Christian Fundamentalists," Public Opinion Quarterly, 63:29-61.
- Conover, Pamela Johnston. 1988. "The Role of Social Groups in Political Thinking," British Journal of Political Science, 18:51-76.
- Friedman, Thomas. 1993. "Jewish Criticism on Clinton Picks," *New York Times*, January 5: A11.
- Fuchs, Lawrence H. 1956. The Political Behavior of American Jews. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Glaser, James M. 1997. "Toward an Explanation of the Racial Liberalism of American Jews," Political Research Quarterly, 50:437-458.
- Glock, Charles, Gertrude Selznick, Rodney Stark, and Stephen Steinberg. 1964. Anti-Semitism in the United States, 1964. [Computer file]. Conducted by National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago. ICPSR ed. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producer and distributor], 1979.
- Greenberg, Anna, Patrick McCreesh, and Kenneth D. Wald. 2005. "The Jewish Vote in 2004: An Analysis," available at [www://thesolomonproject.org/jewishvote.pdf](http://www://thesolomonproject.org/jewishvote.pdf), accessed October 5, 2005.
- Katznelson, Ira. 1995. "Between Separation and Disappearance: Jews on the Margins of American Liberalism." In Pierre Birnbaum and Ira Katznelson, eds., Paths of Emancipation: Jews, States, and Citizenship. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Layman, Geoffrey C. and John Green. In press. "Wars and Rumors of Wars: The Contexts of Cultural Conflict in American Political Behavior," British Journal of Political Science.
- Layman, Geoffrey and Laura Hussey. 2005. "George W. Bush and the Evangelicals." Presented at the Conference on Matter of Faith? Religion and the 2004 Presidential Election, University of Notre Dame, December 2-3.
- Legge, Jerome S. Jr. 1995. "Explaining Jewish Liberalism in the United States: An Exploration of Socioeconomic, Religious, and Communal Living Variables," Social Science Quarterly, 76:124-141.
- Levey, Geoffrey Brahm. 1996. "The Liberalism of American Jews: Has It Been Explained?" British Journal of Political Science, 26:369-402.
- Miller, Arthur H., Christopher Wlezien, and Anne Hildreth. 1991. "A Reference Group Theory of Partisan Coalitions," Journal of Politics, 53:1134-1149.
- Oldmixon, Elizabeth, Beth A. Rosenson, and Kenneth Wald. 2005. "Conflict over Israel: Religion, Race, Party and Ideology in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1997-2002," Terrorism and Political Violence, 17:407- 426.
- Petrocik, John R. 1996. "Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study," American Journal of Political Science, 40:825-850.
- Sigelman, Lee. 1991. "'If You Prick Us, Do We Not Bleed? If You Tickle Us, Do We Not Laugh?': Jews and Pocketbook Voting," Journal of Politics, 53:977-992.

- Tobin, James. 2005. "Jewish American Agenda," Jerusalem Post (November 22), at <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475602832&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull>, accessed November 23, 2005.
- Stanley, Harold W. And Richard G. Niemi. 2005. "Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952-2004." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, September.
- Wald, Kenneth D. 2003. "The Probable Persistence of Jewish Liberalism." In Alan Mittleman, ed., Religion as a Public Good. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Wald, Kenneth D. and Lee Sigelman. 1997. "Romancing the Jews: The Christian Right in Search of Strange Bedfellows." In Corwin E. Smidt and James M. Penning, eds., Sojourners in the Wilderness, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Wald, Kenneth D. and Bryan Williams. 2005. "American Jews and Israel: The Sources of Homeland Salience." Unpublished paper, University of Florida, Department of Political Science.
- Weisberg, Herbert F. and Donald A. Sylvan. 2003. "Social Justice versus Identity: Self-Interest and Liberalism Among American Jews." Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August.

## NOTES

- \* We are grateful to Ira Forman of the National Jewish Democratic Council for providing us with the data and to Patrick McCreesh of Greenberg Research for technical advice on the sampling frame and the data set. We are also grateful for the very helpful comments of Anna Greenberg, Karen Kaufmann, Geoffrey Layman, L. Sandy Maisel, and Kenneth Wald (listed alphabetically). Uslander is also grateful to the General Research Board of the Graduate School, University of Maryland–College Park, for generous support. Some of the data we analyze comes from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. We are grateful to the ICPSR, which bears no responsibility for any of our interpretations.
1. The six percent figure represents people who say rate Israel as a critical voting cue (10 on a 10 point scale), who have an average pro-Israel sentiment score, based upon the difference between the Israel and Palestinian feeling thermometers, of 50 or greater, and who have a feeling thermometer rating of evangelicals greater than equal to 50. The 30 percent figure represents people who do not rate Israel as a key voting issue, who have a pro-Israel sentiment score of less than 50, and who rate evangelicals at 30 or less on the thermometer. A pro-Israel score of less than 30 does *not* imply negative attitudes toward Israel; only 8.9 percent of the sample rate Israel at less than 50 on the 100 point thermometer. Instead, it represents higher ratings for the Palestinians as well. We discuss the survey and these variables in greater detail below.
  2. The “most hostile” segment of the Jewish sample were respondents who rated evangelicals at zero on the 0-100 scale.

3. See <http://www.pat robertson.com/Speeches/IsraelLauder.asp>, accessed October 24, 2005.
4. For a description of the study and access to the data (which includes surveys of both the United States and Canada), see <http://www.thearda.com/file.asp?File=QUEEN'S&Show=Description>.
5. See <http://www.pat robertson.com/Speeches/IsraelLauder.asp>, accessed October 24, 2005.
6. We shall investigate these issues with other surveys in future papers.
7. Patrick McCreesh of Greenberg Research wrote to us by e-mail on June 23, 2005: “In developing a sample frame for surveying American Jewry, we begin with a 2 million person nationwide database of Americans online. We will select top geographic concentrations of Jews and issue email invitations to those individuals. Jewish respondents are expected to be 5 to 15 percent of these invited individuals, and they will be screened according to religious affiliation/background self-identification question(s). This data collection strategy is more cost-efficient and can be, to an extent, validated by comparing demographic characteristics of other Jewish samples.” McCreesh told us by phone that the weighted sample is highly representative of the American Jewish population. More details about the survey are available upon request. We use weights in all of our analyses below and we intend to compare the findings in the NJDC survey with an analysis of an analysis of the American Jewish Committee survey as well as the national exit polls.
8. Neither is Jewish—one is an evangelical and the other is a Catholic.
9. We realize that evangelicals and Christian fundamentalists are not always the same. However, we believe that there would be little difference in the results for Jews had the NJDC survey asked about Christian fundamentalists.

10. These estimates were derived using Gary King's clarify routine (estimated using Stata 9.1).
11. Ideology is collinear with party identification, previous vote, the direction of the country, and the pro-Israel measure.
12. The mean ideology score for white ethnics in 2004 is 4.41 on the 1-7 ideology scale (with 7 being the most conservative) compared to 4.25 for other non-Jews and 3.61 for Jews. The mean party identification score for white ethnics is 3.34 on the 1-7 scale (with higher values reflecting stronger Republican identification) compared to 2.67 for other non-Jews and to 1.91 for Jews.
13. The NJDC survey asked the gay marriage question of only half of the sample. To get a larger N, we imputed values for the other half of the sample. The variables we used to impute gay marriage support were: income, gender, the evangelical thermometer, the prolife thermometer, the importance of terrorism, health, abortion, the environment, Social Security, education, Iraq, poverty, and moral issues, being single, and being widowed. All were significant at least at  $p < .10$  and the regression had an adjusted  $R^2$  of .318.