

“Authoritarian Disposition and Political Choice”

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Authoritarian Disposition and Political Choice

Although authoritarianism has all but disappeared as an explanation for public opinion in the U.S., we argue that its demise is regrettable. We demonstrate that authoritarianism is a powerful predictor of preferences about gay rights and the war on terrorism, two prominent newcomers to the issue agenda. Both should increase feelings of perceived threat among authoritarians, which serves to activate the disposition. As these issues have come to occupy more public attention, especially recently, we show that the effect of an authoritarian disposition on partisanship has, in turn, increased markedly between 1992 and 2004. Using panel data, we further demonstrate that this increased effect on partisan choice helps explain recent Republican gains. We speculate that authoritarianism's increased salience is a likely cause of party polarization and has disquieting implications for the place of tolerance in American political discourse.

Introduction

For three decades following Adorno et al.'s (1950) landmark study, *The Authoritarian Personality*, political scientists studied carefully the relationship between an identifiable authoritarian personality type and various political attitudes, ranging from views of foreign policy and the cold war, to levels of tolerance and views of race and race relations. This focus was undoubtedly animated by the horrors of the Second World War and the concern that increasingly faceless, modern, bureaucratic societies would render people susceptible to the appeals of a strong hand as they lost their sense of community, purpose and identity (see e.g. Fromm 1941).

In the 1980s, however, political scientists began to pay less attention to authoritarian personality (and its revisions) as a category of study, especially as it related to public opinion in the United States. Although by no means a definitive test, it is noteworthy that a J-STOR search of political science journals for the terms “authoritarian personality” and “public opinion” shows that fully sixty articles met the search criteria in the 1960s. That number dropped to thirty-six in the 1970s and twenty-one in the 1980s, before increasing slightly to twenty-five in the 1990s. In the 1990s, however, these articles tended to apply the concepts culled from authoritarian personality studies to newly democratic states, in places like East Germany, Russia, Argentina, Brazil and elsewhere. Only seven related substantially to the U.S and in only two of these articles did authoritarianism play a central explanatory role.

Much of the neglect results from the well-chronicled methodological problems associated with the study of authoritarianism. This is a lamentable state of affairs, given that attributes of a healthy liberal democracy, such as tolerance and compromise, are

negatively related to authoritarianism (Stenner 2005). Furthermore, this relative neglect is a mistake. Theoretically, Lakoff (1996) suggests that contemporary conservative ideology relies on a “strict father morality,” in which contempt for ambiguity and a disdain for questioning of authority are fundamental to a well-ordered society. These characteristics are often associated with authoritarians (Adorno et al. 1950). Empirically, party elites today are increasingly well sorted (e.g. Fiorina 2005)¹ on issues such as race, religion, gay rights, and the proper response to terrorism and perceived external threat, that divide authoritarians from non-authoritarians in the mass public.

We demonstrate a strong relationship in American public opinion between an authoritarian disposition and a range of policy preferences about gay rights and the appropriate use of military force.² The recent emergence of both these issues ought to increase perceptions of threat to authoritarians, which should, in turn, activate the disposition (Stenner 2005; Duckitt 1989; Doty, Peterson and Winter 1991; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Lavine et al. 1999). More importantly, we show that, as these issues have gained prominence, the relationship between authoritarianism and partisanship itself has increased dramatically. Indeed we find that authoritarianism has come to play a fundamentally important role in guiding partisan choice in contemporary American politics, a development that we show has recently played to the Republicans’ advantage. In short, we believe we have identified a powerful empirical explanation for many

¹ Although Fiorina (2005) does not believe that the public is polarized as a result, he does allow that Americans are better sorted on these issues than ever before, which likely has consequences as well.

² Although they do not suggest it measures authoritarianism, Barker and Tinnick (forthcoming) use basically the same parenting values measure we use in this study, although they regard it as just measuring parenting values rather than the conceptually broader authoritarianism. They show that this measure affects preferences for an even wider range of policy preferences than we describe here. We focus on gay rights and terrorism related variables because of their relative newness to the political dialogue.

important facets of the American attitudinal divide and an intuitively powerful explanation for what is the prime mover in that divide.

In the next several sections, we review the evolution of scholarly thinking about authoritarianism from a static personality trait to a situation sensitive disposition. With levels of perceived threat presently high in the U.S., this discussion informs why an authoritarian disposition ought to be relevant in understanding contemporary American public opinion. We then recap the measurement problems associated with the concept and introduce the measure used in our analysis. Next, our data analysis proceeds in three steps. We first demonstrate the central importance of an authoritarian disposition to two relative newcomers to the issue agenda, gay rights and the use of force in a post-9/11 world. Second we demonstrate that, as these issues have become more relevant and as the parties have taken relatively clear stances on them, authoritarian values have come to exert a very large effect on partisanship. Third, we demonstrate, through the use of panel data gathered between 2000 and 2004, that the increased import of an authoritarian disposition on partisan choice has provided Republicans a distinct advantage.

What is Authoritarianism

A vast literature exists about authoritarian personality. Adorno et al's (1950) landmark study identified nine dimensions – conventionality, submissiveness, aggression, subjectivity, superstitiousness, toughness, cynicism, the tendency to project unconscious emotional responses onto the world, and concerns about sex. These nine traits are the manifestation of a latent conflict involving the “repression of hostility toward parental authority and its displacement onto societal outgroups: racial and ethnic minorities,

political dissidents and moral deviants” (Stenner 2005, 2). The original understanding of the origins of authoritarianism was personality-based (Adorno et al. 1950), but criticism of this treatment was withering. The main critiques included, fundamentally, the implausibility and non-falsifiability of the Freudian approach relating one’s own childhood experiences to the emergence of an authoritarian syndrome (Altemeyer 1988, Duckitt 1992, Stenner 2005).

Rather than focusing on a personality “syndrome,” Stenner (2005) conceptualizes authoritarianism as a situation specific disposition characterized by two overriding concerns: a desire for sameness and aversion to difference. Conformism, respect for tradition (though not in all cases), and the necessity of coercion to ensure conformism are important to those with authoritarian values (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988, 1996). Perceptions of threat and fear, in this rendering, activates the disposition (Adorno, et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1981, 1988, 1996, Lavine et al. 1999, Duckitt 2001), though there are varying accounts of what prompts fear in authoritarians.

