Threats against members of our society generally fall into a category of speech deemed “fighting words” and are not within the protective boundaries of the First Amendment (Chiplinski v

The Restriction of Free Speech on Public Property Sean Williamson, Evan Burns, and Brian Mayhew

I. Introduction

II. Cases decided for the Individual

III. Cases decided for the Government

IV. Current Cases

V. Group Opinion

VI. Conclusion

Introduction

The First Amendment is the cornerstone of the American people's relationship with the government that governs them. The right of freedom of speech is a liberty that enables the private individual the ability to interact in society. The First Amendment provides us the right to religion, speech, press, assemblage, and to petition the government. When first written, this Amendment was supposed to provide individuals these freedoms when concerned with political speech. Since then, it has become much more than what our founding fathers had originally envisioned. American citizens have used the First Amendment to their advantage by gaining the ability to speak out against the government, to speak in public areas owned by the government, and to perform religious ceremonies on publicly owned land.
An important issue heard before the Supreme Court is that of free speech and public property. Public property is property that is essentially owned by the government. The cases that involve this issue not only decide the specific areas of where the individual's right to free speech is allowed to be uttered, but also decide between the individual's right and public order. This issue has been decided by the Supreme Court in many different cases. In some cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that an individual has the right to free speech on public property. However, in other cases, the Supreme Court has ruled in favor of the government and its right to regulate the speech of individuals on property in which it owns. To better understand the inconsistencies in the decisions of the cases involving freedom of speech and property, we look at specific cases that contain this issue. First, we look at cases where the Supreme Court has ruled that the individual does maintain the right to free speech on public ground. Then we will look at cases where the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the government to limit the individual's speech while on public property.

