

SYLLABUS - as of Tuesday, August 5, 2008
Fall, 2008-- GVPT 831
INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL THEORIES OF POLITICS
Prof. Joe A. Oppenheimer
www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/oppenheimer/831

Office: Tydings 1140B (x5 4113)

Office Hrs: Tues 1:45-3; Th 11-12:15; dinner after class if requested, and by appt

Home phone: 301 654-5939 (before 9:30pm)

Class: Th 3:30-6:15 pm; Tydings 1111

SPECIAL NOTE: there will be NO class held on 10/9 (Jewish holiday).

COURSE DESCRIPTION:

During the last 45 years important theoretical arguments have been made and tested increasing our understanding of puzzles central to the study of politics. These new theories stem from the extension of traditional behavioral tools of micro-economics (i.e. rationality theory) to non market contexts.¹ This sort of study of politics has developed from a political science oddity 25 years ago to a mainstream activity: Almost 25% of the space in leading political science journals is devoted to the presentation and testing of these arguments.

The department regularly offers a two semester sequence on the subject. The order that they are taken is up to the student. [The other course focuses on theoretical game theory: one of the foundational pillars of formal theoretical analysis in political science.] 831 focuses on the applications which stem from various arguments developed in the formal theory field. Some students will learn most effectively by tackling applications first and then the more abstract theoretical principles. Others may find they first prefer to master the theory and then begin applying them more concretely. Thus we leave it to the student to decide the order in which to take these two courses. Most students, however, begin with 831, and then move on to 832. The material in both courses is a prerequisite for other formal theory courses.

The theories *all relate directly to substantively political matters*. Specifically, this semester, we will work on theories dealing with choice, party platforms, voting outcomes, democratic theory and processes, collective action (e.g. strikes, boycotts, revolutions, etc.), and coalitions.² This course, 831, is an introduction to this literature, with a strong emphasis on its applications. It should enable students, at minimum, to comfortably read and perhaps incorporate in their research agendas, the material in the area. Specifically, after going over some fundamentals students consider the major applications of formal theory to political phenomena: with special emphasis on 5 of 6³ broad categories of extant modeling:

- a. *Collective Action & Public Goods* (including, for example, Olson, repeated n-person prisoner's dilemmas, social dilemmas, alternative models, etc.)
- b. *Policy Design and Political Economy* (including Coase's discussions of quasi markets, incentive compatible design, etc., and criticisms)

1/ This material is also referred to by such labels as "game theory," "public choice theory," "social choice theory," "the logic of collective action," etc. The tools of micro-economics have also been shifting.

2/ In other formal theory courses we continue to develop these topics and add at least the following others: strategic choice, distributive justice, the design of public policy, how the structure of voting rules and institutions effects outcomes, etc.

3/ Information and Learning (including, for example, Bayesian updating, signaling a la Gilligan and Krehbiel, informational vs. distributional debates concerning the organization of legislatures) will not be incorporated in this semester's course. This last topic, though 'mandated' as 'to be covered' in the course, has not been included, for lack of time in the semester. Students interested in pursuing these models are referred to the excellent treatment in Dixit and Skeath's Chapter 12 and their accompanying appendix to Chapter 5 (in the 1st edition) or Chapter 9 and their accompanying appendix to Chapter 7 (in the 2nd edition) . This material is also covered in the other formal theory course.

- c. *Voting and electoral Models* (including, for example, spatial models, structure-induced equilibria, *Pivotal Politics* as well as classics such as Downs, Enelow and Hinich, etc.)
- d. *Social Choice and social welfare* (including, for example, sincere vs. strategic voting, Arrow, Condorcet, McKelvey etc.)
- e. *Public Choice* (including, for example, Niskanen, *Calculus of Consent*, constitutional political economy, institutions as equilibria, culture as equilibria, delegation, etc.)

Through this, we aim to give graduate students a broad sweep of the substance, applicability, and at least some of the technical, methodological foundations of this material.⁴

In order to facilitate the students' use of the material in their research, homework assignments will require the modeling and solving of political problems of interest to the students.

The course is introductory: there is no assumed corpus of knowledge, beyond *a requisite tolerance of mathematics*.⁵ Although introductory, the course is more than a "survey." We will give rigorous treatment of the most important topics during the semester.⁶ The emphasis thus goes beyond a literature survey to an examination of the assumptions and the conclusions and will extend to the technicalities of the derivations.

