

Trust, Diversity, and Segregation in the United States and the United Kingdom

Eric M. Uslaner

Department of Government and Politics

University of Maryland–College Park

College Park, MD 20742

Senior Research Fellow, Center for American Law and Political Science

Southwest University of Political Science and Law

Chongqing, China

euslaner@gvpt.umd.edu

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ABSTRACT

Generalized trust is a value that leads to many positive outcomes for a society—greater tolerance of minorities, greater levels of volunteering and giving to charity, better functioning government, less corruption, more open markets, and greater economic growth. Generalized trust is faith in people you don't know who are likely to be different from yourself. Yet, several people, most notably Robert Putnam, now argue that trust is lower when we are surrounded by people who are different from ourselves. This view is mistaken. Diversity (fractionalization) is not the culprit in lower levels of trust. Instead, it is residential segregation—which isolates people from those who may be of a different background. Segregation is one of the key reasons why contact with people who are different from ourselves does not lead to greater trust: Such contact may not be so frequent and it is not likely to take place frequently and in an atmosphere of equality, as argued by Allport, Forbes, and Pettigrew. I show that diversity is a proxy for the minority share in a community and that: (1) segregation, especially in diverse communities, drives down trust more than diversity does; but (2) close personal ties in integrated diverse communities builds trust, but more so in the United States than in the United Kingdom, and more for majority white communities than for minorities.

Generalized trust, the belief that “most people can be trusted,” is faith in strangers, who are likely to be different from ourselves (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 2). It is a form of “bridging” rather than “bonding” social capital (Putnam, 1993, 93). People who trust others are tolerant of others who are different from themselves, including immigrants and minorities—as well as more being more favorable to policies such as free trade that involve interactions with people (and countries) with populations that are of different backgrounds from one’s own (Uslaner, 2002, chs. 2-3).

Trust thus connects us to people of different backgrounds. And diversity has benefits beyond those connected to trust: Diversity is associated with increased wages and higher prices for rental housing (Ottaviano and Peri, 2005), greater profits and market share for firms that have more diverse work forces (Herring, 2006), and greater problem-solving capacities (Gurin, Nagda, and Lopez, 2004).

Yet, there is now a growing literature—almost a consensus—that *diversity drives down trust*. People are more comfortable with their own kind—and shy away from contacts with people of different backgrounds. People living in areas with diverse populations are *less* likely to trust others and to have heterogeneous social networks (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2000, 2002, 2004; Alesina et al., 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1997; Leigh, 2006; Putnam, 2007). Alesina and LaFerrara (2000, 850) argue: “...diffuse preferences for homogeneity may decrease total participation in a mixed group if fragmentation increases. However, individuals may prefer to sort into homogenous groups.”

Putnam (2007, 142-143) cites a wide range of studies showing a negative relationship between ethnic diversity and indicators of social cohesion, such as trust, investment in public

goods, voluntary activities, car-pooling, and desertion in the armed forces. Putnam (2007, 146-149), using the Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCBS) in the United States, finds that inter-racial trust, trust of neighbors, and even trust of one's own race is lower in more ethnically diverse neighborhoods:

Diversity does not produce 'bad race relations' or ethnically-defined group hostility.... Rather, inhabitants of diverse communities tend to withdraw from collective life, to distrust their neighbours, regardless of the colour of their skin, to withdraw even from close friends, to expect the worst from their community and its leaders, to volunteer less, give less to charity and work on community projects less often, to register to vote less, to agitate for social reform more, but have less faith that they can actually make a difference, and to huddle unhappily in front of the television. Note that this pattern encompasses attitudes and behavior, bridging and bonding social capital, public and private connections. Diversity, at least in the short run, seems to bring out the turtle in all of us.

This argument is misplaced. Low levels of trust are shaped by residential segregation, not diversity *per se*—and the two are not the same phenomenon. When people of different backgrounds live apart from each other, they will not—indeed, cannot—develop the sorts of ties—or the sorts of attitudes—that leads us to trust people who are different from ourselves. Living in segregated neighborhoods reinforces in-group trust at the expense of out-group (generalized) trust.

If anything, we would expect diversity to *increase* the prospects for trust since faith in people who are different from yourself makes little sense if you never encounter them. The link between

segregation and low trust is more straightforward. Segregation isolates people, especially the poor and minorities who do not have access to the same networks for finding jobs as the majority white population (Loury, 1977; Massey and Denton, 1993, 65, 167).

I turn to data from American cities—the SCBS and a new set of measures of diversity and residential segregation in American cities. In multi-level models, I show that people are indeed somewhat *less* trusting in diverse cities. More critically, people living in well integrated cities who have diverse social networks—and who see crime as less of a problem—are much more likely to be trusting than people who live in segregated cities with homogenous social networks or who fear crime. Segregation seems far more important than diversity and: (1) segregation and diversity are *not* the same thing; and (2) diversity is largely a proxy for large non-white populations rather than an “intermingling” of different ethnic and racial groups.

Finally, I examine the impact of residential segregation on trust in the United Kingdom. The 2007 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey includes the generalized trust question and many indicators of social cohesion. It has a very large sample ($N > 14,000$) which permits analysis of different ethnic and religious communities.¹

Comparing the US and the UK

The US-UK comparison is interesting for at least two reasons. First, the two countries share a common culture and their majority (white) populations now have roughly similar levels of trust: 43 percent for the UK in the Citizenship survey and 39 percent for the United States in the 2008 General Social Survey. Yet, minorities occupy a far more prominent place in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Minorities constitute about nine percent of the British population and 30 percent in the United States (Goodhart, 2004). Americans have long

adhered to the “melting pot” model—a single common set of values and an expectation that immigrants will blend in and adapt to the majority culture. In the 2002 General Social Survey only 20 percent of respondents said that it was not important for immigrants to adapt to the common culture. African-Americans are somewhat more likely to say that adaptation is not essential (by 32 percent compared to 18 percent for others). Yet Hispanics—who comprise the largest number of recent immigrants and who some say constitute a threat to the common culture (Huntington, 1998)—are no more likely to say that adaptation should be optional.(19 percent compared to 20 percent of non-Hispanics).