Cases Ruled in Favor of the Individual

    In many instances the Supreme Court has shown leniency for individuals or groups in their battle against the government, in particular states. The Court has reasoned with the individual based on rights granted to them by the First Amendment. This is illustrated in Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., (303 U.S. 444 1938). The ordinance in question here states that, “The practice of distributing, either by hand or otherwise, circulars, handbooks, advertising, or literature of any kind whether being delivered or sold, is prohibited within the city limits of Griffin. This practice shall be deemed a nuisance, and punishable as an offense against the city of Griffin.” The appellant in this case was handing out pamphlets dealing with the Jehovah’s Witness without a permit. She was arrested and convicted, but she appealed on the basis that her Fourteenth Amendment was being violated, therefore abridging her freedom of the press and free exercise of her religion. Since the Fourteenth Amendment parallels the First Amendment, it became a freedom of speech case. The Court reversed the decision of the lower courts, and found for Lovell. The reasons were simple. The court citing numerous cases including Gitlow v. New York (268 U.S. 652) and Stromberg v. California (283 U.S. 359), said that, “Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are protected by the First Amendment from infringement by Congress, are among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action”. Chief Justice Hughes continues by stating that the ordinance is invalid on its face. Whatever the motive inducing its adoption, its character is such that it strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and censorship. The court ruled in favor of the individual. The court decided that the statute was unconstitutional because it completely restricted and went against what the First Amendment stood for. It limited Lovell’s freedom of expression, and since it was a state action, it was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and consequently the First as well.
    The pattern continued in Jamison v. Texas (318 U.S. 413 1943). The appellant, a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses was charged with distributing handbills on the streets of Dallas, Texas, all the while violating an ordinance of that city which prohibits their distribution. The ordinance in question prohibits the distribution of leaflets. The city claims that the ordinance was put into place to, a) to keep control of the streets and, b) because the leaflets include commercial advertising of books which the distributor is offering for sale. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, and ruled in favor of Jamison.   The court reversed the decision because the ordinance denies the appellant the freedom of the press and of religion guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The appellant was distributing the leaflets in a peaceful and orderly manner. The leaflets were two-sided, with one side being an invitation to attend a gathering. The other side repeated the invite, but listed two books that explained the views of the Jehovah’s. On the back also listed directions on how to purchase these two books. The books were not actually being sold on the streets, but would have been delivered by the appellant at a later date. The court dealt with each part of the ordinance individually. The court says that the first clause, about controlling the streets, is unconstitutional on its face. The city contends that its power to control its streets is not limited to the making of reasonable regulations for the control of traffic and the maintenance of order, but that it has the power absolutely to prohibit the use of the streets for the communication of others. This argument was completely rejected by the Supreme Court in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization (307 U.S. 496). The second clause, forbidding the distribution of leaflets for commercial advertising, was also found to be unconstitutional. Justice Black, delivering the opinion of the court says, “The right to distribute handbills concerning religious subjects on the streets may not be prohibited at all times, at all places, and under all circumstances”. Black says that this issue is beyond controversy since the above-mentioned Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga. case. Black concludes his opinion by saying that the state may not prohibit the distribution of handbills in the pursuit of a clearly religious activity merely because the handbills invite the purchase of books for the improved understanding of the religion or because the handbills seek in a lawful fashion to promote the raising of funds for religious purposes. Once again, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the individual. The court used precedence from the Lovell case to come to their decision.
    In Marsh v. State of Alabama (326 U.S. 501 1946), the Court was asked to decide whether a State, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, can impose criminal punishment on a person who undertakes to distribute religious literature on the premises of a company-owned town contrary to the wishes of the town’s management. The facts of the case are this. The appellant, a Jehovah’s Witness, came onto the sidewalk we have just described, stood near the post-office and started to distribute religious literature. In each store was a posted notice that read, “This is private property, and without written permission, no street or house vendor, agent or solicitation of any kind will be permitted”. Marsh was asked to leave and refused. She was arrested and charged in the state court with violating title 14, section 426 of the 1940 Alabama code which makes it a crime to enter or remain on the premises of another after having been warned not to do so. Marsh contended that the statute being applied to her actions violated her First and Fourteenth Amendments. Marsh lost and her appeals were denied. The Supreme Court decided to reverse the decision and Marsh won. The Court gave many reasons for its reversal. Citing Lovell v. Griffin (303 U.S. 444 1938), the court said that neither a state nor a municipality can completely bar the distribution of literature containing religious or political ideas on its streets, sidewalks and public places or make the right to distribute dependent on a flat license tax or permit to be issued by an official who could deny it at will.   