

DRAFT

Rashomon
Rashomon **Goes to Rwanda:**

Alternative Accounts of Political Violence and
Their Implications for Policy and Analysis

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Abstract

Within this paper, we attempt to grapple with a problem that has long confronted individuals within the social sciences: what do you do with alternative historical accounts of events? We explore an approach where distinct accounts are juxtaposed against one another, trying to gauge the degree to which such juxtaposition can inform us about what actually took place. Normally individuals either collapse all source information together or they select one source to examine. We feel that it is useful to maintain the integrity of each source and to explore similarities and differences across sources. For our analysis, we employ the use of a dataset that we just completed on the Rwandan genocide across five sources by the cell, commune and province for 100 days. Our analysis presents us with very different interpretations of the genocide; some fit directly with existing convention while others vary quite distinctly. While all sources therefore agree that something took place they vary with regard to exactly who did what to whom and when – largely in line with why they were compiling information in the first place and to whom they were collecting information.

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Akira Kurosowa's *Rashomon* is a film set during the chaos of 12th-century Japan that explores notions of truth, reality, and objectivity. In the film, a woodcutter, a priest, and a commoner wait out a thunderstorm in the shadow of a ruined gate. To pass the time the woodcutter and priest tell the commoner of a recent investigation in which they both took part. They tell the tale of a samurai and his wife who were attacked by the infamous bandit Tajomaru while traveling. As the woodcutter and the priest reveal the general facts of the story, the commoner learns that the husband has been killed and that the wife and bandit had sex. The woodcutter and priest explain that during the investigation the specifics of the attack are called into question as those involved relate overlapping but conflicting versions of the events. This is where the heart of *Rashomon* lies: the puzzle of the story lies in its recounting and judgments about guilt as well as innocence that hang on the credibility of the competing versions of reality.

According to the captured Tajomaru, after meeting in a chance encounter, the Samurai's wife gives in to his sexual advances, then, horrified at her own conduct, she tells the bandit to kill her husband because she could not bear to be shamed in the eyes of both men. The wife's version of reality differs markedly from Tajomaru's. In her mind's eye, the bandit accosts an innocent husband and wife, the bandit rapes her and the guilty bandit flees the scene of the horrible crime. Recovering from the attack, the wife frees her husband and offers to let him kill her in order to wipe the stain of shame from his life. Before

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coming to a violent end, she faints and when she awakes, she finds her husband dead, lying with a dagger in his chest.¹

The dead husband's version of what took place appears through a medium. In the dead Samurai's accounting, after Tajomaru rapes the wife, the thief begs her to marry him. Parrying the request, the wife replies that first he must kill her husband. The thief is shocked by this unexpected twist, and asks the Samurai what he, the rapist, should do with the despoiled wife. Believing the two men to be conspiring against her, the wife runs off, and the thief chases her. The disgraced samurai then takes his wife's dagger and commits suicide.

With some prodding by his companions at the gate, the woodcutter, who had found the body, delivers a fourth version of the story. The woodcutter acknowledges the rape of the wife, but he claims that after the attack, the wife baits both men into fighting a duel over her. In the fight that ensues, the Samurai trips, then falls into the thief's sword. The film closes with none of the protagonists (and the audience) any closer to the "truth", no more certain of the objective reality as compared to the subjective and distorted versions that each character constructs to suit their own needs and desires.

In 1994, a mass murder and large-scale torture occurred on an epic scale in the Central African Republic of Rwanda. Of that much we are certain. The corpses and skeletons that remain in plain view across much of the country to this day can attest to at least that much. As the ten-year anniversary of the Rwandan genocide approaches, there are essentially four general conclusions

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that have come to constitute the conventional wisdom on the Rwandan genocide. First, it could have been stopped, saving hundreds of thousands of lives if the international community had the will to do so (e.g., Gourevitch, 1996; Kuperman, 1999; Power, 2002). Second, most of Rwandan society was involved in some capacity, either as victims or perpetrators (e.g., Mamdani, 1999). Third, some form of punishment and reconciliation should be imposed and facilitated for the killers as well as their victims (e.g., Africa Rights, 1995; De Forge, 1999). And, fourth, rebuilding civil society and political participation are the keys to facilitating Rwandan development and preventing a recurrence of the mass killings (e.g., Newbury, 1988; Bates, 2002).

The research and discussion leading to these conclusions presumes that we actually understand what took place during the civil war that ran unabated from 1990 to 1994 and during the period of genocide, then extrapolating from this common understanding to issues of conflict processes, reconciliation, and state building. In essence, the conclusions linked to policy recommendations assume away the Rashomon problem, assuming that there is a known objective account of what happened in Rwanda in 1994. For example, Alaine Destexhe, argues that "although we will never know exactly how many died, this should not be used to lessen the significance of the crime itself. It is not necessary to speculate on the exact final figure for the number of deaths. There was a genocide last year in Rwanda. That is a fact, not speculation (Destexhe, 68)." Unfortunately, just as Kurosowa's film highlights, the fractured and subjective

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nature of the truths that we believe that in turn powerfully influence our beliefs about guilt and culpability. We do not share the assumption of most genocide scholars that we actually know what happened during the genocide.

If one attempts to assess the record of what happened in a rigorous and systematic manner, they will immediately confront a set of accounts that vary as much as the four stories of the Samurai's death. Some highlight the variation in actions (e.g., Human Rights Watch 1999), some highlight the variation in victims (e.g., African Rights 1995; Gourevitch 1998), some highlight the variation in perpetrators (e.g., African Rights 1995; Human Rights Watch 1999), and some highlight the variation in geographic locales (e.g., Mamdani 1999). All assume that the victims were (are) essentially the Tutsi of Rwanda and that the guilty were (are) the Hutu. The differences across the various accounts are important to explore for they influence our understanding of what took place as well as our beliefs about what should have been done at the time by potential interveners, and what could or should be done today.

In this paper, we detail the beginnings of an effort to reconstruct the mass killings of 1994. We employ four different databases compiled over the last two years to begin to try to understand what took place during the Rwandan genocide. We explore a diverse set of historical accounts about the mass killing, varying both in terms of sources, as well as in terms of data collection procedures and objectives. In general and consistent with Kurosowa's expectations, we find tremendous disagreement over the scale and nature of

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the mass killings as well as disagreement about the identity of the victims. Interestingly, the biases we uncover do not always tilt in the direction that we would have anticipated. For example, compared to the human rights NGO sources, different ministries of the Rwandan government identify the largest number of individuals killed by a factor of two to one. One government source, also suggests that a larger number of Hutu was killed than was commonly discussed; indeed, based on inferences from one official government census, one could conclude that the majority of those killed in 1994 were Hutu, not Tutsi.