The issue of national identity is more contested in the United Kingdom. Britain has followed a model of multiculturalism rather than complete assimilation as the share of immigrants (especially nonwhites) has increased in recent years. Most Britains favor this multicultural model: 66 percent of whites, 83 percent of non-whites, and 88 percent of Muslims—argue that a dual identity as British and one’s home country or religion is possible. Modood (2008, 130, 127), reporting on the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, argues that “[t]he majority of respondents had no difficulty with the idea of hyphenated or multiple identities,” that religion is a common form of second identity—especially for Asian immigrants—and that “there was very little erosion of group identification down the generations.” Indeed, “...there seems to be less subjective incompatibility between being British and Pakistani than being British and Scottish” (Modood, 2008, 131).

However, many British people, including government officials, are concerned that the policy of multiculturalism is creating in the UK what former Canadian Prime Minister Joe Clark called “a community of communities.” Following racial disturbances in Bradford, Burnley, and

Oldham in 2001, the British government commissioned several studies to understand the roots of social cohesion and the sense of identification with the larger society. People debated whether there has been a “decline of Britishness”; white members of focus groups viewed increasing immigration,² greater demands on the welfare state, and “moral pluralism” as threatening the long-standing culture of the United Kingdom (ETHNOS Research and Consultancy, n.d.). David Goodhart (2004), editor of Prospect, created a stir when he argued that “[a] generous welfare state is not compatible with open borders and possibly not even with...mass immigration.”

In turn, Hudson et al. (2007) reported that black Caribbean and Somali immigrants found their own communities more welcoming than the larger society. They argued that “residential segregation between different ethnic communities...is at the root of problems of social cohesion” although the authors argued that economic conflict between non-whites and whites might be just as important (Hudson et al., 2007, 93-94). Trevor Phillips, Director of the Commission for Racial Equality, argued in 2005 that Britain was “sleepwalking into segregation” and that most British people only had friends of their own ethnic group (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 96; Peach, 2007, 1). The Equality and Human Rights Commission, established in 2007, argued that multiculturalism was a failed government policy, that segregation was widespread in Britain, and it is critical to build a national identity based on shared values. “Separation feeds a dangerous tribalization of communities,” the Commission argued (cited in Finney and Simpson, 2009, 77).

Others argue that this presumed decline in “Britishness” is illusory because: (1) most white Britons do not identify as British at all; and (2) the supposed separation of non-white immigrant communities is largely a myth. Only 41 percent of whites, compared to 61 percent of non-whites, in the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey identify as British. The most common form of

identification among whites is English (62 percent). Manning and Roy (2007, 22) argue from survey evidence on minority groups that “[f]or national identity there is clear evidence of cultural assimilation—for values there is not assimilation, but there are no very big differences to begin with....fears about a culture clash in modern Britain are ill-founded.” Feelings of discrimination are most pronounced among native whites (Georgiadis and Manning, 2008, 21).

The acceptance of a British identity—more often a dual identity—leads to the second reason why a British-American comparison is useful. British minorities are *less segregated* than are minorities, notably African-Americans, in the United States. There is no evidence of ghettos or “hypersegregation” and there is considerable geographic mobility as immigrants seek better housing. Levels of segregation are less than half of those for African-Americans (Fieldhouse and Cutts, forthcoming, 29; Peach, 1996, forthcoming; Simpson, 2007, 413; Waters, forthcoming). The effect of segregation on civic norms is far more pronounced for whites in the United States compared to whites in Britain (Fieldhouse and Cutts, forthcoming, 29).

Any portrait of Britain as a haven of multicultural understanding and friendship among different groups is an exaggeration. First, while most minorities do not live in enclaves of their own kind, they inhabit communities that are largely non-white. Johnston *et al.* (2002, 604) note that “[m]ost whites in England’s cities—as many as 98 percent in Liverpool—live in areas with few residents from any ethnic minorities, and even in London and Slough, over 90 percent live in areas with White majorities.” Most whites, as I shall show below, do not have friends from different backgrounds. Second, not all immigrants have integrated as well into British society as others. Muslims, notably, seem to be less integrated into British society—less favorable toward mutual respect (Georgiadis and Manning, 2009, 22) and more committed to a dual identity based

upon religion (Modood, 2008, 127). They are the least likely of any immigrant group to report close friends of different backgrounds. Their incomes and education levels lag behind other Britons (Waters, forthcoming, 39-40) and many Muslims perceive bias “...from mainstream society that does not fully accept them as British” (Change Institute, 2009, 32).

Third, even if immigrants are more likely than whites to identify themselves as British, national identity is not the same thing as trust. Trust is a much more demanding value than tolerance—it is based upon the notion of a shared fate and accepting people of different backgrounds as part of our “moral community” (Uslaner, 2002, 1). People may identify with a country because they live in it—and have lived there for quite some time. Half of the non-white population of Britain was born in the UK (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 57). A young person of Pakistani roots in Britain may never have visited Pakistan and would easily consider herself British, especially if she can “keep” her ethnic and religious identity. National identity in the “melting pot” of the United States is far stronger: 90 percent of Americans (and two-thirds of blacks) in the 2002 General Social Survey considered themselves to be “just an American” rather than having any dual identity.

The different social contexts between the United States and the United Kingdom present an opportunity to examine how segregation and diversity shape trust in a country with high segregation and one with low segregation—but with two different approaches to integrating minorities. Pennant (2005) reports that people living in more diverse areas of Britain are less likely to trust others in their communities. However, Letki (2008), examining the 2001 United Kingdom Citizenship Survey, finds initial support for a negative relationship between community-level diversity and a composite indicator of social capital—but the result becomes

insignificant when she controls for the economic status of the community. Her findings are consistent with Laurence and Heath (2008, 41, emphasis in original) who argue that “far from eroding community cohesion, ethnic diversity is generally a strong positive driver of cohesion....*It is...deprivation that undermines cohesion, not diversity.*”

For the British data, I estimate separate models for whites, nonwhites, people of East Asian and African heritage,³ and Muslims. The share of minorities in Britain is considerably lower than that in the United States (Finney and Simpson, 2009, 57, 125-126). The 2007 Citizenship survey does not have (public) data that would permit linking individual survey responses to patterns of segregation and diversity in census blocks. But it does ask people to estimate the share of minorities living in their wards as well as the share of people of different backgrounds within 15-20 minutes walking distance of your residence. I estimate probit models of trust for majority and minority populations interacting these measures of diversity/segregation with a wide range of measures of social interactions with people of different backgrounds.

