

ASSESSING THE MILITARY'S INFLUENCE ON POLITICAL REPRESSION

CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT¹
University of Houston

Journal of Political and Military Sociology 1995, Vol. 23 (Summer): 119-144

This paper examines the relationship between military influence and the use of repression (censorship and political restrictions). Three hypotheses are examined in a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of 57 countries from 1948 to 1982. The first hypothesis considers the proposition that military influence directly effects political repression. The second and third hypotheses investigate the moderating impact of democracy and dependency as they effect this basic relationship. Within the context of a multivariate model, the analysis supports the first hypothesis, rejects the second, and partially supports the third. These findings are discussed with regard to their relevance to the existing literature and numerous suggestions are offered for future research.

It is often argued that the degree of influence the military has on nation-states is a critical determinant of state repression.² The dominant perspective in this line of argumentation is simply that repression increases with increasing military power (Hibbs, 1973; Janowitz, 1977; Simon, 1978; Wolpin, 1986; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Gurr, 1986). In contrast to this simplistic model, however, stand two more complex arguments about the relationship between military influence and repressive behavior. One of these holds that the military influence-repression relationship is conditioned by the type of political system within the nation-state (Huntington, 1964; Hanneman, 1985). The other posits that the degree to which states are dependent on the international political-economy is a critical conditioning factor (Hartman and Walters, 1985; Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Evans and Timberlake, 1980).

¹I wish to acknowledge Mark Franklyn, Ray Duch, Juliet Seignious, and two thoughtful anonymous reviewers for their assistance. I also wish to thank Eduard Ziegenhagen for his continual support.

²Repression is defined as government regulatory action directed against those challenging existing power relationships. This is similar to Goldstein's (1978, 1983) where, [p]olitical repression consists of government action which grossly discriminates against persons or organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power relationships or key government policies, because of their perceived political beliefs (1978:xvi).

To decrease the amount of redundancy within the text, repression will be used interchangeably with coercion and negative sanctions.

While the literature is replete with debate about the relative theoretical merits of these differing perspectives, few studies empirically explore the relationships identified. Such an analysis would prove beneficial to both theory and to policy makers. In order to shed some empirical light on the matter, this paper will test hypotheses derived from each of the three perspectives on the military influence-repression nexus.

Using 57 countries from 1948-1982, three hypothesized effects of military influence on repression are examined with a pooled cross-sectional time-series design. The three hypotheses analyzed investigate both direct and interactive effects of the military on state uses of censorship and political restrictions. While the former effect is evident within numerous areas of political science and sociology, the latter effects are specifically drawn from the literature on military professionalization and dependency theory.

PERSPECTIVES ON THE ARMED FORCES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Discussions of the military's effect on domestic politics have generally moved in two directions. One direction is concerned with military interventions, particularly as it relates to the onset of coups (Achene, 1987) and political development (Huntington, 1968; Janowitz, 1977). The other direction, the primary focus of the present study, is concerned with the military's effect upon the use of political repression. This I have labeled the military-coercion perspective (MCP).

MCP focuses on the military as an organization that specializes in the use of violence and actively participates in the implementation of repression within its jurisdiction.³ Repressive behavior is believed to be favored by these organizations for two reasons: 1) it can easily be applied because armies are prepared to use force at all times (Huntington, 1964; Randle, 1981; Zwick, 1984; Hanneman, 1985; Seligson, 1987) and 2) such acts are congruent with the organization's basic ideology, which is control through the application of force (Wayman, 1975; Cortese, 1976).

Unfortunately, the literature on this issue provides little insight into the relationship between the military and negative sanctions. Numerous case studies have been conducted which discuss the issue, specifically

³As Thee (1977:278) suggests, "[b]y definition, military organizations are called to apply organized violence in defense of the state..."

in the areas of political development (Shils, 1962; Janowitz, 1964; 1977; Kick and Sharda, 1986), political stability (Mckinlay and Cohan, 1976; simon, 1978), and civil-military relations (Perlmutter, 1980a, 1980b; Randle, 1981; Zwick, 1984), but given the different theoretical concerns that are addressed by these studies and the lack of concern for measurement exhibited by them, for the purposes of the present analysis, we are unable to derive much assistance from these investigations. This is less a criticism than an identification of divergent research interests.

Upon observing some more rigorous investigations, we are able to derive some assistance from two analyses conducted by Hibbs (1973) and Ziegenhagen (1986). Both authors, within their investigations of mass political violence (i.e., behavior directed against the state, its polices, and its practices), examine the relationship between the military and its effect on the use of negative sanctions. The former analysis measures this influence by gauging the number of internal security forces per 1000 square kilometers, the latter by observing military representation within the government and the size of the military relative to the total population.

With Hibbs employing a cross-sectional investigation of 108 countries and Ziegenhagen a time-series examination⁴ of 221 "conflict episodes,"⁵ both analyses found that when the capacity of the military increased, in terms of its ability to influence as well as implement specific policies, so does the application of repressive behavior. The readiness of the agents of repression, therefore, directly increases the likelihood that governments will utilize repressive means of behavioral regulation. This directly supports the basic hypothesis of the MCP and establishes a relatively good empirical "first cut" at the relationships.

Neither study is without its difficulties however. Both are hindered by two important factors, each highlighting the need for additional investigation. First, neither author attempts to explain coercion nor to identify the factors that are responsible for its manifestation. Rather, they address the phenomena in passing as they try to explain domestic

⁴Hibbs (1973) controlled for system type (democracy), economic development, and political conflict in his examination and Ziegenhagen controlled for the effects of system type (democracy), political conflict, dependency, and two variables associated with the social mobilization literature: the number of university enrolled students relative to GNP and urbanization relative to GNP.