These disagreements over the scale of the killings and the identity of the victims is important from a social science taxonomy perspective as these are the two principle factors that distinguish genocide from its equally repugnant cousin "politicide" (e.g., Harff and Gurr 1988). The distinctions also influence the degree to which we might conclude that the genocide was preventable as well as what efforts should be taken in the present to help the Rwandan population "reconcile" themselves with what happened 10 years ago. If it is the case that the killings occurred in relatively few locations, we should be more willing to accept the claim that something could have been done, particularly if large numbers of deaths occurred months after the initial outbreaks. Finally, the distinctions also matter in the context of international law. The 1947 genocide convention mandates action by signatory states to intervene to stop on ongoing genocide. Politicide, or mass killings associated with civil war, while

equally repugnant does not share the same mandate for international intervention.

We begin our analysis with a basic overview of the conventional wisdom about the Rwandan genocide. We then move from this to explore some of the challenges that have been made toward this general understanding. The third section outlines our data collection effort which then facilitates our discussion of preliminary findings (addressed in the fourth section of the paper). The conclusion outlines some of the implications of our research as well as several areas for future work on the topic.

The Basic Story of the Rwandan Genocide

Since the Rwandan genocide of 1994, a large body of writing emerged about who did and did not do what to whom – both inside as well as outside the country. Individuals from a variety of intellectual perspectives have tried to grapple with what took place, from a wide variety of disciplines: history, psychology, political science, sociology, communications and human rights law. Indeed, the sheer wealth of material has been quite significant.

Most of this effort has come to characterize the genocide in the following manner. Between April and July of 1994, Hutu within Rwanda engaged in a systematic effort to eliminate the Tutsi of Rwanda as well as a small number of moderate Hutu. Fanatical followers of a parasitic regime, acting out against ethnic identities largely constructed and reinforced through colonial administrative efforts earlier in the 20th century, carried out the killings in this

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version. In the conventional view, the killing and other systematic violence constituted a genocide under international law that was meant to: 1) undermine support for the invading Tutsi rebels (coming from Uganda to the North) and 2) eliminate supporters of conciliatory policies toward the Tutsi, both those permanent residents of Rwanda as well as members of the greater Tutsi Diaspora seeking to return to their perceived homeland.

There is consensus that the political movement/party 'Hutu Power' and the militia groups collectively known as the *Interahamwe* ("those who stand together") planned and executed the genocide. There is also some consensus that the Hutu are responsible for the missile attack and assassination of Habyarimana (Rwanda's president) and the president of Burundi – precipitating the mass killing, although many hotly contest this view (Masden, 1999). Perhaps most disturbing to those paying attention to the case was the widespread amount of popular engagement with which the genocide was enacted. In the commonly accepted view, seemingly everyone was involved; an entire society descended on a vulnerable minority ethnic group – the Tutsi. Here, the military, the militia, the police, farmers, teachers, doctors, lawyers, students, mothers, fathers, cousins – everyone took part and as a result the entire society bears both culpability and responsibility for murder, justice and reconciliation. This view of a guilty society contrasts with the fact that many of the mass killings were conducted by relatively small numbers of perpetrators. For example, in Ruhengeri, where an estimated 25,000 died, only several hundred are believed

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to be responsible. If true, this contests the notion that vast swaths of the Hutu population should be viewed as somehow culpable or responsible for the killings in 1994.

In the conventional view, the mass society of perpetrators were not involved in some abstract way, similar to that attributed to everyday Germans (Goldhagen, 1994; Browning, 1991) or whites in the Southern part of the US during the period of Reconstruction and Jim Crow (e.g., Tolnay and Beck 1995). Rather, in the standard view, Rwandans typically participated in a very direct manner – wielding machetes, tracking down victims in mobs, setting up roadblocks and killing en masse. Indeed, perhaps the only thing that was as troubling to observers as the number of perpetrators and victims was the speed with which the former dealt with the later. According to one author, the rate of killing exceeded that of the Holocaust, claiming that it was the "most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (Gourevitch 1998, 4).

What brought the Hutu to this point? Essentially four explanations exist within the literature.

The first explanation attributes much of the blame to specific members of the Tutsi – the Akazu.² For years, this group exploited the Hutu, initially independently, then under German and later still Belgian colonialism (Mamdani, 1999). During this period, from the 15th or 16th century until 1959, this group of Tutsi engaged in numerous discriminatory practices across the areas of

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employment, education, land distribution; all frequently enforced by violence. It is not frequently discussed but the Tutsi appear to have used violence a great deal against the Hutu. Now, it should be clear that there was not anything along the order of a mass killing similar to what took place in Rwanda in 1994 or Burundi in 1972 or 1990, but violence, similar to that found in feudal Europe (Bates, 2002) was a constant part of Tutsi-Hutu relations during this period.

After the revolution culminating in independence from Belgium (1959-1962), the Hutu sought revenge, killing numerous Tutsi, driving hundreds of thousands into exile in the surrounding countries, most notable Uganda, Burundi and Tanzania. At this point, a Hutu-led political machine was instituted that would run the country until the time of the genocide.

Although the number of Tutsi within the country as well as most aspects of Tutsi domination diminished, the fear of a Tutsi return to power persisted. This brings us to the second explanation for the genocide. The Hutu in Rwanda came to fear the return of Tutsi rule and the violence as well as the subjugation that would come with such a reality. The mass killing of Hutu in neighboring Burundi (Rwanda's geographic and demographic twin) appeared to reemphasize that point. The increasingly successful military campaign of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) beginning in 1990 and pushing forward into Rwanda during this period, helped provide an understanding of common Hutu perceptions of the Tutsi "threat" – in effect, they were winning and all Hutu

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would be called upon to take whatever actions were necessary to protect themselves as a community.

A third factor facilitating the mass killings was a carefully cultivated hatred of the “other” by both of the dominant ethnic groups as well as relevant colonial powers. While the first explanation highlights revenge and the second fear, it has also consistently been mentioned that there were two distinct ethnic groups in Rwanda³ who, through historical interaction and colonial indoctrination, came to despise one another (Keane, 1995). Mamdani (1999) is perhaps the one most associated with the view that the systematic cultivation of ethnically based hatred exacerbated the other factors fueling the mass killings. Specifically, he argues that the conflict emerged from a certain “nativist” ideology common to most Hutu in Rwanda, that the Tutsi were outside invaders (and as such not deserving of anything) and the Hutu were cast as the indigenous people (who were essentially deserving of everything having suffered for so many years).