Whether or not authoritarianism is a personality type or a disposition has important implications. If authoritarianism is a static personality type, its effect ought to be constant over time. If, however, authoritarianism is better understood as a situation-sensitive phenomenon, which is more consistent with a disposition, its effect might differ depending on circumstance. Indeed much recent work on authoritarianism has been premised on “situationism,” the idea that the impact of authoritarianism waxes and wanes according to specific social contexts, especially levels of threat (Duckitt 1989; Doty, Peterson and Winter 1991; Feldman and Stenner 1997). Stenner (2005) specifies that not just any threat, but what she calls normative threat is the trigger that activates

authoritarianism as a politically salient disposition. The notion that an authoritarian disposition may be sometimes more or less important is central to the recent dynamics of contemporary American politics presented here.

Though some studies argue that there is an identifiable authoritarian personality type on the left as well as the right (Shils 1954, Rokeach 1960), most of the literature identifies authoritarianism as a conservative or right-wing phenomenon, as is clear from Jost. et al.'s (2003) exhaustive review on conservatism as “motivated social cognition.” Altemeyer (1996), after extensive study of the issue, argues, in fact, that there is no left-wing authoritarian phenomenon to speak of in contemporary North America comparable to his focus of study – right-wing authoritarianism.³

For our purposes, the most noteworthy feature of an authoritarian disposition is an aversion to difference and adherence to militarism and conventionalism, of which attitudes toward gays would be a clear manifestation. Regarding military strength, several scholars have drawn links between aspects of authoritarianism and a hawkish or militaristic attitude toward foreign policy and resolution of conflict (Lipset 1959; Eckhardt and Newcombe 1969; Altemeyer 1996; Perrin 2005). Regarding feelings about gays and lesbians, Altemeyer (1996) demonstrates that authoritarians judged law-breaking much less harshly when it involved gay-bashing or police brutality, suggesting sympathy for dealing harshly, even illegally, with perceived deviants. Similarly, authoritarians are more inclined to favor quarantines for AIDS patients, a likely proxy for attitudes toward gays generally (Peterson et al. 1993).

³ This point is not particularly critical to our argument, given that the measure that we use is meant to capture such values of the right. Our measure, however, does not fall victim to many of the concerns expressed about Altemeyer's various measures of right wing authoritarianism because our measures are divorced from conservative ideology more generally (see Stenner 2005 for a complete discussion).

Although the preferences of authoritarians and conservatives may often overlap, it is wrong to conflate them. Stenner (2005) contends that status quo conservatism, defined in terms of preference for avoiding change, is a demonstrably distinct disposition from that of authoritarianism, with its pre-occupation with uniformity and aversion to diversity. Moreover, it is the authoritarians, not the status-quo conservatives that evince the expected traits of moral, political and ethnic intolerance (Stenner 2005).

Authoritarianism and Broader Political Attitudes

Given authoritarians' antipathy toward specific outgroups and more general ethnocentrism, it is not surprising that authoritarianism shapes a range of attitudes and issue preferences that touch on difference, such as race, religious differences, immigration, ethnicity, or sexual orientation (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Figueredo and Elkins 2003; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Hurwitz and Peffley 1992). For authoritarianism to have broader political implications in the United States, however, these issues must be featured parts of the public agenda, and stark differences between, or at least starkly different perceptions of, the major parties or among differing political ideologies on issues that deal with strength, tradition, difference, and conformity must exist.⁴

Lakoff's (1996) treatment of morality in contemporary American politics is helpful in this regard. He views liberalism and conservatism as comparably consistent

⁴ One reason that scholars of American politics might have lost interest in authoritarianism as a variable is the Cold War. In the context of a clear, external threat about which all relevant elites agreed, there would be no particular appeal for one party to attract authoritarians rather than another. It is arguably true that the Cold War consensus ensured a relatively equal distribution of authoritarians in the two major parties until its end in the early 1990s, though the emergence of Reagan Democrats in the 1980s may have represented an earlier echo of the phenomenon we study here. The absence of the child-rearing battery on the NES prior to 1992 disallows investigation of that possibility.

frameworks for making sense of politics. Lakoff asserts that his schematic conceptions of liberalism and conservatism are based on models of family. His conception of conservatism as premised on a strict father morality (SFM) is closely related to previous conceptions of authoritarianism.

SFM asserts that we live in a dog eat dog world, and that coddling is not only a sign of personal weakness but also undermines the social fabric more generally by failing to teach people the skills necessary to survive in life in what is, ultimately, a zero-sum game. Obedience to authority is central to this outlook: straying from legitimate authority can undermine the moral order, unhinging a society's moorings, casting people into anarchy, lethargy and laziness. Crucial to this worldview are the primacy of fatherly authority and the importance of a traditional family structure. Feminism, seen as a fundamental challenge to that traditional family structure, would be loathsome in these terms. So, by extension, would respect for gay rights and, especially, alternative notions of family. In fact, numerous scholars have posited a link between authoritarianism and a pre-occupation with traditionally-defined social hierarchies, including those pertaining to sex roles and anxiety about deviation from those roles (Adorno, et al., 1950, Conover 1983, Altemeyer 1996, Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

Alternative lifestyles are dangerous not only because they are regarded as inherently wrong, but because they set a possible example for others to follow. In this sense, the social fabric is fragile, and deviation from accepted norms threatens to unravel it. This is significant, too, in helping to explain why these issues must come to be seen as urgent matters of public policy, and not merely left to personal choice. In the authoritarian mind, immorality infects society and undermines its moral purity.

Consequently, it is critical that the government step in to constrain deviations from accepted behaviors (Stenner 2005, Chapter 1).⁵

Although his linguistic theory is compelling on many levels, Lakoff (1996) attempts to use it to explain preferences about the entire range of political issues, which is not appropriate if authoritarianism is, in fact, the disposition that the language of conservatives and liberals activates. While a common set of words and symbols may loosely connect things like the proper size of government, tax cuts, and environmentalism with gay rights, there is little reason in the literature to suggest that an authoritarian disposition ought to have much to do with the former three issues.⁶

Theoretically, Feldman and Stenner (1997) suggest that perceptions of threat activate authoritarianism in the political world, which, in turn, makes an authoritarian disposition politically salient (see also Sales 1973; Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991). Specifically, they interact the four-question NES child-rearing battery that we use below with numerous measures of threat to demonstrate that authoritarians are likely to become more hostile to outgroups and more punitive in their political attitudes when they feel threatened. In other words, they use cross-sectional variation in threat levels to demonstrate when authoritarianism becomes politically relevant.