⁵Conflict episodes are conceived of as temporally contiguous occurrences of conflict events varying in duration, amplitude, and directional change. These are drawn from 64 nations from 1948 to 1982, varying from about 1 year to 14 years in duration.

political conflict. The second problem is that the time frames considered are quite restrictive; as mentioned, Hibbs observes 108 cross-sections and Ziegenhagen 221 episodes of conflict. Although each examination sufficiently addresses a part of the repressive process, particularly relevant to different manifestations of conflict, these limited time dimensions are problematic because they identify a somewhat truncated picture of the overall dynamics involved. It may be the case that the relationships disclosed are not representative of the relationships as they truly exist. The issue thus begs for additional examination to see if the behavioral linkages withstand time-series analysis. Once more, these do not necessarily represent serious difficulties with the particular studies themselves, but rather they reflect different research questions and methodological limitations.

Problems notwithstanding, all of the studies mentioned above have provided the theoretical as well as empirical bases for the present examination. They have facilitated the derivation of three hypothesized relationships between repression and the role of the military in its use. Moreover, and particularly important to an empirical investigation, they have also provided the variables with which to operationalize political repression, military influence, as well as the numerous contextual factors that moderate the relationship between the two. Each will be discussed below after the presentation of the hypotheses.

The first causal relationship proposed in the literature suggests that
1) *sheer military influence increases the application of political repression.*

In this case, the military's influence is expected to promote repressive behavior out of habit (Hibbs, 1973; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Gurr, 1986) and a disrespect for institutional specialization (Huntington, 1964).⁶ This view is most clearly articulated within the work of Lasswell (1941), Chomsky and Herman (1979), and Gurr (1986).

What unifies this relatively diverse perspective is twofold. First, all of the studies in this area are overtly anti-militaristic in character, asserting that there is something inherently aggressive within the military that compels it to push for repressive policies. Second, each study, quite explicitly, calls for an end to militaristic objectives and resource allocations. The underlying assumption here is that if one reduced the capacity of the military to influence policy selection (its

⁶Quite simply, armies know no other way of acting so they continually try to influence government policy towards coercive behavior.

resources, etc.) this would reduce the likelihood that repressive strategies would be implemented.

Not all of the literature comes with such an anti-militaristic bent however. Almost to the defense of military regimes and militarism, another series of analyses puts forth an entirely different set of hypotheses. These analyses stress that regimes influenced by the military could be repressive but only under certain circumstances. In other words, military influence functions interactively with some other factor to elicit an effect on political repression. One such variable is the degree of democracy present within a political system.

Within the presence of a non-democratic government, the military's influence is expected to increase negative sanctions (Huntington, 1968; O'Donnell, 1979). Here, a lack of respect for civilian authority and a limited number of alternatives for controlling political behavior increase the activities of the military, basically to compensate for a weak/less "legitimate" regime.⁷ Within the presence of a democratic political structure, on the other hand, the situation is expected to be quite different.

In the midst of a more democratic form of government, the military is expected to be mindful of its involvement with the political system and disciplined enough to withhold from resorting to or pushing for coercive behavior (Huntington, 1964; Nordlinger, 1977). Here, the boundaries of their jurisdiction would be clearly understood and they would not venture to readjust, redefine or violate these parameters. Additionally, through interest aggregation and articulation, military involvement in government policy-making is decreased out of diminished necessity. In a sense, the alternative mechanisms for controlling political behavior provided by a democracy reduce governmental reliance upon the military for political repression because the increase in available regulatory strategies decreases dependency on any one in particular. Strategic variety thus diminishes the frequency of all strategies applied. This is in line with Ashby's (1957) "law of requisite variety."

As a consequence of this reformation of the basic hypothesis, the relationship between negative sanctions and the military is made conditional. Specifically,

2) military influence is believed to effect repression only as moderated by government structure. When the regime is not democratic, the relationship should be positive; i.e., repression is

⁷A weak regime according to Buzan (1983:67) is one where the idea of the state, its institutions, and its territory all lack definition and stability in their own right.

expected to increase. When the regime is democratic, however, the relationship should be negative; i.e., repression is expected to decrease.

Another variable that is believed to interact with the military and affect its relationship with coercion is identified by the dependency literature. According to this perspective, the degree to which a given regime applies repression is linked directly to its relationship with the international political-economy (Jackson et al., 1978). This relationship is expected to promote repression because it fosters the creation, extension, and perpetuation of certain economic and political conditions, each stage of which is believed to be made more readily with the use of repressive behavior (Petras, 1986).⁸ These conditions include the following: a specialization in exports, a skewed distribution of political-economic resources, cheap labor and a docile labor force in terms of political activity.

The military is of particular importance to this process of "creation, extension, and perpetuation" because of its particular area of expertise. With its assistance certain economic policies could be directly enforced (i.e., free market principles), raw materials could be confiscated and, perhaps most importantly, labor could be forcefully obtained and made quiescent through torture and coercive treatment (Seligson, 1987; Carleton, 1989).

