

Ethnic Clientelism in the Middle East

Daniel Corstange
Assistant Professor
Department of Government and Politics
University of Maryland, College Park

dancorst@umd.edu
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/corstange/

Chapter 1

Introduction

Why are Sunni votes cheap in Lebanon but dear in Yemen? In recent years, Lebanese Sunnis have scrambled to hop aboard what locals caustically term the “Sunni bus” in support of their hegemonic leader. Meanwhile, the Yemeni ruling regime draws much of its key personnel and popular support from Zaydi Shia tribesmen. If our basic intuitions about ethnic favoritism hold, we might expect Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Shiites to lead comparatively more privileged lives than their more divided counterparts in other communities, at least in terms of access to government resources.

Just the opposite seems to be happening, however. To casual observers in both countries, ethnic favoritism appears to be the norm: politicians pack the civil service with coethnics, build schools and pave roads in their own neighborhoods, and distribute contracts and licenses to supporters from their own communities. Yet the purported beneficiaries of this patronage, the mass constituents whose support put their coethnics in power, appear to benefit only minimally from their community links. They may get jobs in the civil service but are paid a pittance to do them, a school for their village without desks or even roofs, or a dirt-floor building for a health clinic without staff or electricity. For many regular people, especially in the two politically-consequential constituencies just cited, the payoffs of unifying behind their hegemonic leaders appear to be scanty indeed.

But why do we observe this curious outcome? On the constituent side, why would people tolerate cheap rewards for their political support? Instead, why not shop that support around to the highest bidder to find the most lucrative rewards? On the elite side, why would leaders with access to sizeable reserves of resources withhold them from their supporters? How can they get away with cheap payoffs?

Lebanon and Yemen help to draw attention to a puzzle found elsewhere in the developing world: ethnic favoritism that coexists with ethnic neglect. In many plural societies, the “who gets what” questions of day-to-day politics — which group predominates in the civil service, where the roads get paved, which company gets an import license — appear to be heavily influenced by

ethnic connections. A large body of empirical research suggests that ethnic links provide an attractive means for politicians to win votes from their coethnics and to target their constituents with material rewards at the expense of non-coethnics.¹ Other studies, in turn, connect ethnicity to corruption and rent-seeking as people try to turn a profit from their ethnic ties rather than from productive activity.²

So central is ethnicity to these dynamics that *ethnic favoritism* has become a standard narrative trope, alongside *ethnic tensions* and *ethnic solidarities*, we use to describe politics in plural societies. We use these narratives to explain episodic, news-grabbing events like riots, violent protests, and civil wars.³ We also employ them, however, to explain ongoing processes in plural societies such as government dysfunction and disappointing development outcomes compared to their more homogeneous counterparts.⁴

Yet there is another, less often-noted empirical regularity found in plural societies that is difficult to reconcile with the first. Despite the apparent prevalence of ethnic favoritism, the rewards paid out to coethnics are often *trivially small*. The simple narrative that community members benefit from group solidarity largely ignores how the returns to solidarity are shared out. We need to take the next step by asking the following questions: *who* benefits, and by how much? Notwithstanding debates over specific mechanisms and behavioral motivations, ethnic favoritism is now a well-established empirical reality in plural societies.⁵ But it is not the whole story. Ethnic favoritism can help us explain why desirable resources flow along ethnic lines. It cannot, however, explain why, for most people, the flow is closer to a trickle than a deluge. Nor can it account for the discontent so often evident among mass constituents at what their coethnic elites do in fact provide.

Ethnic favoritism may help us explain who gets what, but it does not tell us *how much*. This book addresses the proverbial elephant in the room by examining the distributional consequences of ethnic links — not between groups, but within them. In particular, it seeks to understand why the answer to “how much?” is often “not much,” and the conditions under which elites can get away with rewarding their coethnics on the cheap.

The answer I propose in this book is the ethnic monopsony: a political constituency defined along ethnic lines that is dominated by a single vote buying patron. In most developing world societies, patron–client relationships rather than

¹The list of empirical studies is extraordinarily long. For a sampling, see Bates (1974, 1983); Birnir (2007); Chandra (2004); Eifert et al. (2010); Fearon (1999); Horowitz (1985); Kasara (2007); Lemarchand (1972); Lemarchand and Legg (1972); Melson and Wolpe (1970); Miguel (2004).

²Bardhan (1997); Bhagwati (1982); Ekeh (1975); Mauro (1995, 1998); Murphy et al. (1993); Rose-Ackerman (1998); Scott (1969).

³Collier et al. (2003); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Horowitz (2001); Wilkinson (2006); Varshney (2002).

⁴Alesina et al. (1999); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Arcand et al. (2000); Collier (1999); Easterly and Levine (1997); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

⁵Chandra (2006); Habyarimana et al. (2007, 2009); Horowitz (1985); Huddy (2003); La Ferrara (2003); Miguel (2004); Miguel and Gugerty (2005); Varshney (2003, 2007).

political programs link politicians to their constituents. Clientelistic exchanges are, however, subject to opportunism and the difficulty of making credible commitments to uphold either end of rewards-for-support bargains contracted by patrons and clients.

Ethnic networks help to reduce both uncertainty and transaction costs in patron–client exchanges. Informational advantages on the network, however, make it comparatively inefficient for non-coethnics to engage in clientelistic exchanges off-network. For patrons, however, ethnically-based constituencies constitute protected vote markets with high barriers to entry for non-coethnic competitors. In the absence of intraethnic competition for a community’s votes, a hegemonic patron can establish a vote monopsony, in which he becomes the sole credible buyer of his coethnics’ votes. Sheltered from electoral competition, such a patron can then pick and choose recipients of patronage from among his nominal clientele and pay them monopsony prices for their political support rather than market rates. The end result is fewer and cheaper payoffs for communities that unify behind dominant leaders.

In this chapter, I lay out the book’s broad themes, sketch its theoretical arguments, and overview its empirical findings. I begin by motivating the empirical puzzle — how can ethnic favoritism and ethnic neglect coexist? — and briefly reviewing what we think we know about ethnicity and clientelism. I next sketch the book’s main theoretical claim about ethnic monopsonies and provide three working hypotheses that will provide points of theoretical reference throughout the empirical portion of the book. I then introduce the book’s research venues, Lebanon and Yemen, and summarize some of the key findings that are described in detail in later chapters.

1.1 The Puzzle

Ethnicity, in the inclusive sense of the term,⁶ animates much of the day-to-day “who gets what” distributional competition in Lebanon and Yemen. Although political parties in both countries solemnly commit themselves to pursue “development,” “state-building,” and “the rule of law,” few people pay attention to the platforms and programs the parties issue. Instead, politicians spend most of their time jockeying on behalf of constituencies based on sect, tribe, extended family, and region over who gets hired into the civil service, where the roads get paved, and who keeps their electricity longest. Some constituencies, of course, appear to enjoy privileged access to state resources by dint of the political influence of their representatives. But while ethnic favoritism may be rampant,

⁶Here, and throughout the rest of the book, I follow Horowitz’s (1985, 41) inclusive conception of ethnicity “that embraces differences identified by color, language, religion, or some other attribute of common origin.” Despite ongoing debates over conceptualization and operationalization (Chandra, 2006; Posner, 2005), Horowitz’s (1985) definition has become the de facto standard in academic studies of ethnicity, at least among political scientists (Varshney, 2003, 2007). The inclusive, descent-based conception enables us to compare qualitatively similar cleavages regardless of the nominal differences that separate groups and allows us to compare, e.g., sects and tribes in a meaningful way.

just below the surface, so is neglect.

Consider, for example, the dynamic among Lebanese Sunnis, whose hegemonic leader can tap sizeable quantities of state resources as well as his own multibillion-dollar fortune to dispense as patronage. Some Sunnis have benefited handsomely from their access to patronage, of course, yet many mass constituents see little of this potential largesse. A local notable from the city of Tripoli — alternately Lebanon’s “second city” and its “capital of the Sunnis” — has emphasized this complaint repeatedly, such as in this speech to his fast-dwindling supporters:

Where in Tripoli is the state, which had showered promises upon it just before the last elections? Where is the state’s electricity and water? Where are the health and educational services, and relief for the poor? . . . Are you not the inhabitants of the biggest Sunni city in Lebanon? Do you not live in the poorest city in Lebanon?⁷

Notwithstanding the historical rivalry between Sunni elites from the major cities, it is difficult to reconcile the unprecedented support for a single leader within the Sunni community with the apparent neglect suffered by Sunni mass constituents in a city they dominate demographically and politically. At the very least, such a dynamic might encourage us to reconsider what we think we know about ethnic favoritism when the constituents who should theoretically receive favorable treatment get neglected instead.

In Yemen, meanwhile, Zaydi Shia tribesmen can ask themselves many of the same questions that Lebanese Sunnis ask.⁸ Despite the widely-held perception that the ruling regime and ruling party are dominated by influential tribal figures, the Zaydi regions are among the poorest, least developed, and most lawless in the entire country. The paramount shaykh of the country’s most powerful tribal confederation had long highlighted the development challenges facing the tribes, arguing that the provision of basic services and infrastructure would encourage stability and enterprise:

Transforming a tribesman from a warrior to a farmer is very easy to achieve, especially if agricultural and irrigation projects are established, wells are dug, and roads are run to his lands.⁹

⁷The speaker is Ahmad Karami, scion of Tripoli’s most prominent notable family and a former prime minister who has been eclipsed by the Beirut-based Hariri family. “Karami launches harsh attack on Geagea: we are the Sunni Unionist Arabs,” *al-Nahar*, 21 April 2007. The “capital of the Sunnis” moniker comes most recently from Tripoli MP Muhammad Kabbara (a member of Hariri’s parliamentary bloc), although various versions of the same descriptive trope have been in circulation for decades. See “Kabbara to Khazen: Tripoli is the capital of the Lebanese Sunnis” and “Tripoli to remain patriots’ capital, Karami says,” www.nowlebanon.com, 13 and 17 December 2010, respectively.

