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Explanations
of the Black-Jewish Question
These events present many puzzles. First, there is the issue of the significance attached to the precipitants of these clashes. Branch (1992: 55) points out that “The sum of public protest over four decades (of blacks replacing Jews in Chicago neighborhoods) came nowhere near the uproar over one Steve Cokely speech in 1988.” Has selective media reporting distorted and sensationalized the problem? Do most relations between Blacks and Jews remain harmonious? Second, there is the historical question: Why the sea-change in Black-Jewish relations? Some deterioration in Black-Jewish relations over time does seem to have occurred. Finally, there is the comparative question: Why do some cities manifest more harmonious Black-Jewish relations than others? The common-sense pessimism comes from New York where Black-Jewish clashes and racial polization doomed biracial and multiracial coalitions: “New Yorkers tend to be unduly pessimistic on the subject of Black-Jewish relations - an attitude that can be self-fulfilling. Every incident, every comment by even the most marginal person, becomes magnified” (Sonensein 1992: 243). The experience of Los Angeles offers more cause for optimism: Bradley was elected four times by an electoral coalition that involved Blacks and Jews. The
conventional historical narrative of course focuses on the decline of
Black-Jewish relations. It offers three explanations of the deteriorating
social glue and political chemistry behind the Black-Jewish coalition:
changing interests, identities, and institutions. Interests Black-Jewish relations are rooted in a realistic power struggle between the two groups. Material concerns define group interests. The constellation of material group interests in a society induce political or electoral coalitions, which are essentially short-run tactical compromises among self-interested groups. Sonenshein (1997: 262) writes that “the pessimists tended to see interests as the glue of coalitions” because the material interests of Blacks and Jews have changed, and hence so has the possibility for a Black-Jewish coalition. While Blacks have moved to exclude white (Jewish) liberals from racial politics, Jews have moved toward neoconservatism. We will first consider changing material interests and then the changing coalitional possibilities. The Black-Jewish coalition was an opportunistic and defensive alliance and the opportunities for defense have changed. Blacks and Jews are no longer in the same boat. The consequences of repression and oppression in America - antisemitism and racism - have turned out to be dramatically different. Black-Jewish differences in social, political, and economic status have become overwhelming: Jews became privileged and Blacks remained underprivileged. Community priorities have therefore changed. Jews want to consolidate gains and Blacks want to expand gains. Black survival now means economic survival. The threat to the Black community consists of becoming a permanent underclass - endless poverty. Jewish survival now means ethnic survival. The threat to the Jewish community consists of intermarriage and assimilation with the more privileged majority. Hence, old issues have been rethought and new issues have arisen. Political agendas have changed. More specifically, as Jews became wealthier and upwardly mobile, their interests diverged from Blacks: they became more conservative. Moreover, the old liberal, unionized, blue-collar or lower-middle class Jewish constituency has been threatened by shifting patterns of industrialization, by racial succession in labor markets and neighborhoods, and by fiscal problems and the tax burden generated by expenditures on minorities. As Blacks became stagnated in generations of poverty, their interests diverged from Jews: they became more radical. Blacks increasingly looked to government to solve their problems. Hence, they sought various forms of affirmative action to end discrimination and produce equality: representation in the city council and the mayor’s office; a share of the city’s policy benefits, spending, and city services (e.g., education, housing, parks and recreation, police protection, library, health care); and equality in the distribution of city employment, city contracts, and city development funds. Blacks and Jews thus came to fight over material things: neighborhoods, jobs, schools, and the political control of cities. There is one final point: Blacks were scapegoats, buffers, and shields for Jews, not the reverse. Since “buffers have protective value only as long as their marginal, insecure status persists” (Clark 1992: 95), there is a unsavory zero-sum aspect to competing Black and Jewish interests. These changing material interests has rekindled an old dispute. Sonnenshein (1997: 262) writes that “the debate over the viabilty of interracial coaition politics has been an enduring and intensely argued one. Should racial minorites go it alone, join forces with other minorities against the majority, or form alliances with elements of the majority group?” If minorities form coalitions, how much should they compromise their self-interest? Sonenshein (1997: 60) continues: “If minority activists choose to go it alone, they will be consistently outvoted. If minority activists choose a white-oriented strategy, their ability to bring about serious changes in the city’s life will be compromised. Once again, the dilemma is as it has always been: how to pursue an activist agenda for minority equality while responding to the legitimate needs and interests of whites.” There are three basic options for coalitional politics available to Blacks seeking to obtain a place at the table or a piece of the pie: biracial coalition, rainbow coalition, or minority-majority negotiation (Sonenshein 1997). (1) Biracial coalition. