MARTIN HEISLER 

If, as Rosenau (1997) has argued, our age is characterized by the interplay of globalism and localism, then transnational migration not only bestrides but also links these two forces (1). It is at once a hallmark and catalogue of the stresses, frustrations and opportunities indwelling the forces of integration and fragmentation. It significantly affects individual and collective identities, and it creates new identities. It can change the forms and meanings of borders within, as well as between, states; and it increasingly challenges, and sometimes even recasts, domestic and international orders. Migration also straddles the modern and postmodern in social, political, economic and international relations; and many of the problems associated with it derive from the tensions that inhere that duality. My aim is to relate the stresses and promises associated with transnational migration to the evolving, and perhaps converging, problematics of domestic governance and world politics (2).

The study of transnational migration yields valuable insights into these broader concerns. Not only does it highlight tensions and connections between centrifugal and centripetal forces, it also often generates them. Migration is associated with globalization in the world economy (Sassen, 1991; 1996; Ohmae, 1995), the emergence of international society (Bull and Watson, 1984; Elfstrom, 1990: chap. 4;), and the growing number of enclaves, diasporas and new ethnic minorities (Appadurai, 1990; Barkan and Shelton, 1998: part iii; Miège and Dubois, 1994; Rath, 1991; Sowell, 1996). It is difficult to grasp - and even more difficult to institutionalize - the often dialectical relationships between those forces. The circumstances that give rise to migration change rapidly, as do the facts and perceptions it produces in the places of origin and destination. Efforts to address those circumstances and facts through governmental action often lead to new problems. (Indeed, a form of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle seems to be at work, since research, writing and policy interventions often change facts and perceptions involved in migration.) The difficulties in pinning down the nature, meaning and sources of such changes contribute appreciably to the perception of "turbulence" that Rosenau (1990) and others (e.g., Bigo and Haine, 1996) have associated with world politics in the post-Cold War period.

Migration is a particularly good point of departure for the study of the ongoing transformations of societies and international relations because it affects people and institutions at all levels, from the individual or psychological, to collectivities of various kinds and sizes, and even the putative global system. Those affects are economic, social and cultural; and they are increasingly evident in international, national and local politics. But I do not aim to belabor the obvious point that consequences of transnational migration are many and varied. Rather, I want to explore the complexities of migration-related phenomena and their interactions with their immensely diverse and protean contexts.

The rates and magnitudes of change in those contexts are often difficult to comprehend. Like the elements in Rosenau's "fragmegration," (3) they often appear to be moving in opposite directions simultaneously, even while being driven by the same forces. Given the complexity of these forces, it is not surprising that they often seem unmanageable. Officials atop public institutions can only pretend to preside over their consequences; they cannot control, or even significantly influence them.

Contextual analysis is key to grasping the interplay of migration with the ever-shifting frameworks of identity and social and political order that are my main "dependent variables." It is also the best way to understand the influences migration exerts on borders, changing their meanings in some settings and preserving or reinforcing them in others. In some parts of the world, migration has become a bordering and rebordering force that affects identities, and, not infrequently, creates new ones. It often raises contentious questions about civic order in receiving countries (or host societies) and about relations between countries of origin and destination. Migration is sometimes taken to be a sign of the successful and desirable permeation of the borders of states, while in other circumstances it calls for redoubled efforts to close or fortify borders.

In sum, migration is at the focal point of the interrelated dynamics of identity, borders and orders. My principal aim is to understand the conditions and reasons for such varied perceptions and affects. My approach is broadly comparative, across time, as well as types of migration situations; and I focus on the ways the dynamics of these three factors vary across space and time and influence each other (4). 

The changes associated with transnational migration contribute greatly to the growing preoccupation with personal and collective identity noticeable in much of the world today. They fuel "the politics of recognition" (5) that is now so important in many countries and in the international relations of several world regions. Even the dominant majorities in societies hosting large numbers of migrants show such culture-focused behavior (e.g., Fijalkowski et al., 1991; Eurobarometer, 1989). There are several other salient issues associated with such changes. These include the debates revolving around community, citizenship, and individual and collective rights (Walzer, 1997); the articulation of social and political demands in terms of ethnicity, religion, and gender (Elshtain, 1995; Glazer, 1997); and the securitization of person, job and culture (see, e.g., Wæver, 1995b; Krause and Williams, 1996).

Even when transnational migration is implicated in some of these concerns, the ways and degrees of its connections are far from clear. Mere covariation, rather than causation, may be involved (6). There are elements of modernity, noted below, that militate in favor of increased emphasis on identity, independent of migration. It is even possible that the growing concern with migration is an artifact of increased interest in identity, rather than the other way around. The tools of social science research are not sharp enough to determine the direction of causal arrows, or, for that matter, whether there are causal links between migration and the salience of identity issues. But the extent, or even the existence, of unambiguous causal relationships here is less important than the widespread and growing tendency of people to infer such links. Perceptions become realities; and in societies under stress they can be used to mobilize various sorts of political resources for both domestic and international purposes (7). The relationships between migration and migrants and the sorts of issues just noted are at least in part artifacts of social and political construction; and, as will emerge from the discussion below, in important respects so are migration and migrants.

Migration is often blamed for order-disrupting changes in host societies. When people who seem very different appear in one's accustomed spaces, they are readily associated with differences in established ways of life. What used to be taken for granted - the languages heard in public, gestures and other mannerisms, styles of dress, sounds, smells - can no longer be navigated on culturally ingrained auto-pilot. These differences complicate the processing of new experiences through the assumptions on which we all depend to make our way through the complexities of modern life.

Migrants - foreigners, strangers, outsiders - are convenient markers for such changes. They do not seem to belong; and their presence requires explanation and justification. Those explanations and justifications can be interest-based ("we must import foreign workers because our own people will not do these low status, low wage jobs"), moral ("they helped to build our economy, so we owe them decent consideration"), humanitarian ("these poor, persecuted people have nowhere else to go"), or sympathetic ("they are only trying to better themselves and make a better life for their children"), or some combination of such arguments. But regardless of their content, once such arguments enter public discourse, they become issues in domestic and foreign politics. Publics in host societies may divide politically into pro- and anti-immigration or pro- and anti-immigrant factions; but such divisions may, in fact, reflect broader psychological and/or ideological differences that use migration as a convenient shorthand.

