To What Extent Are Students Free?
Book Banning and Student Expression
Amina Arifi-Osman, Meghan Price, Erica Schauber, and David Zaro
"The American Library Association's 14th annual Banned Books Resource
Guide reported that in
1994 and 1995, at least 179 instances of book banning occurred in U.S.
public schools."(Taylor,
163). Over the years, school districts have banned everything
from fairy tales to dictionaries for
content, as well as student speeches and publications, even student
actions. Usually the authorities
object to the viewpoints that the form of expression provides the students
in the school. Many
factors must be explored to fully understand the court decisions regarding
constitutionality and
precedent setting of situations involving the range of the First Amendment
in the public elementary
and secondary institutions, including schools as public forums, the
individual rights of students and
prior restraint.
In answering to what extent students in the United States public
school systems have a right to the
First Amendment, one must explore four monumental cases in the progression
of student activity and
school board direction. Consideration should be most directed
at the precedents set forth in Tinker
v. Des Moines School District 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Board of Education
v. Pico 457 U.S. 853
(1982), Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser 478 U.S. 675 (1986),
and Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260 (1988). The progression of
law through these particular cases
sets forth the underlying theme concerning the permitted level of judicial
intervention in constitutional
issues surrounding the First Amendment and students in public institutions.
As will be shown in the
following case summaries, freedom of speech in the public education
realm encompasses many
different areas, including speech, literature, symbols and publications.
Two consistent issues will
arise throughout the discussion of all the cases: permitting students
to engage in different forms of free
speech and encouraging conduct that tests the limits afforded to individuals
by the First Amendment.
In 1969, Justice Fortas delivered the opinion of the Supreme
Court in the decision of Tinker v. Des
Moines School District. This case is the first landmark
case concerning the freedom of speech and
expression within a private secondary school, to reach the Supreme
Court status. The parties
involved included two high school students, John F. Tinker and Christopher
Eckhardt, in addition to
Tinker younger sister, Mary Beth, still an enrolled student in a junior
high school, as the petitioners,
and the Des Moines School District, the respondents. The
complaint was first filed in the United
States District Court, where the complaint was dismissed. Following
the dismissal, the case was
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit, where the case
was considered, en banc, and
the lower court's decision was affirmed. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari.
In order to protest the occurrences of the Vietnam War, a group
of young adults, including the
petitioners, and adults gathered to devise a plan of attack to publicly
denounce proceedings. In
December 1965, the group decided to ban together and don black armbands
to express their
disgust and support for a truce. When the community and especially
the principals of the two
schools that the teenagers attended, heard of the protest, they devised
a policy that banned the
public display of the armbands in the institutions, and attached the
punishment of suspension through
non-compliance. The petitioners were aware of the policy
and disciplinary actions, yet proceeded
to don armbands into their respective schools, and move through the
punishment until January 1,
1966. The legal question that stems from the developments
is whether or not the actions taken by
the petitioners are protected under the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, or the Public
School administration has the power to demand compliance.
The Supreme Court reversed the previous decision, determining
that the expression of political
viewpoints in this manner is protected under the amendment. The
majority reached the decision in
the utilization of many developed reasons. First, in wearing
armbands, the petitioners were quiet
and passive. They were not disruptive, and did not infringe upon the
rights of others. In these
circumstances, their conduct was within the protection of the Free
Speech Clause of the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. It is
deemed that, in this particular case,
the act in question does not impede the work of the classroom nor did
the District Court prove so,
as was early set as the standard for restricting personal freedom of
expression, Burnside v. Byars
363 F. 2d 744 (1966).
In addition to the absence of chaos, another reason for reversing
the decision involves the
guaranteed First Amendment rights available to teachers and students,
subject to application in light
of the special characteristics of the school environment. The
justices established a close comparison
to that of "pure speech" with the action in question, that may not
be regulated by any school official.
These rights are guaranteed in a fundamental right, which is mandatory
for the State to honor. The
Court goes further to state that the freedom of speech is not just
a mantle piece for our country but
rather must be a worn toy for the country to engage in, including children
in public school systems.
The Court affirmed that the "Constitution does not permit officials
of the State to deny their form of
expression," in other words, the school administrators. In the
dissenting opinion, Justice Black
expresses genuine concerns relating to the power that the judgment
draws from the local school
district and reallocates to the courts, while testing the importance
of authority and laying power to
students and court decisions, not the administrators of the systems.