The University of Maryland is an historically notable center for the study of this material. It has been a focal point of research in this area since Mancur Olson arrived shortly after publishing The Logic of Collective Action. In our department alone we have 6 other faculty members who specialize in this area (Douglas Grob, Irwin Morris, David Lalman, Mark Lichbach, Karol Soltan, and Piotr Swistak) and a number of others who work with models from the area. In economics we have Larry Ausubel, Peter Crampton, Peter Coughlin, Allan Drazen, Thomas Schelling, Razvan Vlaicu and John Wallis, and in other departments Catherine Dibble (Geography), Christopher Morris (Philosophy), and Thomas Wallsten (Psychology) do research primarily in these areas.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS AND GRADING

Including the first week, students will be expected to do the reading before each session of the seminar. In many of the weeks you will be assigned exercises to understand the technical underbelly of the readings and the nature of proofs.

Problems are due by noon on *Tuesday* before the class for which they are assigned. **EXERCISES SHOULD BE DONE ON TIME & AS TECHNICALLY PROFICIENTLY AS POSSIBLE. They will be graded.**

Instead of a final or a midterm, you have two short (i.e. less than 12 pages text) papers: one after each half of the course. The first is due 10/16. You are encouraged (but not absolutely required) to write papers which are applications of the materials, as topics of research that you find interesting. Topics should be cleared with me. But if you really prefer not to tackle an analytic problem, you can also write a 'review' of additional readings or articles. I encourage you to use topics which 'build on one another.' Class participation, homework, and the 2 essays will all count toward your final grades roughly with the following weight: 15% participation, 25% homework, 30% each essay.

RECOMMENDED AND REQUIRED TITLES

Codes:

[bold] Recommended for purchase for use directly in the course; (R): Only recommended in the course; (TB) Basic text books, if you continue in the field; (TB-U) Undergrad level text books; (C) Classics: not assigned;

4/ It is intended for all students: those who will pursue the subject in greater depth later, and for others who simply want a basic knowledge of the current state of the field. There are no prerequisites.

5/ Students are assumed to have a tolerance for rigorous, logical, algebraic (although always elementary) arguments, but need no specific math tools beyond simple, high school algebra, for the course. There are homework problems assigned.

6/ But, this is not a methods course. It deals neither with the philosophical underpinnings justifying the methods, nor with the tools of logic.

(OP) Out of print books. (ADD) Assigned books that are around in many copies and you should be able to find, read without buying. (M) Contemporary monographs of importance.

Titles:

- (C) Arrow, Kenneth J. (1963). *Social Choice and Individual Values*, 2nd ed. Yale: New Haven.
- (C) Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. New York. Note its restriction to 2 person games.
- (M) Boix, Carles (2003). Democracy and Redistribution. Cambridge. We will use this monograph as an example of an applied piece at a research frontier.**
- (TB) Dixit, Avinash & Susan Skeath (1999). Games of Strategy. New York: Norton.** (Any edition will do)
- (C) Buchanan, James & Gordon Tullock (1962), *The Calculus of Consent*. Univ. of Mich Press: Ann Arbor. Began the analysis of electoral systems.
- (C) Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory Of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row. Classic reading. Theoretically dated, but worth knowing. All students of democracy should read, own this book.
- (TB) Enelow and Hinich. (1984) The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK. -- A tough, but useful survey of the material. Quite up to date.
- (R) (C) (OP) Farquharson, (1969) Theory of Voting. This is a thin and brilliant book on voting strategy. Xeroxing doesn't work too well unless you take care to make color xeroxes of the pages with diagrams.
- (C) (TB-U) (OP) Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer, (1978) Modern Political Economy.
- (C) Kreps, David M. (1992) Game Theory and Economic Modelling.
- (C) (TB) Luce and Raiffa, (1985) *Games and Decisions* Dover. Out of date, but covers cooperative game theory well.
- (TB) Mueller, D. (2003) Public Choice III. Cambridge Univ Press, Cambridge, UK.** An earlier edition will do.
- (ADD) Olson, Mancur, (1965) The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press: Cambridge.
- (TB) Ordeshook, Peter C. (1986) Game Theory and Political Theory. Cambridge University Press. One of the basic texts.
- (C) Riker, William H. (1982) *Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice*. Prospect Heights, IL.: Waveland Press. Infuriatingly bad history and analysis. But referred to all the time.
- (TB) Sen, A.K. (1970) Collective Choice and Social Welfare. North Holland: New York. -- A pedagogically and intellectually important work.
- (TB) Shepsle, Kenneth and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics. New York: W. W. Norton Publishers. This is a main text book which we will employ for the presentation of the mathematical models underlying the course.
- (TB) Shubik, M. (1982) Game Theory in the Social Science. MIT. Press, Cambridge, Mass. This volume is very comprehensive but out of date, but tough.
- (M) Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N.J.**