Fourth, and finally, researchers have highlighted the Hutu political organs – especially Hutu Power and the *Interahamwe*. These organized groups of individuals distributed hate propaganda, armed the population, identified targets and led as well as independently conducted innumerable murderous campaigns. Considering this explanation, the genocide started with this group (it was their brainchild), and then it was diffused to the rest of the population through a mixture of mass belief in challenging Tutsi domination, fear of the Tutsi

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re-conquering Rwanda and fear of what the various Hutu organizations would do to the predominantly Hutu population if they did not go along. In many respects, it has been argued that without the entrepreneurs of genocide there would have been no mass killing.

From these four “takes” on the genocide, a variety of claims have been made that directly influence our understanding of what took place as well as our understanding of what could have taken place to prevent the mass killing as well as related abuse and what should take place in the future to overcome such behavior. For example, it is maintained that individuals outside of Rwanda could have prevented the event from taking place if they had intervened. As designed, interested parties needed to simply arrest or surround particular actors and/or places and then they could have contained the event or at least they could have limited the degree of violence that occurred within it. In this context, revenge, fear and cultivated hatred are less important than behavioral capability. There are implications for truth and reconciliation as well. If these four explanations were valid, then all one needed to develop was some uniform process of truth telling, compilation and distribution in order to move to reconciliation.⁴ But what if the genocide did not take place like the descriptions above? How would this change policy about intervention and reconciliation? This we explore below.

A Question of Variation

Over time, various aspects of this conventional thinking have been subject to challenge. By far the most threatening is the claim that there was a significant amount of variation that existed within the genocide; variation that is not readily acknowledged or comprehensible within the explanations provided above.

For example, others have suggested and in our data we can show that only some individuals engaged in certain forms of behavior within certain places and at certain times. This leads one to ask: if fear of or revenge against the Tutsi or fear of "the Hutu" were valid explanations for genocide, how would one account for such variation? In addition to this, there have also been other differences identified. Mamdani and others draw clear distinctions between culpability and actions of the Hutu in Kigali (the capitol) and the Hutu in the rest of the country (Human Rights Watch 1999; Mamdani 1999). There have also been distinctions drawn between different Hutu-led militia organizations (the *Interahamwe* were only one of many militias that existed within a loose confederation [Human Rights Watch 1994]). There have been distinctions drawn between the Northern and the Southern parts of the country; there have also been important distinctions drawn between the Tutsi, those in Rwanda before the genocide are quite different from those that returned after the event in terms of education, skill levels, and expectations.

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Considering the possibilities, we maintain that there are essentially three different ways that we can describe the spatial and temporal variation in the patterns of mass killing in 1994. In one view, the mobilization began in one geographic locale (generally Kigali) and radiated outward from this point over the course of the 100 days of genocide. Second, individuals have suggested that the genocide initiated in the North and then moved Southward with the invading RPF (De Forge, 1999, pg 16). Third, it is possible that the killing sprung up throughout the country simultaneously, and as a result, most of the country engaged in genocide at the same time (Keane, 1995).

These differences are crucially important. Intervention appears to work best when the behavior of interest is concentrated (spatially) in some manner. If those engaged in intervention can focus their efforts on one geographic locale or pathway, then they can more efficiently mobilize and direct their efforts. If those engaged in intervention have to worry about all individuals engaging in the undesired behavior, then this tends to make the intervention quite difficult and unmanageable. There are also implications for truth and reconciliation efforts as well. If the distribution of behavior, perpetrators, and victims is uniform throughout a society, then one standardized process of truth telling, collection, dissemination, and reconciliation would be appropriate. Indeed, this would tend to favor the South African model (e.g., Boraine 2000). If however, behavior, perpetrators, and victims were concentrated in some manner, then it might be necessary to have distinct efforts directed against distinct parts of the

population. For instance, in the central-radiation model, it would be necessary to spend more time on the area that served as the focal point of activity.

Alternatively, it might be necessary to provide additional services and attention to areas where victims were tortured and beaten but not killed.

In sum, to assess the potential causes of the genocide and the possibility of post-genocidal reconciliation and development, one must first have a very detailed understanding of what took place. How should one go about doing this exactly? We discuss this next.

Data Generation and the Importance of Perspective

Individuals have been rigorously collecting information about contentious activity for at least 60 years. Essentially, they have been trying to understand what takes place when people conflict with one another and why such activity varies across space and time. Such efforts are useful for scholarly as well as practical purposes; with data, one can test various hypotheses about what took place and why, as well pose testable questions about what type of activities could eliminate or at least limit future conflagrations.

The sources used for this information have changed very little over the relevant period. Most have employed one or several of the following in their efforts to document conflictual activity: newspapers, expert reports, historical investigations, government archive documents, and non-governmental (NGO) documents. There are significant tradeoffs involved with relying on any one source.

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Newspapers and journalists accounts generally cover a particular spatial-temporal domain across a range of behavior and within a publicly accessible, easily read format. They tend to focus on only events that are large-scale or controversial in nature. Journalists are a suboptimal source for data, as systematic data collectors they invariably lose interest in the object being studied (media fatigue effects) and they tend to rely heavily on official sources or non-randomly selected sources. Issue area experts are particularly useful in that they maintain voluminous amounts of information about the relevant topic. Unfortunately, as is often the case with journalists, it is unlikely that area experts will pay attention to individual events in as much detail and with as much care as quantitative researchers would desire. Nor is it likely that they would consider a range of characteristics outside of their particular theoretical orientation in a rigorous and consistent manner. Government and NGO documents are also useful in that when they exist they commonly contain a great deal of information about what took place. These are generally more focused than newspapers in terms of content and frequently they will draw upon experts as they extend the necessary resources to document events thoroughly. The biggest weakness here is the inconsistent nature with which these reports are created and made available. Other problems concern the issue of sensitivity; governments might not wish to release politically sensitive information. Some focused efforts have become institutionalized and distributed frequently (e.g.,

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Freedom House, Amnesty International and State Department Country Reports), but many have not.

With relevant materials in hand, coding by area experts has also been straightforward. Most read the source material selectively and extract what is of interest to them: e.g., what action has taken place, where it was taken (as in what country or city) and when it was taken (as in what year or week). This information can be placed into a spreadsheet for graphical and statistical analysis. Fewer pay attention to precisely who engaged in the relevant action, why action was taken and who was victimized/targeted.

Historically, researchers have relied upon human coding of source material. In this context, individuals physically read each article and code information. Over time, individuals have utilized “machine-assisted” coding – where computers were used to search through information and filter out irrelevant text. Additionally, there have been a great number of computer programs developed which completely automate the data collection process (for a good review see Tesch [1989, 1990], Miles [1995] and Popping [1997]). There are some distinct advantages for using the electronic as opposed to the strictly human approach. First, the sheer amount of information that one can pass through with the computer far exceeds the amount that humans can cover at a reasonable pace. At the same time, however, the sheer amount of sophistication and nuance that humans can detect (especially when one is

coding full articles and not just leads) tends to give humans a distinct advantage.