In both the United States and Britain, the interaction of diverse social ties *and* integrated neighborhoods leads people to become more trusting. Segregation matters far more than diversity—and it also matters more in the United States and it matters more for whites than for non-whites. Indeed, for the minorities said to be the most segregated or alienated—African-Americans in the United States and Muslims in Britain—the effects of diverse ties in integrated neighborhoods are either small or insignificant.

Measuring Diversity and Segregation

Fractionalization measures such as those used by Putnam and others cannot distinguish between simple population diversity and residential segregation. A city/state/nation

/neighborhood with a highly diverse population—and thus a high fractionalization index—may be marked by either high or low residential segregation. Figures 1 and 2 present alternative scenarios on residential segregation. They represent hypothetical neighborhoods of blue and red ethnicities. Each neighborhood has equal shares of blue and red residents. In Figure 1, the two ethnic groups live apart from each other, divided by a highway, so there is less of an opportunity to interact. In Figure 2, the neighborhood is mixed. Each blue (red) resident has at least one red (blue) neighbor. Yet the fractionalization indices are identical.

Figures 1 and 2 about here

Contact and Trust

Out-group trust is the exception, while in-group trust is the norm (Brewer, 1979; Forbes, 1997, 35). Messick and Brewer (1983, 27-28, italics in original) survey experiments on cooperation: "...members of an in-group tend to perceive other in-group members in generally favorable terms, particularly as being *trustworthy, honest, and cooperative*." Generalized trust is measured by the standard survey question, "Generally speaking, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or can't you be too careful in dealing with people?" In each of four waves of the World Values Survey, only a minority—and seemingly a shrinking one—trusts fellow citizens. In 1981, only four Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) had a majority of trusting citizens. By 1995, as more countries were surveyed, only Norway, Sweden, and China had a majority of trusting citizens.⁴

Putnam (2000, 137) presumes that interaction with others makes people more trusting—and that we induce trust in strangers from our interactions with people like ourselves (Hardin,

1992). However, both Stolle (2000, 233) and (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4) find little support for this claim: Interaction with people like ourselves *does not* transfer to people of different backgrounds. When people join civic groups—and have social interactions such as going on picnics or having dinner parties—they *are not likely to encounter people who are different from themselves*. We choose people very much like ourselves to form our social networks (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001).

However, some venues are more hospitable to breaking out of your shell than are others. If you live in a diverse community, you are more likely to encounter many different types of people—in schools, in business, at work. But simply living in a heterogeneous community—or even having friends or acquaintances of different backgrounds—is not sufficient to develop trust.

There is little support for the simple claim that having a friend of a different background makes you more trusting (Uslaner, in press). Marschall and Stolle (2004) argue that contact will only increase trust if it occurs in a diverse community. Following Allport, Pettigrew (1998, 66) argues that contact with people of different backgrounds must be accompanied by “equal group status within the situation, common goals; intergroup cooperation; and the support of authorities, law, or custom” for trust and tolerance to flourish. Forbes (1997, 144, 150) goes further, arguing that “[t]he more frequent and the more intimate the contacts among individuals belonging to different tribes or nations, the more these groups come to resemble each other culturally or linguistically... Different languages, religions, customs, laws, and moralities—in short, different cultures—impede economic integration, with all its benefits... Isolation and subordination, not gore and destruction, seem to be the main themes in linguistic conflict.”

Concentrated minorities are more likely to develop a strong identity that supercedes a

national sense of identification (trust in people who are different from oneself) and to build local institutions and political bodies that enhance this sense of separateness. Segregation may also lead to greater political organization by minority groups, which can establish their own power bases in opposition to the political organizations dominated by the majority group as their share of the citizenry grows. Massey and Denton (1993, 13, 138, 155-6, 167, emphasis in original) write about 20th century America:

Segregation increases the susceptibility of neighborhoods to...spirals of decline...In the face of persistent neighborhood disorder, residents come to distrust their neighbors and to look upon them as threats rather than as sources of support or assistance...they...limit their contacts outside of close friends and family...The historical confinement of blacks to the ghetto...meant that blacks shared few political interests with whites....The existence of solid black electoral districts...did create the potential for bloc voting along racial lines....an alternative status system has evolved within America's ghettos that is defined *in opposition* to basic ideals and values of American society.

Segregation also leads to greater inequality (Massey and Denton, 1993, 127-128)—and inequality is the strongest determinant of trust--over time in the United States, across the American states, and across nations without a legacy of communism (Uslaner, 2002, 186-189, 230-237; Uslaner and Brown, 2005).⁵ Bowles, Loury, and Sethi (2009, 11) argue that “...when segregation is sufficiently great, group equality cannot be attained even asymptotically, no matter what the initial conditions may be.”

Some recent studies challenge the deleterious effects of diversity. Hooghe et al. (2009)

found no effect of diversity on trust in a hierarchical linear model of trust in the European Union (using the European Social Survey). Collier, Honohan, and Moene (2001) find that ethnic group dominance, but *not* simple ethnic diversity, leads to a greater likelihood of civil conflict.

There is new support for the negative effects of segregation: Alesina and Zhuravskaya (2009) find that ethnically and linguistically segregated neighborhoods, but *not* fractionalization, lead to a lower quality of government. Rothwell (2009, 18-19) finds that “[s]egregation is associated with significantly more racist views on Black intelligence and more psychological distance from Blacks” and that “[i]ntegration...is strongly and robustly correlated with higher levels of trust, voter turnout, and more favorable views of Whites towards Blacks.”⁶

Segregation and Trust: Evidence from the United States

Putnam’s (2007) evidence for his claim that diversity drives down trust (and other aspects of social capital) is based upon his examination of American municipalities using the SCBS.. So any test of the claim that segregation is far more important in driving down trust than diversity should address his evidence head-on. Many of the claims Putnam makes come from proprietary data, but a new data base on both diversity and residential segregation in American cities allows me to examine how each shapes trust. The SCBS (2000) covers communities as well as national samples. Here I focus on the community samples only—and just a subsample of each set of communities that are also covered in data on community residential segregation and diversity devised for the Bureau of the Census by Iceland (2004).⁷ Iceland’s diversity and segregation measures for standard metropolitan statistical areas (SMSAs) are based upon Theil’s entropy index. The diversity index is similar to the traditional heterogeneity measure: it “measures the extent to which several groups are present in a metropolitan area, regardless of their distribution

across census tracts.”