Below in the assignments:

1. Xerox Items will be posted in a large envelope on my door and should be xeroxed by the student and returned to my door! They are indicated by an "[X]" preceding the item.
2. Items on the course's or my web site (for most of my own publications) are indicated by a "[W]" preceding the item, those in j-store are indicated by a "[J]", and those I will make available are with "[A]."
3. The readings on each subject tend to be listed in *order of difficulty*. Read until you get stuck. Come with questions

MAIN TOPICS AND ASSIGNMENTS:

{13 classes: 9/4, 9/11, 18, 25, 10/2, 16, 23, 30, 11/6, 13, 20, 12/4, 12/11}

THE FIRST ASSIGNMENT IS TO BE DONE BEFORE COMING TO THE FIRST CLASS!

Class 1: 9/4 OVERVIEW & THE BASIC RATIONALITY ASSUMPTIONS: Constraints, Preferences, Choice, Indifference curves, & Pareto Efficiency

We will spend time during the first class on the structure and justification of proofs. The rest of the class we will begin the substantive examination on the nature of the assumptions we will be using.

Required Readings:

1. [W] Oppenheimer, Joe (in process) *Political Laws: The Principles Behind the Chaos That Is Politics*. (manuscript) Introduction (p. 1-14).
2. [W] Morris, Irwin and Joe Oppenheimer "Intro" in Morris, Irwin, Joe A. Oppenheimer, and Karol Soltan, eds. (2004) *Politics from Anarchy to Democracy: Rational Choice in Political Science*. Stanford University Press.
3. [W] Varian, Hal R. (1987) Intermediate Microeconomics: A Modern Approach. Norton, New York. Ch 1 (p. 15-16 only), 2 & 3.
4. Dixit and Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 1 (pp. 1- 5) & 17, through section 1 (p. 550-560)
 - b. 2nd edition: Chapter 1 (pp. 3-6) & 18, through section 1 (p. 596-606) .
5. Mueller,
 - a. 2nd edition: Chapter 2 (sections A & B to p. 17)
 - b. 3rd edition: Chapter 2 (sections 2.1-2.3 to p. 18)

Recommended Readings:

On Why the Deductive Method:

Popper, K. The Logic of Scientific Discovery (hard, but authoritative.)

Nagel, E. The Structure of Science, Chaps. 1 & 2, (less clear, less direct, but far simpler than Popper.)

On the rationality assumptions:

Frohlich and Oppenheimer, MPE (p. 1-14)

Sen, Chap. 1, 1* (except 1.*3 and 1.*4) ((p. 1-10, 14-20)

Newman, P. *Theory of Exchange*, Chapter 2 (p. 7-18)

On the Nature of Assumptions and the way to Evaluate Them:

Friedman, M. "The Methodology of Positive Economics," and E. Nagel, "Assumptions in Economic Theory". Both contained in Breit and Hochman, Readings in Microeconomics.

Class 2: 9/11 - Games & THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION - 1

Required Readings:

1. Dixit and Skeath,
 - a. Either edition: Chapter 2
2. Olson Logic of Collective Action (all)
3. Dixit and Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 4 only through section 4 (pp. 79 - 87)

- b. 2nd edition: Chapter 4 only through section 3A (pp. 83-93).
- 4. [W] Oppenheimer, Joe (in process) Political Laws: The Principles Behind the Chaos That Is Politics. (manuscript) Part I.
- 5. Dixit and Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 4 only section 9
 - b. 2nd edition: Chapter 5 only section 1.
- 6. Mueller
 - a. 2nd edition: Chap. 20 section C.1. p. 400 - 401.
 - b. 3rd edition: Chap. 27 section 1 p. 643 - 644