With this in mind, the last hypothesis is somewhat similar in structure to the previous one. Those regimes that are heavily influenced by the military may or may not implement repression but if the states' involvement with (or dependency upon) the global economy is significant, then the use of repression should be increased (Timberlake and Williams, 1984; Alfatooni and Allen, 1991). In other words,

3) military influence effects repression only as moderated by international dependency. When the regime is incorporated into the global economy in a particular manner (i.e., when its trade relations are susceptible to manipulation or unstable price fluctuations), the application of repression will be increased. When the regime is not incorporated in this manner and it is relatively impervious to the various fluctuations of the global economy, the causal linkage is subject to chance.

⁸ A few authors disagree with this (Frank, 1980; Rothgeb, 1989). These authors suggest that dependency (foreign investment, in particular) decreases political repression. This position is the minority view however. I thus stay in line with the expectations of the majority.

We shall now proceed to address the more technical aspects of the investigation.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

The unit of analysis employed within this study is the nation-year (with behavior manifested within nation-states being aggregated by years). Determined by data availability, 57 countries are examined over the time period of 1948 to 1982. These are provided by geographic region within appendix A.

The dependent variable, political repression, is taken from Taylor and Jodice's *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (1983). The measure encompasses both censorship, the limitation of the news media, and political restrictions, which concerns various constraints placed upon individual citizens and also political parties.⁹ These events have been coded annually by consulting the New York Times index as well as various regional publications (see Taylor and Jodice [1983], Vol. 2, pp. 61-77). The actual measure itself is expressed as a natural logarithm (after adding an increment of one).

Although often criticized with regard to the appropriateness of this measure in accurately portraying state repression and also with regard to possible biases that might exist within the data,¹⁰ this operationalization has been identified as the most useful for comparative analyses viewed longitudinally (Goldstein, 1986).¹¹ Employed within most studies that examine determinants (Hibbs, 1973; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Davis and Ward, 1990) as well as aftereffects of state repression (Muller, 1985; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Davis and Ward, 1990; Alfatooni and Allen, 1991), this tradition will be continued here.

Following the strategy of Hibbs (1973), Hanneman and Steinbeck (1980), and Ziegenhagen (1986), three variables are employed to measure military influence. Collected from Banks' *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive* (1991), all are used to investigate hypothesis 1. The first two variables concern organizational attributes of the military: 1) the size of the military (MSIZE), operationalized by dividing the size of the military by the total population, and 2) military

⁹Full definitions are provided in Taylor and Jodice (1983, Volume 2), pages 62-63.

¹⁰For a thorough discussion of the issue look at Volume 8 (4) of the *Human Rights Quarterly*.

¹¹Indeed, no other dataset exists on the subject matter for as long a period of time.

sector allocations (MSA), derived from the amount of expenditures given to the military relative to the nations' overall expenditures. The third variable addresses direct representation of the military in government (MREP). A qualitative ranking of military influence developed by Banks (1991), this variable considers the degree to which the military holds various posts within the government up to and including the Chief of State (p. 17).¹²

To measure democracy, Banks' (1991) composite index of political polyarchy and pluralism (p. 16) will be used. This variable captures multiple dimensions of democratic regimes including the following: the effectiveness of the legislature, the competitiveness of the nominating procedure, the number of political parties in existence, and the degree to which parties are excluded from the political process.¹³ Drawing on the work of Cutright (1963), Bollen (1980), and Gurr (1989), this variable is more useful in capturing what is meant by a democratic system than simply applying some unidimensional indicator. Labeled DEM, this variable is used interactively with organizational attributes of the military (MSIZE and MSA) and military representation (MREP) to examine hypothesis 2.

Considering the third hypothesis, indicators of dependency are less clear than the other variables identified and thus the measurement selection is more problematic. Some authors use investment dependence, which gauges the dollar value of stock of foreign investments from 16 OECD members (Bornschiefer et al., 1978; Evans and Timberlake, 1980; Jackman, 1982; Timberlake and Williams, 1984). Others use Snyder and Kick's (1979) blockmodel of the world system (Kick, 1987; Alfatooni and Allen, 1991).¹⁴ This variable represents a combination of trade flows, treaty memberships, military interventions, and diplomatic relations.

¹²The different categorizations include Civilian, Military-Civilian, Military and Other (i.e., all regimes not falling into one of the other categories).

¹³As the variable itself already combines these attributes, it is not possible to individually assess the relationships between them; i.e., through some factor analysis.

¹⁴Another variable suggested for dependency concerns transnational corporate penetration (Robinson and London (1991:121) and external trade volume. These represent variants of the argument, but since they are not generally acknowledged within the majority of studies on dependency, I have stayed within the boundaries of the existing literature.

Both strategies suffer from significant limitations, however, with regards to their use in the present analysis. First, the information needed to generate each measure is difficult to obtain over time. As a consequence, studies that used this data previously have been forced to apply cross-sectional analysis (Snyder and Kick, 1979; Timberlake and Williams, 1984). Second, each measure stresses external relations over the disarticulation of the domestic economy of a particular nation. Although both external and internal factors are important, emphasis on the former attribute ignores the fact that the structure of the domestic political-economy is more immediately relevant to identifying the effect of the behavioral linkages involved here. With these concerns, I have opted to use the export concentration measure provided by Taylor and Jodice (1983).

Derived from a comparison of all exports to the degree of specialization found in any one particular category, export concentration was selected for three reasons. First, since the data is collected for the years of 1950-1975, by five year intervals, the greater part of the time period examined (1948-1982) is accounted for.¹⁵ Second, export specialization is often cited as an important attribute of dependent nations (Jackson, et al., 1978; Chomsky and Herman, 1979; Petras, 1986; Carleton, 1989). And third, export concentration provides a good measure of economic disarticulation and sensitivity to fluctuations of the global economy.¹⁶ Similar to the measure for democracy, this variable will be used interactively with all three indicators of military influence to examine hypothesis 3.