Sometimes migration is an imputed cause of such undesirable changes as increased crime or unemployment or a declining quality of schools attributed to polyglottous overcrowding. It has been implicated in the growing dissensus in the authoritative delineation of societal values, and it calls attention to distinctions between the societies of many countries and their total populations (8). It is sometimes seen as a threat to societal security (9) and to the environment. Some deem it a barrier to the achievement of equality for historically disadvantaged (native) populations. It may be blamed for declining civility or increasingly particularistic manners and for a generalized sense of heightened risks to economic and personal security.

One reason migration has entered political agendas with greater frequency and salience of late is that, at least in some host societies, it disturbs the sense of boundedness in newly troublesome ways (10). Migrants enter previously delineated and structured social, economic, cultural, political and, of course, physical spaces. (And, although scholars have paid it less attention, they leave empty spaces whence they originate. I shall return to that often overlooked but important point below.) They are outsiders in those spaces, "different" simply by virtue of being newcomers, even when their differences are not objectively discernible. Members of host societies find it more difficult - or are told that they do by those who would seek to mobilize them around migration-related issues - to anchor their lives and expectations in what used to be more comfortable and controllable places (11).

People in the host societies are called on to make myriad decisions about how to adjust to that presence: Should the strangers be welcomed, or should they be ignored and excluded? Who should adapt to whose expectations? Must newcomers invariably adjust to the dominant culture's prevailing systems of order, or should the society they enter also make some accommodation to the differences they represent?

We lack appropriate metrics for assessing the magnitude or the consequences of such penetration. Nor do the social sciences have precise objective criteria for determining the qualitative import of migration, or of the presence of newcomers in such spaces. However, there are indirect indicators of the subjective impacts of immigration and emigration - or, more accurately, for reasons explicated below, of comings and goings. The presence of large numbers of diverse outsiders focuses what would otherwise be a diffuse sense of eroding or permeated boundaries. Such feelings of unsettlement are commonly associated with the condition of modernity (Berman, 1982); and, importantly, they can and do occur without the presence of outsiders. (A counterpart of these perceptions in the places of origin is the sense of unsettlement occasioned by the absence of migrating members of communities. This has a modernizing effect on those communities and migrants, albeit not of the sort usually associated with modernization.)

Anti-foreigner sentiments are present in most societies, but these are neither new, of course, nor uniform (12). What is their etiology? Under what conditions do they influence migration- or migrant-related policies? We do not know whether they accompany the same set of conditions everywhere, however, or, for that matter, whether they occur at particular periods in host societies' histories. Are they less likely to arise with reference to "deserving" migrants - workers recruited by the host society; refugees fleeing persecution by the host society's adversaries, and, by implication, more likely to be associated with undeserving ones - such as illegal entrants or asylum seekers without convincing stories? Some migrants are welcomed more readily than others; and sometimes small numbers are well received but masses are not. Some societies are generally open to all, or virtually all, migrants, while others are equally closed to all outsiders. Can we pinpoint the conditions that lead host societies to be concerned with what has been termed "societal" and/or "social security" (Wæver et al., 1993: esp. chaps. 1-3)? Is there a threshold for such concerns, in terms of numbers of types of migrants? Under what conditions do some societies (or at least their governments) consider the swift repatriation of their nationals abroad to be a threat? And, given curiously little consideration in the literature on migration and xenophobia, how do we explain the evident rise of often large pro-immigrant movements and organizations; and how do we assess their influence on public sentiments and policies? The answers to these and related questions will require much effort on the part of many, and moving toward them will take appreciable time. At most, this essay can be only a first, halting step in that direction. 

There are some new or newly significant developments, not wholly dependent on perceptions, that are changing the meaning of migration and its import for governance and international relations. Three of these are particularly relevant to the concerns at hand. One is found in the nature of migration, a second in a series of relatively recent developments in many western democratic host societies. The third reflects an opening in the study of international relations, manifested in the movement away from state-centered theorizing and rigid adherence to the domestic-international divide, and toward perspectives anchored in social theory writ large.

The first development entails changes both in the nature of migration and in the ways we view it. There has been a marked shift from immigration to "semi-settlement" (Heisler and Heisler, 1986; M. O. Heisler, 1986; Heisler and Layton-Henry, 1993: 156 f.). Immigration has generally connoted settlement - exchanging one home society for another; and, in the conventional view, carries assumptions of assimilation. For reasons discussed here, such expectations and assumptions need to be reexamined in many or most cases of transnational migration. Technological, economic and other factors make it less likely that migrants will - or expect, or are expected by those in the host societies, to - settle. In other words, they are less likely to become immigrants. Semi-settlement often gives rise to transnational communities (see Kearney, 1995); and the dynamics between the communities of origin and places of destination foster new and complex identities among both the migrants and those who stay behind. It also affects the self-conceptions of members of host societies who come into contact with migrants. These new expectations find formal acknowledgment in the decisions of a growing number of countries to accord dual citizenship to their nationals living abroad.

A second development reinforces these changes in western democracies: the acceptance, and sometimes the enthusiastic promotion, of norms of multiculturalism. These norms impel host societies in the same direction as the diffusion and progressive incorporation of human rights concerns (Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996); and they alter status and power relationships between hosts and newcomers in many ways. Perhaps the most important is that justifications for challenging the differentness of migrants have been substantially weakened (13). Cultural, linguistic and other traits, or, for that matter, the disinclination to naturalize or settle in the host society, are less acceptable justifications for discrimination against migrants, either formally by the state or informally, in social relations than in the past. Expectations of assimilation for migrants become attenuated in most host societies; and in western democracies it is a less and less legitimate demand on them (cf. Walzer, 1997; Glazer, 1997). This is the most important reason for eschewing the use of the term immigrant, with its built-in assumptions of settlement and assimilation, and for using, instead, the term migrant, which does not carry such expectations.