Recommended Readings:

- Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer, (1978) Modern Political Economy Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs, N.J. pp. 32-89
- Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (1970), "I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends," World Politics, XXIII (October): 104-121.
- Hardin, R. Collective Action. Johns Hopkins Univ Press, Baltimore, Md. (RFF), Chaps. 2-5.
- Mason, T. D. (1984), "Individual Participation in Collective Racial Violence: A Rational Choice Synthesis," APSR, 78 (December), 1040-1056.
- Olson, M. and R. Zeckhauser (1966), "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, (August): 266-279.
- Samuelson, Paul. (1954) "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure." REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS. v. 36 (November): 387-89 or Samuelson, P. (1955) "A Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS, (Nov): 350 - 6.

<p><i>Class 3: 9/18 The Logic of Collective Action - 2 - the Prisoner's Dilemma Game</i></p>

Required Readings:

- 1. Dixit and Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 4 sections 5-8, 10-12 & Chapters 8 & 11
 - b. 2nd edition: Chapter 4 sections 3b-8 & Chapters 11 & 12
- 2. [J] Miller, N. R. "Social Preference and Game theory: A comment on the Dilemmas of a Paretian Liberal," Public Choice 30, 1977: 23-28. And comments by Aldrich: Aldrich, John. "Liberal Games: Further Comments on Social Choice and Game Theory." Public Choice 30, 1977: pp. 29-34.

First Required Written Assignment: (*due Tuesday 9/18, noon: electronically*).

Describe in a paragraph a simplified (for analytic purposes) collective action or public good event, story, case, class of cases, of interest to you. Hand this in. Next week, you will then model it using one of the approaches developed in the course. That means, identify the actors, their values, the choices they confronted, and how their collective choices could lead to differing outcomes of differing values (which you should estimate). Try to solve the game or problem as you have set it up.

Recommended Readings:

Kreps, Chapter 1-3.

Hardin, R. (1971) "Collective Action as an Agreeable N-Prisoners' Dilemma" Behavioral Science 16 (no. 5): 472 - 479.

[J] Schelling, Thomas C. (1973) "Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Savings: A Study of Binary Choices with Externalities." Journal of Conflict Resolution, v. 17, No. 3 (September), pp. 381 -428.

Luce and Raiffa, Chaps. 1, 3, 4 & 5 and pp. 278-282

Class 4: 9/25 Collective Action - 3 - Evolutionary and Other Views

BE SURE TO HAVE SETTLED ON A PAPER TOPIC BY 10/1 - LATEST! (PAPER DUE 10/19)

Required Readings:

1. Dixit & Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 10
 - b. 2nd edition: Chapter 13
2. [J] Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (2001). "The Evolution of Norms." American Journal of Sociology 106 (6, May): 1493-1545.

Second Required Written Assignment: (due 9/27).

See first assignment, last week.

Recommended Readings:

- a. [J] Bendor, Jonathan and Piotr Swistak (1997), "The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperation." American Political Science Review, v. 91, No. 2 (June): 290 - 307.
- b. Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. New York.

Class 5: 10/2 Collective Action - 4 - Your Assignments

Prepare a 10 min presentation either about your first paper or your previous 2 written assignments (which can be the same topic as the paper). We will have a critical discussion of each person's work.

Recommended Readings:

1. Lichbach, Mark Irving. (1995) The Rebel's Dilemma. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
2. Cain, Michael J. G. and Keith L. Dougherty. 1999. "Suppressing Shay's Rebellion: Collective Action and Constitutional Design under the Articles of Confederation." Journal of Theoretical Politics 11 (2): 233-260.
3. Dougherty Keith L. and Michael J. G. Cain, 1997. "Marginal Cost Sharing and the Articles of Confederation." Public Choice 90: 201 - 213.
4. [J] Ostrom, E., J. Walker and R. Gardner. 1992. Covenants With And Without The Sword: Self Governance is Possible. American Political Science Review 86: 404-417.
5. Chong, Dennis (1991), Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
6. Boyer, Mark (1993). INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND PUBLIC GOODS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press.

Class 6: 10/16 Collective Action - 5 - Experiments & Domain

Here we will examine the Liberal Paradox again and inquire again how general and central is the problem? We also examine experimental evidence for behavior in prisoner's dilemma game environments.