Differences also exist with regard to how individuals code from sources. Some pay close attention to events (discrete activities demarcated within space and time): identifying their frequency, magnitude, location, and so forth (e.g., Sorokin 1937; Tilly et al. 1975; Taylor and Jodice 1983; Francisco 2000). These individuals believe that such information is intricately connected with understanding what takes place out in the world (Tarrow 1998). From this perspective, the most important things that humans engage in are events and to understand what individuals as well as groups do therefore one must focus on these 'events-based' aspects of existence. Others believe that such efforts are ultimately misleading for they maintain that sources are incapable of providing an accurate characterization of events. Instead, they suggest that researchers should use sources to construct rough pictures of what took place by using categories (e.g., civil war/no civil war; violent protest/non-violent protest/no protest).

Following the literature, we employ a research design where we take advantage of the detail allowed within a case and combine this with the precision allowed by a focus on events. Deviating from much of the literature but drawing upon the work of numerous individuals (e.g., Scott 1985; Lustick 1996; Davenport and Ball 2002), we also explore the diversity that exists within

historical accounts offered by distinct observers. This returns us to the observations made by Kurosowa.

The Relevance of the Rashomon Effect

As discussed in the introduction, essentially Rashomon is about a series of events retold by six different people (a woodcutter, a priest, a police agent, a bandit, a wife and a husband through a medium). Within each story (event-sequence), three individuals meet, a woman and a man have sex (the wife and the bandit) and another man (the husband) is murdered. This is where consensus ends for one is not sure what they are seeing/hearing nor why. For instance,

perhaps the husband really loved his wife, was lost without her and hence felt he must kill himself; perhaps (the wife) really thought to save her husband by a show of affection for the bandit, and thus played the role of faithful wife; perhaps the woodcutter knows much more, perhaps he too entered the action – mirror within mirrors, each intention bringing forth another, until the triangle fades into the distance... (Richie 1987, 13).

What really happened and why? We never really know.

Rashomon is important for our study for it acknowledges that diverse actors will see the same event in different ways and may help us understand some of the divergences across our several data sets. This is important as we attempt to understand what took place during the Rwandan genocide for it

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appears more than reasonable that different actors would report different things (e.g., Scott 1985; Lustick 1996) – in many respects this is the essence of conflict even as it plays out today in the current politics of Rwanda. Such variation is particularly important as we attempt to understand policies of intervention and reconciliation.

Just because sources employ diverse criteria for collecting information and have somewhat distinct objectives, however, does not mean that they will focus on completely different things; perspective is not random. Even in *Rashomon* structure can be found. As Richie points out (1987, 11), all of the characters in the Kurosowa film were motivated by one single element – pride.

Each is proud of what (they) did because, as (they) might tell you: “It is just the sort of thing that I would do.” Each thinks of (their) character as being fully formed, of being a *thing*, like the rape or the dagger (discussed within the events) is a thing, and ... of being capable of only a certain number of (consistent) reactions. They are in *character* because they have defined their own character for themselves and will admit none of the surprising opportunities which must occur when one does not. They “had no choice”; circumstances “forced” their various actions; what each did “could not be helped”.

To explain this, Richie (1987, 12) is clear:

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(i)t is interesting that *Rashomon* should have been a historical film... because this limitation of spirit, this tacit agreement (social in its scope) that one *is* and cannot *become*, is a feudalistic precept...

Individuals, within Kurosowa's vision as well as ours, are trapped by the political and social structure in which they exist, they tell their stories in accordance to their station within life. The key to piecing together the unbiased history of the murder is to discover what the structure is.

Adopting this perspective, it should be clearly understood that our use of diverse sources is not comparable to the usual "triangulation" of sources employed within the literature, where information from diverse sources is used to compile one, uniformly interpolated historical accounting. Rather, we specifically chose diverse sources so that we may explicitly juxtapose them and gauge the similarities but also the differences as well.

Toward what end do we undertake this exploration? We do so in an effort to capture, as well as to understand, the realistic mosaic of alternative perceptions that existed before, during and after the mass killings in Rwanda. The conflict took place within the context of a nation riven by hotly contested notions of identity and rightfulness of ownership and power; our understandings of the events that make up the genocide must be situated there as well. This reveals the implications of relying upon one source as opposed to another. This also reveals what characteristics of the genocide are essentially uncontested as

well as which are controversial (serving as a point of reconciliation or later conflict).

GenoDynamics: A Database of Rwandan Genocide

In an effort to understand what took place during the Rwandan genocide, ideally we would conduct a comprehensive survey of all households throughout the country, all refugee camps throughout Rwanda and the surrounding area as well as review all government documents from various levels of the political system. This is not possible (nor will it ever be possible) in the context of Rwanda. Not able to proceed in this fashion, we decided to adopt an approach that compiled information from as many different actors as possible. Different organizations and individuals both within and outside of Rwanda had diverse perspectives on what took place as well as diverse motives for conveying such information. This is important for as Kurosowa would suggest it is organizations and their perspectives that we have to understand in order to better comprehend what they report. Thus far, we have coded information from five sources. As we will see all had a motive for collecting and distributing information; all extend significant resources toward this end.

NGO Sources

In 2001, we began compiling information about individual acts of genocide (or "violations") at the cell, district, secteur, and prefecture levels within Rwanda from two NGO reports. The first was *Leave None to Tell the Tale* (1999) by Human Rights Watch – the international human rights organization; the

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second, *Death, Despair and Defiance* (1995) by African Rights – a human rights organization based in the UK and later Rwanda. To date, we have coded all information within these sources about what was done (the specific violation), who engaged in this activity (what organizational affiliation they maintained, if any), against what targets/individuals (Hutu, Tutsi, Twa as well as the political orientation and profession of the victim), at what location (cell, district, secteur and prefecture) and at what time (day).

Human Rights Watch was and is a US-based human rights organization that

conduct(s) fact-finding investigations into human rights abuses in all regions of the world. Human Rights Watch then publishes those findings in dozens of books and reports every year, generating extensive coverage in local and international media. This publicity helps to embarrass abusive governments in the eyes of their citizens and the world. Human Rights Watch then meets with government officials to urge changes in policy and practice -- at the United Nations, the European Union, in Washington and in capitals around the world. In extreme circumstances, Human Rights Watch presses for the withdrawal of military and economic support from governments that egregiously violate the rights of their people. In moments of crisis, Human Rights Watch provides up-to-the-minute information about conflicts while they are underway.⁵

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This organization has been engaged in this type of activity since 1978.

The research effort in Rwanda began “(i)n early 1995, (Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues, FIDH) began documenting the genocide, attempting to analyze the killing campaign from the level of the local security committee to ... that of the U.N. Security Council. Researchers carried on hundreds of interviews and located, organized, and translated administrative records from communes and prefectures. They also amassed extensive materials from judicial cases and from various diplomatic sources (Human Rights Watch 1999, 28).” It is not clear what records were used or who was contacted.