The third development is the opening of international relations theory to non-state-centric orientations and to a perspective Didier Bigo characterizes as a Möbius ribbon (Bigo, in this volume). There is a growing inclination to view the internal and external as parts of a whole (also see Rosenau, 1997; Walker, 1993). This is portentous for the future of international relations practice and theory. It makes possible the consideration of transnational migration free of the assumptions just noted. The borders of states are no longer seen as the only, or perhaps even principal, determinants of identity and order for at least a non-trivial number and category of people (migrants). Thus, it is no longer taken for granted that all or virtually all of the population will assimilate, or even, perhaps, substantially adapt to the state, or, alternatively, remain completely excluded. More to the point, the notion indwelling the Westphalian state model, that the state may - indeed, should - manage its population through assimilation and cultural coherence, to ensure loyalty and internal stability has been brought into question in some countries, though not in much of the world. Aspects of citizenship may also be affected by international agreements on migration, international human rights doctrines and practices, and, in some countries, domestic norms supportive of foreigners' status.

The trend toward the institutionalization of international human rights in domestic legislation and judicial practice, identified by Jacobson (1996), Sassen (1996) and others, reinforces and is reinforced by the shift in some countries from underlying norms of assimilation to multiculturalism. What is crucial for the future of international relations is that such norms are gaining ever-wider acceptance in western democracies but are resolutely resisted or even rejected in many other places, especially in east and southeast Asia (sources cited in Heisler, forthcoming). This divergence may signal fundamental differences that give rise to tensions in world politics, akin to Samuel Huntington's somewhat fanciful notion of a "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996) (14).

The problématique of this essay can be stated succinctly in terms of this volume's central theme. Seen through the prism of transnational migration, there are two types of states at the end of the 20^th century (15). On one type of setting, mostly western and democratic, migration is a catalyst for transforming the identities of migrants, at least some members of host societies, and, sometimes, those who remain in the sending countries. It affects virtually all manners of borders - personal, local, societal, and even legal and territorial. Migration tends to bound social, political and economic relationships, bringing into being or reinforcing social, political, and economic systems that are either smaller or larger than the state. It is meaningful to speak of the erosion of classic Westphalian borders and notions of sovereignty in such settings.

Migration produces ethnic or cultural minorities of varying sizes in states' populations. Even where migrants lack citizenship and other aspects of formal standing in the host society, they may be protected by international agreements between the sending and receiving states. They can maintain their qualified apartness as minorities for long periods, perhaps indefinitely (Heisler and Heisler, 1986; cf. Rath, 1991) (16). Norms of international human rights and multiculturalism and technological and structural changes now make enclaves and transnational communities more stable and sustainable. Especially in western countries, migrants increasingly tend to become semi-settlers who do not consider themselves full members of either the host society or their place of their origin. This "here and there" existence may have significant affects not only on migrants' identities but also on the dominant cultural majorities of the host and sending countries. The social, and especially the political, borders of the majorities in host societies are likely to be drawn not at the territorial boundaries of the state but, rather, between the society and the other segments of the state's population. Formal citizenship status often serves as the demarcation line, but, as I note elsewhere in this essay, the increasing availability of dual citizenship - including qualified or limited European citizenship in the European Union [EU] (Wiener, 1997) - may serve to blur that line.

These facts on the ground also raise questions about loyalty, equity, representative democracy, public interest and many other important concerns. Only their existence can be noted here; but it is important to bear in mind that issues revolving around migration and the presence of large numbers of migrants of various sorts - foreign workers, refugees or asylum seekers, and others - has generated active, often sizeable and electorally and politically important challenges. But opposition to migration and migrants may be a reaction - a counterforce - to the normative and institutional grounds on which political movements of natives (i.e., members of the dominant cultural groups), and often the goverenments, of host societies base their supports of migrants in place (if not additional inmigration).

There are migrants in the other major type of state as well, but they seldom benefit from international human rights or strong norms of tolerance for cultural differences in the host societies. Most of these are relatively new or newly autonomous states, such as former colonies, successor states to the Soviet Union, or states in eastern and east-central Europe that had long been under the sway of the Soviet Union. They zealously guard their claims to exclusive control over territory and population, or, in Robert Jackson's terms, freedom from external intervention as a function of "negative sovereignty" (Jackson, 1990). They are more resistant to suasion to internalize international human rights norms, even when such cajoling is accompanied by inducements from international institutions, such as the EU (M. O. Heisler, 1992). The principles of Westphalia, including the drive to delegitimize subsocietal identities and loyalties, seem more relevant for such states than ever before.  

My treatment of these questions follows from a small number of observations about the contemporary world and the historical record. First, reactions to the entry and presence of large numbers of foreigners among large segments of the populations, political élites and opinion-makers in contemporary western democracies differ in important ways from reactions in the past. They also differ markedly from reactions to such occurrences in most other parts of the world today. We need to differentiate between current conditions and values and those prevalent before the middle of the 20^th century. We also need to distinguish contemporary western democracies from most of the relatively new states that are intent on guarding their sovereignty and on nationalizing their populations. Today's western democracies approached migration and the treatment of migrants (as well as their own minorities) very differently even as recently as two generations ago, so what we see "here and now" is not what transpired or was deemed appropriate "here then."

Approaches to migration and migrants "there," that is, in many Eastern European, Asian and African states today, bear considerable resemblance to the practices of western democracies in the past. Those approaches are associated with the establishment of new states or radically altered regimes in old states. The exclusion of outsiders and transmutation of minorities to outsiders is a frequent concomitant of what Rogers Brubaker terms "nationalizing states" (Brubaker, 1996). The imposition of the value orientations and normative preferences of dominant cultural majorities and the jealous guarding of prerogatives of sovereignty is often justified - but is not necessarily made justifiable - by the need to mitigate fissiparous tendencies in such settings (17). The failure to satisfy those needs thoroughly has contributed to continuing discrimination against minorities and resistance to the institutionalization of international human rights in most new or substantially recast states.

The second observation follows from a major paradox in the political philosophical underpinnings of western democracies today. Multiculturalism and the protection of human and/or minority rights are increasingly embedded in the formal, legal qualities of such states, as well as in their social and economic institutions. Multiculturalism recognizes and, in varying ways and degrees, legitimates subsocietal group identities and ascriptive ties. These norms are also diffused through international institutions, particularly in Europe (18). The EU is establishing common external borders and dismantling historic ones between member-states, while its regional programs and policies often have the effect of reinforcing subsocietal regional borders within its expanding territory.