The segregation measure “varies between 0, when all areas have the same composition as the entire metropolitan area (i.e., maximum integration), to a high of 1, when all areas contain one group only (maximum segregation)” (Iceland, 2004, 3, 8). Both measures are based on census tract data, but the segregation index is a measure of “the percentage of a group’s population that would have to change residence for each neighborhood to have the same percentage of that group as the metropolitan area overall” (Iceland and Scopilliti, 2008, 83). It is weighted by the diversity of each census tract so that “...the diversity score is influenced by the relative size of the various groups in a metropolitan area, the entropy index, being a measure of evenness, is not. Rather, it measures how evenly groups are distributed across metropolitan area neighborhoods, regardless of the size of each of the groups” (Iceland, 2004, 8).

Diversity and segregation are *not* the same thing. Across 325 communities, the simple correlation for the two measures in 2000 is just .297 (and .231 for 1990 and .270 for 1980).

The SCBS includes the generalized trust question—and I estimate multilevel models of trust below using probit analysis with clustered standard errors in Table 1. I am limited by the available variables and the communities that were surveyed and that had matching diversity and segregation indices (see n. 6).

Tables 1 and 2 about here

Following Marschall and Stolle (2004) and Forbes (1997), I argue that residential segregation by itself is not as critical as the interaction between segregation and patterns of interaction between people. The SCBS asked people about the racial diversity of the civic groups

they have joined and of their friendship circles. The usual practice in models such as this is to include the measures of group and friendship diversity as well as the interaction terms. Ordinarily the measures of group and friendship diversity should be included in a model with interaction terms. However, including the simple measures induces strong collinearity in the model. Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006, 68) argue that “the analyst must have a strong theoretical expectation that the omitted variable...has no effect on the dependent variable in the absence of the other modifying variable” and “...the...modifying variable...is measured with a natural zero. Both conditions hold here. I have argued that a more diverse social network is insufficient to lead to greater trust—and the segregation and diversity measures both have natural zero points (Iceland, 2004, 8). Including the interaction terms does not gain us anything theoretically since I expect that their coefficients should be insignificant—and doing so induces substantial collinearity, driving all coefficients to insignificance.

I estimate the models for all respondents and then separately for whites and African-Americans. We know that African-Americans are less trusting and that the determinants of trust are different for blacks and whites (Uslaner, 2002, 35-36). Since African-Americans are likely to live in segregated communities, the effects of segregation might be different for blacks and whites. Since segregation is so pervasive, there might not be direct effects of either segregation or diversity on the levels of trust of African-Americans—but where blacks do live among whites and have close white friends, I would expect that such ties would shape trust for African-Americans and whites.

There is also evidence that older people and especially more highly educated people are more trusting (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4). So I include race, age, education, and the share of African-

Americans and the mean level of education in a city. I also include a measure of whether people treat you as dishonest, since negative treatment may lead to distrust. I present the probit model for the SCBS in Table 1 (with standard errors clustered by city), with the “effect,” the change in the probability of trusting obtained by setting each variable first at its minimum and then at its maximum while leaving all of the other variables at their “natural” values in the final column. Positive effects indicate that trust increases as one “moves” from the minimum to the maximum value of the predictor in question (other things being equal): The most highly educated respondents are 33 percent more likely to trust others than the least educated. Negative effects indicate less trust for the higher values of the predictor. African-Americans (coded 1) are 21 percent less trusting than non-blacks (coded zero).

Race, age, and especially education (both at the individual and city level) have powerful effects. If people treat you as if you were dishonest, you will be less likely to trust them.⁸

While diversity is more of a surrogate for the minority share of the population and segregation is not, there is at least a moderate relationship between residential segregation and the non-white share of a city’s population. The least segregated city in the data set, Yakima, Washington, ranks low on diversity: It is predominantly white. Shares of minorities. In the models I estimate for the United States, I include the measures of segregation and diversity as well as a complex interaction term.

I interact the segregation and diversity measures to produce an indicator of residential integration in diverse cities. A simple multiplication of the segregation and diversity indices would yield maximum values for highly segregated and diverse communities and minimum values for integrated but less diverse communities. So my interaction term has lower values for

integrated and diverse communities and higher values for segregated communities, leading to the expectations of *negative* signs for this interaction (and the composite measures discussed below) to indicate greater trust.

. I use this interaction term by itself and to create two more complex interactions reflecting my theoretical framework. Diversity and segregation should not matter as much as *living in an integrated and diverse neighborhood and having diverse social networks*. I thus interact the segregation/ diversity measure with the breadth of friendship networks and groups people join.

For all three estimations, residential segregation alone does *not* lead to less trust but diversity does. For all respondents, living in the most diverse city (Los Angeles) will reduce your probability of trusting others by 25 percent compared to residing in the least diverse city. The effect for whites is a decline of 23 percent, but diversity is insignificant for African-Americans (with a minuscule effect). The interaction of segregation and diversity is even more powerful for all respondents and whites: Living in Seattle or York, Pennsylvania—the two most integrated and diverse cities—will lead to a 42 percent boost (43 percent for whites) compared to living in the most segregated diverse city (Detroit). For African-Americans, there is no direct effect of this interaction either.

However, friendship networks matter in integrated areas *for blacks and whites equally*. Having friends of different backgrounds in communities with lower segregation boosts trust by 33 percent for both African-Americans and whites. This effect is greater than the “loss” for diversity for whites—or for the share of African-Americans in a city’s population. Segregation in diverse communities takes a toll on the trust of the majority population. If such isolation is compounded by a lack of diverse social ties, the toll on trust is compounded. These effects dwarf

the more modest loss stemming from diversity alone. Whites get an additional boost if they join a group with diverse membership in an integrated community—by 22 percent. It is ironic that African-Americans do *not* become more trusting from membership in diverse group memberships—because they are considerably more likely than whites to be members of groups with diverse memberships.