They continue,

(t)he study presents both an overview of the genocide throughout the country and a closer examination of its course in southern Rwanda, where people opposed the killing campaign longer than elsewhere in the country and where the role of the authorities in directing the genocide is particularly clear (Human Rights Watch 1999, 28).

Although detailed in terms of the individual stories covered, from available information we are not sure what proportion of the country the enumerators covered and how thoroughly they covered the areas where they conducted their interviews. Additionally, we are not sure how the projects leaders selected the interviewees and we do not know how comprehensive the access was to

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available materials from government officials as well as eyewitnesses. We do know that the projects leaders collected this information with the explicit objective of compelling “policymakers, the press and the public to recognize the genocidal nature of the killings and to honor moral and legal obligations to intervene to halt the genocide” (Human Rights Watch 1999, 28). When this did not work, the organization used compiled information to “initiate legal action against persons accused of genocide” (Human Rights Watch 1999, 28). This is consistent with the larger mission of the group.

Our second source, African Rights, literally emerges from Human Rights Watch, as the individuals that created the organization were initially employed by the international human rights organization; they departed in protest of how Human Rights Watch comprehensively was covering (or not covering) the Rwandan case. Within their preamble, the members of African Rights are clear about their motivation for creating the new organization. As they state,

African Rights is an organization dedicated to working on issues of human rights, conflict, famine, and civil reconstruction in Africa. The urgent motivation for setting up African Rights is that we have become acutely aware of the limitations upon existing human rights, humanitarian and conflict-resolution approaches to Africa's most pressing problems... (African Rights 1995, inside cover page).

They continue,

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Any solutions to Africa's problems – the emergency humanitarian needs just as much as the long-term political reconstruction of the continent – must be sought primarily among Africans. International organizations should see their role as primarily facilitating and supporting attempts by Africans to address their own problems. It is Africa's tragedy that the existing institutions for addressing these problems have not looked to the African people for answers. African Rights tries to give a voice to those concerned with these issues, and to press for more accountability from the international community in its various operations in Africa (African Rights 1995, inside cover page).

Again, the objective of the genocide data collection effort appears to be truth telling to as wide an audience as possible in order to motivate others to take action. As they state,

(a)t the time (of the research), it was literally inconceivable to us that the search for truth and justice would be anything but the overriding priority of the people of Rwanda and the international community. We hoped that our modest attempt to tell the truth of what had happened would prompt others, including the UN itself, to carry through the task in a more comprehensive way.

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The effort was thus conceived as catalytic in nature and not comprehensive – something that they implicitly identify as requiring many more resources than they had available to them.

Regarding the research itself, the African Rights effort's documentation suffers in comparison to the poorly documented Human Rights Watch project.

As they state,

African Rights undertook the research for the first edition of *Death, Despair and Defiance* in Rwanda from April to June 1994, while the genocide was being perpetrated. The book itself was completed only a few weeks after the defeat of the interim government (up until the date of September 15, 1994) (African Rights 1995, xvi).

Specifically, two phases of the research effort have been identified, each published in different editions of the *Death, Despair and Defiance* book.

The first edition of this book was based on seven weeks of research in Rwanda by African Rights in April-June 1994, and additional research in Burundi, Tanzania, Nairobi and Europe (African Rights 1995, xvii)

The work which we coded was not simply based on the time period reported above.

(The revised and expanded edition of the research) includes much additional material from the south and west of Rwanda, especially the prefectures of Kibuye, Cyangugu and Gikongoro which were

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the worst affected by the genocide, but which African Rights could not reach during April-June 1994. Other material has also been included and the lists of killers have been substantially expanded... For the revised edition, three months' additional research was conducted in Rwanda from January-April 1995 (African Rights 1995: xvi-xvii).⁶

Within personal interviews with the one individual that conducted this study, we identified that the researcher obtained most of the information through in-person interviews. In something of a loose "snow-ball sample," and the researcher moved from one group to another and then another. This has several advantages in that the sheer amount of information obtained was significant. At the same time, limitations exist. Snowball samples are particularly prone to bias, as the sample is not random (Van Meter, 1990; Kaplan et al, 1987). In addition, the biases of the interviewer likely affect who enters the sample and who does not. As a result, a snowball sample reveals as much about the researcher who employs it as it does about the object under study (Groger, Mayberry and Straker, 1999). We also have no way of knowing the sampling error associated with samples such as this.

Community Sources

There is a non-governmental group known as Ibuka that represents the surviving Tutsi's interests. Ibuka members differ from the Tutsi that currently run Rwanda in that most are native born Rwandese. From 1996 to the present,

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IBUKA has conducted interviews in several provinces to record a catalog of genocidal events. In Kibuye province, they conducted a household census of the entire province. Kibuye province is particularly important for it represents one of the locales with the largest pre-genocide Tutsi population. This area also contained one of the most sustained resistance efforts against the genocide (which took place in Bisesero). Specifically,

(Ibuka) proceeded alongside the administrative organization of Rwandan society. Kibuye Prefecture (Province) is divided into nine communes. Each commune, having on average 50,000 inhabitants, is subdivided into several sections. These sectors on their turn consist of several cells. Commune by commune, sector by sector and cell by cell, IBUKA collaborators went into all families of Tutsi survivors and of Hutu who did not participate in the genocide to find the names of the murdered Tutsi. The project was financed by the Dutch embassy in Rwanda and employed about two hundred enumerators. The enumerators came from the commune where they were doing the interviews or were familiar with it (Verwimp 2002, 5).

The outcome was an effort that identified approximately 60,000 victims of genocide.

The organization's goal was and is to document every killing that took place during 1994 to facilitate truth telling, healing for survivors and historical

recorders for researchers and lawyers. They meticulously record the victim, the perpetrator, the method of killing, and the location of relevant activity. One of Ibuka's fears is that the current judicial process, known as Gacaca, is being used by the government more as a means to jail potential opposition members than to provide justice for the surviving Rwandese Tutsi.

Government Sources

After several trips to Rwanda (over the course of the last two years), we have also obtained two government reports documenting the same activity as that reported above. After translating the government documents from French into English and coding both sources, we added this data to the other two. Both of these efforts were compiled independently by different ministries within the Tutsi-dominated, authoritarian government that came into power following the civil war and genocide. Both of these efforts were large-scale endeavors involving thousands of individuals and significant amounts of resources.

Now, we mention the composition and structure of the government for we should bear in mind exactly who these individuals are; they are comprised of the former Tutsi community-in-exile that returned to the country by force and attempted to establish a domestically stable and internationally recognized political entity. Confronting the genocide and managing the perception that it was part of an irrational ethnic hatred served their interests in ways that a polifide would not.