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984) challenge the dominant pessimism about this sort of coalition and show that it is the route to minority incorporation. They argue that “protest is not enough”and that black incorporation is a product of biracial alliances with white liberals. Blacks can join with liberal (especially Jewish) whites against conservative white republican coalitions in a cross-racial appeal. Keiser (1997: 66) thus follows McAdam (1983) and suggests that “closely contested or competition elections create the circumstances within which subordinated groups such as blacks can wrest concessions and win incorporation.” Sonenshein (1997: 263) writes that “the biracial coalitions that carried black candidates into power [against conservative whites] were a mixture of racial identification among blacks, ideological affinity with some whites, and some racial and class solidarity with Latinos.” Sonenshein (1997: 272) continues: “under a biracial approach, pioneered by black mayor candidates, minority leaders make genuine and extensive efforts to recuit whites to their cause and to make clear that the leadership will cause the city to be safer and better run.” Whether these coalitions can win is a function of black mobilization and white defections. For example, “The key to the Los Angeles biracial coalition was to divide whites by ideology and to build cross-racial cross-city alliances.” According to some Blacks, the problem with a biracial coalition between Blacks and Jews is that “white liberals are unreliable and ineffective coalition parners” (Sonenshein 1992: 4). Black mayors have therefore lost to white challengers – populists like Sam Yorty and Frank Rizzo and neoconservatives like Robert Guiliani – because they have lost so-called liberal white votes. While Blacks will often lose Latinos, Asians, and anti-growth environmentalists, Jews will especially defect when their interests are threatened (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1997: 285). Many Jews agree with this analysis: a biracial coalition between Blacks and Jews no longer represents their interests. (2) Multiracial coalition. In this strategy of color and class, a rainbow coalition of minorities forms. Since minorities make alliances among themselves without the white majority, or at most with a few disadvantaged whites, whites play a subordinate and supporting role. In this move beyond Black and White, Black-White relations take a back seat and the key divide is white/nonwhite. In other words, biracialism overemphasized the role of whites. Black-White relations are obsolete because they did not sufficiently emphasize color. Minorities therefore should “expand the definition and political meaning of color” (Sonenshein 1997: 265) and form a class alliance of the economically disadvantaged. The political logic behind such a rainbow coalition is as follows. Ideological differences among whites remain, but whites as a whole are moving further to the right; self-interest thus makes whites unreliable allies. Blacks (mostly loyal liberals) must compete against conservative and moderate appeals to the class and ethnic interests of Asians and Latinos, but they can get the progressive elements of these groups on board. The rainbow coalition’s principal goal, to unify and mobilize minorities and reach small numbers of whites, is therefore attainable. More importantly, because of shifting voting strengths it is the strategy of the future: while Jews are declining in population, Latinos and other people of color are increasing in size. Proponents of biracial Black-Jewish coalitions counter the rainbow approach as follows. Sonenshein (1992: 264) writes that “An underlying and unspoken assumption of the rainbow model has been the exclusion of white liberals. That, indeed, has been part of its appeal to those unhappy with liberal biracial coalitions… hence the only real choice is between a minority coalition and white dominance, and a city in which there are no longer relevant differences between white liberals and white conservatives… the vision of city divided between resentful minorities and comfortable, conservative whites (the “Bladerunner” scenario)…The “Bladerunner” assumption even influences research: testing this rainbow model does not require scholars to search for ideological differences among whites. Whites instead become a politically monolithic comparison group. Where white divisions are relevant, they are often examined by social class.” However, Sonenshein (1992: 264) continues, “Experience suggests that coalitions for minorities may not only be coalitons of minorities. Coalitions for economic equality may not only be coalitions of the dispossesed. The missing piece, and a critical key to the puzzle of Los Angeles’s future, is the potential role of liberal whites in minority coalitions.” Blacks and