⁸Zaydis (sometimes known as “Fivers”) form a branch of Shia Islam that concentrates in Yemen and differs doctrinally from the largest branch of Shiism (“Twelvers”) that prevails elsewhere in the Muslim world, particularly in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon. For overviews of doctrinal details, see the early chapters in Coulson (1964) and Momen (1985).

⁹Shaykh Abdallah bin Hussein al-Ahmar was, until his death in late-2007, the paramount shaykh of the Hashid tribal confederation and long-running speaker of parliament. The quote comes from Yahya’s (2004, 23) hagiography.

Yet, as another eminent shaykh from another large tribal confederation with a senior post in the ruling party admitted:

No doubt about it: right now no services or infrastructure are going out to the tribal areas... [even though] everyone wants to put down his gun, go to school, take his kid to a clean clinic, and drink clean water.¹⁰

The tribesmen, ostensibly a core constituency for the ruling party, have seen only minimal rewards at best for their political support, even as some of their shaykhs have been well-compensated for delivering their tribes' support. Whatever the returns to unity, few of the material benefits appear to reach the mass constituents whose votes put their coethnic elites in office.

As with any two societies, Lebanon and Yemen both have their share of idiosyncracies and differ in non-trivial ways. Nonetheless, they also share crucial similarities, and we see the same basic story playing out in both places: constituents who should be well-attended as members of politically pivotal communities instead face neglect from their leaders. The core dynamics that make these two countries worth comparing form a mix of ethnic politics, clientelism, and starkly divergent competitive environments within their different constituencies. To varying degrees, each component of this mix features into the distributive politics throughout both the Middle East and the developing world more generally.¹¹ I intend to clarify and elaborate on these dynamics throughout this book.

1.1.1 Diversity and Development

Ethnic competition has long been suspected of impeding development, and recent cross-national empirical research appears to bear out this suspicion. Beginning with Easterly and Levine's (1997) seminal but controversial paper that connects Africa's slow rate of economic growth to its high degree of ethnic diversity, many studies have linked diversity to underdevelopment via the underprovision of productive public goods, poor macroeconomic policy choice, excessive government consumption, corruption, insecure property rights, and political instability.¹² Although this line of inquiry has identified several intriguing empirical regularities, the microfoundations of these aggregate outcomes are unclear. Most explanations rest on ethnic favoritism in one form or another, but the mechanisms at work remain unsettled because the country-level data support multiple competing causal stories.

¹⁰The speaker is a senior shaykh within the Bakil tribal confederation. Interview, Sanaa, 18 February 2006.

¹¹Binder (1999); Collins (2006); Dagher (1995); Davis (2008); Jabar and Dawod (2003); Joseph (2008); Khoury and Kostiner (1990); Lindholm (1986); Makdisi (2008); Peteet (2008); Richards and Waterbury (1996); Rida (1992).

¹²Alesina et al. (1999, 2000); Alesina and La Ferrara (2005); Annett (2001); Arcand et al. (2000); Collier (1999); Collier and Hoeffler (1998); Easterly and Levine (1997); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Keefer and Knack (2002); Knack and Keefer (1995); Mauro (1995, 1998); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005).

When accounting for undesirable development outcomes at the aggregate level, many observers cite ethnocentrism in the political allocation of scarce resources. Invoking ethnocentrism without clarifying its underlying mechanisms, however, simply labels what it purports to explain — it gives a name to a phenomenon without explaining the phenomenon itself.¹³ To date, scholars have identified three broad families of causal mechanisms that can account for ethnocentric behavior.¹⁴ One set of explanations rests on tastes (“what people want”), another on technology (“ease of use”), and a third on strategic selection (“self-fulfilling prophecies”). Let me briefly overview each of these families in turn; I will return in depth to the connections between them later on in the book (Chapter **XXXX**).

The first family of mechanisms rests on individual tastes and preferences. Simplistic versions of these arguments claim that people have a natural affinity for coethnics and consequently prefer to cooperate with them.¹⁵ In addition to approaching tautology, such explanations have been largely discredited in recent generations of the academic literature and find little support in the empirical data.¹⁶ A more compelling version of the argument, in contrast, holds that people cooperate with coethnics not simply because they are coethnics, but rather because they share similar tastes in outcomes. Nonetheless, it is not immediately apparent how to apply this claim to competition over material resources — e.g., why people should have diverging preferences over infrastructure such as schools on the basis of ethnicity rather than income or residential location.¹⁷ Nor is it clear why people would rely on ethnicity as opposed to some other information to identify others with similar tastes. On their own, then, tastes-based explanations get us to ethnic favoritism largely by fiat, but without also explaining why the favoritism is specifically *ethnic*.

An alternate set of mechanisms rests on information technology: coethnics have more information about each other than do members of different ethnicities.¹⁸ According to this explanation, social networks are much denser within ethnic groups, with many more interactions (and types of interactions) occurring within networks than between them. In-group links are thus more efficient than those between groups because in-group members have more information (direct or indirect) about each other, which in turn makes it easier to monitor each other’s activities and sanction misbehavior. The mechanism’s weak point,

¹³Hardin (1995, 149) elaborates on this point.

¹⁴Alesina et al. (1999); Habyarimana et al. (2009); Miguel and Gugerty (2005).

¹⁵A slightly more developed version of the natural affinity argument is that people hold other-regarding preferences (altruism) for their coethnics, although why altruism should be directed specifically at coethnics is usually left unspecified beyond occasional invocations of evolutionary biology (Hammond and Axelrod, 2006; van den Berghe, 1978). While we might be able to imagine such a mechanism functioning within small-scale kin groups, it is difficult to imagine how it could apply (directly, at least) to large-scale ethnic groups in which two randomly-selected members are, for all practical purposes, unrelated.

¹⁶For an overview of the theoretical debates, see Varshney (2003, 2007). For empirics, see Habyarimana et al. (2009).

¹⁷Alesina et al. (1999, 2000).

¹⁸Fearon and Laitin (1996); Greif (1994); Habyarimana et al. (2009); Miguel (2004); Miguel and Gugerty (2005).

however, is that it describes the benefits of a network without adequately explaining why *ethnic* links are denser than, say, those in a village, neighborhood, or workplace. On its own, then, the technology mechanism clarifies why people would prefer to interact within their networks, but does not explain why those networks must be ethnically based.

The last family of explanations posits a strategic selection mechanism in which people select coethnic partners because they expect coethnics to cooperate with each other and non-coethnics not to do so.¹⁹ The mechanism consequently rests on a posited self-reinforcing equilibrium, although its origins are usually left unspecified. Yet, for in-group members, this equilibrium is a valuable public good whose provision and maintenance should consequently suffer from collective action problems. By itself, this family cannot explain why the cooperative outcome does not collapse under the weight of opportunistic deviations. Nor does it explain why the equilibrium coalesces around ethnicity as opposed to some other social category such as occupation.²⁰

These various explanations all purport to account for what we observe as ethnic favoritism, although some claims are more compelling and empirically better supported than others.²¹ Nevertheless, each of them in isolation fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for ethnic favoritism, if for no other reason than that they do not explain why the favoritism should be specifically ethnic. Moreover, these explanations attempt to account for greater within-group cooperation in the abstract. Many observers, however, have argued that ethnicity becomes especially salient in the context of competition over material resources.²² Consequently, we must understand how greater cooperation in the abstract translates into political constituencies and the political allocation of scarce resources among them. In jumping from social links to political ones, it helps to examine the phenomenon of clientelism as one prominent form of political linkage. Subsequently, we can then synthesize theories of ethnicity and clientelism to produce the main argument of the book.

1.1.2 Clientelism and Development

What links politicians to their constituents? In the abstract, we commonly imagine that politicians offer policy programs that spell out what they intend to offer constituents in exchange for the latter's political support. Ideologies and party labels, in turn, summarize the contents of the programs and translate them into convenient, easily-understood heuristic shortcuts. As attractive as this idealized story may be, however, programmatic linkages are *not* the primary

¹⁹Chandra (2004); Habyarimana et al. (2009); Horowitz (1985).

²⁰Moreover, the strategic selection mechanism shares with the tastes-based explanations the risk of being tautological: coethnics interact with coethnics because coethnics interact with coethnics.

²¹Habyarimana et al. (2007, 2009) find significant empirical support at the individual level for the technology and strategic selection mechanisms, but no evidence that the simple tastes mechanism operates. Also see Miguel (2004) and Miguel and Gugerty (2005) for evidence consistent with technology and strategic selection.

²²Bates (1974, 1983); Chandra (2004); Collier (1999); Fearon (1999); Horowitz (1985, 1999).

mechanisms connecting most of the world's population to most of the world's politicians. In many developing societies, clientelism, rather than programs, links politicians to their constituents.²³

Patron-client relationships are widespread in both the fragile, uninstitutionalized democracies as well as the electoral autocracies of the developing world. In such environments, party programs are frequently non-credible, uninformative, or non-existent, hence sharply curtailing the effectiveness of programmatic linkages.²⁴ Although parties may trumpet their ideologies in the relevant venues, only a few "true believers" expect them to pursue (much less fulfill) their programs when in office. The vast bulk of voters, in contrast, heavily discount programmatic promises. Without credible programs to link voters to the "labor party" or the "agrarian party" or the "party of business," politicians and their constituents link up via clientelism.