The rule established in this case,
that freedom of expression may not substantially interfere with the
actions and curriculum of the
school continues throughout the following cases, though the responsibility
of the school's
administrators and board shifts dramatically from the decision Tinker.
Following the precedent set in Tinker for many years, the next
grand scale case that established a
principle for the protection of students under the First Amendment
is found in a decision rendered by
Justice Brennan in 1982 in the case, Board of Education v. Pico 457
U.S. 853. First a decision
regarding the case was presented in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New
York where the court granted summary in favor of the petitioners, on
the basis of conservative
educational philosophies, yet the decision was reversed by a three-judged
panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The appeal was
presented before the Supreme Court in
1982 for review.
The petitioners, the Board of Education of the Island Trees Union
Free School in New York and
numerous parents, gave permission to remove nine books from both a
high school and junior high
school library for "objectionable" and "improper fare for school students."
Pico, 457. These books
were then presented to a Book Review Committee for final decision of
availability in the school
libraries. Though the committee devised a redistribution plan
of most of the material, the petitioners
ignored the suggestions, thereby inciting the respondents, five students
from both schools, to take
action for their constitutional liberties. The respondents, including
Steven Pico, accused the
petitioners of reclaiming the books for individual political and social
convictions, ergo suppressing the
student's First Amendment rights. The question that arises in
light of these facts is whether or not it is
unconstitutional for a local school board to remove books from public
schools libraries on basis of
personal choice.
The Justices arrive at a decision through careful analysis, yet
based on certain ideals, including the
right to receive information, the right to exercise free expression
and the right to free choice. In
addition, concerning the focus of a public school library, the Justices
layer their discussions with the
basis of content and curriculum. According
to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)(see
also First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978)),
"the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas." This statement provides
a strong basis for the respondents'
call to allow all books to be placed in the public school library.
Along the same lines, following the
right to receive information is the right to exercise one's individual
opinions according to the Court.
Thirdly, the Court establishes that the uses of the public libraries
in the school district in question are
on a completely voluntary basis. This affords the student the
most important right of all, the right of
choice, including self-education and development as the Court points
out.
Besides, holding to the importance of maintaining these Constitutional
rights, the Justices understand
the importance of the school board's role in of determining the content
of the libraries, yet in this
particular situation, is believed by the Court to be, "exercised in
a narrowly partisan or political
manner."Pico, 388. The opinion establishes that a parties attempt
to remove unsatisfying theories
from an individual is unconstitutional.
In dissenting form, Chief Justice Burger questions the reasoning
of the plurality on two basic
subjects, the administration of local schools and the play of morality
on issues of public libraries while
disagreeing with the thought that restrictions are placed on the students.
Burger believes that the
power is being taken away from the individuals who should be making
the decisions concerning the
abolishment of books in school libraries, the local school districts.
As the dissent expresses, the
school board only fills its position when portraying the ideals of
its constituents. The second question
established by Burger is the determination of content-based curriculum,
where is the line drawn in
conclusion? Lastly, he states that students' rights are
not restricted when the public libraries and
bookstores continue to hold the literature in question.
Building upon both the dissenting opinions stemming from Justice
Black in Tinker, and Chief Justice
Burger in Pico, in 1986, the Supreme Courts opinion in Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v Fraser, 478
U.S.675, granted more liberty to the administration to restrict student
actions, yet basically only in
curriculum and progress deterring content situations. The
first decision regarding Bethel was found
in Federal District Court where the respondent was originally found
to be restricted
unconstitutionally, as did the Court of Appeals in a second view.
Yet upon third review, from the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari, the previous decision that
found the school sanctions
constitutional in nature.
The respondent gave a nomination speech that was considered by
many very sexually explicit and
foul in nature in front of an audience of approximately 600 high school
students. Though the student
was warned by numerous faculty members, he proceeded with his oration,
which according to many
counselors and teachers shocked and embarrassed the audience of students.
According to these
individuals, the speech ended in disruption from the entire plan of
the school day. The Assistant
Principal suspended the young man for three days and prohibited his
name from being placed on the
ballot for graduation speaker. The student believes that
he is protected under the First Amendment
from such a punishment regarding an expressive speech, while the school
believes it was maintaining
order in a situation of chaos.