But the principles of western liberal democracy accord rights and obligations to individuals rather than to subsocietal collectivities. And, for at least 200 years, the compact between the state and individuals has focused on the former's responsibilities for protecting the latter - even from the social institutions or subsocietal groups to which they belong. It is not clear if, or how, western democracies can circumvent that bargain in their accommodation of resident foreigners without vitiating it with their citizens. Arguments for preserving the cultural integrity of immigrant, or, for that matter, indigenous, collectivities confront those individual-focused tenets of liberal democracy.

To date, this paradox has eluded a workable solution (19). It gives rise to political and policy problems, as well as philosophical ones. Issues involving migration and migrants enter the political arena and disturb its established patterns. They cut across conventional distinctions between liberals and conservatives and occasion divisions inside each of those broad ideological families. Thus, while some liberals advocate generous immigration policies for humanitarian reasons, others favor strict limits on new admissions, in order to direct attention and resources to present populations in lower socioeconomic strata. Some conservatives hold nativist or xenophobic views that leads them to argue for limitations on immigration, but the free market and cheap labor preferences held by many find expression in the advocacy of "wide open" or generous admission policies. These perspectives occasionally converge, particularly in the championing of universal human rights. To the extent that the universal aspects of fundamental rights derive from western, Judeo-Christian or Christian values, liberals, libertarians and conservatives may be allied against "pragmatists," who decry the introduction of human rights discourse into international relations - and, occasionally, into migration policies as well.

In foreign relations, this dualism leads to equivocation and tension. The human rights-related exhortations western democracies direct toward non-democratic countries and regimes said to be in transition to democracy simultaneously demand the recognition of the status of collectivities (multiculturalism) and the observance of civil liberties (liberal democracy). It is not clear, however, if those two sets of goals can be realized at the same time. Historically, civil liberties and democratic political practice in western states were built on the ruins of subsocietal, particularistic identities and loyalties.

These and related observations point to significant differences along synchronic and diachronic lines. If attitudes and policies toward migration and migrants vary across types or classes of societies and across time, such differences need to be understood in terms of variations in perceptions and contexts. In the sections that follow, I view the temporal dimension through a modernity/post-modernity optic and suggest some connections between migration on the one hand and governance and international relations on the other. 

Current forms and meanings of migration emerge from the intersections of modernity and post-modernity at the local, societal and international levels. By modernity I have in mind the combination of specific characteristics of modern states, economies and societies with the effects of the technological transformations of time and space that began more than 100 years ago. The maturation of the Westphalian state set on course a series of life-altering institutional and normative changes, first in Europe, then elsewhere (Benko and Strohmayer, 1997). This was perhaps most evident in England (not Great Britain or the United Kingdom!), France and some Central European countries in the mid-18^th century (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985; Tilly, 1992, chaps. 4-6; cf. Ertman, 1997). A major culture shift in the meanings of time and space occurred in much of the world in the decades following 1880 (Kern, 1983). It was triggered by innovations in long-distance communication and travel. Time and space were compressed through progressively faster travel and eventually instantaneous electronic communication. At first gradually and then at accelerating rates, technological, transportation and communication reduced distance, telescoped time and altered the meanings of space (Harvey, 1989).(20) 

In politics, modernity was built on a potential indwelling the Westphalian state: the assumption that society could be integrated along secular lines (Walzer, 1997: 85f.). Subsocietal ascriptive ties and markers of ethnic, regional or foreign origins were expected to recede in importance in such a Gesellschaft. They were deprived of legitimacy; and the state was justified in erasing them (Heisler, 1990; also see Corrigan and Sayer, 1985). They were to be supplanted by the formal institutions (and rules or procedures) of the economy and the polity; and those institutions were to follow forms and scale consistent with the particular principles used to justify a state and its regime of governance. The rationale for the Westphalian state favored the eventual emergence of national states. Indeed, there was a seemingly inexorable drift toward a nation-like integration of populations within the territorial boundaries of the state. The template of the modern state was also republican. Membership, and association with and through its institutions, was based on citizenship. In most of the industrialized democracies, inclusionary citizenship had been extended to all indigenous populations by the middle third of the 20^th century, regardless of ethnic or other group identity - at least in legal and normative terms, if not invariably in outcomes (Heisler, 1990; Heisler and Heisler, 1991) (21).

These developments made migration easier and a much less "lumpy decision." In earlier times, and in some settings even fairly recently, the decision to migrate - particularly across great distances, with or away from family - was a huge risk-taking venture (Hatton and Williamson, 1998). Until these innovations in transportation and communication - and, equally important, the secularization of the state and depersonalization of the economy - were achieved, transnational migration usually entailed a life-altering decision. Migrants saw it as leaving behind one way of life and building another, the details of which were not knowable in advance. They were venturing into a more or less alien setting, with different customs, social and public institutions, and often language.

In the decades after World War I, innovations in transportation and changes in the way migration came to be conceived made migration seem less of an irreversible act. For many, maintaining contact with the places of origin became relatively easy; and sometimes public and private organizations, ranging from political parties and local governments to churches and family associations, in the latter assiduously cultivated ties with emigrés (B.S. Heisler, 1985). "Returning home" became a widely held aspiration (22).

In the second half of the 20^th century, swift long-distance travel and communication were brought within the reach even of people whose economic means and educational resources were below the global medians. Travel, keeping in touch with the people in the places of origin, and the portability of cultural media became democratized in ways and degrees that would have astonished an observer two or three generations earlier. For many or most who moved from one country to another, these developments transformed the nature and meaning of migration. In many parts of the world - non-trivially, especially those that have served as the referents for the conceptual and theoretical work on migration of late, these most recent developments have challenged the Westphalian state's sovereignty and the Westphalian international order of which it has long been a cornerstone.

This is an ironic development. For, as Charles Lemert has observed, "what distinguishes the world claims of modern, Western nation-state cultures is that they alone actually succeeded in establishing a global system of economic control and political administration" (Lemert, 1997: 127). Yet, it is precisely that success that has spurred the postmodernization of the economies, societies and polities of those states (Sassen, 1991; 1996; Inglehart, 1997). And it is postmodernization that is transforming the Western democratic state, the international system that grew from their paramouncy, and the substantially altered meanings and consequences of migration.