Accounting for existing threats that a regime is facing political conflict will serve as a control. Since regimes have been found to respond to the magnitude of dissent directed against their policies and practices (Hibbs, 1973; Muller, 1985; Ziegenhagen, 1986; Robinson and London, 1991), this variable allows us to properly estimate the relationship of interest. Conflict (CON) itself is measured by an

¹⁵The missing years were interpolated arithmetically, taking the general pattern from the information provided and incorporating the absent data points. These values were used within the regression equations reported in the text.

¹⁶When an economy is skewed towards the production of only a few products, it becomes virtually reliant upon the price fluctuations of these products without the opportunity to have other products to take up the slack in the economy (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979; Fortado, 1970). It may be that "sensitivity to fluctuations of the global economy" would be better assessed by weighting concentration with trade flows. Examining this possibility for several countries within my sample, the results were not significantly altered. I thus opted for the more parsimonious measure. Such a combination should be investigated further.

additive composite of four conflict events: anti-government demonstrations, guerrilla warfare, riots, and general strikes.¹⁷ Such use follows a relatively long standing tradition within the discipline.

Following the discussion of the previous few pages, the basic equation examined follows below:

Table 1

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Regression} = & A + B_1 \text{Military Sector Allocations} \\ & + B_2 \text{Military Size} \\ & + B_3 \text{Military Representation} + B_4 \text{Conflict} \\ & + B_5 \text{Democracy} + B_6 \text{Dependency} + \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

Legend

A = intercept;

ε = error.

As designed, regression is functionally related to military sector allocations (MSA), the size of the military relative to the total population (MSIZE), military representation (MREP), anti-systemic behavior (CON), democracy (DEM), and dependency (DEPEN).¹⁸

¹⁷The four variables are taken from Banks' (1991) data archive. The operational definitions for each (adopted from Rudolph Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," General Systems Yearbook, VIII [1963]:1-50) are provided below:

Anti-government Demonstrations: any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a distinctly foreign nature.

General Strikes: any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or authority.

Riots: any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force.

Guerrilla Warfare: any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present regime.

¹⁸It should be noted that this equation only addresses the first hypothesis. The second and third hypotheses are examined by adding onto this equation those variables that investigate the military professionalization and dependency arguments, respectively. To accomplish this, in turn, the different interactive variables are incorporated into the basic equation. Assuring efficient results, statistically insignificant variables are discarded after each equation is analyzed and reduced equations are re-run. This practice allows us to assess the degree of multicollinearity present as well as determine the level of confidence we can have in the results themselves across different equations.

The research strategy employed to investigate the proposed relationships is a pooled cross-sectional time-series design (PCT). This strategy has become increasingly popular in recent years given the fact that it facilitates the examination of hypotheses across both time and space simultaneously. Along with these increased capabilities, however, there are several problems that also must be confronted when addressing both issues at the same time; specifically, case specific error and autocorrelation. These are problematic in utilizing PCT designs because, with regard to case-specific error, without controlling for the differential variability exhibited from unit to unit the parameter estimates are biased (Stimson, 1985); and in the case of autocorrelation, the parameter estimates obtained are inefficient (Kmenta, 1971). Additionally, these are particularly problematic here, because they increase the likelihood that crucial assumptions maintained by ordinary least squares (OLS), the most often applied model for PACT designs, would be violated. As a consequence, we must find an appropriate alternative.

To address these problems I employ a twofold strategy primarily based upon the work of Stimson (1985).¹⁹ Concerning the issue of case specific error, country dummies will be employed in all analyses. This controls for the effects of the different nation-states utilized within the study. In reference to the second difficulty, an Arima model is used to identify any pattern of autocorrelation that may exist within the residuals of the basic equation.²⁰ If there is a problem, I re-estimate the equation with the detrended dependent variable in a generalized least squares (GLS) regression and, in turn, address each of the hypotheses.

FINDINGS

Analyzing the residuals from the basic equation with Arima modeling techniques, autocorrelation was found. The particular variant

¹⁹Stimson does not address the particular situation that I consider; i.e., a cross-sectionally dominant data set where autocorrelation may be a problem. But having read numerous discussions about the issue (Sayrs, 1989; Poe and Tate, 1992), I believe I have sufficient grounds for employing the strategy that has been selected.

²⁰Although observation of the Durbin Watson statistic has often been used to detect for autocorrelation (specifically investigating the existence of a first-order autoregression), as the Box and Jenkins (1976) work has made clear, other kinds of error processes besides first-order autoregressive process are possible. Subjecting the residuals of the basic equation to Arima modeling, I should be able to identify any problems.

of autocorrelation identified was a classic AR(1) process. Saving the detrended dependent variable and re-estimating the equation with GLS the derived results are provided below:

Table 2.
Estimated Effects of the Military on Repression
Basic Model

	Equation 1.	Equation 2.	Equation 3.
Intercept	2.76 (.27)**	2.39 (.25)**	2.58 (.22)**
MSA	.69 (.35)**	.63 (.35)*	.64 (.35)*
MREP	.11 (.05)**	.09 (.05)	---
MSIZE	3.57 (7.18)	---	---
CONFLICT	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**
DEMOCRACY	-.16 (.04)**	-.18 (.04)**	-.23 (.03)**
DEPENDENCY	.12 (.02)**	.14 (.02)**	.14 (.02)**
R ²	.6426	.6445	.6440

LEGEND:

MSA = Military sector allocations relative to total allocations;

MREP = Military representation;

MSIZE = Size of the military relative to the population;

*** = Statistical significance at .05 level;

** = Statistical significance at .1 level;

--- = Not examined;

() = Standard errors;

Note: All Coefficients are unstandardized.