The Supreme Court opinion of 1986, reversed the previous
decisions, establishing that the school
did have the right to limit such speech and punish the respondent in
such a manner. The stated
conduct code at Bethel High School reads, "Conduct which materially
and substantially interferes
with the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene,
profane language." Bethel,
676. The speech given by the respondent most definitely
violated this code of conduct. The Court
establishes the difference in wearing the armband in Tinker and the
obscene speech given by the
respondent as the difference in a passive expression of ideals, creating
no disruption. In addition,
the Court decides in Bethel, that the appropriateness of speech may
be determined by the school
board according to the "shared values of a civilized social order."
Bethel, 680. Upon decision of the
opinion, the Court decided that because a school must be able to discipline
a wide array of juvenile
pranks, the code of conduct may not be as established, thereby allowing
for the punishment of not
speaking at graduation. The establishment of authority to the
school board based on disruptive
content established in Bethel leads into the most recent precedent
setting case Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
After the first decision by the District Court which denied an
injunction to the respondents, three
former Hazelwood High school students, the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision stating that the
decisions of the petitioners infringed upon the constitutional rights
of the students, respondents. In
1988, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision
once again in favor of the
educators and the order of the school system.
The respondents brought forth the issue that the school newspaper
had been subject to the
censorship of articles by the faculty and administrative editorial
staff. Publication of the newspaper
was funded by the school board, yet it was student run through a journalism
class. Upon submittal
to the principle for approval, he objected to two stories, one concerning
pregnancy because of
identification reasons, and the other regarding divorce and the lack
of unbiased reporting. Though
the District Court upheld the school's actions, the Court of Appeals
found that the newspaper was a
public forum, open for free discussion and expression.
Reasons for the decision of the Supreme Court include that the
school newspaper was in fact not a
public forum, but rather an active curriculum for developing journalists,
where as determined before
may be regulated by school officials. The school had not yet
opened the newspaper to the general
public, therefore the Court determined that this particular arena was
not a public forum for all forms
of freedom of expression. In addition, the Court upheld the schools
policy of not restricting
responsible journalism. According to numerous experts, the reporting
was neither safe nor unbiased,
ergo unrespectable as journalism. The school administrators,
as an educational experience held the
censorship of the newspaper and according to the Court, this is reasonable.
When considering the issues surrounding students rights in public schools,
one of the most important
questions that the courts have had to decide, is whether public schools
are considered public
forums. Further, they have had to decide what types of restrictions
on the freedom of speech are
appropriate in such forums. In 1992, the Supreme Court decided
two important cases that impact
these issues.
One of the cases is The International Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc. v. Lee and Lee v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992), 112 S. Ct. 2709
(1992), 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992). In this case, the Krishnas wanted
to be able to solicit patrons in
an airport owned and operated by city of Port Authority. However,
the Port Authority passed
regulation prohibiting the Krishnas from such actions. The Krishnas
believed that the First
Amendment of free speech enabled them to conduct their solicitation,
in this public airport. The
Supreme Court decided this case using a “forum-based” approach,
to determine what restrictions
the government can place on its property. See Cornelius v. NAACP
Legal Defense and Educational
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985). The courts decided there
are traditional public
forums-where the property had a “principal purpose…of the free exchange
of ideas.” (Cornelius, at
802). The second category of public property is “the designated
public forum, whether of a limited
ore unlimited character-property that the state has opened fore expressive
activity by part or all of
the public” (ISKON, thru Van Alstyne, at 523). The Court said
that regulations of speech in these
two forums are subject to the highest scrutiny; and that any regulations
must be narrowly drawn to
serve a compelling state interest. Then there was all remaining
public property, or non-public
forums. Regulations on these forums need only be reasonable,
and are not strictly scrutinized. Thus,
the Court clearly established the different standards for government
owned property. They also go
further and cite Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), that “the government
has the power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated,” and “a public
forum is not created whenever members of the public are permitted freely
to visit a place owned or
operated by the Government” (Greer, at 836, thru Van Alstyne, at 524).
In the case of Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S.
123 (1992), the court pointed
out another distinction regarding the limitations placed on speech,
allowable by the government, in
public places. The case was about fees charged for certain groups
to conduct a march
commemorating the birthday Martin Luther King Jr, The Court upheld
that the government could
place time, place, and manner restrictions on speech. See U.S.
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, (1983).
However, the restriction may not be based on the content of the message,
it must be narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and must leave
open alternatives for
communication (Forsyth, thru Van Alstyne, at 474).