The Court also cites Martin v. Struthers (319 U.S. 141), saying that the court has recognized that the preservation of a free society is so far dependent upon the right of each individual citizen to receive such literature as he himself might desire that a municipality could not without jeopardizing that vital individual freedom, prohibit door to door distribution of literature. In his decision, Justice Black continues, by saying that ownership does not always mean absolute dominion. The managers appointed by the corporation cannot curtail the liberty of press and religion of these people consistently with the purposes of the Constitutional guarantees, and a state statute, as the one here involved, which enforces such action by criminally punishing those who attempt to distribute literature clearly violates the First and Fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Justice Frankfurter, concurred, saying that he is unable to find any legal significance in the fact that a town in which the Constitutional freedoms of religion and speech are invoked happens to be company-owned. The court continued its pattern of deciding for the individual. The court reasoned that just because land is company-owned, it does not have the right to restrict or limit guarantees granted to individuals by the Constitution. And in this case specifically, the notice displayed in the stores clearly violated First Amendment freedoms of speech and expression.
     Gregory v. Chicago (394 U.S. 111 1969), is another case where the rights of individuals comes into question. The facts in this case are simple as well. Petitioners, accompanied by the Chicago police and an assistant District Attorney, marched in a peaceful manner and orderly line from city hall to the mayor’s office to demonstrate the segregation in the public schools. The petitioners continued to demonstrate in a completely lawful fashion, but the onlookers started to act unruly. The Chicago police, concerned about what they felt to be an impending civil disorder, demanded that the petitioners, upon threat of arrest, disperse. When this command was not followed, they were arrested for disorderly conduct. In many cases, including Brown v. Louisiana (383 U.S. 131, 1966), the court has reasoned that petitioners march, if peaceful and orderly, falls well within the sphere of conduct protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned that the petitioners were convicted not for their marching, but for their refusal to disperse when asked to. However, the petitioners were charged and convicted for holding a demonstration, not for refusal to obey a police officer. After hearing the case, Chief Justice Warren delivering the opinion of the court, sided with Gregory and reversed the judgments. The Court gave many reasons for its reversal. For one, it described the statute as, “…a meat-ax ordinance, gathering in one comprehensive definition of an offense a number of words which have a multiplicity of meanings, some of which would cover activity specifically protected by the First Amendment”. Moreover, the court continues saying, that the ordinance goes on to state that it would be a crime for anybody to “collect in bodies or crowds for unlawful purposes, or for any purpose, to the annoyance or disturbance of other persons…” According to the court, this language along with a conviction simply because the form of the protest displeases some of the onlookers, would certainly encroach on First Amendment rights. The facts in this case are the same as the previous ones. The court reasoned that the Chicago Police cannot restrict the petitioner’s right to march. The court decided that if the demonstration was done in a lawful manner, it would be unconstitutional to break it up.
The final illustration of the Supreme Court granting certain liberties to the individual occurs in United States v. Grace (461 U.S. 171 1983). The question in this case is whether section 13k of title 40 is constitutional. 13k prohibits the display of any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement in the U.S. Supreme Court building or on its grounds, which include the public sidewalks that make up the outer boundaries of the grounds. The Supreme Court held this statute to be unconstitutional. The court held that, “as a general matter, peaceful picketing and leafleting are expressive activities involving speech protected by the First Amendment. Streets, sidewalks, and parks are historically considered to be public forums that the government may enforce time, place and manner restrictions upon. But this does not allow for absolute prohibition of a particular type of expression. The court also held that the court grounds are not a public place, but the perimeter sidewalks that are not indistinguishable from every other sidewalk of Washington, D.C. should not be treated any differently in terms of First Amendment purposes. The appellant started distributing leaflets in May 1978, and on two other occasions in 1980. All three times he was asked to leave the sidewalk in front of the Supreme Court building. Later on in 1980, Mary Grace appeared on the sidewalk carrying a sign that read verbatim the text of the First Amendment. Like the appellant, Grace was asked to leave. The United States District Court ruled against the appellant and so the two appealed. In the court of appeals, the two won, and the Government appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the appellants. The Court said, “The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the Freedom of speech, and there is no doubt that as a general matter peaceful picketing and leafleting are expressive activities involving speech protected by the First Amendment”.   Justice White delivering the opinion of the court cited United States Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations, in saying that, “Congress…may not by its own ipse dixit destroy the public forum status of streets and parks which have been historically been public forums…”. White continues saying, that the public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds, in our view, are public forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes. The court says that it does understand the need to protect persons and property and maintain proper order within the Supreme Court grounds, but an absolute ban serves no purpose. In this case, the court takes an absolutist approach. The court reasons that the statute is unconstitutional because it completely goes against what the First Amendment says. The First Amendment states that Congress shall make no law abridging speech, and the statute in question does just that. In all of the above-mentioned cases the court has used a variety of reasons to decide for the individual. Whether it be because the statute is to restrictive or because the Court is taking an absolutist approach, the Supreme Court has used its power to decide for the Individual against the government, and more specifically the state.