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The first study comes from a mass-grave identification project undertaken by the Ministry of Youth, Culture, and Sport with assistance from the Ministries of Social Affairs, Rehabilitation of Social Integration, Communal Development, Family and the Promotion of Women, and the Ministry of Defense. Using contacts throughout the country to identify all sites of mass killing, these ministries used forensic evidence to ascertain the number of victims that existed in each locale. This was initiated in and completed in 1995.

A more recent and possibly more thorough census of the country took place in July 2000 conducted by the Ministry for Local Government – Department for Information and Social Affairs or MINALOC (this became the department of Local Administration, of Information and Social Affairs on November 15th, 2002). The objectives of this study were threefold (MINALOC 2002: 15):

1. To know the families and the names of the genocide and massacre victims.
2. To know the number of the genocide and massacre victims across the country in terms of facilitating a work to them remember by.
3. To identify the most affected sites of the genocide in order to allow the Government of the National Union to concentrate there their efforts to reconcile the Rwandan people.

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Over two weeks in July, 1,900 enumerators canvassed the country, recorded recollections of victims families as well as conducting interviews throughout the nation's prison system. According to the report issued by the organization (MINALOC 2002, 16):

- On the national level, 60 prefectural supervisors, from each province 4 and 16 from the prefecture of the City/Town of Kigali (PVK) were recruited as trainers and have contributed so much to the enriching discussions and have improved the content and questions of the survey and have defined the conditions of recruitment for the staff in charge of leading the activities on the communal level: controller (quality, number and strategy for covering the entire district);
- On the prefectural level, the 60 supervisors were deployed in their prefectures in order to recruit the controllers with the managerial staff in the national technical committee. At this level, 724 controllers were recruited and have trained during 3 days with the support of the members of the technical coordination committee. This phase was deciding for the finalization of the survey.
- At the communal level, 1825 census agents were recruited and trained. Their training took also 3 days.

Who was surveyed? This is not exactly clear. MINALOC identifies that they conducted their survey within households throughout the country but they do

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not identify how many individuals were interviewed or how these individuals were selected. They do identify that (MINALOC 2002, 16)

(i)n the case of a family completely decimated, or in the case of a family whose survivors do not live at this place any longer, the respondent was a neighbor or any other person of the commune, who could provide answers regarding the household of the victim(s).

They continue (MINALOC 2002, 16):

(i)n the case of a family of which at least one survivor still lives in the commune, it is the head of the household who responds or in his/her absence all other family members.

The ministry is clearly aware of the difficulties involved with conducting such a research project. They readily admit that there are numerous limitations:

- a) The individualism of the majority of the urban population and their indifference with regards to the data collection, so as to have the effect that the information there has not been given exhaustively;
- b) The omissions due to the forgetfulness of the respondent based on the amount of time that has passed since the genocide;
- c) The fear to speak about the victims in order to not be questioned like a witness in court;

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- d) The lack of information in certain zones where families were entirely decimated;
- e) The remarkable forgetfulness of names and size of victim families, which is occasionally reflected in the significant difference between the declared victim size and the victim size accounted for;
- f) The fear to testify because one could be the next potential target for genocide criminals who are not yet disarmed;
- g) The refusal of certain genocide survivors to answer questions under the pretext that the government "has not yet done anything in their favor"; and,
- h) The counting of the genocide victims has taken place almost at the same time as the GACACA, which made certain people believe that this exercise was going to trap the witnesses and authors of the genocide (MINALOC 2002, 16-17).

Nevertheless, the data collection effort is worth considering.

In evaluating these sources, we feel that it is necessary to do so in an informed matter. If one is to use *Rashomon* properly (that is as Kurosowa intended it), then they cannot be content with just telling different tales. Rather, they must also explore the structure within which the tales were told (similar to the arguments of Lustick [1996]). In many respects, the contexts are similar between the film and the Rwandan case; both involve traditional, agrarian societies with authoritarian governments and a history of subjugation.

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Additionally, each of the actors identified here has an interest in telling a particular story. Each collects and distributes information for this is “just the type of thing that they would do”. Our task is to see if we can understand the mosaic of perspectives.

The View from Above. The former rebel group and newly established government is most likely seeking both domestic and international legitimacy. As a result, they would collect information for they came to power, in part, to stop the genocide. This presents something of an interesting paradox for the larger the number of victims and perpetrators, the greater the legitimacy for the government. At the same time, if the number is too large, then this reveals that a larger number of individuals were involved and that a larger number of individuals would have to be incarcerated, tried and judge. This would put a tremendous financial burden on the regime. It would also likely diminish the willingness of the population to tolerate the ruling regime. This situation would not be tenable for there are other, seemingly more pressing, matters to contend with: poverty, underdevelopment, and conflict with the Congo.

Now, it is not only important who is reported to have died. It is also very important for the existing regime whom is counted among the living – this directly relates to government entitlements, legal redress, moral authority, sympathy and international aid. From the governments perspective, the victims were essentially their kin – the Tutsi. It is acknowledged that both Tutsi and Hutu

were killed (indeed there are names affixed to each activity: Itsembawoko and Itsembasemba) but the largest number is Tutsi.

The View from Below. Domestic organizations collecting information (such as Ibuka and to some extent African Rights which could also be classified as a foreign institution) are caught within a very complex situation as well. For example, the ruling government is authoritarian and nature and has potentially been engaged in eliminating rivals since it assumed power in 1994. Individuals within Rwanda would be safe to assume that saying anything against the regime would provoke some type of response against them in retaliation. Although it is not quite clear what the government would want (noted above), it is likely that this uncertainty would lead to a large amount of self-censorship. This follows a relative long historical pattern of disengagement from Rwandan politics. Related to this, the government controls access to the population. In order for one to move into a geographic locale for the purposes of collecting information, they need to receive the permission of various authorities. Upon arrival to the relevant location, one is met by local officials who invariably monitor where one goes and who they speak to. It would be fair to say under this context that individuals would be careful about what they told anyone.

At the same time, however, many in Rwanda (lacking funds and other economic opportunities) might acknowledge that information about genocide is a type of currency in the country. Individuals are seemingly always interested and thus any information that is held serves as a form of local product which

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can be purchased. This suggests that efforts at data collection would always yield something; the reliability of this information is another matter but there would always be some product.

Ibuka is particularly important here for they are interested in what took place, they have access to the whole country as their members exist in every secteur, and because they represent survivors they have a certain degree of autonomy from the government. This independence has led to some tension between the two organizations. As a result, the government has appointed numerous IBUKA officials to government positions. African Rights maintains no such relationship with the government and they do not have the organizational structure or access of IBUKA.