Considering the first equation, we see that the basic model performs quite well. Roughly 64 percent of the variance is explained in the dependent variable, and supporting the existing literature, political repression is increased by both dependency and conflict while, at the same time, being decreased by democracy. This allows us to have a reasonable amount of faith in the results because previous findings, which have become the very foundation of the empirical analyses conducted on repression, are directly supported.

What about the impact of military influence, the particular subject of this study? Addressing the first hypothesis, in equation 1 both military sector allocations and military representation in the government are found to positively effect the imposition of negative sanctions. Both effects are marginally significant at about the .05 level. This reconfirms Ziegenhagen's (1986) findings.

Re-estimating the reduced version of the equation (in equation 2), deleting the size of the military as an explanatory variable (which failed to achieve statistical significance), military representation is no longer significant and military sector allocations is now significant only at the .1 level. While somewhat disappointing, in that the relationship is not as strong as that found within the initial equation, the relationship does hold up across different analyses. Specifically, the relationship withstands re-estimation with all statistically insignificant variables being removed (reported in equation 3). From this, we can conclude that when the resources given to the military are increased, censorship and political restrictions are enhanced correspondingly. This bears out some of the worst fears of the "Garrison State Syndrome."

As we discovered from reading the literature, however, we cannot simply accept this basic relationship without also exploring some of the variants of the military-coercion perspective. Indeed, as Randle suggests (1977:67),

[m]ilitarism is only one of a number of factors which influence the political, economic, and social climate. What can be said is that that influence is a negative one and that it interacts with others to create or reinforce those situations in which repression occurs.

Two particular "influences" include democracy and dependency. Each is explored below.

Investigating the military professionalization argument in equation 4, i.e., the interactive effect between military influence and democracy, we do not find any support whatsoever for the attenuation claim of system type. Neither military sector allocations, the size of the military nor military representation within the government is moderated in its effect on repression when viewed within the presence of a more open government. This refutes several long standing claims within the literature.

The strength of this refutation should be treated somewhat skeptically. There are two reasons for this. First, military professionalization stresses many important confounding elements, relevant to the application of repression, that cannot be identified with the data utilized in this study; i.e., ethnic composition of the armed forces (Enloe, 1980) and cohesion within the military apparatus itself.

Table 3.
Estimated Effects of the Military on Repression within Different Contexts

	Equation 4.	Equation 4a.	Equation 4b.	Equation 5.	Equation 6	Equation 7.	Equation 8.
Intercept	2.59 (.24)**	2.62 (.24)	2.55 (.24)**	2.59 (.25)**	2.49 (.22)**	2.51 (.22)**	2.53 (.22)**
MSA	.44 (.61)	.40 (.60)	.70 (.37)**	.39 (.61)	.84 (.32)**	.84 (.35)**	.84 (.35)**
CONFLICT	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**	.04 (.00)**
DEMOCRACY	-.33 (.09)	-.31 (.09)**	-.31 (.03)**	-.25 (.06)**	-.20 (.03)**	-.22 (.03)**	-.23 (.04)**
DEPENDENCY	.12 (.02)**	.14 (.05)**	.12 (.01)**	.12 (.02)**	.16 (.07)**	.23 (.06)**	.27 (.04)**
MSA*DEM	.16 (.32)	.14 (.32)	---	.18 (.38)	---	---	---
MREP*DEM	.07 (.06)	.04 (.30)	.07 (.06)	---	---	---	---
MSIZE*DEM	.35 (3.18)	---	.77 (3.01)	.23 (3.10)	---	---	---
MSA*DEP	---	---	---	---	-.80(.35)**	-1.03 (.31)**	-.97 (.31)**
MREP*DEP	---	---	---	---	.04(.03)	.03 (.03)	---
MSIZE*DEP	---	---	---	---	2.45 (4.37)	---	---
R ²	.6422	.6441	.6421	.6418	.6431	.6450	.6462

LEGEND:

MSA = Military sector allocations relative to total allocations;

MREP = Military representation;

MSIZE = Size of the military relative to the population;

"DEM" = Democracy;

"DEP" = Dependency;

"***" = Statistical significance at .05 level;

"**" = Statistical significance at .1 level;

"---" = Not examined;

"()" = Standard errors;

Note: All Coefficients are unstandardized.

Without addressing these factors, the results may be misleading. Second, observing the Pearson correlation coefficients between the numerous variables used (provided in Appendix B), the possibility may exist that an independent effect of the interactive variables could not be properly evaluated because of multicollinearity; specifically, democracy correlates with the interaction between military representation and democracy (REPDEM) at $r = .90$. Deleting REPDEM in equation 5, however, the lack of support for the hypothesis continued. This possibility is also explored in Equations 4a and 4b, where different variables are alternately deleted. As a consequence, the present analysis must reject this proposition, albeit tentatively.

Considering the moderating influence of dependency (equation 6), we do find a statistically significant interactive effect but the relationship identified was quite different from that anticipated. As expected, when dependency moderated the military's impact upon the use of repression, the relationship should have been positive across all measures of influence. Primarily this was attributed to the fact that within a more concentrated export-economy the military would be called upon more frequently to involve itself in "stabilizing" the investment climate; increasing the application of political repression. These linkages were partially supported by considering the independent effects of military influence (i.e., military sector allocations) and dependency. Both of these variables were found to increase the state's use of repressive behavior. The situation changes markedly when the interactive effect was considered.