Cases in which the Court sided with government

    As we have just seen, there are numerous instances in which the Court has sided with the private citizen over disputes involving public property and freedom of speech. This section will examine five cases where the Court sided with the government.
     The first case involves the issue of free speech on public sidewalks. The next two cases deal with separate government institutions, a public school and a country jail. After that, the court debates a case where the posting of signs on public property is debated. Finally, the Court takes on the issue of the first amendment and volume control.
     The first case to be discussed is FEINER v. NEW YORK, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). The issue here deals with free speech, the First Amendment, and a public sidewalk. The petitioner, Irving Feiner was addressing a crowd at an open-air meeting on the corner of South McBride St. and Harrison St. in Syracuse, NY. A complaint was received by local police, who dispatched two officers to the scene. The two officers found the petitioner addressing a crowd of about eighty people. He was trying to convince people to attend a meeting at the Syracuse Hotel, later that night. Feiner was however, making disparaging remarks about President Truman, the American Legion, Mayor of Syracuse, and other local officials.
     The crowd started to become restless as the petitioner tried to pit whites and blacks, and the officers asked the petitioner to stop his speech for public safety and disperse the crowd. After asking the petitioner three or four times, the officer arrested the petitioner and charged him in violation of sec. 722 of the Penal Law of New York, a disorderly conduct charge.
     The trial court recognized the petitioner's right to hold a street meeting and to use the loud speaker system. However, the officers made the arrest solely for the reason of maintaining public peace, thus the petitioner was guilty. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed stating "an imminent danger of a breach of the peace, of a disturbance of public order, perhaps even of riot, was threatened". (441)
     The Supreme Court also affirmed the rulings of the lower courts. The Court said that "the findings of the state courts as to the existing situation and the imminence of great disorder coupled with petitioner's deliberate defiance of the police officers convince us that we should not reverse this conviction in the name of free speech." (Van Alstyne, 440-44)
     Thus, the government and the state of New York were able to restrict speech on a public sidewalk. The government or state would now be allowed to restrict speech on a public sidewalk if public safety is in jeopardy, and the speaker is resistant to reasonable police orders.
     In the second case, Perry Educational Association v Perry Local Educators'
Association 460 U.S. 37 (1983), the court looks at regulation of speech at a public school.
     The Perry Educational Association (PEA) is "the duly elected exclusive bargaining representative for the teachers of the Metropolitan School District of Perry Township, Ind,"(488). The other part is the Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA).
     For years before an election in 1977, both of these groups represented teachers in the district in question. But, PLEA challenged the other group's status, and lost in an election which was for exclusive representation of the district's teachers. Later, the School District and PEA signed an agreement which gave the association sole access to "interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes". The original agreement was renewed and is still in tact.
     The agreement only pertains to the two fore-mentioned entities and not to other school facilities. PLEA is allowed to communicate with teachers on school bulletin boards, and may hold meetings after school hours at the school. (489)
     PLEA believes their exclusion from access to interschool mail and teacher mailboxes is a violation of First Amendment and of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They believe under these two amendments that they should be given equal access to the mailboxes and interschool mail system.
    The plaintiff sought an injunctive and declaratory relief and damages, but the District Court ruled in favor of PEA. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not agree and reversed the decision. The Court stated, "once the School District opens its internal mail system to PEA, but denies it to PLEA, it violates both the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment," (489). PEA appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court.
     The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the appeals court ruling in favor of the defendant. The Court simply said that on government property, which has not been made a public forum, the State may decide who can and cannot speak based on the special purpose of the property. The key to is that on this type of property all speech is not situated. (Van Alstyne, 488-96)
     In this case we see the Court once again, ruling in favor of the government. This time the Court tells us if government property has a specific use and is not a public forum (where all speech is not situated), it has the right to restrict speech based on the use of the property.
     In the last case we examined a case that dealt with a school, in this case, Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978), discusses First Amendment rights and a county jail.
    The issue here is whether or not the media, by the First Amendment, have the right to access of a county jail to interview inmates and produce material for its audience.
    The petitioner is the Sheriff of Alameda County in California, who controls all access to the jail in question, Alameda County Jail at Santa Rita. Around March 31, 1975, the respondent reports an inmate at the jail had commit suicide and states an expert psychiatrist believed it was due to the poor conditions at the jail. A statement was released by the sheriff refuting those allegations.
    In the aftermath of the death, the respondent asks for permission to "inspect and take pictures" within the facility. Permission was denied and a suit was filed claiming a violation of First Amendment rights. The complaint asked for a permanent injunction to have total access to the jail.
     The sheriff responded by offering 25 person tours of the compound with very limited access. No interviews with the inmates were allowed. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent stating "that the public and the media had a First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of access to prisons and jails." (572)