These elements of modernity coincided with, and were reinforced by, the emergence of postmodern economies, societies and polities in the highly industrialized democracies (Sassen, 1991; 1996). Postmodernity was only partly a consequence of the sorts of technological and economic developments just noted. It was also a result of abstract, symbolic and remote relationships with political, economic, and sometimes even social institutions and of significant value shifts (Inglehart, 1997; Kumar, 1995).

For many migrants, modernity changed profoundly the nature and ramifications of migration in the last quarter of the 20^th century; and the development of postmodern political, economic and social relationships changed the contexts of migration - particularly for populations of the countries of origin and destination. In ways and for reasons developed in more detail elsewhere, transnational migration has created "semi-settled" minorities in virtually all countries (Heisler and Heisler, 1986; M. O. Heisler, 1986; Heisler, 1990).

Semi-settlement became possible as a consequence of technological innovations and lower costs for long-distance travel and communication, but particular changes in host societies were necessary to make it a stable, sustainable pattern. A new politics of identity has helped to condition the expectations of migrants, their families and communities in their countries of origin, and important segments of the host societies (e.g., seasonal and black labor market employers) in this regard. The new politics of identity or, in Charles Taylor's terms, "politics of recognition" (Gutmann, 1994) dates from the mid-1970s (Gutmann, 1994; Elshtain, 1995). It militates in favor of bounding populations that can be distinguished in cultural or ethnic or other ascriptive terms (e.g., gender).

It is perhaps a coincidence, and, in any case, a question that cannot be explored here, that the drive toward multiculturalism and heightened consciousness of the presence of migrants and refugees occurred at about the same time (cf. Rose, 1997). Western societies launched new agendas centered on identity in the 1960s and 1970s, independent of concerns with migration or migrants (Heisler, 1990). Civil rights movements, the politicization of ethnic and regional cultural concerns, gender equality and other demands by segments of societies on societies-as-wholes - of which the state was seen as the preeminent agent - underlay the politics of recognition (Hollinger, 1995; Elshtain, 1995; Glazer, 1997).

These movements triggered concerns with borders and orders - whose? with what content? for whose benefit and whose detriment? - as well as with identity or recognition. They raised to the fore questions about whose values were to be maximized in the political process (see endnote 8). Was it still possible to identify society-wide, or state-wide, collective interests? And, if so, what incentives would subsocietally directed people have for providing resources for such collective goods?

It is in this intellectual, and subsequently political, context that attention came to be paid anew to citizenship as a bordering mechanism (Schmitter, 1979; Heisler and Heisler 1991). Post-modernity, multiculturalism and demands for group-based recognition, undermined the modern enterprise that was characterized by broadly encompassing secular and impersonal institutions and unity through abstract symbols. Citizenship became a common denominator. It could be used to bound the population for which authoritative decisions were made in politics; and, concomitantly, authority would flow from citizens.

But most immigrants, and especially semi-settled migrants, were not citizens. It is, therefore, plausible that the exclusion of migrants is as much or more a quality of post-modern political and social life as of timeless xenophobia or insecurities in the host society (Heisler and Heisler, 1991). Thus, the presence of migrants - indeed, the processes and facts of migration - may have bounding and ordering functions for post-modern societies.

The proximity of the Other may be an indispensable element in the social (re)construction of citizenship in such emerging post-modern societies as those of North America and Western and Central Europe (cf. Patterson, 1995). If identity is increasingly sub-societal in content, the formal marker of citizenship takes on greater importance for governance. It bounds the population for which the polity acts and from it derives its authority. But, as already noted, at least or especially in these societies, there are non-trivial external influences on the shape and content of domestic order, through internalized elements of international human rights, migration-related bilateral agreements and international organizations. Consequently, while the reconstituted notions of citizenship may exclude (non-citizen) migrants, citizenship as a bordering device does not determine domestic order in a commensurate fashion.

This reflexive process embodies the triad of identity, borders and orders at the core of this volume, at least for the host societies. It operates in a parallel fashion in non-western receiving countries, but there the construction is that of national identity, the borders of the sovereign state, and the forms and contents of order are modern or pre-modern (or, at any rate, pre-post-modern). Pressure is applied to relate identity and citizenship, in the fashion of what used to be discussed as nation-building (Heisler, 1990). Borders are Westphalian; as are the foundations for delineating and applying order. This is one of two significant sources of linkage between the domestic and international levels that emanate from transnational migration. The other is the development of such coherent identity without transgressing the normative parameters sketched by western liberal democracies regarding human rights, compelling assimilation and denial of the cultural integrity of indigenous as well as migrant minorities.

As suggested, modernity is embodied in symbols, abstractions and impersonal formal institutions. In Marshall Berman's title phrase, in modernity "all that is solid melts into air" (Berman, 1982). Those abstractions are fleeting and presume the capacity of large numbers of people to understand them in at least superficially, if not essentially similar ways. Modernity requires high levels of cognitive proximity (q.v. in Douglas, 1986). Cultural integration was required for the effective operation of the modern nation-state, particularly if it were to have realistic aspirations to evolving a democratic regime.

The task confronting both receiving countries that are at some pre-post-modern stage and most sending countries (which are at such a stage) is to govern populations with relatively low levels of cognitive proximity. This task was approached in the pasts by most of the countries that are mature democracies today through processes of homogenization, including loyalty tests, disregard for subsocietal identities and cultures, and, in not a few instances, practices currently termed ethnic cleansing. But what was justifiable, indeed, "recommended" in the past is deemed at least politically incorrect and, increasingly, sanctionable by external actors and institutions - and the "international community" - today. In sum, what was acceptable then and is currently practiced there (in non-western and non-democratic states) is no longer acceptable here now; and a powerful set of state and non-state actors in international relations deny the legitimacy of such practices there, as well.

Since migration both reflects and refracts the current waves of change in societies and in the international system, it could be expected to figure prominently in discussions of international relations theory. As has often been remarked, migration vitiates state boundaries and established (Westphalian) notions of sovereignty in a variety of ways. It is a catalyst for limiting the sovereignty of many receiving countries through the human rights discourse and practices to which it gives rise (see, e.g., M. O. Heisler, 1986; Jacobson, 1996; Sassen, 1996). Some spokespersons for sending countries also claim that,under particular circumstances, having large numbers of nationals living and working abroad may impinge on the sovereignty of the countries of origin. Such claims suggest that migration may cut across the debate between state-centric and transnational - or realist and liberal - perspectives.  