In addition to this cross-sectional variation, perceived threat ought to vary over time depending on the nature of issues and events. Hence the political relevance of

⁵ We have attempted to cull insights from the research program on authoritarianism and from Lakoff's approach. We do not mean to suggest that the two programs are synonymous. However, we do believe that there is significant overlap between the two, based on a shared set of insights about a hierarchical, tradition-based understanding of the family, in which authority is exercised in a more aggressive and, if necessary, violent manner, with greater antipathy directed toward people perceived to be different and greater fear about the impact of perceived deviance on social well-being more generally.

⁶ Indeed, we have shown elsewhere that an authoritarian disposition is not significant when issues do not elicit feelings of threat, such as with support for the Bush tax cuts, support for the privatization of Social Security, and support for school vouchers (reference deleted).

authoritarian attitudes is subject to changing historical and political circumstances, rather than a fixed, static reality. When perceived threat is high, authoritarianism will do more to shape politics in the aggregate even if mean levels of authoritarianism remain unchanged. When threat is low, authoritarianism ought to be less important.

Importantly, issues likely to generate perceived threat among authoritarians are among the most salient issues in the major political debates today. In 2004, gay marriage and the war on terror were among the two most prominent campaign issues and also the two issues that appear to have most worked to George W. Bush's advantage (e.g. Campbell and Monson 2005). Those two issues also tap, quite directly, fundamental SFM/authoritarian concerns about the proper structure of the family, the need to aggressively quell possible threats to social homogeneity and a related tendency toward intolerance in dealing with difference.

Measuring Authoritarianism

Devising a measure of authoritarianism has generally proven quite problematic. Adorno's original F-scale fell into disrepute within a decade of its introduction for any number of good reasons. The long list of methodological critiques included:

- A lack of effort to ensure random sampling.
- Authoritarian responses on the questionnaire were all located at the same end of the scales, thus encouraging consistently authoritarian or non-authoritarian responses.

- Many of the questions were open-ended and too little care was paid to the systematic coding of such responses (see Hyman and Sheatsley 1954 for an early review).
- The F-Scale proved to lack reliability and unidimensionality, measuring several poorly related factors (Altemeyer 1981).

In retrospect, these problems are perhaps not surprising, given the concerns about positivism among the participants on Adorno's research team (Wolfe 2005). Later measures of authoritarianism used in political surveys often included loaded words and phrases, rendering them operationally indistinct from other political predispositions, such as partisanship and ideology (Duckitt 2003; Stenner 2005).

Measurement of "core values," to which an authoritarian disposition might be thought of as similar, presents a serious empirical problem. One would be hard pressed to construct a verbal theory suggesting that, *conceptually*, core beliefs would be more malleable than (and hence a function of) political values like partisanship rather than the reverse. Recent scholarship, however, demonstrates that partisanship is causally prior to change in a host of core values, at least as they are measured (Goren 2005). Although such findings are critically important in specifying correct models when using these measures in models of political behavior, the results of analyses like this is almost surely in large measure a function of question wording.

For example, consider moral traditionalism as tapped by the National Election Study (NES). Conceptually, morals are developed very early in life through pre-adult socialization. Given their centrality, they are primed and thus solidified almost constantly, which, given most Americans' inattention to political matters, ought to make

them causally prior to any attitude in the political world. Operationally, however, this concept is measured by asking people to judge, among other things, whether newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown in our society and whether the country would be better off if there was more emphasis on traditional family ties. The Republican Party and political conservatives are closely identified with both these ideas, which necessarily confuses causal ordering, especially in the context of a survey interview where people are encouraged to think about politics. Are people Republicans/Democrats because they are traditional/non-traditional on these issues, or, are people traditional/non-traditional on these issues because they note Republican/Democratic elites with whom they identify taking positions on these specific matters? Using these exact questions, Goren (2005) demonstrates that causality runs from partisanship to moral traditionalism rather than vice versa.

Our measure of authoritarianism does not fall victim to this problem, thus alleviating concerns about endogeneity. In 1992, the NES introduced four questions designed to measure authoritarianism. Specifically, they ask respondents to judge attractive attributes in children. It seems clear to us that opinions about child rearing are causally prior to political thinking of any kind. Although these items do not tap all three of the domains of authoritarianism identified by Altemeyer (1996), they seem to get at two of them – conformity to prevailing social conventions and submission to legitimate authority.⁷

The NES begins its four item battery with the following preamble:

“Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have,

⁷ The third of these components is authoritarian aggression. We expect that, if the aggression component were more clearly represented in the measure, our results would be all the more impressive.

every person thinks that some are more important than others. I am going to read you pairs of desirable qualities. Please tell me which one you think is more important for a child to have.” The pairs of attributes are the following:

- 1) INDEPENDENCE OR RESPECT FOR ELDERS
- 2) OBEDIENCE OR SELF-RELIANCE
- 3) CURIOSITY OR GOOD MANNERS
- 4) BEING CONSIDERATE OR WELL BEHAVED

Those who value “respect for elders”, “obedience”, “good manners”, and being “well behaved” score at the maximum of the authoritarianism scale. Those who value “independence”, “self-reliance”, “curiosity”, and “being considerate” score at the minimum.⁸

In creating an authoritarianism scale, we array all four items such that the authoritarian response has a score of 5 and the non-authoritarian response has a score of 1. Since both values in each pair are desirable, it is not surprising that a fair number of people volunteer that they value both. We score these responses as 3. With this information in hand, there are a number of ways to create the scale. To avoid the loss of information, we combine the items additively and take the mean. To maximize the number of cases we have for analysis, we require that respondents provide only one valid response.⁹

⁸ Stenner (2005) notes that these questions about child rearing preferences are less effective in measuring authoritarianism among college students and perhaps more generally those without children. To the extent that there is slippage between the concept of authoritarianism and its measure, it is sure to attenuate our results rather than help them. For example, the effect of authoritarian disposition on partisanship increases by about one-fifth if we limit the sample to those over the age of 30.

⁹ Our results are consistent no matter how we handle missing data. In fact, requiring that respondents answer all four questions usually strengthens our results.