    The Supreme Court, in citing Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., said "neither the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources of information within the government's control". (574)
    The Court went to say, it is a "decree" by another political branch to give access to the respondent. Thus, the sheriff could do as he wanted, regardless of the wishes of the press. (Van Alstyne, 571-78)
    In this case, we see, once again the government under extenuating circumstances was able to restrict speech. Here the press was given no special access to the jail because there is no special right of access of government information or property in the constitution.
    The fourth case is CITY COUNCIL v. TAXPAYERS FOR VINCENT, 466 U.S. 789 (1984). The issue is can the Los Angeles City Council prohibit the posting of signs on public property and does this prohibition abridge freedom of speech.
    The supporters for Roland Vincent, a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council, hired a company to fabricate and post signs in support of Vincent. The signs were put up, but then taken down by the city's Bureau of Street Maintenance due to sec. 28.04 of the Municipal Code. In total, 1,207 signs were removed from public property during the week of March 1-March 7, 1979, and 48 of those were in support Roland Vincent.
     The District Court ruled in favor of the City Council stating the section of the code does not stop the taxpayers from exercising their free speech rights through alternative forms, namely picketing and distributing handbills for example. The District Court said it helped the city's economic and esthetic interests by improving the beauty of the city.
     The Court of Appeals ruled the city had not shown sufficient evidence in its argument about the esthetic and economic interests of the city. The Court of Appeals concluded that the city had not justified its total ban and reversed. The Supreme Court then reversed that decision and ruled in favor of the city.
     The Court, in upholding the ban on signs, stated numerous rationales for its decision. First, the Court said that the state might legitimately exercise its police powers to advance esthetic values through removal of the signs.   Then, the Court, in citing, Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, said that the city had justifiable interest in avoiding visual clutter, which was sufficient to justify the ban. Also, in citing Schneider v. State, the Court said that the ordinance curtails no more speech that is necessary because they have numerous alternative types of expression. Finally, the Court said, if the signs were permitted to stay, more would follow, and thus the aforementioned clutter would appear. (Van Alstyne, pp. 445-52)
     The final case tackles speech volume, WARD v. ROCK AGAINST RACISM, 491 U.S. 781 (1989). The Naumberg Acoustic Bandshell is located in New York City's Central Park and is used primarily for concerts. With a nearby residential area, the city attempted to regulate the volume of the music, so the audience could hear the music well and the local residents would not be disturbed.
Rock Against Racism, a concert promotion group, brought a suit against the city stating the volume regulation was a violation of its First Amendment rights. The trial court sustained the noise control measures, but that decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Supreme Court then, "granted certiorari to resolve the important First Amendment issues presented by the case." (456)
     The Court first stated music, as a form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment. But, the Court refuted RAR's argument that the city's limitation on volume would somehow reduce its potential audience ruling that there where plenty of "remaining avenues of communication".
     Also, the Court stated the justification for the sound-amplification guideline has nothing to do with content, and thus satisfies the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations are content-neutral. So, the city was able to place this volume control restriction.
     Finally, the Court stated that the city's guidelines did not effect the ability of the Bandshell performers due to the quality of the city's sound technician.
      Here the government was able to again restrict speech on public property. The Court ruled that the government presented legitimate reasons for sound control. As with the previous case, the quality of life for the city and its residents was a deciding factor in ruling in favor of the government. (Van Alstyne, pp. 455-61)
    A key case discussed in class concerning the issue of free speech on public property was International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee., 112 S.Ct. 2701 (1992), 112 S.Ct. 2709(1992), 112 S.Ct. 2711(1992) In this case the Krishnas, a not-for-profit religious organization, performed religious ceremonies in an airport terminal. The Krishnas also solicited for funds of support while performing the ceremony. The primary motivation for the religious act is to raise funds. Lee, the deceased Police Superintendent of the Port Authority Of New York and New Jersey, ordered the Krishnas to leave the air terminal and did not allow them to perform their religious ceremonies there. The officials of the Port Authority wanted the Krishnas to move their ceremonies outside. The Krishnas filed suit against Lee, the head of the Port Authority. The Krishnas held that the religious ceremony, and therefore the solicitation of money, was protected under the Constitution, specifically the First Amendment. The Krishnas also held that the area in which they performed these ceremonies was public, therefore they were not infringing on the rights of a private corporation. The Port Authority argued that the government has the right to regulate the type of expression performed on the property it owns. The Court felt that the main issue in this case was what exactly constitutes a public forum, and does the individual's right to freedom of speech outweigh the government's ability to prohibit certain types of speech on the property it owns? The Court decided for Lee, ruling that a public area is a public forum when its traditional use and primary purpose is such. Therefore, in the case at hand, the traditional use of an airport terminal is not a public forum, but for transportation. The Court ruled that the airport terminal is a public place, not a public forum in which the free exchange of individual's ideas may take place. Rather, the primary purpose of the airport terminal and traditional use is for transportation. The Port Authority did set aside an area outside the terminal in which the Krishnas could perform their ceremony. This case shows how the Court ruled in favor of the government's right to prohibit speech while it was uttered on public property.