Viewed through the optic of traditional international relations, the decades since World War II have produced another, scarcely studied, set of changes with far-ranging implications for the shaping of identities, the functions borders and the ontology of orders. Four centuries of state consolidation started to be reversed in the 1950s. Decolonization, the independence of international mandate territories, and, most recently, the breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and several other countries, increased the number of the world's states more than three-fold. That, in turn, has increased many times over the length of the boundaries demarcating those states and their putatively discrete realms of order. What had been deemed internal migration or movement from one portion of a colonial realm to another (and, thus, not a direct concern in international relations) became international or transnational migration (Nugent and Asiwaju, 1996).

For more than forty years, the Cold War made for "abnormal" international relations (Jackson, 1995). Restrictions on movement included barriers to exit as well as to entrance. Freedom to move across state borders became an ideologically charged litmus test: "bad countries" locked their people inside their borders; "good countries" allowed, indeed, encouraged, free movement. During the Cold War most migration was driven by economic forces, dictated by labor needs in the wealthier countries and poverty and surplus populations in the poorer ones. But the international political economy of large-scale transnational migration was undergirded by Cold War ideological rhetoric.

The moral tone of western demands to "let your people go" directed toward the Soviet Union, its allies, and other countries that denied or severely restricted exit to their citizens implied that migration is "natural" and perhaps a even right to be enjoyed by all. But just as the achievement of the right of exit seemed near, at the end of the 1980s, the countries that had championed it tightened their restrictions on entrance. The prospect of large-scale migration by formerly "captive peoples" coincided with very substantial increases in the flow of refugees, from conflicts in imploding Yugoslavia, civil strife in several African and Asian countries, and the failure of a growing number of states to maintain even the rudiments of domestic order.

The international human rights versus state sovereignty argument correlates highly with other value differences within societies. Thus, the views and values of those who tend to support the incorporation of international human rights into domestic practice differ markedly on a number of issues from the values of those who expound the primacy of core cultural values (see, e.g., Hoskin, 1991, esp. chap 6). The former tend also toward multiculturalist positions in social relations, while the latter defend what they see as integral national or "native" values (Eurobarometer, Nov. 1989). The international human rights versus sovereignty and the multiculturalist versus culture defense stances reflect multidimensional, if not comprehensive, cleavages between cosmopolitan and parochial world-views. They affect not only attitudes toward migrants and migration or international relations but often also stances in domestic politics. Attitudes toward immigration are less strongly associated with such "objective" factors as the actual loss of jobs to migrants likely to be independent (Hoskin, 1991; but cf. Schor, 1985, pt. 4).

The consequences of migration - those considered good as well as those deemed bad - are more evident inside countries than in external relations, but they depend on systematic and sustained links between the inside and outside worlds. Some of the reasons for this are obvious. One is that changes in the nature of migration have coincided with changes in the principles of social order in many countries, especially in western democracies. A second can be attributed to the increased importance of purist or fundamentalist cultural (particularly religion-related, but also national) values in politics, especially in parts of Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. A third reason can be found in the growing difficulties some states face in managing modern challenges - the transformation of economies from agricultural to industrial activity, urbanization, political mobilization and assertiveness, rising expectations for greater political choice and economic progress - using resources within their borders. Emigration can serve as a safety-valve in the labor market, housing and educational shortages, and concomitant political tensions. It can also generate substantial inflows of hard currency, in the form of remittances from those working abroad, and of accumulated capital repatriated by returning migrants. The patterns of semi-settlement and sustained transnational communities thus serve to relieve shortfalls inside the sending countries, raise the standards of living of the stay-at-home portions of transnational communities, and enrich the economy through savings funneled into their economies.

All of this would suggest that transnational migration is making Westphalian notions of sovereignty less relevant. But that is not the case, at least not uniformly.

While these changes have contributed to the "debordering" of some states, they have not had similar consequences for others. In fact, in some states classic notions of sovereignty seem more relevant than ever before. The "shrinkage of the world" through innovations in transportation and communication, the advent of economic interdependence, and other forces of "globalization" have not affected all states in similar ways (cf. Albert and Brock, 1996: esp. 71ff.). These differences are also evident in the ways the dynamics of migration play out, in the meanings of migration, and in the fates or circumstances of migrants. In sum, the effects have not been monotonic for the system of states. Post-modernity may be eroding some states' claims to exclusive control of territory and jurisdiction within their borders but not the claims of others. Migration serves to bridge the two types of states.  

Transnational migration today also confronts a mixture of modern and postmodern aspects of reality as regards space (cf. Benko and Strohmayer, 1997). The Westphalian state and system of states marked an important watershed in the spatialization of politics. It made for substantial uniformity across states through normative and diplomatic suasion. By the late 19^th or early 20^th centuries, structural similarities developed in most parts of the world, in response to external and internal challenges. The best way to survive in a world of powerful Westphalian states was to become more like a Westphalian state. Uniformity increased through diffusion, aided by power. But, as already noted, the Westphalian state and order also made possible the rise of profound differences and asymmetries.

Before Westphalia, space was controlled by a multitude of authority claimants. In fact, a common and important feature of the pre-Westphalian arrangements of space was the coexistence of multiple and overlapping claims to jurisdiction - functionally, structurally and temporally competing claims to authority, based on different principles. These included feudal nobility and landed aristocracy; the (Roman Catholic) church, at least in Europe and its colonial territories; and even brigands and pirates in some "no-go" areas (23). Ordinary people had little or no control over space. Social and economic relationships spilled over boundaries created by formal authorities, but they could not supplant them (Wroe, 1995). While those boundaries sometimes fostered the development of loyalties and identitive attachments, it was the subsequent Westphalian order that made possible the integration, homogenization and, in some sense, rationalization of the relationship between space and identity through the melding of authority claims and territory (cf. Walker, 1993: 116-17). It did not transmit control over space to ordinary folk; but, through the extension and diversification of property rights, it opened the door to private and social control and the imposition of order designed to serve the interests of those with such control.