Debates over subtypes aside, scholars generally define clientelism as a contingent direct exchange of material rewards for political support. Scholars usually conceptualize the exchange occurring between parties of unequal status. Hence, a relatively powerful or wealthy patron trades material rewards, usually via an intermediary or broker, to a relatively weak or poorly-endowed client for the latter's political support.²⁵ The vote has increasingly become the most prominent resource that the average client can offer as polities increasingly adopt elections, although patrons may also value other forms of support such as participation in rallies or riots, especially when playing a "dual game" to influence institutional rules as well as win electoral support.²⁶ In practice, patrons offer money, a breathtakingly wide range of consumer goods, subsidized school fees, medical care, and utilities, access to government permits and licenses, exemptions from the rule of law, and public employment.²⁷

Clientelism is, consequently, a form of distributive politics, but distinguished from other types by an enforced *quid pro quo*: benefits only reach compliant voters. This emphasis on distributive targeting, in turn, situates clientelism squarely within the ongoing debate over whether parties funnel rewards to their

²³For a discussion of linkages, see Kitschelt (2000, 2010); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007a); Stokes (2007, 2009). For studies of clientelism in advanced economies such as Italy, for example, see Banfield (1958); Chubb (1982); Putnam (1993). On clientelism in Japan, see Cox and Thies (2000); Scheiner (2007).

²⁴Blaydes (2010); Keefer (2005, 2007); Keefer and Vlaicu (2008); Magaloni (2006); Mainwaring (1999).

²⁵Early studies of clientelism by political scientists drew heavily on work from anthropology and sociology, the two disciplines in which the concept of clientelism originated. Perhaps as a result, early generations of theorizing emphasized the affective and face-to-face nature of the patron-client relationship (Powell, 1970; Scott, 1969, 1972; Weingrod, 1968). Later generations, however, have downplayed these elements as non-central to "modern" or "mass" clientelism, in which the number of personal relationships a patron would need to maintain would be far beyond any individual's capacity (Kitschelt, 2000; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007a; Stokes, 2005, 2007). Hence, subsequent work has focused heavily on the role of brokers (Auyero, 1999; Johnson, 1986; Kasara, 2007).

²⁶Cammett (2010); Mainwaring (2003); Schedler (2002).

²⁷Auyero (1999); Bates (1981); Blaydes (2006, 2010); Cammett (2010); Cammett and Issar (2010); Chubb (1982); Jamal (2007); Robinson and Verdier (2003); Schaffer (2007); van de Walle (2007).

core supporters or to swing voters.²⁸ One set of arguments holds that core supporters — either ideological voters or those “on the network” for patronage distribution — are easier to reach and can be rewarded more efficiently.²⁹ Dissenting views argue that “near-median” voters are decisive in elections, so parties target swing rather than core voters because the latter will give their support to the party regardless of rewards.³⁰

Core arguments suffer from two main weaknesses. The first is the main swing voter critique: why indeed would parties pay for votes which they already expect to receive when they could instead floating target voters who could tip the election? Second, if parties really do favor core voters, why then does not everyone become a core supporter and consequently dilute the patronage resources available? Swing voter arguments, in turn, are likewise open to critique. First, there are likely to be relatively few “core ideologues” to be taken for granted where ideology is heavily discounted. Hence, developing world polities that emphasize clientelistic rather than programmatic linkages should lack significant numbers of voters for whom ideology provides an alternative payoff to material rewards. Second, enforcing the clientelistic quid pro quo is likely to be harder among voters less “on the network,” i.e., swing voters. Swing voters may be valuable to the patron in principle, but may be unable to make credible commitments to uphold their end of the rewards-for-support bargain.

Targeted rewards and quid pro quos are central features of clientelism. Connecting these components to ethnic politics means understanding how ethnicity facilitates precision targeting and enforceable exchanges of rewards for support. In the context of doing so, we can also conceptualize how ethnicity defines the otherwise ambiguous sets of core and swing voters, and whether or not there can be a swing within the core.

1.1.3 Ethnicity and Clientelism

How can we connect what we know about ethnicity with what we know about clientelism? Even though they are distinct concepts, a voluminous body of evidence documents ethnic favoritism in the allocation of material resources — which certainly appears to confirm that there is an empirical affinity between ethnicity and clientelism. Ethnicity seems to be about how politicians define their constituencies, and clientelism is about how they service and maintain those constituencies. Why, though, would a patron prefer an ethnic clientele over some other kind?

In the electoral marketplace, a vote is a vote regardless of who casts it, so politicians must have some auxiliary reasons for cultivating coethnic support.

²⁸A formal literature continues to investigate the conditions under which a party would favor one strategy over the other (Cox, 2010; Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Gans-Morse et al., 2009; Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987), and a growing empirical literature finds support for both predictions (Blaydes, 2010; Calvo and Murillo, 2004; Cammett, 2010; Fleck, 1999, 2001; Magaloni, 2006; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005).

²⁹There is considerable ambiguity in what defines a “core voter” (Calvo and Murillo, 2009; Cox, 2010; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). I return to this point later.

³⁰Dekel et al. (2008); Stokes (2005).

Similarly for constituents, a job is a job, a road is a road, and a bag of rice is a bag of rice, all regardless of who supplies it. Constituents, too, must have some additional reasons for supporting coethnic politicians. If the commodities being traded — votes and material rewards — are valuable independently of who supplies them, ethnicity’s contribution must come from facilitating trades, not in determining what gets traded.

Let us return briefly to the three families of mechanisms that purport to explain ethnic cooperation and consider how they may be leveraged into a political relationship. Tastes mechanisms do not apply directly — a vote is a vote, a job is a job — unless we wish to throw up our hands and accept the tautology that coethnics support each other because they want to do so.³¹ In contrast, information technology mechanisms make exchanges between coethnics cheaper to transact than those between non-coethnics, while strategic selection mechanisms make those exchanges more credible. According to these latter explanations, ethnic clientelism emerges either because it is more efficient (lower transaction costs) or because it is more credible (expected exchanges become self-fulfilling). There is, of course, a certain amount of hand-waving that goes into the invocation of these two claims: *why* is it easier to monitor coethnics, and why do expectations emerge around shared ethnicity rather than some other shared trait?

Let us also return briefly to the “core versus swing” debate from explanations of distributive politics. Given the stylized facts of ethnic favoritism, ethnic constituencies seem to follow the core model: politicians reward their core, coethnic supporters and do not bother to expend resources on non-coethnics. Taking this dynamic to its logical conclusion, in fact, there should be no swing voters at all when all constituencies are ethnically based because people cannot “swing” between ethnic groups.³² Yet our conceptions of the core and swing sets are already ambiguous,³³ so to make them useful in understanding ethnic constituencies we need to clarify who these groups of people are. As I will suggest below, it helps to conceptualize swing voters as those with an outside option or an alternate bidder for their votes — which turns out to be a crucial distinction in determining which constituents do and do not receive lucrative rewards for their support.

Observing ethnically-based clientelism, and explaining the mechanisms that support it, does not yet tell us much about how the benefits of coethnicity are

³¹In Chapter **XXXX**, I consider in more detail two more compelling tastes-based claims for why constituents support coethnics (although they are silent on why rewards flow in the other direction). The first is that politicians can supply identity goods such as dignity or recognition (Varshney, 2003). The second is that clients can bask in the reflected status of their patrons (Chandra, 2004). Although we can surely find individuals for whom these appeals are strong motivations (or who say so, at any rate), these explanations suffer from unconsidered collective action problems. In brief: identity and status are club goods that have the characteristic of public goods for everyone in the club. Consequently, we should expect constituents to free-ride on each other, letting their peers provide the identity good while each individually votes for a privately-consumed benefit.

³²Compare the “election as census, census as election” observations in Chandra (2004); Ferree (2006); Horowitz (1985); Kertzer and Arel (2002); Maktabi (1999).

³³Calvo and Murillo (2009).

shared out between patrons and clients. Rewards may indeed flow along ethnic lines, but we cannot yet explain when the flow is a deluge and when it is a mere trickle. It is much easier to understand why constituents support their coethnic politicians when the rewards for doing so are lucrative than miserly. Yet pittance are frequently what constituents get — why do they tolerate it? And how can politicians get away with it? This book’s answer is ethnic vote monopsonies, the theory of which I sketch below.

1.2 The Argument

Under what conditions must elites promote the welfare of their coethnic mass constituents, and when can they take those same constituents for granted by offering them cheap rewards for their political support? This book argues that competition within ethnic groups, or the lack thereof, explains who elites can neglect and who they cannot. Defining constituencies with ascriptive membership rules cuts off constituents’ exit options and makes them captive audiences for their coethnic elites. Enforcing in-group unity, in turn, cuts out the electoral competition that would otherwise bid up the value of their votes. When hegemonic elites can form ethnic monopsonies, they become the sole credible buyers of their coethnics’ votes. Favoritism and neglect are joint outcomes of this constituency-building process. Elites favor their coethnics *because* their votes are cheap. Constituents, in turn, tolerate their meager rewards because they have little choice in the matter.

1.2.1 Uncertainty in Clientelistic Exchange

As sketched above, clientelism is a prominent mechanism linking politicians to their constituents in the developing world where programmatic linkages are non-credible and ineffective. Clientelism is a form of distributive politics that revolves around the contingent exchange of material resources and political support. It heavily emphasizes the quid pro quo of the exchange. Enforced reciprocity means that patrons employ what Magaloni (2006) has called a “punishment regime” in which they funnel benefits to compliant supporters and withdraw them from deviants. They emphasize this regime because clientelistic exchange occurs against a backdrop of potential opportunism that, if unchecked, would collapse the possibility of exchange.

Both patrons and clients face temptations to cheat each other in every transaction, the patron by taking the client’s vote and withholding the payoff, and the client by taking the patron’s reward and staying home. They transact in a strategic environment akin to a prisoner’s dilemma: exchange makes both better off, but both also face incentives to renege on their partners. Both, consequently, have incentives to develop mechanisms to make their promises of exchange credible. Nonetheless, several important asymmetries in the relationship compel the patron in particular to invest in tools to operate the punishment regime efficiently.