Authoritarianism and Issue Preferences

We have hypothesized that policy preferences and, as a result, party choices are increasingly a function of an authoritarian disposition. The reason is because the types of issues that might engage this disposition have come to play a more prominent role on the issue agenda. If issues that did not activate authoritarianism occupied most of our attention, then authoritarianism would have no effect on political outcomes. This is not, however, the case.

We are not suggesting that the potential importance of authoritarianism in the United States is new. In fact, it has a long history. Smith (1997), in a “re-review” of one of the first reviews (his own) of *The Authoritarian Personality*, argued that its insights had clear relevance for the combined charges of communism and homosexuality directed at the State Department (see also Farris 1956; Lane 1955; McCloskey 1958). In the 1960s, race became the defining political issue of the era (Carmines and Stimson 1987). Importantly, authoritarianism has a profound effect on racial attitudes (Sniderman and Piazza 1993), and is, indeed much more influential in explaining stereotypical thinking than commonly cited explanations such as preferences for individualism and egalitarianism (Hurwitz and Peffley 1992). Hence items like McCarthyism (Lipset 1963, Chapter 4) and the presence of race and racialized issues like crime (Mendelberg 2001) and welfare spending (Gilens 1999) on the public agenda would have made authoritarianism important in the past.

If the importance of authoritarianism to politics is situational (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Stenner 2005), the rise of two new sets of issues and the parties’ relatively clear stances on them ought to make authoritarianism all the more influential today.

Placing high value on conformity, authoritarians tend to be staunch defenders of existing norms and mores. The rise of gay rights issues over the last decade certainly threatens one set of “traditional” values and the unity that accompanies it. In addition, authoritarians tend to prefer responses to threat that are more aggressive than those preferred by non-authoritarians. Hence issues involving the use of force versus diplomacy and the strength of the military more generally ought to increase the importance of authoritarianism as well. Fears about terrorism after September 11, 2001 and the best way to combat it, such as the decision to go to war in Iraq as an extension of the war on terror, play into this second dimension.

Dependent Variables

To establish that the emergence of gay rights and issues that focus on the military have the potential to make authoritarianism an important political consideration, we estimate a series of models using data from the 2004 NES. Several dependent variables suit our purposes. Specifically, the NES asked people’s preferences on *Gays in the military*, *Employment protections* for gays and lesbians, *Gay adoption*, and *Gay marriage*. Regarding strength and aggressiveness, the NES asks a number of valuable questions. First, respondents were asked to place themselves on a seven point continuum ranging from favoring diplomatic solutions to favoring *Military intervention* in trouble spots. Authoritarians ought to be more supportive of the use of force. Second, respondents are asked the relative importance of a *Strong military*. Authoritarians, we hypothesize, will favor a stronger military. Finally, we estimate a model for the NES’s *Military feeling thermometer* score, and we expect authoritarians to be warmest.

Independent Variables

We also need to account for other potential causes of these issue preferences in addition to *Authoritarianism*. For the sake of simplicity, we estimate parallel models for each issue domain. Specifically, we first account for a range of social characteristics (*Race, Age, Education, Income, and Gender*). Since authoritarianism is strongly related to one's relationship with church, we also control for a person's church denomination (*Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish*) and whether or not a respondent *Attends church at least weekly*. In addition, *Party identification* and *Ideology* ought to profoundly affect issue preferences, so we include the seven point scales for each as explanatory variables.

Each of the gay rights items is a binary choice, so we employ logistic regression to estimate these models.¹⁰ The three questions about the strength and use of the military are measured on scales that approximate interval scale, so we use ordinary least squares to estimate these models. So that we can more easily compare and interpret the effects of the explanatory variables, particularly in the OLS models, we map all the dependent and independent variables onto (0,1) intervals.

Results

Gay Rights Issues

Table 1 contains the logistic regression estimates for the gay rights agenda items. In each of the models the effect of authoritarianism is not only statistically significant, it

¹⁰ For the gay marriage question, a fairly sizable percentage of respondents volunteered that they supported civil unions. We coded them as not supporting gay marriage. We should add, however, that the results are perfectly consistent if we coded them as supporting the idea that gays and lesbians ought to have at least certain of the rights of married people versus people who did not.

is substantively very large. To demonstrate its substantive effect, we simulate a typical respondent – a Protestant woman who goes to church regularly and is not African American and is “average” in terms of her other characteristics. We use these characteristics for all the simulations in this section. We calculate first differences by varying variables of interest from their minimum to maximum and recording the resultant change in predicted probabilities.

(Table 1 About Here)

Take for instance the effect of authoritarianism on support for protections against job discrimination for gays and lesbians. Moving from minimum authoritarianism to maximum, the predicted probability of supporting such protections decreases from .754 to .429, or .323 points. Substantively, the range of change is important as well because the predicted probability moves from well above .5 for those without authoritarian values to well below .5 for those with the strongest authoritarian values. In other words, with authoritarianism at 0, we would predict this “typical” individual to support protection against discrimination for gays and lesbians. With authoritarianism at 1, however, we would predict this “typical” individual to oppose it.

Authoritarianism’s effect is also large relative to other variables. Compare it with the effect of partisanship, often the most powerful predictor of public opinion and political behavior. If we fix authoritarianism at its mean and keep the other variables as before, we can compare the effect of partisanship with that of authoritarianism. Moving from strong Democrat to strong Republican decreases the probability of supporting protection against discrimination by .214 points. In other words, the effect of authoritarianism is about 50 percent larger than that of partisanship. Ideology has the

largest effect, causing an increase of .353 points across its range, but authoritarianism's effect is almost as large.

Authoritarianism has a large effect on the other gay rights issues as well. We find the same general pattern for support for gay adoption, except that relative to other variables, authoritarianism's effect is largest. In moving from minimum to maximum authoritarianism, the predicted probability of support for gay adoption decreases by .306 points, from .429 to .123, for our "typical" respondent. The change in predicted probability for partisanship and ideological self placement is .164 and .268, respectively.

The effect of authoritarianism on support for gays in the military and gay marriage is also very large. For gays in the military, moving from minimum to maximum authoritarianism increases the probability of support by .233 points, and for gay marriage the effect is .209 points. In both cases, again, the effect of authoritarianism is solidly larger than that for partisanship (.194 for gays in the military and .104 for gay marriage). Although ideology has a somewhat larger effect than authoritarianism in these two models (.296 for gays in the military and .363 for gay marriage), it is worth noting that only five percent of Americans fall into the most extreme categories for ideology. In contrast, nearly a quarter of the sample falls into the most extreme authoritarianism categories. Since authoritarianism has a much larger standard deviation than ideology (.292 versus .215), its effect is on par with that of ideology in these models.