Each of the other predictors—education, age, the average level of education in a city, and the percent African-American in a city matter more for whites than for African-Americans. Even being treated as dishonest leads to a sharper drop in trust for whites (15 percent) than for blacks (11 percent)—which seems remarkable since 42 percent of African-Americans compared to half as many whites believe that people treat them as if they were dishonest. The answer to this puzzle may rest in a more general account of why African-Americans are less trusting: Even if a black person has not experienced discrimination, (s)he will certainly know someone who has faced such bias—and such knowledge can readily translate into distrust. Personal experiences play a lesser role in explaining the level of trust for African-Americans than for whites (Uslaner, 2002, 35-36). Such an explanation may also account for the weaker, indeed insignificant, effects of joining a group with diverse membership on blacks. People who have long faced discrimination might well demand more than group diversity to prove that people of different backgrounds are trustworthy. Closer personal ties through friendship in integrated settings seemingly reduces the trust gap for blacks.

Integration matters—but only if people take the initiative to interact with people of different backgrounds, much as Pettigrew (1998), Forbes (1997), and Marschall and Stolle have argued, following Allport. Kumlin and Rothstein (2008) find that informal contacts with

neighbors lead minorities in Sweden to become more trusting. The effect of integration more than “compensates” for any negative impact on trust attributable to diversity.

Integration is not simply an “alternative” to diversity. The diversity measure is a surrogate measure for the share of a city’s population that is white. The correlation between the diversity index and the percent of a city’s population that is white is -.917 for the 20 SCBS cities with comparable measures from Iceland (2004), compared to just -.305 for the segregation measure.⁹

There is a measure of diversity (fractionalization) in the SCBS for its 41 “communities” (including some states and regions). The fractionalization measure turns out to be a surrogate for the share of the population that is white ($r = -.959$) and to a lesser extent for the Hispanic and African-American shares ($r = .678$ and $.508$, respectively). Since minority populations are less trusting than whites (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4),¹⁰ the diversity index may simply show low levels of trust in communities with large non-white populations rather than a reluctance of people to interact with people of different backgrounds.

Segregation, Diversity, Contact and Trust in the United Kingdom

There is less segregation in Britain, but that does *not* mean that whites and non-whites live next to each other. Almost 80 percent of whites estimate that more than half (or even all) people within walking distance of them are from the same ethnic group as they are (see Figure 3). Most non-whites, including people of African and East Asia heritage¹¹—and most Muslims say that less than half of the population within walking distance are from different groups. Yet, this is not a simple picture of a fully integrated society. Almost 60 percent of whites believe that the ward they live in is less than half minority. Almost 90 percent of East Asians, Africans, and

Muslims say that their wards are 80 percent or more minority—and 70 percent of each say that 90 percent of their immediate neighbors are from minority groups (Figure 4). The British pattern of integration is not a melting pot where people of all backgrounds live together (Johnston et al., 2002). The correlations between the walking distance measure (closest to an indicator of segregation) and the minority share (which is an indicator of diversity) is modest: For the full sample, the tau-c correlation is modest (.484). For whites, it is .363; for non-whites, the correlation is -.231 and for Muslims it is only -.159. For minorities, living in an integrated community largely means living near other people of color. Yet since minorities constitute a small share of the British population, the prospect for diverse friendship networks to lead to the belief that “*most people* can be trusted” may be limited.

Figures 3 and 4 about here

As in the United States, minorities are less trusting than whites: 43 percent of whites believe that most people can be trusted, compared to 29 percent of nonwhites, 31 percent of East Asians, 26 percent of Africans, and 28 percent of Muslims (see Figure 5). However, the greater segregation of whites leads to fewer friends of different groups: 17 percent for whites, compared to 47percent for all nonwhites, 48 percent for Africans, 43 percent for East Asians, and 39 percent for Muslims (Figure 5). Perhaps ironically, the groups with the largest number of friends of different backgrounds are the least trusting.

Figure 5 about here

Do diverse social networks in integrated settings lead to greater levels of trust? I estimate

probit equations for trust in Tables 2 and 3. The key variable, as in the model for the United States, is an interaction between whether one has close friends of different backgrounds and the share of people of different backgrounds within walking distance of your residence. The balance of the model for trust is somewhat different from conventional models (esp. Uslander, 2002, ch. 4)—reflective of the questions available in the Citizenship survey. The variables in the model, while less conventional, seem important for examining trust among minorities.

The predictors include measures of local cohesion—do neighbors share your values and do they get on well with each other, as well as three questions about factors shaping one’s identity: If you place a great deal of importance on your country of origin or your ethnicity, you will be more likely to trust your in-group rather than out-groups. But if your identity is shaped by your interests, you may be more responsive to bridging ties. Uslander (2002, 197) argues that trust presumes a common culture, so we might expect that support for the idea that everyone should speak English would lead to higher levels of trust. For minorities, demands that everyone speak English might be construed as an assault on their cultural heritage—so an argument from multiculturalism might lead to the opposite expectation for speaking English: Respect for one’s heritage might build trust for minorities.

Worrying about a racial attack should reduce trust, while being respected at stores might increase faith in others. Brehm and Rahn (1997) argue that fear of crime should reduce trust (cf. Uslander, 2002, 128-129), so people who worry about crime or who don’t feel safe at night should be less trusting. Rothstein (2000) has argued that the justice system is supposed to be a neutral, fair arbiter among citizens (and groups), so faith in the judicial system should lead to greater trust in other people. He finds that trust in the police is more strongly linked to generalized trust than

is confidence in other political institutions. The standard demographics would lead us to expect that more educated and older people would be more trusting, but would be more agnostic about the positive effects of higher income (Uslaner, 2002, ch. 4).