The first asymmetry is market power. There are many clients and few patrons, and the latter have incentives to economize on keeping track of their many patron–client relationships. Second, the nominally secret ballot yields asymmetric observability. Clients can more easily confirm when they have received minor tangible rewards (e.g., a bag of rice) than can patrons confirm their clients’ vote choices. Third, social norms against vote trafficking favor the client. Those who “take the money and run” receive social plaudits, while patrons who offer to buy, much less try to enforce the agreement, are villified for desecrating the sanctity of the ballot. Consequently, patrons face especially strong incentives to internalize the cost of building the machinery to operate the punishment regime in an efficient manner.

1.2.2 Monitoring, Machines, and Go-Betweens

One prominent resolution to the prisoner’s dilemma in theory, and opportunism in clientelistic exchange in practice, has been to embed individual, episodic exchanges in ongoing relationships with repeated interactions.³⁴ Under these conditions, the shadow of the future deters defection in the present as the fear of foregone future rewards outweigh one-shot opportunistic gains. Maintaining such relationships is not costless, however, and both parties to the exchange prefer to keep maintenance costs as low as possible. Patrons, who must keep track of large numbers of dyadic relationships, faces particularly strong incentives to build machines in order to leverage economies of scale and keep unit maintenance costs down.

The patron’s organizational machinery serves double-duty as both a monitoring mechanism and a tool to distribute rewards. In its former capacity, the machine keeps track of clients’ behavior and keeps the patron informed about their reliability and expected compliance with the clientelistic contract. In doing so, it reduces the patron’s uncertainty about the exchange. By making the patron more willing to transact exchanges, better monitoring also encourages clients to comply because their actions are less likely to be misconstrued — either as defection when clients are trying to comply, or compliance when they are trying to defect.

Machines also have a more benign face that complements the implicit threat communicated by their monitoring functions. In particular, they serve as the delivery mechanisms through which patrons distribute rewards on a day-to-day basis.³⁵ Machines consequently help lower the transaction costs associated with distribution. In the process, they embed clients in ongoing relationships that provide desirable benefits alongside implicit threats to withdraw those benefits from wayward clients.³⁶ In providing positive inducements, machines maintain

³⁴Auyero (1999); Axelrod (1984); Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007a); Kreps et al. (1982); Scott (1969, 1972).

³⁵Auyero (1999); Despres (2005); McCaffery (1993); Riordon (1905); Stokes (2005); Werner (1928).

³⁶Machines consequently differ in an important way from domestic spy services such as the East German Stasi or the famed Arab *mukhabarat* in that they are simultaneously the

patron–client relationships and make the client want to comply rather than simply fear to defect.

Patrons commonly embed their machines deeply into clients’ social networks, which is usually seen as a means for the machines to monitor clients. Doing so, however, serves a complementary function: it helps clients monitor their patrons, albeit largely on the patron’s terms. More specifically, it enables clients to confirm the patron’s largesse because information about rewards paid out spreads throughout the clients’ social networks. This information helps other in-network clients verify that the patron is providing rewards as promised. It also serves as a publicity tool to recruit other voters on the social network by providing trustworthy evidence of the benefits of supporting the patron. Consequently, embedding machines in social networks helps patrons to maintain their links with core supporters as well as attract swing voters with credible expectations of rewards.

1.2.3 Clientelism and Ethnic Networks

Machines reduce uncertainty and transaction costs by embedding themselves deeply in clients’ social networks. Left in the abstract, this dynamic could, in principle, apply to *any* such network, whether based on ethnicity, occupation, school, hobby, or whatever else. Nonetheless, ethnicity crops up repeatedly in different societies as the network of choice over its alternatives. Structurally, ethnic links make clientelism more efficient by facilitating in-network information transmission even as they limit information flows across networks. Lower transaction costs within ethnic groups compared to across them, in turn, makes clientelistic linkages relatively more efficient within groups.

We commonly assert — without much follow-up — that ethnic groups provide members with dense social networks. The unsettling part of this claim, of course, is that we rarely specify the mechanisms through which these networks operate. But ethnic groups at high levels of aggregation are far too large to coincide with members’ personal, day-to-day networks. Ethnic groups are, instead, imagined communities: most members will never meet each other, so cannot directly be part of a dense network.³⁷ Yet we need not imagine that an entire ethnic group constitutes a single, all-encompassing social network, with everyone capable of learning about everyone else with minimal cost. Instead, they are amalgamations of smaller networks, internally dense and more loosely connected to each other.

Ethnic groups at high levels of aggregation are descent-based identity categories. They are, in turn, subdivided into smaller units at lower levels of aggregation in which “descent” becomes progressively less putative or imaginary. These lower-level units are often extended families, which often concentrate residentially and are highly connected socially.³⁸ Consequently, networks at lower

instruments of rewards as well as threats.

³⁷Anderson (1983).

³⁸Readers may notice some parallels to anthropology’s old segmentary lineage models that have subsequently been subject to criticism (Caton, 1987; Dresch, 1986, 1988; Gellner and

levels of aggregation are better suited to serve as monitoring and distributive channels as compared to broader identity categories that encompass more people than could reasonably be connected “densely.” Employing ethnic networks, then, really means employing the smaller units within the ethnic group, even if observationally the smaller units aggregate into the appearance of ethnic networks.³⁹

To the degree that people’s social networks are densest at small level units, and those units are embedded within a broader ethnicity, information flows are much stronger and cheaper within ethnic groups than across them, and with brokers from the lower-level units acting as go-betweens. For patrons, it is comparatively more costly to monitor clients and distribute rewards to them if they are not on the network. For clients, it is harder to verify that out-of-network patrons are paying out rewards as promised, so they too find it easier to monitor a coethnic rather than a non-coethnic patron. Consequently, the information technology mechanism gives rise to the strategic selection mechanism — people have different access to information and select their partners based on better information.

Hence, we can locate the microfoundations for the strategic selection mechanism in the technology mechanism: ethnic favoritism arises from structural conditions that reduce transaction costs. Ethnic networks are internally dense and enable patrons and clients to monitor each other more cheaply when both are on the same network. Patrons do not bother to patronize non-coethnics because the transaction costs to doing so are higher. Clients, in turn, are proven right if their expectations that they cannot get rewards from non-coethnic patrons because they never observe such exchanges occurring. In equilibrium, we consequently observe ethnic favoritism because the structure of ethnic networks reduces the transaction costs to clientelistic exchange relations within networks to the degree that exchanges outside of the networks are comparatively too inefficient to be worthwhile.

1.2.4 Ethnic Monopsonies and the Captured Core

Ethnic networks thus facilitate clientelistic exchange by reducing transaction costs. Because those costs are lower between coethnics than between members of different ethnicities, they maintain the strategic selection mechanism that we observe as ethnic favoritism. The label “favoritism” can, however, be misleading because it loosely implies favorable terms to the exchange for clients. So far, however, nothing in the dynamics of the exchange relationship speaks to how the benefits of the exchange are divided up between the patron and the client. Importantly, though, ethnic vote markets suffer from imperfect competition —

Munson, Jr., 1995). My point is not to take sides in that debate, but rather to draw on the insight that “common descent” can be an inclusive concept but made more exclusive by successively narrowing the criteria that make it common to members.

³⁹Note that this contention is consistent with the often-remarked factionalism that exists within ethnic groups, and the propensity of patrons to exclude lower level units that are nominally part of the latter’s ethnic groups.

potentially a boon for buyers and a penalty for sellers.

Recall that one of the key defining features of ethnic constituencies is that an ascriptive, descent-like membership rule defines who is and is not a constituent. Ascription, in turn, implies that there is little to no boundary permeability between groups — unlike voluntary organizations, people cannot join or leave at will. Ascription consequently reduces the scope for opportunism and makes rewards-for-votes bargains more credible, hence facilitating exchange. It also, however, effectively cuts off constituents' entry and exit options and restricts them to selling only to coethnics. Consequently, clients cannot easily go shopping for alternate patrons outside their ethnic group, because they cannot easily change their ethnicity.

Emphasis on ethnic clienteles effectively cuts off interethnic competition for votes, and politicians cater only to their core (coethnic) supporters. In the absence of interethnic competition between buyers, however, the degree of market power that patrons enjoy — the ability to set prices, quantities, and price discriminate between sellers — depends crucially on the degree of *intraethnic* competition for clients. Returning to the language of the core versus swing voter debate, we can pose a fundamental question: has the core been captured, or is there a set of swing voters within the core?

When intraethnic competition between patrons exists, that is, when there are multiple credible vote buyers within the community, competing patrons bid up the value of their coethnics' votes. Buyers have less discretion in picking and choosing clients because they need support from as many as they can get to win office, or at least win political influence. In contrast, when competition is absent, there is little incentive for the hegemonic patron to dispense lucrative rewards to constituents. This latter environment constitutes an ethnic vote monopsony. The monopsonist harvests his coethnics' votes on his own terms because he lacks electoral rivals to put the exchange on voters' terms. Ethnic monopsonies consequently approximate what Stokes (2009) has called the single machine assumption — the simplifying proposition that there is just one vote buyer in a given election — while internally competitive communities approximate the dueling machines dynamic.⁴⁰

The theory of ethnic vote monopsonies helps to resolve the seeming contradiction with which I opened the book: how can ethnic favoritism and neglect coexist? Politicians reward their coethnic clients not out of some deep-seated affinity for people they have never met, but because ethnic social networks reduce transaction costs and make it more efficient to conclude rewards-for-support bargains with coethnics than with members of other ethnicities who are off the network. In other words, they patronized coethnics because they can do so more efficiently, which makes their votes cheaper relative to the cost of buying votes from other communities. Moreover, when they can eliminate intraethnic competition — by pushing the importance of “unity,” for example — they can get away with paying far less to their clients in the absence of an electoral impetus to pay more. Mass constituents tolerate such a dynamic not

⁴⁰Gans-Morse et al. (2009); Kitschelt (2010); Nichter (2008); Stokes (2005, 2007, 2009).

because they derive pleasure from watching their “betters” consume the surplus, but because they have little choice in the matter. Lacking viable alternatives, they support their coethnic patrons because even the small rewards are better than no rewards.

