



**Review: [Untitled]**

Reviewed Work(s):

*State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria* by Ian Lustick  
Mark Lichbach

*The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 4. (Dec., 1986), pp. 1376-1377.

Stable URL:

<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28198612%2980%3A4%3C1376%3ASFIBIA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G>

*The American Political Science Review* is currently published by American Political Science Association.

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at <http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html>. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at <http://www.jstor.org/journals/apsa.html>.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.

---

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

**State-Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria.** By Ian Lustick. (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California-Berkeley, 1985. Pp. x + 109. \$8.95, paper.)

Lustick argues that the presence of British and French settlers was "a sufficient, albeit not necessary" condition for the unsuccessful incorporation of the "subject peripheries" of British Ireland and French Algeria into the British and French states (p. 5). The bulk of his evidence for this claim comes from secondary source material on the consequences of "settler political activity for cooptive and participatory native policies pursued by metropolitan cores" (p. 9) for Britain (pp. 17-38) and France (pp. 47-76). Lustick also uses material about the successful cooptation of local elites and hence the successful incorporation of subject peripheries by Britain and France in their earlier history (pp. 9-16). Lustick's explanation of state-building failures in Britain and France is an important and clever addition to the literature on colonialism. He argues that the failure results from the relationship between settlers, natives, and the metropole.

To expand the central state, the metropolises had to overcome the demographic preponderance of the natives. Their solution was to settle large numbers of nonmilitary citizens in outlying territories inhabited by "culturally distinct and antagonistic natives" (p. viii). The British thus planted colonies in Ireland in the 1580s (Elizabeth), from 1607 to 1640 (the Stuarts), and in 1652 (Cromwell); France planted colonies in Algeria from 1830 to the early 1900s. However, in planting these colonies, the metropolises pursued contradictory goals. During tough times, the colonies were viewed as an asset to be exploited—needing the natives in order to consolidate their rule, the metropole accommodated native demands by attempting reforms. During good times, the colonies were viewed as a burden to be ignored—not needing the natives, the metropole accommodated its settler's demands and ignored reforms.

Settlers also pursued contradictory goals. On the one hand, they were numerically weak compared with the natives, and hence wanted protection against potential native mobilization. The settlers thus sought close ties and assimilation to the metropole, so that they

could use its resources to maintain local hegemony. On the other hand, the settlers wanted to dominate the native majority and protect their local privileges. They thus sought autonomy from the metropole, so that they could escape the logic that full integration into the metropole meant equal treatment of all citizens, settlers and natives alike.

Through various mechanisms (pp. 81-82) the settlers were able to undermine the metropole's cooperative policies towards the natives, and hence block reforms. The consequences were that indigenous local elites were not coopted into the decision-making process, and native masses did not enjoy full citizenship rights. These factors led to native unrest, a struggle for political rights, separatist demands, and the prevention of the transfer of loyalty and legitimacy from the core to the periphery.

Lustick's argument is intriguing, but based on two crucial assumptions. He assumes, first of all, that in the absence of pressures from settlers, Algerian and Irish ethnic groups would be reformist, and that native elites would welcome metropole reform policies (pp. 37, 70, 72). In other words, Lustick assumes that settlers disrupt "processes of elite cooptation and expansion of political participation rights to natives" (p. 8) that are sufficient for successful integration. However, would the native elites ever have been reformist and coopted? The argument tends to slight other factors (e.g., geography, culture; see p. 83) that influence separatist and radical ideologies and behaviors among ethnic groups.

Second, the argument assumes that metropole policies would be reformist in the absence of settler pressures, but how generous are metropole elites? Are they ever willingly reformist and accommodative of native demands? The argument tends to ignore other factors (e.g., interelite squabbles) that influence metropole policies. Lustick assumes that accommodative metropole policies are sufficient for successful integration.

To test Lustick's argument, one thus needs a crucial case study: if settler undermining of metropole policies is decisive in preventing successful incorporation of peripheries, then a situation where cooperative natives rebelled against reformist metropolises stymied by hegemonic settlers should be analyzed. Lustick did not establish that, *ab initio*, the natives

---

## 1986 Book Reviews: Comparative Politics

---

were cooperative and the metropolises reformist. This volume thus establishes only the plausibility of Lustick's argument. It is an interesting and important attempt to "describe, compare and explain the differential success of various state-building efforts" in Britain and France (p. 2), but a convincing test of Lustick's argument has yet to be made.

MARK LICHBACH

*University of Illinois  
Chicago*

**Capitalism and Apartheid: South Africa, 1910-1984.** By Merle Lipton. (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Allanheld Publishers, 1985. Pp. xii + 449. \$19.95.)

The historical and contemporary relationship between capitalism and apartheid is an issue of significant debate among scholars of South African political economy. To cast it starkly, some maintain that apartheid structures, which place severe limitations on the vertical and horizontal mobility of African labor, were the creation of irrational and backward forces of Afrikaner nationalism that obscured capitalist development. Capitalists, therefore, have never really wanted apartheid, and can be expected to press for its removal. Others argue that capitalist forces helped to construct apartheid and benefited enormously from the cheap labor it guaranteed. Thus, the racist structures were not an irrational impediment to capitalist growth and profit, nor can capitalists be expected to be a progressive force to help eliminate apartheid. Lipton engages this debate in a complex and dynamic study that demonstrates the crudity and static nature of some previous formulations.

The heart of Lipton's analysis is contained in the book's middle section, which systematically examines the changing interests of the "white oligarchy." Included in the oligarchy are agricultural, mining, and manufacturing capitals, and white labor. The author asserts that the exclusion of Africans from political and economic power was rationally calculated and vital to white (predominantly Afrikaner) farmers' interests because

it underwrote their possession of the land, shielded them from black competition and pro-

vided them with plenty of cheap docile labour, while not imposing on them the costs in the skilled [white] labour market incurred by other employers. (p. 108)

White labor was the other major economic sector that demanded apartheid in order to protect itself from the higher quantity and lower costs of African labor.

Mining capital, dominated by the English, had a more complex calculation of the costs and benefits of apartheid. In the beginning, white conquest was essential to the operation of the mines, and later mineowners supported the restrictions on Africans' physical mobility. However, these capitalists did not want or like the job bar that inflated the price of white labor by assigning all whites to skilled jobs and all Africans to unskilled jobs. Forced to accept this piece of apartheid, mineowners responded by instituting highly repressive measures against Africans, such as closed housing compounds and very low wages. In addition, the increasingly interventionist role of the state was resented by owners of mining companies, whose surpluses were taxed to pay for the protection of agriculture and manufacturing. Manufacturers generally opposed apartheid because it was incompatible with their need for skilled black labor and a larger domestic market. This sector was compensated for such costs through protectionist policies that, together with repressive measures by the state, helped assure its acquiescence.

In the 1970s, Lipton asserts, the benefits of apartheid to certain sectors of the white oligarchy that had previously supported it began to change. This change was brought about by increasing capital intensity in all sectors of the economy that required even more stable, skilled labor—the kind that apartheid was designed to discourage among Africans. Support for apartheid among capitalists of all kinds has dramatically declined in the last 15 years, Lipton argues, although it has remained high among white labor and the state bureaucracy. The resulting conflict within the oligarchy has produced "a contradictory and confusing mixture of reform (particularly in the socio-economic sphere) and maintenance of apartheid (especially politically)" (p. 49). Capitalists have not forced more changes because of divisions among them, their inability to forge coalitions with the black opposition, their fear that instability and