In sum, authoritarianism is at the root of public opinion about the gay rights agenda. As hypothesized, authoritarians are unsupportive of initiatives that benefit gays and lesbians. Political commentators have often identified gay rights as a "wedge" issue, and our analysis confirms this conventional wisdom and extends it by demonstrating

what makes it so. An authoritarian disposition appears to be at the root of the explanation.

Strength and Aggressiveness of Military

We believe the same disposition that is at the heart of opposition to gay rights explains public division on other dimensions, specifically physical threat and what people think is the appropriate response to it. Table 2 presents the results for the series of military-related dependent variables. The results in the first column explore the trade off between diplomacy and the use of military force. As expected, authoritarians are significantly more inclined to favor use of the military over diplomacy. Although the effects of partisanship and ideology are substantially larger, authoritarianism outperforms all the demographic variables with the exception of education.

(Table 2 About Here)

The same pattern emerges when people are asked how important a strong military is to them. These results appear in the second column. It is significantly more important to authoritarians than non-authoritarians, other things being equal. Since all variables are on (0,1) intervals, we can interpret the effect of authoritarianism as follows. Moving from lowest to highest authoritarianism moves a person's preference about 11 percentage points toward a strong military being very important. Its effect is almost identical to that of partisanship, particularly impressive given that a strong defense has been identified with the Republican Party at least since the Reagan era. In this case, authoritarianism outperforms each of the demographic variables.

The final column in Table 2 shows that authoritarians also have more positive affect for the military than non-authoritarians do. Here the dependent variable is the feeling thermometer score for “The Military.” The effect of authoritarianism is about the same size as it was for the strong military question, and, in this case, its effect exceeds that of partisanship and is on par with that of conservatism.¹¹ Again, consistent with the authoritarianism literature, this disposition has a significant and consistent effect on feelings about the use of force and the military more generally.

Authoritarianism and Partisanship

Importantly, gay rights and the role of the military in dealing with external threat have become significantly more important considerations over the past 15 years. In 1992, for instance, gays in the military received some attention during the campaign, but the issue did not occupy center stage. Indeed, gays and lesbians were so unpopular in the minds of ordinary Americans (mean feeling thermometer of 37.73 degrees – nearly 15 degrees less warm than the never very popular welfare recipients), that political leaders embraced the gay rights agenda at great peril. Although Bill Clinton supported gays in the military, it was by no stretch a central issue in his campaign.

In addition, military issues were less significant in this period than in previous decades. The successes of the George H.W. Bush presidency in bringing the Cold War to an end caused political elites to discuss a peace dividend rather than combating foreign

¹¹ As evidence that our theory about when authoritarianism ought to be influential is sound, we estimated a series of models using dependent variables that have nothing to do with changing social mores or responses to threats: support for Bush’s tax cuts, support for privatizing Social Security, and support for school vouchers. Authoritarianism did not affect any of these preferences. We take this as evidence that only certain types of issues trigger the importance of authoritarianism in shaping policy preferences.

threats in the early 1990s. In other words, two of the issues that we argue (and demonstrate above) engage authoritarianism were not particularly important.

By 2004, however, gay rights and military issues had taken center stage. Although still not popular relative to other groups, tolerance for gays and lesbians had increased markedly since the beginning of the Clinton presidency (mean feeling thermometer in 2004 - 48.52 degrees). The Supreme Court's striking down of a Texas sodomy law in 2003, and court rulings on gay marriage in Massachusetts and California certainly placed that issue in the political mix. Moreover, the profile of gays and lesbians in mainstream culture increased substantially. Religious conservatives, in part concerned about gains made by gays and lesbians, increased their role in American public life dramatically (Wilcox 2005), which made gay rights an even more central issue. As far as external threat was concerned, the September 11 terrorist attacks increased fears exponentially. And, of course, the United States subsequently went to war with Iraq and continues to fight an insurgency against the American presence in the region.

Beyond the issues themselves, their partisan implications depend on the response of parties to this changed political environment. If parties stake out similar positions on these new issues, any effect that authoritarianism might have on larger predispositions like party identification will be muted. If party differences are relatively clear, however, the implications can be sizable. Republicans generally staked out clear positions that would generally be attractive to authoritarians. George W. Bush, for example, called for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage, and Republicans played a disproportionately important role in fully 13 states proposing anti-gay marriage ballot initiatives in 2004. As for terrorists, the "Bush Doctrine" emerged after the September 11

terrorist attacks, which called for preemptive war when the U.S. faced serious threat. The Bush Administration also trumpeted their resoluteness in dealing with the Iraqi insurgency through the continued use of force. Drawing down troop levels were most often characterized as a sign of weakness, and bringing other countries into the process was dismissed as a less than credible alternative.

Although Democrats have gone to great pains to appear “tough”, their adopted positions on these issues appear clearly to the left of the Republicans. It was Democrat Bill Clinton who originally championed the official “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy that allowed gays in the military. Although party standard bearers John Kerry and John Edwards in 2004 did not embrace gay marriage, they certainly opposed the constitutional ban proposed by George W. Bush. Even though Bush and Kerry both eventually embraced civil unions, there could be little doubt in the public mind that Democrats were significantly more tolerant of gay lifestyles than were Republicans.¹² The same differences were clear on foreign affairs. Although few Democrats in Washington called for a withdrawal from Iraq since many had voted to give the president free rein in pursuing war in the Gulf, Democratic presidential frontrunner, Howard Dean, opposed the war during the primaries. Among Democrats who thought the U.S. should stay in Iraq, such as John Kerry, their approach focused on building better relationships with Europe (perhaps even France!) and an increased role for the United Nations to help deal

¹² Measuring perceived party differences on the gay rights questions is hard because the NES did not ask respondents to place the parties on any of them. A recent Pew Foundation poll, however, supplies indirect evidence that the public perceives large differences between the parties on these issues. When asked whether each of the parties positions on homosexuality was either “too conservative”, “too liberal”, or “about right”, roughly three times the number of respondents chose “too conservative” over “too liberal” to describe the Republican Party and “too liberal” over “too conservative” to describe the Democratic Party.

with the problem. In other words, diplomacy would be an important tool in the war on terrorism, not just force.¹³

When parties take positions that are clearly different, it makes it easier for ordinary Americans to align their preferences with those of the parties (Carmines and Stimson 1987). The results we presented in the previous section demonstrating that authoritarianism is at the root of preferences about gay rights and preferences about the use of force and the military suggest that authoritarianism should have become an increasingly important predictor of party identification over time.