Here as well there is a stake on not only counting the dead but dividing them by ethnic group. These groups would directly benefit from such activity for they could assist with bringing home the goodies, the bread – which in a poor country matters a great deal. On the one hand, it is expected that the Tutsi have vested interest in inflating the number upward. This increases their moral authority, the likelihood of receiving benefits and generally weakness the position of the Hutu within the society. On the other hand, however, if the number becomes too large, then the Hutu might become fearful of immense prosecution and retribution (something which did take place right after the RPF came into power).

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It is further expected that no Hutu would be engaged in collecting information about deaths – at least not openly. We have not yet identified any Hutu organization that has collected information; in a sense, to the victims and later victims go the enumeration.

The View from Outside. If one were interested in assessing the Rwandan genocide from abroad (such as Human Rights Watch, African Rights or Physicians for Human Rights) they would be less overtly hindered by Rwandan authorities than indirectly hindered as their access to eyewitnesses would be limited or their local guides avoided areas and topics of considerable controversy. Now, it is clear that these types of organizations bring with them a certain degree of capital and prestige (if a government were attempting to improve it's image, then they would clearly assist them) but given the temporary nature of the investigatory operations that are being discussed here it is unclear how much access or how deeply such an effort would be.


There is likely less of an interest in the distribution of killing across ethnicities for this group than the others but at the same time there is less of a capability in ascertaining differences. This is simply a constant difficult for outsiders trying to peer in.

Structuring Rashomon

We provide our insights into the structure of trace evidence in the Rwandan case below. Here, we see that the Rwandan government serves as a primary conduit for much activity. They have relationships with all domestic

actors as well as maintain access to and supervision over all international contacts. We do not, however, expect that the ministries coordinate with one another. Similar to the structure found within many authoritarian regimes, essentially one finds distinct domains of power who attempt to retain their position through serving some central figure while at the same time closely guarding what they do and what they communicate to others. Coordination can be mandated in this context, but distinct bureaucratic identifies, procedures and practices likely persist.

Figure 1. Understanding Trace Evidence in Post-Genocidal Rwanda



Legend: dotted line = weak relationship; thicker line = strong relationship.

In contrast, Ibuka has relationships with the Rwandan society, the government and they distribute information to the media and to the Rwandan courts. African Rights has relationships with Rwandan society, the media (both inside and outside the country) and the government. Human Rights Watch maintains the weakest linkages with the society and the government, but perhaps the strongest with the international media.

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What do we find? This we discuss below.

Basic Overview

We shall first deal with the number of individuals killed and then move from there. According to the different sources, the data compiled from the Ministry of Local Affairs within the Rwandan government suggests that roughly 900,000 people died in the spring of 1994. Similarly, the mass grave identification project undertaken by the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport estimates that roughly 800,000 people were killed. Human Rights Watch estimates that there were 500,000 victims but our coding of their material only accounted for 47,121. Events were not considered if they were not affixed to either space or time. African Rights provides no estimates. As they state,

(w)e do not attempt to calculate how many people were murdered in Rwanda after 6 April 1994. The number is huge, but the experience of any one individual, those who have died and those who have survived, is also huge. Every single death is a loss. There are relatives and friends who grieve, who suffer trauma, despair and loneliness (African Rights 1995, xv).

From this source we identify 133,144 deaths.

The distribution is interesting. The different government ministries are consistently higher than the other sources but they are not identical. The two are generally close to one another in Kigali-Rural, Kibungo, Butare and Kibuye – the sites of some of the largest massacres. The source differ however on the

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other locations: Gitarama, Gikongoro, Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Cyangugu – all regions in the western part of the country, suggesting one form of systematic bias.

The position of African Rights is understandable. They were interested in telling the truth, but they seemingly lacked the resources to do so. Consequently, the number identified is quite low. Additionally, not providing an estimate is comprehensible as well. The regime is still authoritarian and joining the conflict over the body count might interfere with their access to the country. Although generally lower than either of the ministries, African Rights is found to exceed the values of Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport in two provinces: Gikongoro (which is actually quite close) and Cyangugu (which is much higher). The latter is the most distant province from the capitol (near the Burundian border) and it identifies what may have been the last area to be engulfed by genocide. Interestingly, between African Rights and the two ministries, this is the location where the estimates are third closest to one another, following Kigali-ville (the area surrounding Kigali) and Kibuye (discussed earlier).

The estimates for Human Rights Watch are consistently lower than the others. Two explanations exist for this. One, their access to the country was limited; or, alternatively, their research simply identified a lower figure. De Forge estimates that 500,000 died in the genocide, but this estimate comes not from the organizations data, but from estimates made by a demographic consultant. Referring to his report, it is clear that the 500,000 figure is a rough estimate at

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best. From Human Right Watch's data we do know that she sampled a small proportion of the actually number of stories of killings. We do NOT know what means she and her organization used to select those interviewed. If we assume that De Forge's colleagues used a snowball sample technique, then it is likely the sample used to tell the genocide's story suffers from potentially severe bias.

Additionally, the number of reported survivors is important. If we assume a Tutsi population of 600,000 (based on the 1992 census), then we can begin to estimate the number of Tutsi and Hutu victims. The other key figure, for which there are few estimates, are the number of surviving Tutsi. Gerard Prunier estimates 130,000 survivors. Human Rights Watch estimates 150,000. Ibuka claims 300,000 survived, with roughly 50,000 perishing form natural causes over the subsequent 8 years. These distinctions matter a great deal.

If we accept the Ibuka figures and the data from the Rwandan government, then roughly 300,000 Tutsi died along with 600,000 Hutu. If this were the case either no genocide took place, or, alternatively genocide of the Tutsi took place followed by a large-scale massacre of Hutu in retaliation. We do not know who the perpetrators of the majority of Hutu deaths were, although an unpublished UN report (the so-called Gersony report) implies that the RPF is responsible for a large proportion of the Hutu deaths. Clearly many Hutu died in the early spring and summer, victims of the Hutu Power movement who planned to slaughter of Tutsi as well (which we are documenting rather consistently). What we do not know, is whether the proportion of Hutu victims was low during

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the initial phases of the mass killings, which would be consistent with the charge of genocide, or if the killings took place simultaneously, which would be consistent with a more general, but equally horrific, politicide. It is also possible that the Hutu deaths followed the Tutsi deaths, and as such would then represent a continued escalation of violence and counter violence that characterizes much of Rwandan and Burundian politics of the past 50 years. We are still collecting data on this.

Of course, it is not only important what the total figure was but also the distribution across space. For this, we have examined our data across each commune within Rwanda by the source as well as across time. This information has been posted on the webpage dedicated to the project.⁷

In figure 2, we demonstrate graphically, based on the most recent government census, the geographic distribution of the killings. As is apparent in the map, the killings, while distributed throughout the country (including areas the RPF is reported to have controlled before the genocide began), in these data the killings are concentrated in 4 principle locations, supporting the contentions that intervention could have saved a large proportion of the lives lost (if properly timed and adequately armed).