1.2.5 Observational Consequences

The above theory sketch lays out my main arguments about ethnic vote monopsonies. Subsequent chapters in the book will develop these claims in more detail, but here I pause for a moment to lay out some of the observational consequences and core working hypotheses that fall out of the book’s overall theory. These hypotheses are conceptual predictions implied by the theory. As I work through the applied component of the book, I will be matching up these core claims to a series of empirical expectations that translate their mid-level abstractions into more specific claims that can be explicitly tested against the data I have collected.

The first major working hypothesis, and the core prediction of the theory, can be stated succinctly as follows:

Working Hypothesis 1 *Constituents in dominated communities receive lower material payoffs than do constituents in internally-competitive communities.*

Mass constituents in monopsonized communities — those dominated by a single vote buying patron — should receive less lucrative payoffs for their political support than constituents in communities that are internally competitive. This core claim follows from the qualitatively different competitive environments that characterize the different communities. Constituents with multiple credible vote buyers from which to choose enjoy a dynamic of patrons competing for, and consequently bidding up the value of, their votes. In the absence of a credible alternative for a community’s votes, in contrast, monopsonists need not fear being outbid by rival patrons and can offer lower, “take it or leave it” payoffs for votes. Monopsonized constituents, consequently, should suffer from comparatively more ethnic neglect than their peers in non-monopsonized communities. In principle, monopsonists’ payoffs should translate to lower purchase prices for votes: poorer public services, cheaper individual handouts, and fewer or lower-paying public employment opportunities.

A second working hypothesis complements the first:

Working Hypothesis 2 *Constituents in dominated communities vary more in the magnitude of their material rewards than do constituents in internally-competitive communities.*

There should be considerably more variability in the magnitude of rewards enjoyed by monopsonized mass constituents as compared to their non-monopsonized peers. This claim follows from the lack of credible electoral competition in the monopsonized community, which grants monopsonists greater discretion over

which clients to target for rewards than politicians in more competitive communities enjoy. Because they do not face electoral pressures to court every voter, monopsonists can be more choosy about which particular voters receive payoffs. Consequently, they have more market power to price discriminate, selecting beneficiaries from their pool of nominal clients on the basis of efficiency considerations. Monopsonists consequently have more leeway to leverage economies of scale in the distribution of club goods, and the discretionary power to target individuals for private rewards with precision. Monopsonized constituents should consequently see considerable variation in who gets what, with subsets of “haves” and “have-nots.”

A third major working hypothesis reinforces the second’s emphasis on the monopsonist’s discretion over who to target for rewards:

Working Hypothesis 3 *Constituents in dominated communities compete with each other for rationed patronage resources.*

We should expect to observe considerably more competition for scarce patronage resources among monopsonized constituents than among constituents in electorally competitive communities. This claim follows from the qualitatively different electoral environments in which patrons and their clients operate. Because monopsonists do not face a credible electoral threat, they do not need the active support of all of their nominal clientele. Consequently, they can reward some clients without rewarding others because the latter lack a credible alternate buyer for their votes. Monopsonists ration the supply of benefits, which requires clients to compete with each other to obtain a portion of the limited patronage that monopsonists dispense. This dynamic implies that monopsonized constituents should turn up in droves for rallies and demonstrations and express slavish, sycophantic admiration for their patrons — but usually with an eye to the material payoff. Hence, monopsonies should be characterized by perverse competition in which voters compete for patronage rather than politicians compete for votes.

Hence, the theory of ethnic monopsonies makes at least three broad predictions that can be tested empirically. First, monopsonized constituents should receive fewer benefits than do constituents in other communities. Second, monopsonists should be able to price discriminate more than their peers in electorally competitive communities, so have the discretion to target rewards much more precisely. Finally, given the discretion enjoyed by monopsonists, their nominal clients should find themselves forced to compete with one another to earn the patronage that the monopsonist rations out. How, though, do these predictions fare when put to the test in applied settings? Let us turn now to a sketch of the book’s empirics to find out.

1.3 The Evidence

The empirical study of ethnic politics in the developing world has long concentrated in Africa along with a few “usual suspects” beyond the continent,

notably India, Indonesia, and Malaysia.⁴¹ Despite this seeming affinity between concept and region, however, ethnic politics is far from region-specific. We observe it, for example, in the indigenous politics in Latin America, clan politics in the Central Asian states, and the more familiar racial and linguistic divisions found in some of the advanced industrial democracies such as the United States, Canada, or Belgium.⁴² Empirical studies of clientelism, in turn, have long been dominated by Latin America, where the phenomenon holds special salience in the region's politics.⁴³ Nonetheless, clientelism is simply a linkage mechanism rather than a Latin American perversion, and has been studied extensively in patronage democracies like India, wealthier states like Japan and Italy, and in electoral autocracies like Egypt and Jordan.⁴⁴ This book, in turn, combines ethnic politics and clientelism in the Middle East, where day-to-day clientelistic politics helps to sustain durable, long-standing regimes.⁴⁵

In particular, I focus on two key empirical venues in the Arab world: Lebanon and Yemen. The former was itself one of the “usual suspects” in the study of both ethnic politics and clientelism until its civil war took Lebanon off of most scholars' agendas.⁴⁶ The latter is a largely unknown empirical quantity outside of anthropology.⁴⁷ Clientelism and ethnic politics are central in both countries, and the varying competitive environments that prevail in their different communities provide an empirical treasure trove with which to make both within-venue and cross-venue comparisons.

1.3.1 Why Lebanon and Yemen?

Lebanon and Yemen are two fragile Arab countries whose geopolitical importance — the former the home to Hizballah, the latter a feared haven for al-Qaida — has usually overshadowed their inevitably more prosaic domestic politics. Lebanon uses a mixture of consociational power-sharing principles to manage cleavages within its diverse polity alongside elections of varying degrees of cleanliness to allocate formal political power. Yemen, in turn, began its post-unification era as a potential democracy but has increasingly shifted to a dominant party electoral autocracy. Although each country's governing institutions have persisted over time, neither regime is consolidated insofar as their institutions are always on the table. Moreover, programs and ideologies do not mean much to most people. Instead politicians and voters largely rely

⁴¹Chandra (2004); Wilkinson (2006); Varshney (2002).

⁴²Lijphart (1977); Van Cott (2007a,b).

⁴³Auyero (1999); Brusco et al. (2004); Calvo and Murillo (2004, 2009); Greene (2007); Magaloni (2006); Stokes (2005).

⁴⁴Blaydes (2010); Chandra (2004); Chubb (1982); Lust-Okar (2005).

⁴⁵Blaydes (2010); Brownlee (2007); Jamal (2007); Lust-Okar (2005).

⁴⁶Post-war Lebanon is, however, reemerging as a viable venue for studying clientelism (Cammatt, 2010; Cammett and Issar, 2010; Nizameddin, 2006; Perthes, 1997; Saleh and Harvie, 2005; Salti and Chaaban, 2010).

⁴⁷Holding aside local scholars for the moment, recent work by political scientists includes Alley (2010); Browsers (2007); Burrowes (1987); Carapico (1998); Colton (2010); Schwedler (2006); Wedeen (2008).

on clientelistic linkages, with elections providing an episodic means to regularize the distribution of resources to clients.

Clientelism is consequently a prominent feature of both societies' politics. In turn, coethnicity of one form or another serves as a prominent link between patrons and clients. In Lebanon, sect has long been the country's most prominent cleavage. In Yemen, meanwhile, tribes have long been central political actors, with tribal influence in turn correlating strongly with more encompassing sectarian and regional groupings. Although the parties of both countries invariably engage in rhetorical flourishes about pursuing programmatic interests — and denigrating the idea of catering to “backwards” or “pre-modern” constituencies like sects or tribes — they nonetheless base their linkages along ethnic lines to large degrees. These are, of course simplifications of a much more complex reality. Later in the book, however, I intend to motivate these claims in more detail and show that they are indeed useful simplifications for understanding politics in these two countries.

As comparative venues, Lebanon and Yemen are particularly attractive because each has qualitatively different competitive environments within their different communities. In particular, both countries have at least one constituency within which legitimate electoral contestation occurs, albeit not always on a level playing field. Each also has at least one constituency that is more or less “unified” behind a single, hegemonic leader. Consequently, both countries have ethnic monopsonists who approximate the single-machine assumption and do not face viable electoral competition, as well as internally competitive communities that better fit the dueling machines dynamic in which there is credible political contestation.

In Lebanon, a Sunni vote monopsony emerged from the country's civil war in the early-1990s and peaked in its dominance after the 2005 “Beirut Spring” — events themselves sparked by the Sunni leader's assassination followed by the ascension of his son to the community's leadership. Shia voters, in contrast, enjoyed viable clientelistic alternatives between the two main Shia parties, even after the traditional rivals closed ranks to form a collusive alliance after 2005. Christians, meanwhile, witnessed fierce competition between rival leaders and parties for Christian popular support. These are of course simplifications, and later in the book I will lay out how close the communities are to the ideal types. For now, however, the key point is that we observe qualitatively different competitive environments within the different constituencies. The Sunni community has approximated the monopsonistic, single-machine environment, while the other big communities better approximate the internally competitive, dueling machines condition.