We test this hypothesis by estimating a model of party identification at several points over time. We focus on non-black respondents. African-Americans are, in fact, the most authoritarian racial group in the U.S. by far.¹⁴ Yet, for obvious historical reasons, they remain an overwhelmingly Democratic group (see also Bartels 2005). Although it is plausible to think that the Republican issue agenda might be attractive to African-Americans in the future, it is a group that is clearly tethered to the Democratic party for now.

Specifically, we regress the seven point *Partisanship* scale on the range of social characteristics, including education (*Some college, College, Graduate School*), *Age*, *Income*, gender (*Female*), race (*Hispanic*) religious denomination (*Protestant, Catholic, Jewish*), and church attendance (*Attend at least weekly*) along with *Authoritarianism*.

Although some might argue that other core values might be appropriate as right hand side variables, all are clearly endogenous to partisanship, and partisanship's effect on them, at

¹³ Whether or not both sides tried at times to obfuscate to some degree on issues of force, it is noteworthy that the public perceives large differences between them. For the defense spending and the military intervention versus diplomacy seven point issue scales, respondents judged Republicans an average of 1.81 and 2.30 points to the right, respectively. Both are highly significant differences.

¹⁴ The mean authoritarianism score for blacks is .75 in 2004. For non-blacks it is .55.

least as they are measured, is much larger than the reverse (Goren 2005). The great advantage of the authoritarianism battery is, in fact, that it asks about child rearing preferences, which are not a specific part of the political dialogue. This allows us to assume, reasonably we believe, exogeneity. Moreover, authoritarianism is a root cause of political predispositions like conservatism (McCloskey 1958), and, as we have shown, a range of new wedge issue preferences.

The NES has only irregularly asked the authoritarianism battery that we use in our analysis, so our inquiry necessarily focuses on three election studies, 1992, 2000, and 2004 NES. The results appear in Table 3. Most important for our purposes is the changing effect of authoritarianism. In 1992, when gay rights occupied a very small part of the issue agenda and terrorism was not on it at all, the effect of authoritarianism was statistically significant, but its effect was relatively small. The presence of race, another issue that engages an authoritarian disposition (Sniderman and Tetlock 1993) and so called family values issues, probably account for the significant result. In 2000, the effect of authoritarianism had increased somewhat from .078 to .115.

(Table 3 About Here)

Of course, external threat increased exponentially after September 11, 2001. And threat of a different sort increased as well with the national dialogue about the propriety of gay marriage in 2003 and 2004. As a result, we find that the effect of authoritarianism essentially doubles in the short four years between Bush's election and re-election, from .115 to .225. Since all the variables are mapped onto (0,1) intervals, these effects can be interpreted easily. In 2004, when one moves from least to most authoritarian, placement on the party identification scale moves in a Republican direction by .225 points, or nearly

a full quarter of the scale's range. In 2000, a similar change in authoritarianism yielded a change of only about .115, or a little under an eighth of the scales range. And, of course, in 1992, moving across the range of authoritarianism only moved partisanship by about .078 points.

It is not just that this increase in effect is impressive. The effect of authoritarianism relative to other variables is at least as impressive. Although class as measured by income has become an increasingly important predictor of party identification (Stonecash 2000), the effect of authoritarianism is somewhat larger than that of income by 2004. In our analysis, income is divided into roughly equal \$20,000 intervals. Its estimate of .178 means that, in moving from a respondent whose family makes less than \$20,000 a year to one whose family makes more than \$105,000 a year, partisanship moves by about 18 percentage points in a Republican direction. Authoritarianism's effect is somewhat larger. Indeed, only the effect of being Jewish, relative to not belonging to a religious faith, has a larger effect on partisanship than does authoritarianism in 2004.

Also noteworthy for our purposes is the waning effect of education. To allow for non-linearity, we included dummy variables for those who reported attending some college, those who reported graduating from college, and those who reported having completed some graduate education. The reference category is those who reported a high school education or less. Scholars have consistently found the most and least well educated tend to prefer the Democrats while those in between prefer the Republicans. This was indeed the case in 1992, as we find positive and significant effects for those with some college and those with college degrees. These differences become

significantly smaller in 2000. And, by 2004, education differences in party identification completely disappear, a point we take up below.

In sum, we have shown thus far that authoritarianism is an important component in attitudes about issues new to the political agenda, such as gay rights, and issues about the use of force, which are increasingly important in a post-9/11 world. As these threat inducing considerations have become more central to politics and the parties have taken at least largely opposing positions on them, authoritarianism's effect on partisanship has surged. Our models of partisanship suggests it was nearly three times as important in 2004 as it was in 1992 and nearly twice as important as it was in 2000.

Authoritarianism and Change in Partisanship

In addition to having a substantial impact on partisanship today, we believe that the increased importance of authoritarianism has been a boon to Republicans, specifically. The mean authoritarian disposition score in the 2004 sample was .552 among non-blacks, which is solidly to the more authoritarian side of the midpoint. Moreover, during the period when authoritarianism has become more important, Republican party identification has increased markedly. In 1992, for example, 36 percent of Americans identified themselves as either strong or weak Democrats while only 25 percent identified themselves as either strong or weak Republicans, an 11 point Democratic advantage. In 2004, however, only 32 percent called themselves Democrats while 29 percent called themselves Republicans, a three point Democratic edge.

One hint of the potential importance of authoritarianism in explaining partisan change is that it is being fueled by the less well educated. Using data from the NES's

2000-2004 panel study, Table 4 tracks mean levels of partisanship of four different education groups among non-black respondents. Again, we focus on non-black respondents because of blacks' continued overwhelming support the Democratic party. To the extent that a Republican drift is occurring, it is among non-African Americans.

(Table 4 About Here)

As the data in Table 4 show, Republican gains have come from people with a high school education or less. Since the partisanship scale runs from strong Democrat at the low end to strong Republican at the high end, positive numbers correspond to increased Republican identification over the period. While a statistically significant change of .087 points occurred in the sample as a whole, only the .209 point shift among those with a high school education or less is significant among the education subgroups. The differences in partisanship for the other groups failed to approach statistical significance.