Figure 2. Map of killings by Commune.

In Table 1, which details the various sources of data in our study, we find that the greatest distribution of killings/victims exists within the Ministry of Local Affairs report. Here, seemingly every location was involved, with Butare mounting the largest number of victims followed by Gitarama, Kigali and Gikongoro. This would complicate efforts at intervention and simultaneously any efforts taken toward reconciliation. When we consider the Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sport we find that Butare is again the location with the largest amount of killing. This is followed by Kigali (again) and Kibuye. After this point, there is a fairly uneven distribution across the various geographic locales. This

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concentration makes efforts at intervention and reconciliation appear more feasible. In contrast, African Rights reveals that Kibuye had the largest number of killings with five provinces tied for second: Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Gitarama, Kigali and Kibungo. This suggests that intervention might have been facilitated had it targeted one location but at the same time reveals that the remaining locations might have been harder to contain. This also suggests that reconciliation efforts should be distinctly targeted to different parts of the population. Again, differing from the others, Human Rights Watch reveals that Butare had the largest number of killings with Gikongoro and Kibuye closely behind. The remaining values are low and fairly evenly distributed. Such a pattern also would lead one to suggest that intervention and reconciliation are feasible.

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Table 1. The Demography of the 1994 Rwandan Mass Killings

Prefecture	Publication	Victims	Number of Tutsi Dead	Prefect Pop	Tutsi Pop	Hutu Pop	1992 Census	Victims as % of Tutsi	Victims as % of pop	Tutsi as % of Pop
Kigale-ville	Mass Graves	17,564		235,664	39,703	150,550	221,806	44%	7%	
	Gov't census ¹	98,131						0%	0%	
	Africa Rights	820						2%	0%	
	Human Rights	36						0%	0%	
Kigale-rural	Mass Graves	180,854		914,034	79,696	822,314	905,632	227%	20%	
	Gov't census	136,359						171%	15%	
	Africa Rights	20,247						25%	2%	
	Human Rights	128						0%	0%	
Byumba	Mass Graves	0		782,427	11,639	761,968	775,935	0%	0%	
	Gov't census	6,550						56%	1%	
	Africa Rights	26						0%	0%	
Kibungo	Mass Graves	71,383		652,941	49,966	596,999	648,912	143%	11%	
	Gov't census	82,431						165%	13%	
	Africa Rights	12,126						24%	2%	
	Human Rights	3,000						6%	0%	
Butare	Mass Graves	378,472		764,448	130,419	618,172	753,868	290%	50%	
	Gov't census	206,871						159%	27%	
	Africa Rights	2,005						2%	0%	
	Human Rights	33,568						26%	4%	
Gitarama	Mass Graves	57,946		851,451	78,019	764,920	848,027	74%	7%	
	Gov't census	113,261						145%	13%	
	Africa Rights	3,500						4%	0%	
	Human Rights	83						0%	0%	
Gikongoro	Mass Graves	20,900		467,332	59,624	401,998	465,814	35%	4%	
	Gov't census	96,372						162%	21%	
	Africa Rights	26,006						44%	6%	
	Human Rights	3,506						6%	1%	
Ruhengeri	Mass Graves	3,453		769,297	3,734	760,661	766,795	92%	0%	
	Gov't census	11,925						319%	2%	
Gisenyi	Mass Graves	9,840		734,658	21,228	708,572	731,996	46%	1%	
	Gov't census	35,130						165%	5%	
	Africa Rights	3,394						16%	0%	
	Human Rights	771						4%	0%	
Kibuye	Mass Graves	88,315		470,643	69,485	398,131	469,494	127%	19%	
	Gov't census	72,688						105%	15%	
	Ibuka	50,878						73%	11%	
	Africa Rights	57,212						82%	12%	
Cyangugu	Human Rights	6,000						9%	1%	
	Mass Graves	5,556		514,656	57,914	498,238	551,565	10%	1%	
	Gov't	55,271						95%	11%	
	Africa Rights	27,953						48%	5%	
Total	Human Rights	3						0%	0%	
	Mass Graves	834,283		7,157,551	601,427	6,482,523	7,139,844	139%	12%	8.40%
	Gov't census	914,989	855,148					152%	13%	
	Africa Rights	133,144						22%	2%	
Human Rights	47,121							8%	1%	
	Human Rights ⁵	500,000	350,000 ⁵					83%	7%	

1. The Rwanda government conducted a new genocide victims census from July 17-27, 2000. The figures draw on that survey.

2. If this figure is correct, the government survey implies 851,000 Tutsi dead, some 200,000 more than believed to reside in Rwanda at the time of the mass killings.

3. William Selzter, a demographer, puts the 1994 Tutsi population at 647,000. De Forge, pg 15.

4. De Forge estimates that roughly 500,000 died in the genocide. Leave None, pg 16.

5. De Forge estimates that 150,000 Tutsi survived. Leave None, pg 24.

Conclusion

Within this paper we have attempted to outline a particular direction for research in the field of contentious politics but for other forms of research as well. We have attempted to identify a variety of different source which each had an interest in documenting a series of events within Rwanda. With this information we then proceeded to explore whether or not the variation made sense and then we attempted to assess the degree to which intervention and reconciliation would be influenced (albeit in a limited fashion).

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This paper represents a first look at the data presented above as well as a first look at this problem. While several individuals have suggested that we should begin to explore the variation that exists across our sources, few have systematically attempted to identify and investigate this variation directly – attempting to understand what is reported, why and what the implications of this variation actually are. Within later versions of this work, we will continue to explore the themes outlined above. Specifically, we will rigorously investigate the varying spatial and temporal patterns in genocide revealed within the data across the different sources. This will then be related in greater detail to the processes of intervention and reconciliation alluded to within the paper.

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¹ She admits that it would appear to many that she must have killed her husband.

² Similar to the Hut, many of the Tutsi are poor and were largely removed from politics. It is not clear exactly how they benefited. Perhaps the best way to think of their privilege is to think of it as being largely analogous to what was enjoyed by poor whites in the United States under slavery and Jim Crow or enjoyed by poor whites in South Africa under Apartheid.

³ A third includes the numerical small Twa.

⁴ We do not mean to suggest that reconciliation is this easy, but much of the literature does maintain such a position.

⁵ This can be found at the following url: <http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare.html>.

⁶ From the beginning, the effort was guided to cover a wide range of activity in different locals but, perceiving a weakness in coverage, the initial effort was supplemented with additional research in areas believed to be under-reported/under-studied.

⁷ This can be found at www.genodynamics.com.