From the derived results, the proposed relationship identified is negative. Rather, than the moderating effect of dependency further enhancing the application of repression, simultaneous consideration of both factors results in a decrease in censorship and applied restrictions. This holds within the reduced equation (Equations 7 and 8), improving upon both the level of significance and also the amount of variance explained.²¹ There are two plausible explanations for this, both requiring further investigation.

First, regimes influenced by the military may decrease political repression because it is potentially dangerous to their status within a dependent society. As the armed forces have already secured adequate resources and since their repressive behavior might prove deleterious to the domestic economy (instigating anti-systemic behavior), they would

²¹Perhaps confronting the possibility of multicollinearity again, this time amongst the interactive variables themselves, different equations were run with different combinations of interactive variables being estimated. Despite the various combinations the results reported were sustained.

be more inclined to reduce the application of censorship and political restrictions. This would protect their status as a well funded organization and also the economic situation itself. The second reason for the negative effect concerns some more logistical factors. Within a situation where the resources given to the military are significant and the economy is centered on a few items, the use of repression may be more effective. This decreases repression out of decreased necessity. Since more individuals would be concentrated geographically, given the structure of a dependent economy (Scott and Storper, 1986), fewer acts of repression would probably be needed to control the behavior of the citizenry. This stems from the role of the citizenry in the regulatory process. Given the fact that a greater "audience" would be present for each act of repressive behavior, it would logically follow that less effort would need to be exerted by those in authority. Directly following from this, we would actually observe less censorship and political restrictions being applied. Indeed, repressive acts would decrease basically because they were having the intended effect of behavioral regulation.

CONCLUSION

The current findings help shed additional light on three hypotheses about the relationship between military influence and political repression. First, supporting the existing theoretical literature as well as Ziegenhagen's similar study, it was found that increasing the resources given to the army enhanced the likelihood that censorship and political restrictions would be applied by governments. These results thus make it clear that the dominant hypotheses are correct in their depiction of the causal relations. The second hypothesis, investigating the moderating effect of democracy on the basic MCP model, was not supported by this analysis. From this finding, it can be concluded that the type of political system a given state has does not offset the relationship between military influence and repressive behavior; in other words, an "open" system is just as likely as a "closed" system to be receptive to the linkages identified here. Contradicting the dependency perspective, we have the third relationship. As found, when the effects of military influence were considered in conjunction with concentration in exports, repression decreased. This I explained by considering the overall context within which repression is applied, addressing how and why repressive behavior is used.

In the final analysis, regardless how one interprets the individual results, the pattern of relationships identified above are sufficiently

complex as to warrant additional examination of all of the relevant hypotheses. As the results suggest that one option available to policy makers concerned with decreasing political repression is to simply increase the concentration in exports as well as their allocations to the military, the issue is indeed worthy of further discussion. This is especially the case because such advice seems to contradict the dominant perspective on how to improve countries human rights practices; i.e., increased democratization. Towards the goal of directing future analysis, therefore, I suggest three areas of inquiry that follow directly from the research presented here.

First, the military's different motivations for pursuing repressive policies should be explored. For instance, does it participate in order to guarantee access to resources or because of a fear of losing governmental allocations? Does the ethnic composition of the armed forces make it more inclined to involve itself in sanctions directed against the population (Enloe, 1980; Van den Berghe, 1990)? Are external political or cultural influences more important than economic ones? Lastly, does some combination of factors provoke or hinder military participation in the repressive process? All of these merit further examination.²²

Concerning the second area worthy of discussion, present policies that seek to reduce the application of repression through democratization must be re-examined for they have been shown to be rather naive. Although democracy, all other things being held constant, was found to decrease repression, the results here suggest that the importance of democracy is somewhat limited, especially with regard to its ability to regulate the effects of other factors that promote repressive behavior (i.e., military influence). As there mere existence of an organization can never fully address the role that the institution may play within the daily operations of the polity, it appears to be very important to understand the particulars of the political-economic relationships more completely rather than simply concentrating on the mere symbolic representation of specific institutional forms. This is obviously born out in several recent cases (Zaire, Peru, and El Salvador, to name but a few).

Finally, measures of repression should be further examined as well as, and in concert with, the desires of the international community. As

²²Thee (1977:298) is again particularly useful here as he notes, [i]n reality, militarism defies any simplistic definition. It is multi-dimensional and varied, with different manifestations in various circumstances, dependent on the historical background, national traditions, class structure, social conditions, economic strength, acute problems faced, and the vigor of the officer corps.

we saw, it was possible to decrease the application of repression without necessarily eliminating repressive behavior entirely. Rather, *it may simply be made more effective*, thus decreasing the need for additional use. Consequently, a clarification in goals is needed: Is the elimination of political repression as a means of governance the goal or, is the reduced frequency of certain kinds of repressive action the primary objective? The former goal would make us more concerned with capturing different aspects of coercive behavior; its frequency, its scope, its targets, its cultural variance, forcing those interested to collect more appropriate data. The latter would enable us to continue to use existing data and also apply newer strategies proposed by Henderson (1991) and Poe and Tate (1992).