(Table 3 About Here)

It is unlikely that less well educated people would change their partisanship just because they are less well educated. Certain characteristics among the less well educated are likely at play. An authoritarian disposition is a particularly compelling possibility because those with low levels of education are significantly more authoritarian, a consistent finding dating back to the origins of survey research (e.g. Janowitz and Marvick 1953; Lane 1955). Using our measure of authoritarianism mapped onto a (0,1) interval, non-blacks with a high school education or less have an average authoritarian score of .69. Those who attended some college or more have an average authoritarianism score of .51, an 18 percentage point difference.

To test whether authoritarianism is among the factors fueling the recent Republican drift in partisanship, we use the 2000-2004 panel data to estimate a model of partisan change over this period. Our dependent variable is partisanship in 2004. We use the same explanatory variables as those in the cross-sectional models of party identification estimated above except that we use measures of these variables taken in 2000. In addition, we also include respondents' reported partisanship in 2000 as an explanatory variable. With the lagged partisanship term on the right hand side of the regression, variables that achieve statistical significance can be interpreted as having caused a change in partisanship between 2000 and 2004.

The results of this analysis appear in Table 5, and they suggest the importance of authoritarianism in understanding the recent increase in Republican identification. Its effect is statistically significant. Relative to those who score at the minimum the authoritarianism scale, those who score at the maximum moved .062 points in a Republican direction, other things being equal. A number of other variables are also significant predictors of change in partisanship. Those who are younger are significantly more likely to have moved toward the Republicans than those who are older. Consistent with the conventional wisdom, church attendance is also very important. Those who attend church weekly or more than weekly moved more toward the Republicans than those who attend church less frequently. Being Hispanic also mattered. Hispanics were less likely to move in a Republican direction than non-blacks of other racial backgrounds.

Conclusion

We provide strong evidence that inattention to an authoritarian disposition in the study of American politics comes at a great cost. Our results show a particularly strong relationship between authoritarian attitudes as operationalized in terms of child rearing preferences and both antipathy toward the gay rights agenda and favoring strong military solutions. The gay rights agenda challenges long-standing social norms, or, to use Lakoff's terms, the monolithic authority of the father. The authoritarian preference for a strong aggressive military in the face of external threat is also very clear in the data.¹⁵

Our results make clear that the presence of issues that engage the authoritarian disposition has broader political implications. As these issues have come to occupy a larger part of the political agenda, authoritarianism is increasingly important in sorting people into parties. This is true in examining cross-sectional data over time. Indeed an authoritarian disposition has an effect on partisanship in 2004 that is even greater than that of income among non-blacks. In addition, authoritarianism also helps explain the recent Republican gains in partisanship. Using panel data, we show that the Republican party has benefited from this new way of organizing politics.

The fact that an authoritarian disposition is now a defining cleavage in partisan choice is certainly normatively troubling. A liberal democracy is founded on principles of tolerance. Yet decades of survey research confirm that authoritarians are significantly less tolerant than non-authoritarians. Our results, of course, show that they are less tolerant of differences in sexual orientation. But this is also true of tolerance for people of different races, religions, and ethnicities. To reiterate, we do not claim here that there

¹⁵ Moreover these two issues are not the only ones that authoritarianism helps explain. The same is true of issues that have been on the political agenda for years, including racial policy preference, abortion, and capital punishment (reference deleted). We focus on the two clusters of new issues in our analysis here because we believe their emergence has served to increase the importance of authoritarianism over time.

is a general increase in such intolerance in America today. However, the fact that this disposition is increasingly central to determining key issue positions and partisanship itself raises the disturbing possibility that the political system is sorting itself along lines premised on fundamentally opposed and arguably irreconcilable worldviews. The potential consequences of this new rift, though beyond the scope this analysis, raise disturbing questions about the solidity of the consensus on tolerance that has been at the heart of normative defenses of democracy in America.

The increased importance of an authoritarian disposition on partisanship coincides with a period when people are more strongly tied to their partisanship than in previous decades. The test-retest correlation between partisanship as measured in 2002 and partisanship measured in 2004 is significantly higher than that taken from previous panel studies conducted by the NES. In the 1974-76 panel, this test-retest correlation was .72. In the 1990-92 panel, it had increased to .80. In the 2002-2004 panel, it has increased even further to .88. People have become less tractable in their political dispositions. We believe that the centrality of a core disposition like authoritarianism is an important part of the explanation.

In that sense, our results are significant both as an insight into what drives public opinion dynamics in the United States and because it suggests that the growing polarization in American politics may reflect fundamental dispositional orientations to politics and authority. It further suggests that polarization may be persistent and sustain an increasingly intense and acrimonious political divide. Differences in policy preferences on some of the key issues of the day may go far beyond disagreements over

policy choices and even ideology, to core self-understandings of what it means to be a good person and to the basis of a moral society.

Recently, Alford, Funk and Hibbing (2005) have examined the relationship between genes and political orientations. The authors found no compelling relationships between individual personality traits and various kinds of political attitudes. However, they speculated that there might exist a more proximally relevant personality construct – what they call “social personality.” To get away from the individual level bent of most survey questions, Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005) suggest using questions such as “Does society work best when people go their own way rather than follow the rules?”

We do not, of course, explore the heritability of any of the measures we discuss here. However, it is worth considering the possibility that an authoritarian disposition comes as close to the concept of “social personality” as we are currently likely to find – a set of attitudes that tap deeply held notions of the proper foundations of social life that, in turn, would form a revealing basis for understanding people’s attitudes on specific political questions. Regardless of whether an authoritarian disposition is properly understood as central to a social personality, we believe we have demonstrated that it provides a compelling explanation for the key attitudinal shifts that have shaped American politics over the past twelve years. Consequently, our results suggest that authoritarian disposition ought to occupy a central place in scholars’ understanding of contemporary political dynamics in America.