In Yemen, meanwhile, the ruling party has progressively developed a vote monopsony in the heavily tribal Zaydi Shia community, systematically buying up the loyalty of tribal leaders and freezing out alternatives for Zaydi votes. Meanwhile, it continues to contest the loyalty of the country's Sunni majority — some tribal, some not — with the opposition. Although Yemeni elections are inequitable and resemble those held in other electoral autocracies, the various opposition parties offer legitimate alternatives for Sunni voters, even as the or-

ganized Zaydi factions of the opposition have largely disappeared. Again, these are simplifications that I will motivate in greater detail later in the book. In the meantime, the takeaway point is that, like Lebanon, Yemen boasts both a vote monopsony as well as a community within which credible political alternatives exist.

Empirically, the presence of both vote monopsonies and electorally competitive communities in each country venue provides substantial inferential advantages. First, it enables us to compare and contrast the dynamics in the different competitive environments within each country in a broadly controlled environment. Doing so allows us to hold a variety of institutional and cultural influences constant. This degree of control, although imperfect, increases our confidence that the differences we observe between the constituencies actually are products of their differing competitive environments rather than some other confounding factor.

Second, we can also compare and contrast the differences in dynamics across the two country venues. Doing so helps us probe the generalizability of the findings. Should the basic dynamics replicate in two different societies, we can be more confident that the findings reflect systematic political processes rather than a country-specific luck of the draw. Variations on the basic themes I am proposing, in turn, can suggest additional factors worth examining in future research and other venues.

1.3.2 Data and Methods

The empirical evidence I use in this book comes from a variety of primary and secondary source data. I gathered the former during approximately two years of field research spread over several trips to both countries. These included site visits to Lebanon in the spring of 2005, summer of 2008, and spring of 2009, and analogous trips to Yemen in winter of 2004–2005, from summer 2005 to summer 2006, and spring of 2010. I gathered secondary sources, considerably more sparse for Yemen than Lebanon, in between field visits. Moreover, I made use of the countries’ newspapers and online news agencies — even Yemen’s are web-accessible — to keep abreast of domestic events.

By necessity, I have employed mixed methods in collecting and analyzing the data used in this book.⁴⁸ The “necessity” reflects a nod to practical data limitations. What information is available in and about these two countries is scattered, fragmented, and sometimes of questionable reliability, whether the data are qualitative or quantitative in nature. I have consequently mixed these two basic types of evidence in the hopes that each will tell enough of the story

⁴⁸ “Mixed methods” have become fashionable in recent years in the study of comparative politics, both for laudable and not so laudable reasons. In the former case, mixed methods enable scholars to triangulate: each data collection regime addresses some questions well and others poorly, and the hope is that each method will complement the others. In the less laudable sense, however, “mixed methods” sometimes gets held up as a talisman by scholars who prefer quantitative (qualitative) methods when confronted by epistemological criticisms from their qualitative (quantitative) counterparts. It is our own scholarly analogue to the Hand of Fatima.

to advance the argument when called upon. The qualitative data have been most helpful in illuminating the elite side of the story: what the patrons and parties are doing. The quantitative, survey-based evidence, in turn, has been indispensable in piecing together the client's side of the story: who gets what, and how much.

The qualitative data come in a variety of forms, including elite interviews, newspaper coverage, party literature, government publications, and classic soak-and-poke immersion. The last of these more than compensated with comprehension for what it lacks in a dignified label and, in particular, helped me understand which questions were worth asking and how to ask them — advantages that extended, in turn, to the surveys. The qualitative sources were primarily helpful for understanding the elite side of the story and, to a degree, what elites think that mass constituents think. The most important sources for understanding dynamics among elites were, unsurprisingly, the elites themselves. I gathered these data via over 100 interviews of political party leaders and operatives, tribal shaykhs, religious figures, civil society activists, journalists, parliamentarians, ministers, and various other government officials. I restrict attribution for all interviewees to studiously vague occupation and seniority even when their statements appear unremarkable — the intent is to provide cover for those statements that are sensitive.⁴⁹

The quantitative data for this book, which I use extensively in later chapters to examine the client's side of the story, come from original mass attitude surveys I conducted in both field sites. Both surveys were nationally representative and utilized face-to-face interviews and comparable questionnaires. The Lebanon survey comprises 1000 respondents, with the sample drawn and interviews administered by Beirut-based MADMA Co. in the fall of 2005. The Yemen survey, in turn, includes 1440 respondents, with the sample drawn and interviews conducted by the Sanaa-based Yemen Polling Center in the spring of 2007.⁵⁰ These data provide systematic and comparable evidence of what mass

⁴⁹Politics is a gentleman's sport in neither Lebanon nor Yemen. A number of interviewees had previously been exiled, and a non-trivial number of them have either been threatened with or subjected to violence or legal trouble for their politics. Moreover, some interviewees keep their livelihoods only by remaining in the good graces of their superiors, not all of whom would be enthusiastic about what their subordinates have to say behind closed doors. I hope, at any rate, that I have provided all of my interviewees with that most valuable of resources under such circumstances: plausible deniability.

⁵⁰Given its relatively small and compact size, I sampled from all provinces in Lebanon. Yemen is much larger and more spread out, and for practicality I drew the sample from a random draw of approximately half the provinces whose chances of inclusion in the sample were directly proportional to their population sizes. I imposed two auxiliary constraints on the province sampling, however. First, at least one province needed to come from those that constituted the former southern republic. Second, safety concerns required that we not include the northern province of Saada, the location of the on-again, of-again Houthi insurgency. Although technically excluding Saada makes the survey less representative of the national population, the province itself is sparsely populated and would have only contributed a small handful of respondents to the sample. Moreover, there are several other provinces in the sample that are heavily Zaydi and heavily tribal, so the inferential concerns should be minimal. Ultimately, the provinces sampled were Aden and Hadramawt (both formerly in the southern republic), Taiz, Ibb, Hajjah, Hudayda, Dhamar, Amran, Marib, and Sanaa city.

constituents experience in their relations to their political patrons.

1.3.3 Empirical Expectations and Findings

Given the competitive dynamics in these two field venues, what should we expect to observe in the data? Vote monopsonies should reduce the welfare of regular people in both societies. We should, in principle, be able to detect these welfare reductions by comparing monopsonized constituents side by side with their peers from more internally competitive communities. Consequently, Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis should be broadly comparable to one another and should differ in predictable ways from their co-nationals who are not subject to the same monopsony environment. The core expectation, then, is that Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis should receive cheaper material payoffs than their respective co-nationals.

The first major test of this expectation looks for variation in constituents' access to basic infrastructure and government services. Specifically, it examines electricity and piped water coverage, two basic utilities that citizens of the developed world can take for granted but residents of the developing world cannot. In Lebanon and Yemen, rare are the individuals who do not encounter interruptions in their supply of basic utilities on an almost daily basis. The first test examines whether community membership helps to explain the frequency of service interruptions. The data reveal that, on average, Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis go without electricity and water more often than their co-nationals — but with an important caveat connected to their patrons' discretionary capacity to target payoffs.

Targeting is, of course, a central dynamic in clientelistic politics. Another central hypothesis that falls out of the overall argument claims that monopsonists are relatively free to exercise discretion in where and to whom to target rewards on account of their insulation from competitive pressures. Greater scope for discretion, in turn, frees them to deploy their patronage resources with greater efficiency, serving only select subsets of their nominal constituencies. Consequently, we should expect monopsonists to concentrate their dispensations of club goods in discrete, homogeneous localities where the benefits accrue only to supporters without risk of dissipating them on non-supporters. Moreover, we should also expect monopsonists to swap out club goods in favor of privately-consumed rewards (e.g., jobs) in mixed areas, reserving the latter for localities in which they prefer to target clients more precisely.

The public utilities data, in turn, reveal patterns of interruption consistent with the expectations about targeting. For the electricity and water supply, it is indeed the case that Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis get poorer services — in the urban areas. Their rural cosectarians, meanwhile, have their services interrupted less often. Rural constituents are, in key respects, better clients. In addition to being easier to monitor, most villages tend to be homogeneous

Stratification was based on preliminary figures from the 2004 census down to the village or city neighborhood level, with respondents sampled via a random-walk pattern.

and consequently are attractive locations to deploy club goods. Hence, efficient monopsonists leverage patronage economies of scale — and clients' lowered expectations — by targeting better services to the rural areas.

I find additional, more refined evidence of targeting in Lebanon, for which I have more detailed data on the locations of constituent concentrations derived from voter rolls. First, the data reveal that Sunni-dominant electoral districts suffer more interruptions to their utilities than do other districts. While particular villages may escape the worst of the monopsony penalty, the districts overall suffer from neglect. Second, Sunnis living in homogeneous neighborhoods are less likely to hold government jobs than their cosectarians living in mixed neighborhoods. The latter finding substantiates the expectation that the monopsonist has greater discretion to toggle between club and privately-consumed rewards as needed, with the former going to homogeneous areas and the latter to mixed ones.

The luxury that monopsonists enjoy to target payoffs also changes the relationship dynamics between patrons and clients in a subtle but important way: who is competing to impress whom. The final working hypothesis posits that monopsonized constituents must compete with one another for patronage much more explicitly than their peers in competitive communities. Monopsonists, largely freed from electoral pressure, do not need votes from all their nominal constituents to retain office and so can be selective in which clients they patronize. The result is perverse competition: constituents must demonstrate why they, as opposed to their neighbors, should be granted a share of the largesse. Empirically, we should observe Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis making special efforts to attract the attention of their patrons in pursuit of a small share in the spoils.