Required Readings:

1. Mueller,
 - a. 2nd edition: the remainder of Chap. 20: p. 401+.
 - b. 3rd edition: the remainder of Chap. 27: p. 644+.
2. [X] Ledyard, John O. (1995). "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," in The Handbook of Experimental Economics, John H. Kagel and Alvin E. Roth, eds. Princeton University Press: Princeton. pp. 111 - 194.
3. [W] Lohmann, Susanne (1994). "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91." World Politics, V47, #1 (Oct): 42-101.
4. [W] Frohlich, Norman and Joe A. Oppenheimer (2006). "Skating on Thin Ice: Cracks in the Public Choice Foundation." Journal of Theoretical Politics, 18(3): 235-266; and "An Analysis of Context-Dependent Preferences in Voluntary Contribution Games with Agent-Based Modeling." (Stephen Wendel & Joe Oppenheimer) Conference of the French Economic Association - Association Française de Science Economique (AFSE) on Behavioral Economics And Experimental Economics Lyon, France, May 23 - 25, 2007
5. [W] Frohlich, Norman Joe Oppenheimer, & Stephen Wendel (2008). Paradox Lost: Explaining and Modeling Individual Behavior in Social Dilemmas. For presentation at the Conference on Conflict and Complexity.

Recommended Readings:

- a. Miller, Gary, (1992) Managerial Dilemmas: The Political Economy of Hierarchy Cambridge.
- b. [J] Sen, Amartya (1976) "Liberty, Unanimity and Rights," Economica v. 43: (August): 217 - 246.
- c. [J] Bernholz, P. "Liberalism, Logrolling and Cyclical Group Preferences," Kyklos v. 29 (1976): 26-37.

Class 7: 10/23 Collective Goods, Externalities, the Role of Government, Coase

With all these problems, do we need central decision making to achieve Paretian results?

Required Readings:

1. Dixit & Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 17 Section 2 & 3 (p. 560 - 572)
 - b. 2nd edition: Chapter 18 Section 2 & 3 (p. 606 - 618).
2. Mueller:
 - a. 2nd edition: Chapter 2 (sections F, G and H)
 - b. 3rd edition: Chapter 2 (sections 2.7 - 2.12)
3. [J] Plott, Charles R. "Externalities and Corrective Policies in Experimental Markets." The Economic Journal, 93 (March, 1983), 106 - 127.
4. [W] Blake, Elizabeth L., John L., Guyton, Steven Leventhal. "An Experimental Test of Coasian Bargaining in Games with Empty Cores." mimeo.

Recommended Readings:

- a. [J] Coase, R. "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and Economics v. 3, 1960: 1 - 44.
- b. [J] Aivazian, V.A. and Jeffrey L. Callen, (1981) "The Coase Theorem and the Empty Core." Journal of Law and Economics v.24: 175 -181.

Class 8: 10/30 - MAJORITY RULE AND THE MEDIAN VOTER THEOREM: Spatial & Pivotal Voting in 1 & Dimensions

Required Readings:

1. Mueller,

- a. 2nd edition: (the median voter theorem p. 65 - 67, **PLUS 398-399 OF THE 3RD EDITION**); Chapter 5 (sections D, E, K, and L) & Chapter 6.
 - b. 3rd edition: (the median voter theorem p. 85-86, 398-399); Chapter 5 (sections 5.4), & Chapter 11.
2. [W] Oppenheimer, Joe (in process) Political Laws: The Principles Behind the Chaos That Is Politics. (manuscript) Part II.
 3. Dixit & Skeath,
 - a. 1st edition: Chapter 14
 - b. 2nd edition: Chapter 15
 4. [J] Eavey, C. & G. Miller, "Bureaucratic Agenda Control: Imposition or Bargaining?" American Political Science Review, 78, September, 1984: 719-733.

Recommended Readings:

Ordeshook GT&PT Chapters 7 & 8

Enelow, James and Melvin Hinich (1984). THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chaps. 1 & 2

Krehbiel, Keith. "Where's the Party?" British Journal of Political Science, Volume 23, Issue 2 (April, 1993), 235-266.

<http://www-gap.dcs.st-and.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Condorcet.html> - on the life of Condorcet.