The forum analysis in conjunction with the time, place, and manner
restrictions, have refined the
definitions of public forums. In an analysis by Van Alstyne,
he explains that this refinement identifies
a special significance to the place to which a particular restriction
of access, and of forum use, is
linked. “It permits significantly greater discretion of public
regulation of what may (and also what
may not) be expressed in some places than in others, and a significantly
greater public discretion of
who may (and also of who may not) be permitted to share access and
first amendment use of
particular governmentally managed facilities (481).
Having established the conditions surrounding public forums,
it is now important to look at the
decisions the Court has made regarding the status of public schools
as public forums. It would be
quite natural to assume that government owned and run, public schools
would be considered
traditional public forums. This would mean that they would have
to have compelling state interests to
enforce restrictions on any speech of the students, teachers, etc.
The Courts did not see this as a
way for the state to provide education to its youth.
One of the landmark cases regarding the freedom of speech in
public schools discussed above is
Tinker v. Des Moines School District. This case appeared to favor
the rights of the students over
the decisions of school officials. The Tinker Court points out
a very important decision of the courts
“It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker, thru Van Alstyne,
at 280). Further the Court
says that, “In our system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves
of totalitarianism. School
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students” (282).
The Court does not make clear
whether or not, public schools are to be considered public forums.
However, from these statements
and the ruling of the court, it could certainly be considered that
they were leaning in that direction.
In 1982, in the case Board of Education v. Pico, the Court appears
to be moving away from
considering public schools public forums. Even though the Court
rules that the books not be
removed from the library, some important points are made in the dissents
to the ruling. “the plurality
pays homage to the ancient verity th>
In revealing the limited scope of a public school as a public forum,
only half of an argument is
established. In addition to the restrictions that the school
building and physical school environment
dictates, the scope of a student’s First Amendment rights to
the freedom of speech depends upon
their status as a minor and position as a pupil within a place of learning.
The government does not
grant full rights or guarantees of the freedom of expression
to students within the school setting. As
educator, the government desires to impart knowledge and training to
the young with as little
distraction as possible. Generally, the educational system cannot
limit or curtail the First Amendment
rights of its students, but the courts have found it a necessary tool
for schools to retain the right to
exercise control over otherwise protected speech within the educational
system in order to maintain
a proper and cultivating learning environment for America’s youth.
Freedom of Expression within the Schoolhouse Gate
It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate ...@(Tinker, at Van Alstyne
280)
In the landmark case, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the Supreme
Court upheld the rights of a group of students to wear armbands on
school grounds as a means of
protesting the Vietnam War. The Tinker Court makes a bold statement
in qualifying the rights of
individuals within the schoolhouse gate. But indeed, within a school
setting, the rights of adults as well
as those of students are qualified by the operational needs of the
schools.(Valente, 277) Further, The
First Amendment rights of students are not coextensive with those of
adults. To a significant extent,
students are at the mercy of their school officials: those official’s
anticipations of disruption, their
views of what causes psychological harm, and their beliefs as to the
proper nature of a learning
environment. The scale, in determining the question of student’s rights
to free speech, weighs the
importance of the schoolhouse in providing an educational forum for
the purposes of indoctrination
or the maintenance of a marketplace of ideas.
Symbolic Speech and Political Expression
It is within the realm of symbolic speech and political expression
that students initially gained First
Amendment protections. These first qualifications are hard to
interpret practically, though. Tinker
provides that symbolic or political expression cannot be infringed
upon by school officials, unless that
infringement rests on a cause that is of greater value than a dissatisfaction
or disagreement with the
speech’s intended message. The Tinker Court refuses to uphold
any limitation of speech in the
schools that is based upon a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.(Tinker, at Van Alstyne 281) The Court
also sets forth a
forecast rule. The greater value mentioned above, is qualified as an
evidenced forecast of speech that
would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements
of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school,(Tinker, at Van Alstyne 281). In this way,
the opinion of the Tinker Court
provides that situations, in which an individual claims infringement
of his First Amendment rights,
those liberties cannot be looked at in a vacuum. The extent
of the interference with the institution’s
work must be weighed against the backdrop of all circumstances confronting
it. The courts have
held, though, that it is the burden of the educational system to bring
evidence justifying a reasonable
forecast of material interference,(Scoville v. Board of Education,
425 F.2d 10 (7th Circuit)(1970).
Mere allegations and empty arguments have not been sanctioned by the
courts.
Subsequent Cases Limit Tinker’s Findings
The cases that followed Tinker do not provide wide or well supported
guarantees of First
Amendment rights to free speech for students. The Hazelwood and Bethel
cases expressly limit the
Tinker standard to expression that is not of pedagogical concern.