I use a novel behavioral measure to capture constituent efforts to attract patronage: whether or not they proclaim their loyalty to their patron by publicly displaying a poster or other political symbol outside their homes.⁵¹ The poster data, in turn, align with the general patterns described earlier. In particular, Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis are much more likely than their co-nationals to display such posters the stronger they believe that they need political connections to secure a government job, one of the classic patronage rewards. Meanwhile, there is no evidence that their co-nationals in the more competitive communities display posters for this instrumental reason. The poster evidence suggests that monopsonized constituents in both countries are actively competing with one another for patronage rewards, while their peers in other communities are not.

1.4 Plan of the Book

The plan of the rest of the book is as follows. Chapter **XXXX** develops the theory of ethnic monopsonies that I sketched above. It begins by considering the

⁵¹See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007a) for a brief discussion of public displays of political loyalty.

transaction dilemma that patrons and clients face when they wish to exchange rewards for political support, but must find ways to make credible commitments to each end of the bargain. It next describes how ethnicity helps reduce transaction costs and increase certainty, which facilitates clientelistic exchange. It then shows how basing constituencies on ethnicity produces imperfectly competitive vote markets. Finally, it compares ethnic constituencies with and without intraethnic competition between patrons for clients' votes.

After developing the book's theoretical arguments, I then turn to the empirics. Chapter **XXXX** introduces Lebanon and Yemen as the research venues. It summarizes the historical antecedents to contemporary political constituencies and motivates the continuing importance of sectarian and tribal affiliations in both countries. After bringing the narrative up to present day politics, it traces the development of ethnic vote monopsonies among Lebanese Sunnis and Yemeni Zaydis, leaning heavily on elite interviews to do so.

Next, Chapter **XXXX** explores how ethnicity helps patrons and clients identify and keep track of each other. Using qualitative evidence, I examine how Lebanese use a variety of informational cues to identify each other's sectarian affiliations, which can then be used in the context of keeping track of political clienteles. I then use quantitative evidence from Yemen to explore these ideas more systematically. Here, I employ a novel observational measure, whether or not respondents wear the country's iconic tribal dagger, to examine the ease with which Yemenis can identify each other as tribesmen and Zaydis. These dynamics illustrate with one particular indicator people's capacity in general to use cues and heuristics to identify each other's social category memberships with tolerable accuracy.

I next turn to the empirical heart of the book, which relies centrally on the survey evidence collected in both Lebanon and Yemen. Chapter **XXXX** examines constituent access to basic government-supplied infrastructure — specifically, electricity and piped water in their homes. It finds that members of the monopsonized communities suffer from poorer service provision in the cities, but that this monopsony penalty wanes in the countryside where patrons can deploy club goods to geographically-concentrated supporters without dissipating them on members of other communities. Chapter **XXXX** builds off of these findings with more fine-grained evidence from Lebanon. It shows that monopsonized constituents receive poorer services in districts that they dominate demographically. It also shows that they are more likely to receive rewards in the form of government jobs when they live in mixed areas, indicating that patrons switch over to privately-targetable rewards in areas where club goods would be wasted on non-supporters.

Chapter **XXXX**, the final empirical chapter, explores differences in patronage-seeking behavior among constituents in monopsonized and non-monopsonized communities. It grafts data on public displays of political symbols onto the survey data to examine which people are more or less likely to display political imagery, and why. It finds that monopsonized constituents are considerably more likely to display the political iconography, and that they do so not out of conviction but in pursuit of patronage. Chapter **XXXX** concludes the book

by reviewing the evidence and highlighting potentially productive avenues for future research.

Bibliography

- Alesina, A., R. Baqir, and W. Easterly (1999). Public goods and ethnic divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 114(4), 1243–1284.
- Alesina, A., R. Baqir, and W. Easterly (2000). Redistributive public employment. *Journal of Urban Economics* 48(2), 219–241.
- Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic performance. *Journal of Economic Literature* 43(3), 762–800.
- Alley, A. L. (2010). The rules of the game: Unpacking patronage politics in Yemen. *Middle East Journal* 64(3), 385–409.
- Anderson, B. (1991 [1983]). *Imagined Communities* (Revised ed.). London: Verso.
- Annett, A. (2001). Social fractionalization, political instability, and the size of government. *IMF Staff Papers* 48(3), 561–592.
- Arcand, J.-L., P. Guillaumont, and S. G. Jeanneney (2000). How to make a tragedy: On the alleged effect of ethnicity on growth. *Journal of International Development* 12, 925–938.
- Auyero, J. (1999). ‘From the client’s point(s) of view’: How poor people perceive and evaluate political clientelism. *Theory and Society* 28(2), 297–334.
- Axelrod, R. (1984). *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Banfield, E. C. (1958). *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Bardhan, P. (1997). Corruption and development: A review of issues. *Journal of Economic Literature* 35(3), 1320–1346.
- Bates, R. H. (1974). Ethnic competition and modernization in contemporary Africa. *Comparative Political Studies* 6(4), 457–484.
- Bates, R. H. (1981). *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

- Bates, R. H. (1983). Modernization, ethnic competition, and the rationality of politics in contemporary Africa. In D. Rothchild and V. Olorunsola (Eds.), *State Versus Ethnic Claims: African Policy Dilemmas*, pp. 152–171. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Bhagwati, J. (1982). Directly unproductive, profit-seeking (DUP) activities. *Journal of Political Economy* 90(5), 988–1002.
- Binder, L. (Ed.) (1999). *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Birbir, J. K. (2007). *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Blaydes, L. (2006). Who votes in authoritarian elections and why? Determinants of voter turnout in contemporary Egypt. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Blaydes, L. (2010). *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Forthcoming.
- Boix, C. and S. C. Stokes (Eds.) (2007). *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Browsers, M. (2007). Origins and architects of Yemen's Joint Meeting Parties. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 39(4), 565–586.
- Brownlee, J. (2007). *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brusco, V., M. Nazareno, and S. C. Stokes (2004). Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review* 39(2), 66–88.
- Burrowes, R. D. (1987). *The Yemen Arab Republic: The Politics of Development, 1962-1986*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Calvo, E. and M. V. Murillo (2004). Who delivers? Partisan clients in the Argentine electoral market. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4), 742–757.
- Calvo, E. and M. V. Murillo (2009). Selecting clients: Partisan networks and the electoral benefits of targeted distribution. Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada, September 3–6, 2009.
- Cammett, M. (2010, April). Partisan loyalty and access to welfare in Lebanon. Paper presented at the Democracy and Development Seminar Series, Princeton University.

- Cammett, M. and S. Issar (2010). Bricks and mortar clientelism: Sectarianism and the logics of welfare allocation in Lebanon. *World Politics* 62(3), 381–421.
- Carapico, S. (1998). *Civil Society in Yemen*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Caton, S. C. (1987). Power, persuasion, and language: A critique of the segmentary model in the Middle East. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 19(1), 77–101.
- Chandra, K. (2004). *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Chandra, K. (2006). What is ethnic identity and does it matter? *Annual Review of Political Science* 9, 397–424.
- Chubb, J. (1982). *Patronage, Power, and Poverty in Southern Italy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Collier, P. (1999). The political economy of ethnicity. See Pleskovic and Stiglitz (1999), pp. 387–411.
- Collier, P., V. L. Elliott, H. Hegre, A. Hoeffler, M. Reynal-Querol, and N. Sambanis (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*. Washington: World Bank.
- Collier, P. and A. Hoeffler (1998). On economic causes of civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers* 50(4), 563–573.
- Collins, K. (2006). *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Colton, N. A. (2010). Yemen: A collapsed economy. *Middle East Journal* 64(3), 410–426.
- Coulson, N. J. (1978 [1964]). *A History of Islamic Law*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Cox, G. W. (2010). Swing voters, core voters, and distributive politics. In I. Shapiro, S. C. Stokes, E. J. Wood, and A. S. Kirshner (Eds.), *Political Representation*, pp. 342–357. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cox, G. W. and M. D. McCubbins (1986). Electoral politics as a redistributive game. *Journal of Politics* 48(2), 370–389.
- Cox, G. W. and M. F. Thies (2000). How much does money matter? “buying” votes in Japan, 1967–1990. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(1), 37–57.
- Daghir, V. (1995). *Sectarianism and Human Rights*. Cairo: Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies. Arabic.

- Davis, E. (2008). A sectarian Middle East? *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40(4), 555–558.
- Dekel, E., M. O. Jackson, and A. Wolinsky (2008). Vote buying: General elections. *Journal of Political Economy* 116(2), 351–380.
- Despres, L. M. (2005). *Challenging the Daley Machine: A Chicago Alderman's Memoir*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Dixit, A. and J. Londregan (1996). The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. *Journal of Politics* 58(4), 1132–1155.
- Dresch, P. (1988). Segmentation: Its roots in Arabia and its flowering elsewhere. *Cultural Anthropology* 3(1), 50–67.
- Dresch, P. K. (1986). The significance of the course events take in segmentary systems. *American Ethnologist* 13(2), 309–324.
- Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997). Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112(4), 1203–1250.
- Eifert, B., E. Miguel, and D. N. Posner (2010). Political competition and ethnic identification in africa. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(2), 494–510.
- Ekeh, P. (1975). Colonialism and the two publics in Africa: A theoretical statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 17(1), 91–112.
- Fearon, J. D. (1999, June 16). Why ethnic politics and “pork” tend to go together. Presented at a MacArthur Foundation-sponsored conference on Ethnic Politics and Democratic Stability held at Wilder House, University of Chicago, May 21–23.
- Fearon, J. D. and D. Laitin (1996). Explaining interethnic cooperation. *American Political Science Review* 90(4), 715–735.
- Fearon, J. D. and D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review* 97(1), 75–90.
- Ferree, K. (2006). Explaining South Africa's racial census. *Journal of Politics* 68(4), 803–815.
- Fleck, R. K. (1999). The value of the vote: A model and test of the effects of turnout on distributive policy. *Economic Inquiry* 37(4), 609–623.
- Fleck, R. K. (2001). Inter-party competition, intra-party competition, and distributive policy: A model and test using New Deal data. *Public Choice* 108(1/2), 77–100.
- Gans-Morse, J., S. Mazzuca, and S. Nichter (2009). Who gets bought? Vote buying, turnout buying, and other strategies. *Weatherhead Center for International Affairs Working Paper Series* (09-0006).