<http://condorcet.org/> which has a lot of interesting software, and other info re voting and Condorcet.

Newman, P. Theory of Exchange, Chapter 2 (p. 18-40)

Mueller, (On Probabilistic Voting) Chapter 12.

<p><i>Class 9: 11/6 SPATIAL VOTING: more on 2+ dimensions, extending the theoretical findings, institutions, and experiments</i></p>

Required Readings:

1. [J] Miller, N. R. "Pluralism and Social Choice," American Political Science Review 77 (1983): 734-747.
2. Mueller,
 - a. 2nd edition: Chapters 10 (**PLUS Chap 17 OF THE 3RD EDITION**)
 - b. 3rd edition: Chapter 5 (sections 5.4), 5.5, 5.12.1, and 5.13 only), Chapters 13 & 17
3. [J] Hammond, T. H. and Gary J. Miller (1987) "The Core of the Constitution" American Political Science Review. Vol 81, 1156 - 1174.
4. [W] Joe Oppenheimer (2005), Discussing Democracy. Course Handout.

Required Written Assignment: (*due Tuesday 10/30, noon*).

Describe in a paragraph a collective choice voting problem, story, case, class of cases, of interest to you. Hand this in. Next week, you will then model it using one of the approaches developed in the course. That means, identify the actors, their values, the choices they confronted, and how their collective choices could lead to differing outcomes of differing values (which you should estimate).

Recommended Readings:

- a. Black, Duncan and R. Newing, (1951) Committee Decisions with Complementary Valuations. London: William Hodge.

- b. Plott, Charles R. (1990). "Will Economics Become an Experimental Science?" Presidential address for the annual meeting of the Southern Economics Association, New Orleans, November, 1990.
- c. Enelow, J. and M. Hinich. The Spatial Theory of Voting. Cambridge Univ. Press: Cambridge, UK., 1984.
- d. Downs, Anthony (1957) An Economic Theory Of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

Class 10: 11/13 - TOWARD AN ASSESSMENT OF DEMOCRACY - I

Required Readings:

- 1. Boix, Carles (2003). Democracy and Redistribution, New York: Cambridge.

Recommended Readings:

Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy

Class 11: 11/20 THE ARROW PROBLEM: (1) NICE SOCIAL CHOICE PROPERTIES: The Relationship between Aggregate Choice and Individual Behavior -- The Proof

Required Readings:

- 1. Mueller,
 - a. 2nd edition: p. 373 & Chapter 20
 - b. 3rd edition: p. 563 & Chapter 24

Fourth Required Written Assignment: (due 11/22).

See third assignment, last week.

Recommended Readings:

- a. Luce and Raiffa Chap. 14
- b. Arrow, Kenneth (1953). Social Choice and Individual Values. The classic.
- c. Black, Duncan (1958) The Theory Of Committees And Elections, Part II. This is a history of social choice literature before Arrow.
- d. Bonner, John Introduction to the Theory of Social Choice. An introductory discussion. But it has some good points.
- e. Ordeshook, Chap. 2
- f. Sen, Chap. 3*

Class 12: 12/4 THE ARROW PROBLEM: (2) The Issues and Findings

BE SURE TO HAVE SETTLED ON A FINAL PAPER TOPIC BY 12/1 - LATEST! (PAPER DUE 12/13)

Required Readings:

- 1. [X] Mackie, Gerry (2003). Democracy Defended. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, England. Pp. 44-196.
- 2. Tsebelis, George (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N.J. (Pages TBA).

Recommended Readings:

- a. Niemi, Richard G. and William H. Riker. (1976) "The Choice of Voting Systems" Scientific American 234, no. 6 pp. 21-27.
- b. Sen, Chap. 3, 4

- c. Sen, A.K. "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory," Philosophy and Public Affairs v. 6 (no. 4, Summer): 317-344.
- d. Arrow, "Current Developments in the Theory of Social Choice," Social Research, 44, 1977: 607-622 in Barry and Hardin, pp. 247 -263.
- e. Mayston, The Idea of Social Choice

Class 13: 12/11 - TOWARD AN ASSESSMENT OF DEMOCRACY - II

Prepare a 10 min presentation either about your first paper or your previous 2 written assignments (which can be the same topic as the paper). We will have a critical discussion of each person's work.

Final paper is due 12/18.