The six estimations for trust point to four key findings. First, the interaction between the number of close friends and the level of integration in one's environment is *always* significant—for every group. The probit effects are similar for most groups—with the exception of East Indians for whom a diverse set of friends in an integrated environment matters most. East Indians are less likely than other minorities (other than Muslims) to have such diverse environments and ties—though still 3.5 times as likely to do so as whites. While the probit effect for Muslims is about equal to that for most other groups, the significance of the coefficient is less than for other groups.

Second, the probit effects in Britain are much smaller than those for the American models except for African-Americans. This suggests that white (majority) populations respond to diverse environments more powerfully where there are higher levels of segregation.

Third, the roots of trust are different for majority and minority groups in Britain. Ironically, many of the factors I expected to shape trust for minority groups are significant *only for, or primarily for, whites*. The importance of country of origin matters only for whites and for Muslims. The importance of ethnicity to your sense of identification matters *only for whites*, while concern about crime seems more consequential to trust for whites, as does the belief that everyone should speak English. The more isolated white majority seems to respond more to the demands of multiculturalism than do minorities. For East Asians, Africans, and Muslims, the key factors underlying trust are educational and economic status and especially confidence in the

police—rather than a sense of vulnerability and fear for safety. Among minority groups, only Muslims’ trust is shaped by identification with their home country and how well they feel treated in stores. Muslims are the most segregated of the minorities and have the fewest friends of different backgrounds. Africans, who are the most likely to live in integrated areas (in contrast to black Americans) and to have close friends of different backgrounds, are *least* affected by perceptions of safety and multicultural values. They are the only minority group where the importance of interests rather than ethnicity or country of origin shapes trust.

Finally, familiarity by itself does not breed trust. I include a dummy variable for immigrating to the UK within the past seven years for each minority group. It is never significant in any of the estimations—so that people do not become more trusting simply by living in a higher-trust country.¹²

While diverse friendship networks and integrated neighborhoods seem to lead to greater trust in both the United States and the United Kingdom, simpler relationships seem to lead to a puzzle that calls for further investigation. In the UK, the correlations (τ -b) between trust and having close friends of different backgrounds are stronger for whites, nonwhites, East Asians, and Africans in low segregation neighborhoods, but *negative* for Muslims in such contexts. The effects are stronger in integrated neighborhoods for whites and Africans; The correlation between diverse friendship networks and trust is actually negative in high segregation areas for Africans (Figure 6). In the United States, the correlation between trust and diverse friendship networks is *lower* in low segregation neighborhoods—but is higher for African-Americans. The correlation is also slightly higher for Asian-Americans in low segregation communities, but there the diversity of friendship networks has little effect on trust in any context for Asian-Americans

(see Figure 7).¹³ None of these correlations is particularly large, but the direction Ironically, in the multivariate models, diverse friendship networks in integrated neighborhoods only shapes trust for whites and not for African-Americans.

Figures 6, 7 about here

Reprise

The aggregate and survey results I have presented point to a common theme: Residential segregation drives down trust. Diversity either has no effects on trust or far more modest impacts, largely attributable to the fact that “diversity” is a surrogate for a large non-white population. Simply because a country or a city is diverse does not mean that we have ready opportunities to interact with people who are different from ourselves—or that we take the opportunity. Diversity alone will not drive down trust. Integration provides the opportunity—but people must take it seriously and interact with people of different backgrounds for trust to flourish. But in both the US and the UK the stronger impact for close ties with people of different backgrounds, even in integrated communities, extend more to the majority whites than to minorities. Minorities do respond to close ties in integrated settings, but less robustly than do whites. While the data and models are not fully comparable, the effects of friendship diversity in integrated neighborhoods appear to be greater in the United States than in the United Kingdom. Segregation is more extensive in the United States and people move out of their neighborhoods to more desirable locations with much greater frequency in the United Kingdom. In the US, but not the UK, segregation is linked to economic inequality (Peach, 1996, 229-232). Both the social isolation resulting from hypersegregation and economic inequality drive down trust, so the

greater effects in the United States are understandable.

More integrated communities in the United States are marked by lower economic disparities between majority and minority groups (data not shown). These results provide a note of caution to arguments such as Putnam's (2007) that diversity by itself drives down trust or Rothwell's (2009, 19) that integrated neighborhoods lead to greater faith in others and tolerance without examining the interaction between integration and diverse social ties. Such friendships are unlikely in segregated neighborhoods, but they are not inevitable where people of different backgrounds live close to each other.

Segregation, rather than diversity, lies at the root of low trust. While "solving" the problem of segregation is not easy—since people choose where they want to live and these choices are to a considerable degree based upon racial attitudes (Charles, 2007) and trust. However, changing housing patterns is considerably less difficult than changing who lives in a country. The challenge is to create integrated neighborhoods, but that alone is not sufficient. Trust does not rest entirely upon who lives in a community—but who lives there *and who their close friends are*. This is a more demanding test and one not easily met. When people live apart from each other, they cannot develop the sorts of ties conducive to generalized trust.

TABLE 1
 Probit Model of Trust, Ethnic Segregation, and Diversity: Social Capital Benchmark Survey 2000

Variable	All Respondents				Whites				African-Americans			
	Coefficient	Std. Error	z	Effect	Coefficient	Std. Error	z	Effect	Coefficient	Std. Error	z	Effect
Residential segregation	-.508	.583	-.87	-.082	-.507	.573	-.88	-.082	.765	2.002	.38	.112
Ethnic/racial diversity	-.587***	.210	-2.80	-.250	-.550***	.219	-2.55	-.239	-.012	.746	-.02	-.005
Interaction of segregation & diversity	2.705***	.898	3.01	.420	2.849***	.910	3.13	.431	1.303	2.536	.51	.209
Interacted segregation * group diversity	-.181****	-.024	-7.68	-.151	-.283****	.056	-5.09	-.215	.146	.109	1.34	.102
Interacted segregation * friendship diversity	-.204****	.044	-4.59	-.320	-.180****	.027	-6.80	-.327	-.247****	.043	-5.79	-.335
Treat as dishonest	-.388****	.037	-10.57	-.140	-.408****	.041	-9.93	-.149	-.339****	.065	-5.21	-.109
Education	.156****	.008	19.49	.333	.167****	.010	16.71	.355	.118****	.029	4.08	.240
Age+	.006****	.001	6.76	.117	.006	.001	7.00	.125	.002	.003	.90	.043
% Black in city	-.824****	.165	-5.00	-.161	-.994****	.201	-4.94	-.197	.057	.443	.13	.010
Avg education in city	.269***	.083	3.24	.133	.278****	.082	3.35	.138	.259**	.147	1.76	.120
African-American	-.583****	.042	-13.83	-.213	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
Constant	-.974**	.271	-3.59		-1.035**	.269	-3.85		-2.092**	.699	-2.99	
R ² % predicted correctly		.216, 66.4%				.212, 65.9%				.315, 71.0%		
-2*LLR, PRE, N		11095.368, .327, 8986				8673.515, .129, 7009				1664.925, .014, 1457		

+ Effect calculated between 18 and 75 years old.