By pursuing these three issues, we should begin to improve our capability to identify the effects of the military and militarization on repressive strategies of behavioral control. Moreover, and perhaps equally as important, after addressing these issues we may be better able to construct foreign and domestic policies that effectively regulate political repression (in all of its forms). This issue, at the present time, we must leave to future research.

REFERENCES

- Achene, R.
1982 *The Likelihood of Coups*. Gower: Aldershot.
- Alfatooni, A. and M. Allen
1991 "Government Sanction and Collective Political Protest in Periphery and Semiperiphery States: A Time Series Analysis." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 19:29-45.
- Ashby, H.
1957 *Introduction to Cybernetics*. New York: Wiley.
- Banks, A.
1992 *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*. Binghamton: Center for Social Analysis.
- Bollen, K.
1980 "Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political Democracy." *American Sociological Review* 45:370-90.
- Bornschier, V., C. Chase-Dunn and R. Rubinson (eds.)
1978 "Cross-National Evidence of the Effects of Foreign Investment and Aid on Economic Growth and Inequality:

- A Survey of Findings and Re-Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology* 84:651-83.
- Box, G. E. P. and G. Jenkins
1976 *Time-Series Analysis: Forecasting and Control, Revised Edition*. San Francisco, CA: Holder-Day.
- Buzan, B.
1983 *People, States and Fear*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.
- Carleton, D.
1989 "The New International Division of Labor, Export-Oriented Growth, and State Repression in Latin America." Pp. 221-36 in G. Lopez and M. Stohl (eds.) *Dependence, Development, and State Repression*. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Cardoso, F. and E. Faletto
1979 *Dependence and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Chomsky, N. and E. Herman
1979 *The Washington Connection and Third World Facism*. Boston, MA: South End Press.
- Cortese, C.
1976 *Modernization, Threat and the Power of the Military*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Cutright, P.
1963 "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis." *American Sociological Review* 28:253-64.
- Davis, D. and M. Ward
1990 "They Dance Alone: Deaths and the Disappeared in Contemporary Chile." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34 (3):449-75.
- Enloe, C.
1980 *Police, Military and Ethnicity: Foundations of State Power*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books.
- Evans, R. and M. Timberlake
1980 "Dependence, Inequality, and the Growth of the Tertiary: A Comparative Analysis of Less Developed Countries." *American Sociological Review* 45:531-552.

- Frank, I.
1980 *Foreign Enterprise in Developing Countries*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Fortado, C.
1970 *Economic Development of Latin America*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Goldstein, R. J.
1978 *Political Repression in Modern America: From 1870 to the Present*. Boston, MA: Schenckman/G. K. Hall.
1983 *Political Repression in 19th Century Europe*. Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble Books.
1986 "The Limitations of Using Quantitative Data in Studying Human Rights Abuses." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (4): 607-627.
- Gujarati, D.
1978 *Basic Econometrics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gurr, T.
1986 "Persisting Patterns of Repression and Rebellion: Foundations for a General Theory of Political Coercion." Pp. 149-68 in M. Karns (ed.) *Persistent Patterns and Emergent Structures in a Waning Century*. New York: Praeger.
- Gurr, T., K. Jagers and W. Moore
1989 *Polity II Codebook*. Center for Comparative Politics, Department of Political Science, university of Colorado, Boulder, CO.
- Hanneman, R.
1985 "The Military's Role in Political Regimes." *Armed Forces and Society* 2:29-51.
- Hanneman, R. and R. Steinbeck
1980 "Military Involvement and Political Instability: an Event History Analysis 1940-1980." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 18:1-23.
- Hartman, J. and P. Walters
1985 "Dependence, Military Assistance and Development: A Cross-National Study." *Politics and Society* 14:431-458.

- Henderson, C.
1991 "Conditions affecting the Use of Political Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35:(1):120-42.
- Hibbs, D.
1973 *Mass Political Violence*. New York: Wiley.
- Huntington, S.
1964 *The Soldier and the State*. New York: Random House.
1968 *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Jackman, R.
1982 "Dependence on Foreign Investment and Economic Growth in the Third World." *World Politics* 31:247-88.
- Jackson, S. et al.
1978 "Conflict and Coercion in Dependency States." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22:627-57.
- Janowitz, M.
1964 *The Military in the Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Politics*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
1977 *Military Institutions and Coercion in Developing Countries*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Kick, E.
1987 "World System Structure, National Development, and the Prospects for a Socialist Order." Pp. 127-155 in T. Boswell and A. Bergesen *America's Changing Role in the World System*. New York: Praeger.
- Kick, E. and B. Sharda
1986 "Third World Militarization and Development." *Journal of Developing Societies* 2:49-67.
- Kmenta, J.
1971 *Elements of Econometrics*. New York: Macmillan.
- Lasswell, H.
1941 "The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence." *American Journal of Sociology* 46:455-68.
- Mckinlay, R. and A. Cohan
1976 "Performances and Instability in Military and Non-military Regime Systems." *American Political Science Review* 70 (3):850-64.