Multiple, often shifting claims to authority over territory in the pre-Westphalian world precluded a fusion of identity and space on any but the smallest scale or in a lasting and legitimate way (cf. Wroe, 1995). Between the beginning of the Westphalian era, in the mid-16^th century, with the Treaty of Augsburg (Krasner, 1993), and the mid-18^th century - by which time the ancien regimes were consolidated in most of Europe - such linkages became normal, perhaps even essential. But the Westphalian nexus of space and identity was predicated on the formal authority of central government, or, more precisely, driven by claims asserted by the government. Loyalty to and identification with those small places/units persisted long after the establishment of absolutist Westphalian states. It was not to become grounded in social consciousness and institutions until much later, when national societies and states came to overlap in appreciable degree.

The advent of constitutional governments and democratic regimes in some places further fostered that relationship. Such developments did not vitiate the central authorities' claims to jurisdiction over the entire territory of the state but it did loosen the reins of the identity structure they and their feudal and ecclesiastic predecessors had monopolized. One of the hallmarks of mature democracy in the last decades of the 20^th century is the ability, and presumed right, of people to mediate important elements of the space-identity nexus through various sorts of social institutions. Thus, the identities of residents of the social institution that is a neighborhood or of the somewhat formalized social institution that is the condominium or cooperative apartment house, influence and are influenced by the spaces that are their containers. Those inside tend to exercise considerable influence over entry and have myriad ways to restrict or deny entry to newcomers. This is true even where formal laws and rules seek to regulate entry, and even where the social institution associated with the space is poorly or not at all organized.

A second, less commonly considered, set of affects on perceptions of, and interactions with, time and space derives from the central (state and societal)-local distinctions that indwell the issue-area of migration. In terms of the trite but accurate observation, the state is expected to manage migration-related policies centrally, but the most important impacts of migration are local. Immigrants reside and work in towns and cities, not in a country as a whole. They live, shop and send their children to school in neighborhoods, not in integral societies. To the extent they serve as markers of change, they do so at the local level. It is there that they are perceived as threats to employment or familiar ways of life, or, alternately, as valued workers and the sources of welcome cultural enrichment of the local community.

Neighborhoods, schools, factories, shops, buses, sidewalks, parks and other public spaces have attributes as social institutions, not only as formal state or economic entities. The people who live and work there - more precisely, the people who lived there when newcomers arrived - have history with each other. They may have formed various kinds and degrees of solidarity; invariably, the patterns of their relationships have produced structures of accommodation. Local cultures have greater concreteness than the broad lines of language, religion, shared myths and other components of societal or national identity. In banal but substantive ways, the small gestures, tones, body language and recollected common experiences - a flood six years ago; the championship the local team almost won; the deference to be accorded to the veterans of the last war - embodied by and embedded in social institutions often matter more than the wider but more distant abstractions of societal culture or state institutions and laws.

Local social spaces are constructed over time. In the past, newcomers were expected to adjust gradually. Immigrants, the first generation, were also often expected to accept less than full social rights and inferior status. Over time, they, but more likely only their children and grandchildren, the second and third generations, were expected to assimilate. That is, they were expected to integrate into, and internalize the norms and values of, the dominant cultural core of the society in which they settled. In post-modern settings, the rise of subsocietal multiculturalism has made that problematic; and, in a number of western democracies, such policies as bilingual education and the subsidization of migrant cultural activity makes it even more difficult (cf. Rath, 1991).

Finally, the increasing significance of transnational communities contributes a further instance of the inside/outside Möbius ribbon quality of migration. Viewed as social institutions, transnational communities perform preserving, ontogenetic and transforming functions for identities and for orders. They help to preserve local identity and, of course, ties to the place of origin, in local rather than general or country terms. They are ontogenetic, in that they create new communities of migrants, in which the "from¾in¾back" dynamics and raisons-d'être of the transnational enterprise differentiate its members from both the surrounding host populations and those who stay at home. At the same time, they provide a distinctive basis for integration for the members. Their enterprise is not about staying in the place of origin; nor is it about settling and integrating into the host society. Their lives differ in that they are about living in two places.

First, if chain migration occurs from specific locality to specific locality (or at least to relatively compact regions), then identity-reinforcing social relationships can be strong enough to withstand the host society's homogenizing pressures. Second, the periodic return to the community of origin - and the knowledge of, and purposes embodied in, such expectations of return - serve to cement the ties among the away-members of the transnational community.  

Migration has reinforced or accelerated the construction of communitarian spaces. Enclaves have always constituted such spaces; but, in the modern setting individuals or small groups could step out of the enclaves and into the larger society. This was the promise of modernization (Walzer, 1997). But the larger society is increasingly attenuated; and its most apparent and enduring aspects are formal institutions, largely of the state and the economy. It is there that migrants and their hosts meet.

But that terrain is a vast and often only partially visible mesh of socially mediated spaces. When migrants cross borders, they enter not only the territory of a (more or less) sovereign state, with predominant legal powers within its boundaries, but also that maze of social relationships and institutions. Negotiating those relationships and informal institutions successfully requires skill and luck. But regardless of their effectiveness in managing those tasks, migrants must also cope with the formal institutions. It is at the intersection of the formal and social institutions that most of the action takes place; and that remains largely opaque.

The expectations of people in host societies reflect, in large measure, the content and texture of their constructions of the past and the present. These are emphatically not monolithic or homogeneous - or, in some cases, even compatible. The variegated experiences and expectations of those populations need to be studied for an understanding of the kinds and distributions of those dispositions toward immigration and immigrants. The attitudes involved are dynamic; and it is not only the commonly attended economic or migration or cultural variables that need to be taken into account in studying them but the politics of migration as well.

We also need to gain better understanding of a wider range of transnational communities. In most instances their functioning is refracted through the state system (see Faist, 1997; Kearney, 1995). But they consist predominantly of social institutions, and these need to be studied on their own terms. Perhaps the most effective approach to doing that is to treat the state and international relations conventionally conceived as intervening variables - and least for heuristic purposes. One arena in which work on the transnational dimensions of migration has begun to integrate the social and formal (state and international) dimensions is that of human rights, in legal terms and, more broadly, in discourses in the language of rights (Jacobson, 1996).