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants)

Standard errors clustered by city

Cities included in model: Baton Rouge, LA; Birmingham, AL; Bismark, ND; Boston, MA; Charlotte, NC; Cincinnati, OH; Cleveland, OH; Denver, CO; Detroit, MI; Greensboro, NC; Houston, TX; Kalamazoo, MI; Lewiston, ME; Los Angeles, CA; Rochester, NY; San Diego, CA; San Francisco, CA; Seattle, WA; Yakima, WA; York, PA.

TABLE 2
 Probit Analyses of Trust and Diversity: 2007 UK Citizenship Survey: Full Sample, Whites, and Nonwhites

Variable	All Respondents				Whites				Nonwhites			
	Coeff.	SE	z	Effect	Coeff.	SE	z	Effect	Coeff.	SE	z	Effect
Diversity friends*integration	.036***	.011	3.32	.049	.051***	.020	2.55	.071	.055****	.015	3.75	.068
Neighbors share values	.156****	.025	6.29	.157	.100***	.033	3.01	.104	.196****	.039	5.07	.178
Neighbors get on well	.052**	.026	2.02	.052	.084**	.034	2.45	.088	.014	.041	.35	.013
Interests shape sense of self	.431****	.098	4.23	.150	.356***	.109	3.25	.125	.525**	.226	2.32	.179
Importance of ethnicity	-.074****	.020	-3.74	-.076	-.066**	.024	-2.70	-.069	-.053*	.036	-1.46	-.050
Importance of country of origin	-.049***	.020	-2.54	-.050	-.042**	.024	-1.73	-.044	-.046*	.033	-1.39	-.044
Worried about racial attack	-.148****	.022	6.95	-.146	-.104	.035	-2.96	-.108	-.025	.036	-.70	-.023
Worry about crime	--	--	--	--	-.155****	.030	-5.19	.164	-.144****	.036	4.04	-.136
Everyone should speak English	-.225****	.035	-6.36	-.077	-.128***	.044	-2.93	-.045	-.109**	.057	-1.90	-.033
Trust police	.185****	.021	8.65	.183	.167****	.021	5.96	.173	.200****	.034	5.89	.177
Safe at night	.132****	.018	7.16	.173	.124****	.025	4.90	.171	.057**	.029	1.95	.069
Respected at stores	.144****	.024	5.99	.183	.136****	.031	4.40	.185	.158****	.040	3.99	.175
Education	.083****	.008	10.00	.168	.110****	.011	9.95	.235	.050****	.013	3.88	.092
Income	.024****	.006	4.23	.109	.012**	.007	1.66	.056	.040****	.010	4.13	.169
Age	.011****	.001	8.66	.204	.013****	.002	8.24	.250	.005***	.002	2.38	.092
Constant	-2.509****	.199	-12.60		-2.911****	.262	-11.11		-2.374****	.323	-7.35	
R ² Percent predicted correctly	.289, 69.2%				.234, 67.0%				.374, 72.4%			
-2*LLR, PRE, N	8513.648, .238, 7212				5210.9402, .353, 4269				3202.142, .047, 2933			

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants) —: variable not included because of collinearity

TABLE 2 (continued)
 Probit Analyses of Trust and Diversity: 2007 UK Citizenship Survey: East Asians, Africans, Muslims

Variable	East Asians				Africans				Muslims			
	Coeff.	SE	z	Effect	Coeff.	SE	z	Effect	Coeff.	SE	z	Effect
Diversity friends*integration	.078***	.026	2.99	.101	.049**	.029	1.72	.059	.048**	.027	1.74	.059
Neighbors share values	.064	.070	.92	.060	.163**	.072	2.72	.146	.217***	.072	3.01	.190
Neighbors get on well	.094	.075	1.25	.087	.056	.0800	.70	.049	.069	.073	.95	.061
Interests shape sense of self	.296	.552	.54	.098	.872*	.571	1.53	.302	.585	.968	.60	.200
Importance of ethnicity	-.058	.057	-1.01	-.056	-.035	.082	-.43	-.032	-.0001	.067	-0.00	-.000
Importance of country of origin	-.067	.056	-1.20	-.065	-.060	.078	-.78	-.056	-.119**	.058	2.07	-.114
Worried about racial attack	-.078*	.060	-1.29	-.073	-.043	.068	-.63	-.038	-.100**	.052	1.90	-.090
Worry about crime	-.131**	.060	-2.18	-.125	-.096*	.068	-1.40	-.087	---	---	---	---
Everyone should speak English	---	---	---	---	-.142	.378	-.37	-.044	.023	.426	.05	.007
Trust police	.320****	.064	4.97	.273	.250****	.071	3.50	.207	.189***	.059	3.20	.164
Safe at night	.092**	.050	1.85	.113	-.006	.056	-.10	-.007	.051	.049	1.03	.060
Respected at stores	.103*	.073	1.41	.121	.122*	.076	1.62	.133	.212***	.076	2.81	.215
Immigrated within 7 years	-.091	.111	-.81	-.028	.060	.126	.47	.018	---	---	---	---
Education	.031*	.021	1.50	.058	.082***	.025	3.25	.144	.024	.021	1.10	.044
Income	.067***	.016	4.10	.296	.012	.022	.53	.046	.049***	.018	2.68	.209
Age	.002	.004	.57	.039	.010**	.005	2.23	.179	.004	.004	.98	.073
Constant	-2.732****	.567	-4.82		-2.242****	.761	-2.94		-2.138**	.704	-3.04	
R ² Percent predicted correctly	.365, 70.7%				.408, 75.4%				.389, 74.7%			
-2*LLR, PRE, N	1162.856, .072, 1058				776.028, .072, 735				1015.23, .076, 945			

* p < .10 ** p < .05 *** p < .01 **** p < .0001 (all tests one tailed except for constants) —: variable not included because of collinearity

FIGURES 1 & 2

FIGURE 1
High Fractionalization, High Segregation




FIGURE 2
High Fractionalization, Low Segregation





FIGURE 3


Diversity of Population Within Walking Distance



Data are for the United Kingdom from the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey.