Current Court Cases Relevant to Topic

    Just as important as precedent-setting cases decided years ago, are the cases and issues in our courts today. It is these cases which will help to shape our future and maybe even set some new precedents. This section will focus on several cases in our United States Court system that will have an impact on the First Amendment and the guidelines of where you can and cannot speak your mind.
     The first case comes out of the University of Texas and deals with pamphlet distribution. The case heard opening arguments on November 20 of this year. It will determine if a policy of the University of Texas, which states that non-university students are not allowed to pass out flyers or pamphlets on university property, is a violation of the freedom of speech guaranteed in the First Amendment.
     "The university is supposed to be a place of free inquiry and speech and intellectual dialogue, so to prevent people from peaceably passing out information is terribly wrong," said environmentalist Robert Brister, 43, a plaintiff in the lawsuit.
     In January of 1996, the plaintiff and other members of Austin Greens and Austin Earth First were passing out fliers by the Erwin Center on campus when they were forced to stop. "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity," was the title of the handout and it discussed the devastation of pollution and the human population on the environment.
     The university's lawyer, James Todd said numerous other campuses have a similar policy. "University space is not limited," he said. "It's still primarily an educational institution, and the first priority is the teaching of students in classes."
     In the next case we stay on campus, but move to the University of New Mexico where a clash over free speech has pitted the administration against the faculty and student body. To begin with, students are only allowed to openly speak out and express their ideas in designated free expression areas.
     The school's administration has made a proposal to add two more free-expression areas to the campus. However, students would only be allowed to use them if the Student Activities Center was notified by 5 p.m. the previous business day. Students would also be allowed to use other university locations only with 48 hours' notice for review. More important, the university does not need the approval of the faculty or student body to implement this proposal.
     "We trying to balance the rights of people that want to make a statement about a particular issue with the rights of people that want to go to a classroom and learn, to go to an office to get help," said Debbie Morries, director of the Student Activities Center.
     About a little less than a month ago, the Faculty Senate voted unanimously against the proposed policy, stating that they did not agree with the provision which requires for notice.
     Keith Elston, executive director of the ACLU in New Mexico stated that both the current and proposed policy is definitely unconstitutional.
     "Absent of a significant disturbance to the university's routine, any public place on the university should be a free-speech area," he said.
     In a case very similar to PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, the issue of whether or not a mall is a public forum is debated. Simply put, the court system must decide if have malls become a public forum, and if so, can owners restrict individual free speech?
     Today, malls have become the center of shopping in America. It is taken for granted you are going to a mall, if you say, "I'm going shopping". But, by opening up these large malls, which are considered private property, mall owners turning their property into the town squares of our era.
     A case, which is currently before the Minnesota Court of Appeals, could have as much impact than the PruneYard case. The State v. Wicklund, which started as a simple trespassing case, when four animal rights protesters were arrested in front of a Macy's store in the Mall of America, which is the countries' largest mall. The four protesters refused to stop protesting and were arrested for criminal trespassing.
     The protesters argue that their arrest violated their First Amendment and freedom of speech rights. While the mall owners counter-claim, it is their private property and the protester's actions were not good for business.
     In the Minnesota trial court, the protester's were able to score a victory when a judged agreed the Mall of America was a "city within a city", mainly because it was in part funded by taxpayer money. The mall owner's appealed immediately, and now the appeals court must decide if a mall built with public money should be put up to First Amendment scrutiny.
     The appeals court could use that as its rationale to decide the case, but it could also use PruneYard as its precedent. In that case, the Supreme Court ruled "California could interpret its state constitution so that free-expression rights are protected even on private property". If it were used as a precedent, the protesters would be very likely to score a victory. So, its up to the Minnesota Court of Appeals to decide if malls are to be considered public forums.
     In the final case of this section, we look at an interesting case, Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, involving street begging and the First Amendment. The case's arguments were heard before the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in August.
     The United States Constitution views panhandling as a form of protected speech. However, an ordinance in the city of Los Angeles prohibits any begging within the city limits. The law was enacted just last due to complaints of overly aggressive beggars. It never was enforced due to the ALCU invention in the courts.
     The law "prohibits panhandlers from begging on government property, near ATM's or while people are waiting in line for movies or restaurants." A fine of as much as $500 accompanied with six months in jail is possible for repeat offenders.
     The law is said by opponents to violate First Amendment and free speech rights. It also hurts legitimate charities and solicitors from getting necessary donations.   The lawyer from the ALCU, Peter Eliasberg, said he felt the ordinance was overly broad, stating you could not beg within 10 feet of a bus stop.
     The assistant city attorney, Byron Beckman, said the law was designed to prevent beggars from annoying passerby's. "The issue isn't free expression, but rather conduct."
     Each of these previous cases, in their own way, will have an effect on the First Amendment, whether the government or the citizen wins. Each case offers a different and unique perspective on the First Amendment and freedom of speech. Maybe some of these cases will make it to the Supreme and become major precedents, but we will have to just wait and see.