Jews are the crucial building blocks of any liberal, biracial coaition. Of all whites, Jews have historically been the group most likely to ally with Blacks. Interestingly, Jewish conservativies counter such “odd-bedfellow coalitions” (Kilson 1996: 27) with similar arguments. First, race and ideology are losing their force; color has been overemphasized. The vast majority of voters want pragmatism, leadership, and good government. Sonenshein (1997: 269) thus writes that “Unlike earlier white-led coalitions of raging populists with a strong racist flavor like Frank Rizzo in Philadephia and Sam Yorty in Los Angeles, the new mayors are pragmatists who are just as open to the ideas of white reformers as black mayors have been. And they are more likely than minority opponents to speak directly to the interests of these communities.” Second, minority groups are internally fragmented, not unitary (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997: 283). Whites and Latinos are decreasing in their support for Blacks. Black-Latino clashes lead to Jewish-Latino alignments. Hence, the idea is to create a Rainbow II coalition that includes formerly liberal Jews, Latinos, and Asians. This is a winning coalition (e.g., L.A. Chicago, and N.Y.). Third, urban machines can buy off the autonomous leadership of the Black community via patronage and cooptation by white politicians (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1997: 282). Finally, the collective action problem is more severe in a multigroup rather than a two-group coalition: rainbow coalitions make it harder to reconcile different interests and hence are more likely to break apart. In sum, radical Blacks propose a new rainbow coalition: people of color would form a multicultural and multiracial coalition. Conservative Jews also want a new rainbow coalition: a new Republican majority can be constructed out of neoconservative white democrats, Christian fundamentalists, and upwardly mobile Latinos and Asians. Mainstream liberals hold out for the old-time Black-Jewish coalition. (3) Minority-majority negotiation. Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1997: 289) raise the possibility that “cities become increasingly multiracial, but Latino and Asian-American populations grow more readily than black populations. The first two groups are increasingly assimilated - at least their relatively light-skinned and educated members - and coopted into white-dominated coalitions from which African Americans are largely excluded. The latter find themselves increasingly unwanted partners in urban political alliances” due to racism and real differences of social values and politial priorities. This might have occurred, for example, in Miami (Sonenshein 1997: 267). If exclusion is going to be the end-game, then Blacks might as well immediately reassert their “historical and political claim to lead any minority coalition” (Molenkopf 1997: 106), go it alone, and be “the” single unified minority to negotiate with whites - the “minority-majority”, i.e., plurality, anyway. While this strategy serves the needs for Black independence and assertiveness, it of course reflects and intensifies Black political isolation. Identities Sonenshein (1997: 262) writes that “optimists [on Black-Jewish relations] focus on the role of ideology and emphasize the enduring and solid character of biracial coalitions based on common beliefs.” In other words, a shared liberal ideology produced the norms of mutual trust and support and the goodwill that held the Black-Jewish coalition together. These liberal values and beliefs, based on a racial liberalism among Jews that produced an ideological affinity between Blacks and Jews, have weakened. The role of government in solving social problems has been challenged. Even more importantly, many Blacks and Jews now reject the idea that acculturation and Americanization inevitably produce assimilation. Black and Jewish pride leads to a turn inward toward ethnic solidarity. Blacks and Jews thus no longer identify their struggles as one struggle for a liberal melting pot. Black consciousness and Black power have challenged integrationist sentiments. Similarly, a new “muscular Judaism” has challenged a liberal enlightenment commitment to universal community and the oneness of humanity. What happens to a society that houses multiple growing ethnic solidarities? Society is Balkanized: separate communities, each with its own language, culture, economy, etc., multiply. An emphasis on the universal traits of humankind - love, hate, heroism, cowardice, leadership, followership, loyalty, and betrayal - is replaced by the particularisms of race, color, class, religion, language, ethnicity, and creed. The end result of such hyperpluralism is militant and competing nationalisms that encourage the Black antisemitism and Jewish racism that fuels continuing Black-Jewish conflict. Diversity without a liberal superstructure of assimilation into common values therefore causes the breakdown of social order. In
sum, interracial politics is rooted in preexisting values and beliefs.
As liberal ideology has weakened, as we have moved from from a melting
pot to a Black/White society and finally to a multicultural and multiracial
society, we have experienced pandemonium (Moynihan 1993). Black-Jewish
relations are just the most visible victim of these cultural changes.