- Gellner, E. and H. Munson, Jr. (1995). Segmentation: Reality or myth? *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 1(4), 821–832.
- Greene, K. F. (2007). *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Greif, A. (1994). Cultural beliefs and the organization of society: A historical and theoretical reflection on collectivist and individualist societies. *Journal of Political Economy* 102(5), 912–950.
- Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D. N. Posner, and J. M. Weinstein (2007). Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? *American Political Science Review* 101(4), 709–725.
- Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D. N. Posner, and J. M. Weinstein (2009). *Coethnicity: Diversity and the Dilemmas of Collective Action*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hammond, R. A. and R. Axelrod (2006). The evolution of ethnocentrism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50(6), 926–936.
- Hardin, R. (1995). *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Horowitz, D. L. (1999). Structure and strategy in ethnic conflict: A few steps toward synthesis. See Pleskovic and Stiglitz (1999), pp. 345–385.
- Horowitz, D. L. (2001). *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Huddy, L. (2003). Group identity and political cohesion. In D. O. Sears, L. Huddy, and R. Jervis (Eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology*, pp. 511–558. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jabar, F. A. and H. Dawod (Eds.) (2003). *Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East*. London: Saqi Books.
- Jamal, A. A. (2007). *Barriers to Democracy: The Other Side of Social Capital in Palestine and the Arab World*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Johnson, M. (1986). *Class & Client in Beirut: The Sunni Muslim Community and the Lebanese State 1840–1985*. London: Ithaca Press.
- Joseph, S. (2008). Sectarianism as imagined sociological concept and as imagined social formation. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40(4), 553–554.

- Kasara, K. (2007). Tax me if you can: Ethnic geography, democracy, and the taxation of agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review* 101(1), 159–172.
- Keefer, P. (2005, June). Democratization and clientelism: Why are young democracies badly governed? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3594.
- Keefer, P. (2007). Clientelism, credibility, and the policy choices of young democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 51(4), 804–821.
- Keefer, P. and S. Knack (2002). Polarization, politics and property rights: Links between inequality and growth. *Public Choice* 111, 127–154.
- Keefer, P. and R. Vlaicu (2008). Democracy, credibility, and clientelism. *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization* 24(2), 371–406.
- Kertzer, D. I. and D. Arel (2002). Censuses, identity formation, and the struggle for political power. In D. I. Kertzer and D. Arel (Eds.), *Census and Identity*, pp. 1–42. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Khoury, P. and J. Kostiner (Eds.) (1990). *Tribes and State Formation in the Middle East*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2000). Linkages between citizens and politicians in democratic polities. *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6–7), 845–879.
- Kitschelt, H. (2010, May). Democratic accountability relations: Exploring global patterns. Unpublished Manuscript, Duke University.
- Kitschelt, H. and S. I. Wilkinson (2007a). Citizen-politician linkages: An introduction. See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007b), pp. 1–49.
- Kitschelt, H. and S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.) (2007b). *Patrons, Clients, and Policies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Knack, S. and P. Keefer (1995). Institutions and economic performance: Cross-country tests using alternate institutional measures. *Economics and Politics* 7(3), 207–227.
- Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982). Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. *Journal of Economic Theory* 27(2), 245–252.
- La Ferrara, E. (2003). Kin groups and reciprocity: A model of credit transactions in Ghana. *American Economic Review* 93(5), 1730–1751.
- Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political clientelism and ethnicity in tropical Africa: Competing solidarities in nation-building. *American Political Science Review* 66(1), 68–90.

- Lemarchand, R. and K. Legg (1972). Political clientelism and development: A preliminary analysis. *Comparative Politics* 4(2), 149–178.
- Lijphart, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lindbeck, A. and J. W. Weibull (1987). Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition. *Public Choice* 52(3), 273–297.
- Lindholm, C. (1986). Kinship structure and political authority: The Middle East and Central Asia. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 28(2), 334–355.
- Lust-Okar, E. (2005). *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Magaloni, B. (2006). *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Mainwaring, S. E. (2003). Party objectives in authoritarian regimes with elections or fragile democracies: A dual game. In S. E. Mainwaring and T. R. Scully (Eds.), *Christian Democracy in Latin America: Electoral Competition and Regime Conflicts*, pp. 3–29. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Mainwaring, S. P. (1999). *Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Makdisi, U. (2008). Moving beyond Orientalist fantasy, sectarian polemic, and nationalist denial. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40(4), 559–560.
- Maktabi, R. (1999). The Lebanese census of 1932 revisited. Who are the Lebanese? *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 26(2), 219–241.
- Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3), 681–712.
- Mauro, P. (1998). Corruption and the composition of government expenditure. *Journal of Public Economics* 69(2), 263–279.
- McCaffery, P. (1993). *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Melson, R. and H. Wolpe (1970). Modernization and the politics of communalism: A theoretical perspective. *American Political Science Review* 64(4), 1112–1130.
- Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World Politics* 56(3), 327–362.

- Miguel, E. and M. K. Gugerty (2005). Ethnic diversity, social sanctions, and public goods in Kenya. *Journal of Public Economics* 89(11–12), 2325–2368.
- Momen, M. (1985). *An Introduction to Shi'i Islam*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol (2005). Ethnic diversity and economic development. *Journal of Development Economics* 76(1), 293–323.
- Murphy, K., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth? *American Economic Review* 83(2), 409–414.
- Nichter, S. (2008). Vote buying or turnout buying? Machine politics and the secret ballot. *American Political Science Review* 102(1), 19–31.
- Nizameddin, T. (2006). The political economy of Lebanon under Rafiq Hariri: An interpretation. *Middle East Journal* 60(1), 95–114.
- Perthes, V. (1997). Myths and money: Four years of Hariri and Lebanon's preparation for a new Middle East. *Middle East Report* (203), 16–21.
- Peteet, J. (2008). Imagining the “New Middle East”. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40(4), 550–552.
- Pleskovic, B. and J. Stiglitz (Eds.) (1999). *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1998*. Washington: World Bank.
- Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Powell, J. D. (1970). Peasant society and clientelist politics. *American Political Science Review* 64(2), 411–425.
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Richards, A. and J. Waterbury (1996). *A Political Economy of the Middle East* (Second ed.). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Rida, M. J. (1992). *The Struggle Between State and Tribe in the Arab Gulf*. Beirut: Centre for Arab Unity Studies. Arabic.
- Riordon, W. L. (Ed.) (1963 [1905]). *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall*. New York: E. P. Dutton.
- Robinson, J. A. and T. Verdier (2003, July). The political economy of clientelism. Working paper.
- Rose-Ackerman, S. (1998). Corruption and development. In B. Pleskovic and J. Stiglitz (Eds.), *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics 1997*, pp. 35–57. Washington: World Bank.

- Saleh, A. S. and C. Harvie (2005). An analysis of public sector deficits and debt in Lebanon: 1970–2000. *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 9(4), 106–136.
- Salti, N. and J. Chaaban (2010). The role of sectarianism in the allocation of public expenditure in postwar Lebanon. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 42(4), 637–655.
- Schaffer, F. C. (2007). Why study vote buying? In F. C. Schaffer (Ed.), *Elections For Sale: the Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying*, pp. 1–16. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
- Schedler, A. (2002). Elections without democracy: The menu of manipulation. *Journal of Democracy* 13(2), 36–50.
- Scheiner, E. (2007). Clientelism in Japan: The importance and limits of institutional explanations. See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007b), pp. 276–297.
- Schwedler, J. (2006). *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Scott, J. C. (1969). Corruption, machine politics, and political change. *American Political Science Review* 63(4), 1142–1158.
- Scott, J. C. (1972). Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia. *American Political Science Review* 66(1), 91–113.
- Stokes, S. C. (2005). Perverse accountability: A formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. *American Political Science Review* 99(3), 315–325.
- Stokes, S. C. (2007). Political clientelism. See Boix and Stokes (2007), pp. 604–627.
- Stokes, S. C. (2009). Pork, by any other name... building a conceptual scheme of distributive politics. Paper presented at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.
- Van Cott, D. L. (2007a). *From Movements to Parties in Latin America: The Evolution of Ethnic Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Van Cott, D. L. (2007b). Latin America's indigenous peoples. *Journal of Democracy* 18(4), 127–142.
- van de Walle, N. (2007). Meet the new boss, same as the old boss? The evolution of political clientelism in Africa. See Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007b), pp. 50–67.
- van den Berghe, P. (1978). Race and ethnicity: a sociobiological perspective. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1(4), 401–411.

- Varshney, A. (2002). *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Varshney, A. (2003). Nationalism, ethnic conflict, and rationality. *Perspectives on Politics* 1(1), 85–99.
- Varshney, A. (2007). Ethnicity and ethnic conflict. See Boix and Stokes (2007), pp. 274–294.
- Wedeen, L. (2008). *Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Weingrod, A. (1968). Patrons, patronage, and political parties. *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 10(4), 377–400.
- Werner, M. R. (1928). *Tammany Hall*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co.
- Wilkinson, S. I. (2006). *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Yahya, N. A. (Ed.) (2004). *The Views of Shaykh Abdallah bin Hussein al-Ahmar*. Sanaa: Horizons Press. Arabic.