The Court’s opinion, in these
cases, echoes wording found within Tinker that limit its protections
to expression that is not found to
be disruptive. Such wording is found when the Tinker Court relates
its reasoning for ruling in favor
of the group of students; The Court found that the student’s expression
does not concern aggressive,
disruptive action and does not interfere with a school’s work or the
rights of other students (Tinker,
at Van Alstyne 280). The disruption question raises problems
in terms of defining the extent of
physical and/or psychological harm that must be anticipated or created
in order to deem that speech
as unprotected within the gates of the schoolhouse.
The Court seems to conclude that when pedagogical concern in involved,
the Tinker doctrine no
longer stands as applicable. Student speech that reflects inappropriateness
and/or expression
inconsistent with educational objectives, namely, The fostering of
an elevated, respectful level of
discourse in the school, is found to be immune from First Amendment
protections.(Valente, 278)
The Bethel Court narrows a student’s right to free speech in the way
of simply requiring a
reasonableness standard. The necessity of proving a threat of
disruption is no longer the case. A
speech-limiting action need only be reasonable. Speech that is
otherwise subject to strict scrutiny,
finds itself restricted to what is deemed to be sensible by school
administrators.
The Hazelwood Court upheld the more general qualifications found in
the Bethel case. Although
heavily relying on a public forum analysis in its decision to uphold
the censorship of unsuitable articles
found within a school newspaper, the Hazelwood Court also determined
that editorial control would
be held as permissible as long as the speech in question was reasonably
related to pedagogical
concerns. The Hazelwood analysis also broadened the category of student
expression under
curriculum to include school plays, publications, and other school-sponsored
activities. Both the
Bethel and Hazelwood cases have tilted the see-saw of freedom to order
in the guise of deference to
school administration.
Students may still argue for their free speech protections and it is
still the burden of the school to
justify its actions, but student’s are indeed limited by their youth.
Applying the Standards
The issues surrounding a student’s First Amendment rights come to a
head in the banning of library
materials. Public schools are generally considered a non-public forum
because they are restricted to
enrolled students. However, the Supreme Court case of Tinker
v. Des Moines 393 U.S. 503
(1969) held that students do not lose their First Amendment rights
when they enter school property.
On the other hand, the case additionally stated that school officials
can suppress any student
expression that disrupts the normal functioning of the school or that
violates the rights of others. This
presents a dilemma for school boards and administrators, who must make
certain that their decisions
concerning the removal of literature are content-neutral.
The case at the heart of this issue is Board of Education v. Pico 457
U.S. 853 (1982). This Supreme
Court case involved the removal of books by a local school board from
junior high school and high
school libraries, and whether or not their actions were in violation
of the First Amendment. The
Court found that the removal of the books did in fact violate the First
Amendment rights of the
students. Justice Brennan who wrote the majority opinion, was able
to sum up the reasoning of the
majority decision of the Court by stating in Pico at 386 that First
Amendment rights of students may
be directly and sharply implicated by the removal of books from the
shelves of a school library.
However, the Pico court did not entirely take away the rights of the
school board administrators. It
was made clear that the school board was not being stripped of their
responsibility to maintain
authority and discretion over the students. The decision simply required
that the school boards make
decisions that are consistent with the First Amendment rights of their
students.
Another interesting factor that is related to the Pico decision is
in the intent with which the decisions
are made by the school boards. One of the most important determinations
in a case of book removal
in schools is the reasoning behind the decision. According to the Pico
case, it is unconstitutional for a
school board member to make decisions that are intended to deny students
access to certain
literature as a result of personal disagreements. This qualification
echoes the Tinker Court’s refusal to
uphold limitations on a student’s freedom of speech on the basis of
mere dissatisfaction or dislike of
the intended message. Also, if it is found that a school board
member made a decision based upon
personal preference, it then needs to be determined whether or not
their personal intent was the
decisive factor of the decision. It was further noted by Justice Brennan
that removal of literature is
only allowed if there is substantial proof that the decisions made
by the school board members are
based on either inappropriate language within the literature or the
educational relevance that the
literature contains. As a result, a great deal of pressure is placed
upon the members of the school
boards to make their decisions with respect towards the First Amendment
rights of students and
without personal intent.