Institutions The Black and Jewish communities are composed of many social, economic, political, cultural, and religious institutions. The Black-Jewish coalition was composed of organizations of these organizations in which elites from both communities interacted. Stable and harmonious Black-Jewish relations were thus rooted in strong interracial leadership based on the long-term personal ties between the elite activists of both communities. “Elite interracial networks” (Sonenshein 1993: xvii), consisting of interactions and alliances that manifest “long-standing trust among leaders” (Sonnenshein 1993: 20), filtered down into trust among masses and thereby cemented harmonious Black-Jewish relations. Sonenshein (1997: 264) thus argues that “the outcome of interracial coalitions is profoundly shaped and influenced by leadership. Leaders and organizers have an impact on how group interests [and ideologies] are perceived. The prospects for biracial coalitions depend heavily on the willingness and ability of leaders to create and sustain such coalitions.” Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1997: 279) agree: “Because competion and conflict between groups are typical historically, the structure, size, and timing of new coalitions depended on the ability of leaders to overcome divisons and to shape issues so as to minimize antagonisms and sustain joint effort. The flow of issues, partly under the control of coalition leaders, and the willingness and ability of the available leadership to reach out across racial boundaries [is] a difficult task…” Sonenshein thus suggests that “In New York City, interracial leadership networks were weak, internally divided, and vulnerable to demagogery from outside” while they were much stronger in Los Angeles. How does a long-standing harmonious interracial leadership elite emerge? The answer, of course, is from within each community. A harmonious Black-Jewish leadership, however, arises out of some elements of the Black and Jewish communities and not others; in other words, it originates from part of the communities and not the communities as a whole. Sonenshein thus writes that “interracial leadership ties arise out of factional divisons within the Black and white communities.” Which parts of the Black community underlay an harmonious Black-Jewish coalition? Sonenshine (1993: 20) writes that “From within the Black community, leadership came from a progressive faction based in the upwardly mobile areas of the community.” Blacks from upwardly mobile or middle-class and professional communites were thus more likely to seek alliance with liberal Jewish refomers than working-class and poor blacks: “upwardly mobile Blacks and liberal, educated whites are the most likely to form a strong elite” and work with white Jewish reformers against traditional democractic party organizations (Sonenshein 1992: 13). A similar social base in the Jewish community underlay the harmonious Black-Jewish coalition: wealthier, better-educated, and more upwardly mobile Jews supported the alliance moreso than poor, working-class, and lower-middle class Jews. But why should upper middle class Blacks and Jews control politics within each community and hence be able to forge an interracial alliance? Each community contains within-community political struggles that affects the relationship among communities. For example, Lewis (1992: 27) writes of the 1930s in New York that “just as Uptown Jews tried to outflank the Zionists by combining with Lower East Side socialists, upper-crust Afro-Americans readily joined with Harlem socialists led by the African Blood Brother’s Cyril Briggs to defeat the Garveyites.” Within-community politics often takes on a distinctive character. Each faction of a community wishes to carve out its own distinctive niche by ‘product differentiation’ of its goals and tactics. Radicals will attempt to outdo moderates by outbidding them and accusing them of caving in. They charge the moderates with being impotent, ineffective, and inept, and then put forth more extreme means and ends. This is a typical strategy identified by Riker (1982: also see Lichbach 1996: sect. 6.3.2): new groups try to make inroads in an existing political market by dividing an older group that currently has a monopoly over its constituency. Toward this end, new groups generate divisive issues to split their opponents. Dividing the existing policy ‘space’ in new ways allows them the ‘space’ for mobilization. Hence, new and more radical factions subsequently form within the traditional moderate community groups and press their leadership to move beyond the groups’ traditional actions. As part of this process of radicalization, the radicals attempt to outdo the moderates by outbidding them. The easiest way is to accuse them of caving in to false allies in other communities. Extremists in each community thus use the other community as scapegoats to mobilize their followers and attack the moderates. Internally fragmented minority ethnic groups are thereforeprone to attack other minority communities – especially ones that sometimes act as their patrons. Elites thus draw masses into their struggles: leaders who control the competing institutions within the Black and Jewish communities mobilize their supporters by attacking the other community. Branch (1992: 51) thus writes that “the leaders masquerade as peacemakers, but the fight is almost exclusively theirs.” In other words, the fights between Blacks and Jews are not rooted in the different interests and identities of the Jewish and Black masses; rather, the struggle between the communities is a political construction that is derivative of the power struggle within each community. Internal divisions in the Black and Jewish communites thus affect Black and Jewish leaders and hence Black-Jewish relations. Black-Jewish interactions are often held hostage to the internal politics generated by community mobilization and organization. Much of the dynamics of inter-group protest is thus explained by the internal competition within each group. The particular problem of the Black-Jewish coalition is therefore that it is always strained and put at risk by vocal extremists in each community who are outside of the coalition. Civic cooperation between Blacks and Jews thus must occur across institutional barriers forged in each community. The Black-Jewish coalition, in others words, is involved in a two-level game: Between- and within-community institutions are responsible for Black-Jewish relations. Between-community institutions hold the potential for cooperation, but they can be disrupted by within-community power struggles among competing communal institutions. Since leaders are Janus-faced, standing at the interface and pinnacle of these institutions, elites bear close scrutiny.
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