Group Opinion

    The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment has been one of inconsistency because the Court generally struggles between the rights of the individual and public order. As seen in the cases previously discussed, an individual’s right to free speech is at times interrupted by the ability of government to regulate the property it owns. These cases show that the Supreme Court’s decisions usually protect the rights of the individual, unless there are extenuating circumstances that call for the property of the government to come before the rights of the individual. Seen in Lovell v. City of Griffin and Marsh v. Alabama, the right of freedom of press is in protected against the state’s right and a company’s right to control what is said in front of its property, respectively. In Jamison v. Texas and Marsh v. Alabama, the right to the freedom of religion is protected against the state’s right to control what occurs on its streets and again what is said on the property outside land owned by a company. Once again in United States v. Grace, the individual’s right to leafleting and picketing is upheld as long as the action is done in a lawful manner. In Gregory v. Chicago, we see the Supreme Court rule in favor of the individual to march on government property, when acted out in behavior that follows the standards of the law. These cases show that the Supreme Court allows for the protection of free speech on public property as long as the individual maintains behavior in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court’s decisions differ from these when the individual does not follow the law while exercising his Constitutional right to free speech.
     In certain situations, the Supreme Court has not protected the individuals right to free speech while on public property. These decisions are seen in cases with circumstances that are not generally seen in the cases previous. In Feiner v. New York, we see the restriction of speech when it poses a threat against the safety of the public and when the individual practicing free speech does so in a manner not in accordance with the procedures of the law. This man was pitting whites against blacks and denouncing the President. In Perry v. Perry, we see the government rule that not all public property is public forum. In Houchins v. KQED, the government does not protect the freedom of press when it conflicts with the right for government to withhold information about convicts. This information does not need to become public knowledge, according to the Supreme Court. In the case of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincenet, the Supreme Court ruled that the posting of signs on public property would create a visual clutter, an eye-sore in essence. The government also ruled against the individual’s right to free speech in Ward v. RAR, where the Court ruled that the music, or the speech, of the concert was not being impeded by the regulation of the volume of the music.
     Many Supreme Court cases border on the topics as others, but specific details in each cause the Court to rule differently on similar issues. The reason for this is that certain cases contain situations that are only relevant to that case. There have been many cases arguing for the freedom of press on public property, but particular events in each case force the Court to author different opinions. This is seen in Supreme Court cases involving the freedom of speech right while on public property.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment in many different ways for different cases. When deciding cases involving disputes of whether the individual's right to free speech outweighs the right of the government to restrict that speech when it is spoken on public property, the Supreme Court has shown inconsistencies in its decisions. In some instances, the Court ruled that the government did have the right to prohibit speech, press, or religion when it took place on public property. In other cases, though, the Supreme Court decided that the individual’s freedom to speech should take priority over the government’s ability to control individual action on its own property. The boundary set by the Supreme Court when making decisions involving this matter is whether or not the speaker used legal manner when exercising his or her liberty of free speech. When the orator did in fact use the expressive voice by following proper legal manners, the Court favored the individual over the government. But, when the speaker’s expression was used in accordance with prohibited behavior, or some other exceptional action, then the Court ruled in favor of the government to protect the property it owns. The discrepancies can be attributed to many things, such as the time the case was decided, the type of speech involved, and the area in which the speech was said. The legal battle continues still today in cases involving students’ speech on university campuses, the issue of whether a mall is a public forum, and the legality of panhandling. The Supreme Court will continue to struggle with this issue with new specific details appearing in each new case, making the Court’s decision more difficult yet more important with each case.

Works Cited

http://www.freedomforum.org/first/welcome.asp. November 16, 1998

http://www.findlaw.com/. November 12, 1998

Van Alstyne, William W. First Amendment. New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 1995. (p.
440-452, 455-461, 488-498, 571-578)