The effects of the Pico decision have spread to a number of different
aspects within the issue of the
banning of literature in schools. One of these controversial aspects
is the placement of certain
literature inside the schoolhouse walls. It was determined in the 1972
case of Presidents Council
Dist.25 v. Community School Board. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, that A...it
is the board that has ultimate
authority for the initial selection of the public school library collection(Rapp,
11-112). The Pico court
reaffirmed this by maintaining that school boards have the ultimate
authority to make decisions
concerning the library selection process, assuming that any limitations
made are permitted in relation
to the First Amendment.
Another aspect of this issue relates to the presence of the Establishment
Clause of the First
Amendment. The placement of literature can be unconstitutional if the
selections were made in order
to favor a certain religion. However, the Pico court opinion as to
the relation of the Establishment
Clause was supported in the 1990 opinion in the case of Roberts v.
Madigan 921 F.2d 1047 10th
Circuit which stated, The Establishment Clause does not allow educational
institutions to sterilize
their classrooms and libraries of any materials with religious references(Rapp,
11-113). This
basically means that the school boards must not only refrain from favoring
a certain religion, they also
must be aware that religious material has a right to be
present in the schools assuming that there is no preference given to
any one religion in particular.
This leads to the topic of the removal of literature in schools, which
is the most controversial aspect
of the Pico court decision. The Pico Court clearly established that
the First Amendment rights of
students can be affected by the removal of books from school libraries.
The Pico Court also made it
clear, at 388, that our Constitution does not permit the official
suppression of ideas. This majority
decision made by the justices in this case was largely reliant on the
support of the First Amendment.
The Pico court used this basis to state two main distinctions. The
first distinction made was between
the acquisition of books and the removal of books. It was determined
by the Court that school
officials cannot remove a book without proving that they were not attempting
to deny students the
right to have access to certain viewpoints that may seem offensive
to the officials. The acquisition of
books was left almost exclusively to the school boards themselves.
The second important distinction
is between the school library and the school curriculum. In Pico at
387, the court found that the
library is a place where students have an opportunity at self-education
and individual enrichment that
is wholly optional. The school curriculum, on the other hand, is up
to the discretion of the school
authorities who have the right to decide what is appropriate for each
grade level to read.
ConclusionThis paper has sought to illustrate a map of student’s First
Amendment rights. The case
history outlines the landmark cases that have shaped the nature of
this issue. We have learned that
the schoolhouse is a restricted or limited forum. The physical
environment in which students express
themselves has been determined as a arena that is not subject to strict
scrutiny, but rather a place in
which reasonableness standards are sufficient to curtail a student’s
freedom of expression. These
students are also subject to the limitations their youth places on
them. They are minors who are
viewed to be not yet fully matured and to be highly impressionable.
Students are present at school to
be educated by those who know better due to the fact that they are
on a different social and mental
level than their adult counterparts. The compelling interest
within this topic is found in the
government’s job as educator. As such, the educational system
must retain some sort of power to
determine what is appropriate in terms of speech in order to maintain
an productive learning
environment. The courts have given deference to school administrators
in terms of defining a
student’s First Amendment rights within the schoolhouse gates.
The banning of school library
resources magnifies the issues this paper addresses. Libraries
lie within the boundaries of the
educational forum and have direct contact with a student’s right to
free expression. In this case,
although a school board may not irresponsibly curtail constitutional
liberties, administrators may deny
student's access to materials that contain inappropriate language or
those material void of educational
value. It is imperative to state that the Courts have sought
to clearly define the qualifications for
narrowing a student's freedoms, but it is impossible to refute the
existence of abuses and
over-reaching applications of case standards. Like all First
Amendment issues, freedom is at war
with order. In this case, totalitarian indoctrination feuds with
the preservation of a free marketplace
of ideas.
Works Cited
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744(1966).
Cornelis v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
Levy, Leonard W., Kenneth L. Karst, John G. West, Jr., Eds. Encyclopedia
of the American
Constitution. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1986.
Rapp, James A., Education Law. Vol. 3. New York:Matthew Bender&Co, Inc. 1998.
Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047(1990).
Taylor, Bonnie B., Education and the Law Dictionary. Santa Barbara:ABC-CLIO, Inc. 1996
Valente, William D., Law in the Schools. 3rd ed. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
Van Alstyne, William W., First Amendment, Cases and Materials. 2nd ed.
New York:The Foundation Press, Inc, 1995.
Copyright 1998
Amina Arifi-Osman, Meghan Price, Erica Schauber, and David Zaro.
All Rights Reserved.
Unauthorized reproductions are prohibited without authors's express
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