COMMUNITIES, CRIME AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA

by Lena Y. Zhong. Devon, UK: Willan Publishing, 2008. 256pp. Hardback. £45.00/$79.95. ISBN: 9781843924050.

Reviewed by Xiangfeng Yang, Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California and Ying Li, Department of Politics and Public Administration, University of Hong Kong. Email: xiangfey [at] usc.edu.

pp.59-62

Lena Zhong’s COMMUNITIES, CRIME AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA is no common work of criminology. This book boldly explores the origins and effects of social control and crime prevention measures in China by utilizing social capital as a possible framework, thus providing a new perspective to observe the phenomenon. While she uses comparative empirical case studies to test and challenge the applicability of Western criminal theories in the Chinese context, her focus is not limited to the effectiveness of community crime prevention itself. In fact, she vividly captures and presents the changing social capital patterns underlying a broader picture of political and economic transitions in the post-Mao China. Based on a large volume of rich secondary data, Zhong probes the effects of the “Building Little Safe Civilized Communities” (hereinafter, “BLSCC”) program that the government claims to be positive. The surveys and interviews conducted on-location in these communities, however, reveal a different story: effectiveness varies community by community. Linking the nexus with social capital, Zhong argues that the effective enforcement of BLSCC (or, broadly speaking, public social control) lies in both the vertical and horizontal aspects of social capital that have been undergoing profound changes as a result of the broad socioeconomic and political developments in China since the early1980s.

The book is composed of three parts. Part 1 includes Chapters 1 and 2, which outline the issue and provide an overview of the city of Shenzhen where empirical evidence is collected. Part 2 encapsulates Chapters 3, 4 and 5, which include the author’s understanding of Western theories that interpret crime as social phenomena, as well as a review of the customs and disposition of social infrastructure in China. The contrast between Western and Chinese society indicates that the emergence of community crime prevention derived from a complex setting of relational networks and the resources engaged therein, thus exposing the role of social capital. Chapters 6 through 9 constitute Part 3. Social control policies – especially the BLSCC program and Zhong’s field work – are elaborated here to examine how social capital influences the effects of social control or crime prevention mechanisms from a micro perspective. Zhong concludes that social capital matters greatly in facilitating effective community crime prevention mechanisms, as seen especially from the significant impact of the vertical linkages on institution building. Finally, Chapter 9 summarizes the entire [*60] research journey and conclusion, and suggests new directions of future study.

Recent theories in the West on crimes have shifted their research scope from individuals to the community level, and from punitive to preventive measures, although in reality the society and the government pay attention to both aspects. In China, the field is straitjacketed by various political constraints and difficulties in obtaining objective, first-hand data. Zhong endeavors to make up for this deficiency by inserting the conditions of social capital and choosing Shenzhen for her empirical study. Being one of the first experimental reform zones, Shenzhen has seen waves of migrants pouring into the city looking for opportunities. Despite the dramatic change in demographic structure, old segregation policies like household registration (hukou) remain. Indigenous residents, too, may have changed their behavioral patterns and ideological inclinations via their intense interaction with the rest of the region. Hence, tension between the past and present generates dilemmas and contradictions, while traditional ties within and among different actors are mixed with new features. All in all, Shenzhen displays a condensed picture of the problems and trials that have exploded across China, proving the venue is a suitable and smart choice.

There are three identified variables in the surveys and interviews Zhong conducted. The first regards how to positively test the mutual interaction within the community and in what patterns the connections are manifested. The second variable looks at how residents perceive the public security situation. This can be an indicator to measure the relationship between actors of different communities. The third variable invites interviewees to appraise the effectiveness of BLSCC, thereby reflecting the different outcomes owing to the aforementioned disparities.