- Muller, E.
1985 "Income Inequality, Regime Repressiveness and Political Violence." *American Sociological Review* 50:47-61.
- Nordlinger, E.
1977 *Soldiers in Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Petras, J.
1986 "Political Economy of State Terror: Chile, El Salvador, and Brazil." *Crime and Social Justice* 27:88-109.
- Permutter, A.
1980a *The Military and Politics on Modern Times: On Professionals, Praetorians, and Revolutionary Soldiers*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Permutter, A. and V. Bennett
1980b *The Political Influence of the Military: A Comparative Reader*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Poe, S. and C. Tate
1992 "Repression and Freedom in the 1980's: A theory and Pooled Cross-Sectional Analysis." Paper presented at the American Political Science Association (Chicago), Sept. 6.
- Randle, M.
1981 "Militarism and Repression." *Alternatives* VII:61-144.
- Robinson, R. and J. London
1991 "Dependency, Inequality and Political Violence: A Cross-National Analysis." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 19:119-56.
- Rothgeb, J.
1989 "Direct Foreign Investment, Repression, Reform, and Political Conflict in Third World States." Pp. 105-126 in W. Avery and D. Rapkin (eds.) *Markets, Politics, and Change in the Global Political Economy*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Sayrs, L.
1989 *Pooled Time-Series Analysis*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Scott, A. and M. Storper (eds.)
1986 *The Geographical Anatomy of Industrial Capitalism*. Boston, MA: Allen Unwin.

- Seligson, M.
1987 "Democraticization in Latin America: The Current Cycle." Pp. 3-12 in J. Malloy and M. Seligson (eds.) *Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Simon, S.
1978 *The Military and Security in the Third World: Domestic and International Impacts*. Colorado: Westview Press.
- Snyder, D. and E. Kick
1979 "Structural Position in the World System and Economic Growth, 1955-1970: A Multiple Network Analysis of Transnational Interactions." *American Journal of Sociology* 84:1096-126.
- Stimson, J.
1985 "Regression in Space and Time: A Statistical Essay." *American Journal of Political Science* 29 (4):914-47.
- Stohl, M. et al.
1986 "State Violation of Human Rights: Issues and Problems of Measurement." *Human Rights Quarterly* 8 (4):592-606.
- Taylor, C. and D. Jodice
1983 *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators III*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Thee, M.
1977 "Militarism and Militarization in Contemporary International Relations." *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 8:296-309.
- Timberlake, M. and K. Williams
1984 "Dependence, Political Exclusion, and Government Repression: Some Cross-National Evidence." *American Sociological Review* 49:141-46.
- Van den Berghe, P.
1990 *State Violence and Ethnicity*. Colorado: University Press of Colorado.
- Walker, S. and I. Lang
1988 "The Garrison State Syndrome in the Third World: Research Note." *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 16:105-16.

- Wayman, F.
1975 *Military Intervention and Politics: A Causal Model.*
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Wolpin, M.
1986 *Militarization, Internal Repression and Social Welfare in
the Third World.* New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Ziegenhagen, E.
1986 *The Regulation of Political Conflict.* New York: Praeger.
- Zwick, J.
1984 "Militarism and Repression in the Philipppians." Pp. 121-
42 in M. Stohl and G. Lopez (eds.) *The State as Terrorist:
The Dynamics of Governmental Violence and Repression.*
Westport, CT: Greenwood.

APPENDIX A.
COUNTRY LIST

- | | | |
|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1) Afghanistan, ME | 25) Honduras, LA | 49) Sri Lanka, AS |
| 2) Argentina, LA | 26) Hungary, E | 50) Sweden, E |
| 3) Australia, O | 27) Indonesia, AS | 51) Switzerland, E |
| 4) Belgium, E | 28) Iran, ME | 52) Syria, ME |
| 5) Bolivia, LA | 29) Iraq, ME | 53) Thailand, AS |
| 6) Brazil, LA | 30) Italy, E | 54) Turkey, E |
| 7) Bulgaria, E | 31) Jordan, ME | 55) USSR, E |
| 8) Burma, AS | 32) Lebanon, ME | 56) United States, NA |
| 9) Canada, NA | 33) Liberia, AFR | 57) Venezuela, LA |
| 10) Chile, LA | 34) Malaysia, AS | |
| 11) Columbia, LA | 35) Mexico, LA | |
| 12) Costa Rica, LA | 36) Nepal, AS | |
| 13) Cuba, LA | 37) Netherlands, E | |
| 14) Czechoslovakia, E | 38) Nicaragua, LA | |
| 15) Denmark, E | 39) Nigeria, AFR | |
| 16) Dominican Republic, LA | 40) Norway, E | |
| 17) Ecuador, LA | 41) New Zealand, O | |
| 18) Egypt, AFR | 42) Phillipines, AS | |
| 19) El Salvador, LA | 43) Poland, E | |
| 20) Finland, E | 44) Portugal, E | |
| 21) Ghana, AFR | 45) Rumania, E | |
| 22) Greece, E | 46) Saudi Arabia, ME | |
| 23) Guatemala, LA | 47) South Africa, AFR | |
| 24) Haiti, LA | 48) Spain, E | |

APPENDIX B.
PEARSON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	1	2	3	4	5	6	1*5	2*5	3*5	1*6	2*6	3*6
1. MSA	---						.64	-.13	.29	.06	-.08	-.09
2. MREP	.07	---					-.35	-.33	-.26	.06	-.14	-.04
3. MSIZE	.36	-.09	---				.29	-.10	.76	-	-	.37
4. CONFLICT	.16	.01~	.06	---			.21	.04~	.09	.01~	-.07	-
5. DEMOCRACY	-.12	-.55	-.08	.05	---		.57	.90	.37	-.19	-.27	-.19
6. DEPENDENCY	-.13	-	.00~	-.09	-.23	---	-.18	-.21	-.12	.83	.91	.62

Legend:

"MSA" = Military sector allocations relative to total allocations;

"MREP" = Military representation;

"MSIZE" = Size of the military relative to the population;

"*" = Considered in conjunction with;

"~" = Insignificant relationship at .05 level.