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Table 1
Support for Gay Rights Agenda Items as a Function of Authoritarianism, Symbolic Attitudes, and Social Characteristics, 2004, Logistic Regression Estimates

Variable	Gays in the Military	Employment Protections	Gay Adoption	Gay Marriage
	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)
Intercept	2.360*** (0.408)	3.116*** (0.399)	2.014*** (0.350)	2.742*** (0.394)
Authoritarianism	-0.998** (0.351)	-1.405*** (0.331)	-1.673*** (0.297)	-1.687*** (0.326)
Party Identification	-0.810** (0.315)	-0.886** (0.292)	-0.964*** (0.280)	-0.965*** (0.316)
Ideology	-1.273** (0.501)	-1.519*** (0.473)	-1.406*** (0.449)	-2.890*** (0.516)
Female	0.793*** (0.180)	0.227 (0.165)	0.495*** (0.156)	0.074 (0.173)
Black	-0.026 (0.271)	0.066 (0.255)	-0.634** (0.241)	-0.627* (0.270)
Income	1.050*** (0.312)	0.465* (0.285)	0.073 (0.261)	-0.367 (0.291)
Education	0.757* (0.359)	0.544* (0.332)	1.215*** (0.310)	1.417*** (0.349)
Age	-0.320 (0.378)	-0.691* (0.357)	-1.030** (0.342)	-1.845*** (0.394)
Attend Church at Least Weekly	-0.514** (0.201)	-0.408* (0.190)	-0.751*** (0.201)	-0.445* (0.245)
Protestant	-0.525** (0.208)	-0.539** (0.191)	-0.536** (0.190)	-1.041*** (0.237)
Catholic	-0.059 (0.252)	0.237 (0.238)	0.168 (0.212)	-0.341 (0.234)
Jewish	0.870 (1.123)	0.533 (0.841)	0.638 (0.685)	1.127* (0.675)
Cox and Snell R ²	0.12	0.14	0.24	0.30
Number of Cases	931	931	931	908

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, one tailed tests

Source: American National Election Study, 2004

Table 2
Strength and Punishment Preferences as a Function of Authoritarianism, Symbolic Attitudes, and Social Characteristics, 2004, Logistic and OLS Regression Estimates

Variable	Military Intervention	Strong Military	Military Feeling Thermometer
	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)	Param. Est. (<i>Std. Err.</i>)
Intercept	0.307*** (0.036)	0.596*** (0.031)	0.581*** (0.028)
Authoritarianism	0.057* (0.032)	0.113*** (0.028)	0.115*** (0.025)
Party Identification	0.265** (0.030)	0.112*** (0.026)	0.077** (0.024)
Ideology	0.148** (0.047)	0.220*** (0.041)	0.125** (0.037)
Female	-0.041** (0.017)	-0.019 (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)
Black	-0.001 (0.026)	0.013 (0.023)	-0.046* (0.021)
Income	0.008 (0.028)	0.004 (0.024)	0.044* (0.022)
Education	-0.159*** (0.033)	-0.074** (0.029)	-0.098*** (0.026)
Age	0.048 (0.036)	0.065* (0.032)	0.132*** (0.029)
Attend Church at Least Weekly	-0.028 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.018)	0.005 (0.017)
Protestant	0.019 (0.021)	0.008 (0.018)	0.033* (0.016)
Catholic	0.021 (0.023)	0.022 (0.020)	0.027 (0.018)
Jewish	0.029 (0.057)	0.041 (0.049)	-0.032 (0.046)
Adjusted R ²	0.21	0.16	0.17
Number of Cases	931	929	921

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, one tailed tests

Source: American National Election Study, 2004

Table 3
Partisanship as a Function of Authoritarianism and Social Characteristics, 2000-2004, Non-Black Respondents

Variable	1992 Param. Est. (Std. Err.)	2000 Param. Est. (Std. Err.)	2004 Param. Est. (Std. Err.)
Intercept	0.366*** (0.031)	0.380*** (0.039)	0.367*** (0.045)
Authoritarianism	0.078** (0.029)	0.115*** (0.037)	0.225*** (0.045)
Female	-0.047** (0.016)	-0.058** (0.020)	-0.053* (0.024)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.019 (0.030)	-0.059 (0.045)	-0.132** (0.045)
Income	0.196*** (0.029)	0.156*** (0.034)	0.178*** (0.039)
Education (Some College)	0.055** (0.020)	0.045* (0.025)	0.037 (0.030)
Education (College)	0.106*** (0.024)	0.043 (0.029)	0.051 (0.035)
Education (Graduate School)	-0.010 (0.033)	-0.007 (0.037)	-0.017 (0.042)
Age	-0.064* (0.035)	-0.143** (0.048)	-0.150** (0.054)
Attend Church at Least Weekly	0.072*** (0.019)	0.099*** (0.024)	0.045 (0.031)
Protestant	0.071*** (0.020)	0.086*** (0.024)	0.122*** (0.030)
Catholic	-0.075*** (0.023)	-0.013 (0.026)	0.006 (0.032)
Jewish	-0.191*** (0.059)	-0.204*** (0.082)	-0.256*** (0.076)
Adjusted R ²	0.10	0.09	0.12
Number of Cases	1644	1159	796

* p<.05, ** p<.10, ***p<.001 – one tailed tests

Source: American National Election Studies, 1992, 2000, 2004

Table 4
Change in Partisanship by Education, Non-Blacks, 2004-2000

Level of Education	Mean Difference	Standard Deviation	p-value	Number of Cases
High School or Less	0.209	1.347	.010	230
Some College	0.026	1.235	.375	229
College	0.037	1.199	.327	192
Graduate School	0.046	1.035	.323	110
All	0.087	1.236	.027	761

Source: American National Election Studies, 2000-2004 Panel Study

Table 5
Change in Partisanship as a Function of Authoritarianism and Social Characteristics, 2000-2004, Non-Black Respondents

Variable	Parameter Estimate (Standard Error)
Intercept	0.070 (0.037)
Partisanship in 2000	0.879*** (0.024)
Authoritarianism	0.062* (0.031)
Female	-0.014 (0.017)
Race (Hispanic)	-0.079* (0.044)
Income	0.043 (0.029)
Education (Some College)	-0.034 (0.022)
Education (College)	-0.046* (0.025)
Education (Graduate School)	-0.037 (0.030)
Age	-0.096* (0.045)
Attend Church at Least Weekly	0.074*** (0.020)
Protestant	-0.009 (0.020)
Catholic	0.004 (0.023)
Jewish	0.022 (0.060)
Adjusted R ²	0.72
Number of Cases	600

* p<.05, ** p<.10, ***p<.001 – one tailed tests

Source: American National Election Studies, 1992, 2000, 2004