Much of this complexity, indeed, confusion, stems from attempts to treat the ramifications of migration in positivistic terms. Post-positivist analyses are necessary (Lapid, 1989); but these will not suffice alone, either. Thus, while norms clearly matter, we need to consider them as both the foundations and products of constructions. In the present usage, norms are at once key elements of a cognitive and constructivist perspective, but they are also data. As with the politics of ethnic relations, so too with migration, things are much more what they are made out to be than how "objective reality" would have them be.

Historically, explanations of migration have concentrated on objective qualities, such as numbers or provenance or cultural distance or other qualities of migrants; economic conditions in countries or regions of origin and destination; and, more recently, historical foundations of citizenship and collective identity in host societies. More recently, global economic conditions, refugee-generating wars and famine, and other "macro" phenomena have become more crucial. Two factors related factors have not been taken into account, however, and this chapter is devoted to their consideration. First, what we expect of, or how we see, migration and migrants is changing; and those changes are uneven across and within societies. Second, the societies of both the sending countries and receiving countries are undergoing multifarious changes; and the political, social and economic aspects of migration are best viewed in the light of such changes. 
 

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Notes 

1. For a stimulating discussion of this theme, with applications closer to my concerns here, see Kearney (1995); and see also several of the contributions to Cox (1997).

2. For complementary, but only tangentially related, perspectives, see Koslowski (1996); and Faist (1997).

3. Since the early 1980s, James Rosenau has referred to the simultaneous manifestation and interplay of globalization and localization as "fragmegration." See, e.g., Rosenau (1983; 1997).

4. For an explication of such multidimensional contextual analysis, see Heisler and Peters (1977).

5. See the discussions of multiculturalism and the politics of recognition by Charles Taylor and others in Gutmann (1994). Also see Glazer (1997); and Elshtain (1995).

6. This is often the case with regard to statistical relationships between "immigrants" and crime, for instance. See Tonry (1997).

7. This is, of course, a synthesis of the various iterations of W. I. Thomas's classic theorem about public definitions of a situation becoming a part of that situation (see, e.g., Thomas, 1928; and Thomas and Znaniecki, 1920, vol. 4: 241-271).

8. Recall that in the mid-1950s David Easton defined politics as "authoritative allocation of values [and, presumably, valued things] for a society" (Easton, 1971 [1953]: 129-41; emphasis added). While several aspects of this formulation gave rise to lively discussions in the literature of Political Science in the ensuing years, the phrase "for a society" was not one of these. It is central to the present argument, since it brings to the fore a question generally not made explicit in theoretical discussions by Easton or others: What are the boundaries between population and society, and how do they matter?

9. Societal security can be conceptualized in several ways. Here I intend both the defensive cultural posture discussed in Wæver et al. (1993) and the organic and functional cultural conservatism reflected in the contents and title-phrase of Robert Nisbet's The Quest for Community (Nisbet, 1953).

10. There are, of course, many other reasons, only some of which can be noted here. Another important factor in the politicization of migration stems from the recruitment of labor. I touch on that below.

11. This proposition rests on multiple and complex foundations. There are, of course, myriad social psychological arguments on which to build it. However, the most appropriate for the subject-matter at hand are likely to be those of the cognitive bases of social institutions (Douglas, 1986) and normative political theory (Walzer, 1997).

12. Plato and Rousseau both recommended against allowing foreigners entry into the society in their respective ideal state constructs (Plato in The Republic, Rousseau in "Constitutional Project for Corsica").

13. Such challenges are still common, even in the most mature liberal democracies. The point here is that mounting them has become more difficult to justify and embed in state policy. There are serious, sound grounds for questioning some differences, regardless of how politically incorrect that may be. This is not an appropriate place to elaborate on that point; but some aspects will be found below, in the treatment of bordering and the delineation of order.

14. These complex issues revolve around relationships between the norms and principles on which domestic regimes are based, on the one hand, and public expectations about the state's posture in foreign relations. They require fuller theoretical and empirical elaboration than can be provided here. (For an adumbration of the argument, see M. O. Heisler, 1992.) Much of my work in progress focuses on these relationships and their implications for domestic governance and international relations.

15. These two categories are neither exhaustive of all contemporary states nor, strictly speaking, mutually exclusive. Some states do not closely resemble either type, and some exhibit a mixture of traits. From a heuristic standpoint, however, these are the two preeminent and politically, as well as analytically and theoretically, most interesting types.

16. The proportion of such extra-societal populations ranges from nearly one-third in such countries as Luxembourg, to approximately 5 percent in larger western host societies. As I note below, the criteria for determining who is a member of the core society and who is not are complex, controverted, and in flux (see Dauenhauer, 1996; Wiener, 1997).

17. The international system militated in favor of maintaining the zones of colonial administration transmuted into state boundaries, regardless of the social, political or economic diversity they encompassed. That external juridical buttress of statehood therefore tacitly justified "nation-building" practices no longer deemed acceptable or politically correct in western states - including the former European colonial powers. See Jackson and Rosberg (1982).

18. Europe here should be viewed as an expanding arena for fostering democracy, human rights, free movement and establishment of persons, and transnationally delineated migration regimes (see Heisler and VanDeveer, 1997, publication forthcoming).

19. Thus, a hypothetical variant of the "affair of the foulards" (which, incidentally, has recently become an issue in Germany as well as in France and Belgium, where it first received attention) can illustrate the complexity of this problem. So long as the young women from observant Muslim families wished to wear headscarves in state schools, they confronted the opposition of public policies, if not laws. But if they did not wish to wear such headcoverings in school but their families insisted they do so, principles of liberal democracy would have supported them against their own families. The paradox becomes evident when public policies aim to support the cultural integrity of subsocietal groups under the aegis of multiculturalism while those principles of western liberal democracy still call for the protection of individuals' prerogatives by the state.

20. I am grateful to Michael Kearney for bringing this seminal work to my attention.

21. See also Vining's (1978) interesting discussion of property and legal system foundations for identity in the secularized Western tradition.

22. There is an assumption in the literature on migration that the "myth of return" harbored by many migrants was no more than a myth for most. Large enough numbers do return to the countries of origin, however, to sustain and even reinforce the myth. See Miller (1986: 72f.); B. S. Heisler (1986: esp. fn. 11).

23. No-go areas are places within the borders of states where states do not make serious, practical efforts to enforce law and order. An example of a no-go area is a "bad part of town," where even police do not go. My notion of "no-go" areas comes from Dahrendorf (1985).