FIGURE 4

Percentage of Minority Ethnic Households in Ward (Deciles)



Data are for the United Kingdom from the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey.

FIGURE 5




FIGURE 6





FIGURE 7



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NOTES

- * This paper is an extension of papers presented at the Workshop on Diversity and Democratic Politics, Queens University, Kingston, Ontario (Canada), May 7-8, 2009; the Conference on "The Social Differentiation of Trust and Social Capital," Aalborg University, Denmark, June 6-9, 2009; the Conference on "The Politics of Social Cohesion," Centre for the Study of Equality and Multiculturalism (CESEM) at the University of Copenhagen, September 9-12, 2009; and the 2009 Sweden Conference on Urban Policies and Social Capital, Lidköping and Gothenburg, September 24-26, 2009. It is an extension of talks given at the Conference on "Understanding Diversity: Mapping and Measuring," Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Italy, supported by Marie Curie Series of Conferences, EURODIV - Cultural Diversity in Europe: a Series of Conferences, Milan, Italy, January 26-27, 2006; the Conference on Civil Society, the State, and Social Capital, University of Bergen (Norway), May 11-14, 2006; and the Canadian Political Science Association Meetings, London, Ontario, June, 2005; the Joint Sessions of Workshops, European Consortium for Political Research, Helsinki, Finland, May, 2007; and the at the EURODIV 5th Conference "Dynamics of Diversity in the Globalisation Era," October 22-23, 2009. I am grateful to the participants at these meetings for their helpful comments and to the General Research Board, University of Maryland–College Park and the Russell Sage Foundation and the Carnegie Corporation for a grant on a related project that is encompassed in my work on the United States on "Inequality, Trust, and Civic Engagement," 2001-2004. I am also grateful to David Campbell, Michael Hanmer, Karen

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1. The data in the 2007 UK Citizenship Survey, conducted for the Home Office, are described in Tonkin and Rutherford (2008). The data are available at <http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/findingData/hocsTitles.asp> (registration required).
2. Peach (forthcoming, 22) presents data showing that the non-white population of Britain rose from a few thousand in 1951 to 2,500,000 in 1991 and to over 4,000,000 in 2001.
3. Black Carribeans are included in the African heritage indicator. There are too few respondents of Carribean background to permit reliable estimation of separate models and excluding them has no effect on the results reported here.
4. See Uslaner (2002, 220, n. 1) for a discussion of why the Chinese results in this and other waves should be discounted.
5. In work in progress, I have found that diversity is *not* related to economic inequality in cities, but residential segregation is strongly related to inequality.
6. Rothwell uses the 2000 General Social Survey and has access to the municipal codes (not generally available) to merge the Iceland segregation data I employ here.
7. The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey is available from the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut (www.ropercenter.uconn.edu). The Knight data were made available to me as an integrated file by the Foundation—details are available at: http://www.knightfoundation.org/research_publications/community_indicators/community_indicators.dot, accessed October 30, 2008. The segregation/diversity data are available

at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/housing_patterns.html, accessed October 28, 2008. The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey was conducted in 40 jurisdictions, but eight were either states or areas (such as “Rural Southeast South Dakota”) that could not easily be linked to any city. Of the remaining 32 cities, only 20 had matching data from the residential segregation data. The ethnic groups used in the indices are non-Hispanic whites, non-Hispanic African Americans, non-Hispanic Asians and Pacific Islanders, Non-Hispanic American Indians and Alaska Natives, non-Hispanics of other races, and Hispanics (Iceland, 2004, 3).

8. Putnam (2000, 135-136) treats honesty as simply a measure of trust. Uslander (2002, 72) shows that the two are related but not the same thing: In the 1972 American National Election Study included both the generalized trust question and whether “most people are honest.” The correlation (tau-c) between the two measures is modest (.345) and barely more than half of respondents who said that “most people are honest” agreed that “most people can be trusted.”
9. The SCBS has a Herfindahl measure for each “community.” The zero-order correlation for the 41 “communities” between fractionalization and percent white for the aggregated data is -.959. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999, 1271) admit that their measure of ethnic diversity is strongly correlated with the percent African-American in a community ($r = .80$) and worry that their diversity measure “...could just be proxying for black majorities versus white majorities.” They show that ethnic diversity matters even in majority white communities, but this does not resolve the issue of whether diversity is another name for the share of the minority population. Segregation is *not* as strongly correlated with the

share of African-Americans in a community ($r = .542$) or the share of minorities—African-Americans, Hispanics, and Asians— more generally ($r = .150$, both $N = 237$). Similarly, in the SCBS, the aggregate data show a strong negative correlation between trust and diversity ($r = -.662$, $N = 41$). When I add the shares of population in a community who are African American and Hispanic to a regression, diversity is no longer significant ($t = -.032$), while the African-American and Hispanic population shares are significant at $p < .001$ and $p < .10$, respectively ($t = -3.41$ and -1.62 , one-tailed tests).

10. In the General Social Survey from 2000 to 2006, 16 percent of African-Americans and 21 percent of Hispanics agreed that “most people can be trusted,” compared to 41 percent of whites.
11. I classify people of East Asian (African) heritage if either: (1) both parents came from East Asia (Africa) or (2) the respondent speaks an East Asian (African) language as their main tongue.
12. Soroka, Helliwell, and Johnston (2006) report that “parental trust” for immigrants is a strong predictor of generalized trust in Canada, but the effect “wears off” more quickly than in the United States.
13. I cannot estimate a full model for Asian-Americans because of the limited number of cases.