The main idea and analytical framework are elaborated in Part 2. Modernization has brought about globalization, which, paradoxically and simultaneously, reinforced localism. As the formal social control institutions were exposed as incapable of coping with the deteriorating situation, an appeal of returning to the local community attracted much attention. On the theoretical level, scholars now regard the rising crime rate as a concomitant symptom of modernization rather than an aberration, and a public issue instead of a private affair. Research trajectories have been transferred from an individual to a more community-based or societal level. Under this rubric, many crime prevention models that emphasize strategic partnerships and informal social sanctions as alternatives to punitive measures have emerged. The links between crime prevention and social capital are therefore established. Zhong’s concept of social capital stresses both the networks and a desire to invest in cultivating those networks. Both longitudinal and latitudinal dimensions of social capital are important in augmenting the ultimate sum. The author claims that various crime prevention theories (social disorganization theory, opportunity reduction theory, and broken window theory) prove the strength of social capital in explaining the crime prevention paradigms. Notwithstanding, refocusing on the community does not mean that the role of the state can or [*61] should be excluded. As a matter of fact, the bonding and bridging patterns of social capital already imply an intersection between the society and the state.

After reviewing the Western theories, the final part of the book is dedicated to the Chinese scenario. One of the profound historical impacts of Confucianism is that the Chinese people tend to conceptualize the law as a tool instead of as an institution. Breaches of law can be forgiven in light of “moral merit,” whereas familial relations (or guanxi) are above the law. In terms of the organization of the modern social fabric, Chinese society is an intrinsically and intimately woven collective but isolated from the outside. Zhong agrees with the “ripple” model articulated by Fei (pp.80-82, 84) and the “honeycomb” model elucidated by Shue (pp.82-85). In such a low-mobility environment, interpersonal ties demonstrate strong power. The book parallels the discourse of guanxi in Chinese society to the conception of social capital in the West, and encourages the reader to consider the positive meaning of the word. Guanxi is a tie that extends beyond family or kinship to help maintain the smooth operation of social relations and facilitate reciprocal favors. Individuals and entities believe that guanxi enables them to increase familiarity with and express trust with others, reduce transaction costs and increase the desire to exchange favors. Though the traditional setup of society has disintegrated, the belief in guanxi has never faded.

Given the conventional understanding of interpersonal relations and social values in China, the discourse on crime and social control paradigms echo the ideology underneath. On the one hand, crimes and criminals are often morally judged. On the other hand, the traits of a communist state determine the government’s high sensitivity to crimes that threaten social stability. As such, crackdowns on crime have been put at the top of political agendas. Therefore, household registrations, neighborhood committees, work units and public security organs have been constructed not only to prevent crime but also to accommodate the state’s needs for governance. Household registration drew a sharp line between the urban and rural populations, and helped restrict population flows from the countryside to the cities. For urban residents, as their life was largely regulated by their work units and neighborhood committees, people formed a society of acquaintances with boundaries. This was particularly true before the mid-1990s, when state-owned enterprises constituted the majority share of the national economy. Above the basic infrastructure of social control institutions stand the public security organs, which not only fought real crimes but also functioned to guarantee the corporate security management with grassroots communities. The web was knit tightly, insomuch that the social order was sustained and the segregation among different communities preserved. Interestingly, unlike in the West, although driven by state power, Chinese crime prevention has been community-based.

Yet over the past decades crime rates increased dramatically while patterns of crimes also multiplied. The old mechanisms lost their appeal, and new ways of social control are needed. In [*62] Shenzhen, stern measures were employed to guard public order, while innovation of community crime prevention also emerged. The “Comprehensive Management of Social Order” (hereinafter, “CMSO”) policy set the tone on an all-out scale campaign which mobilized both formal and informal institutions. The BLSCC program took shape as the embodiment of the CMSO campaign in Shenzhen. In addition to emphasis on ideological and legal education, the highlights include mass prevention and management tactics. Situational measures and moral education are imposed upon individual dwellers. Grassroots organs are encouraged or required to cooperate with public police. The migrant population is set as the main target of scrutiny. The state once again plays a crucial role in organizing various societal textures and resources. Zhong hereby convincingly argues that the Chinese crime prevention paradigm cannot be simply explained in the same state-society dichotomy that serves the West.

The variance in the assessments of the BLSCC program also supports one of Zhong’s major hypotheses: all things being equal or similar, a web with good links to connect to other chains is able to function better. In other words, the relations with actors outside the immediate community will increase the “bridging” social capital, hence helping to build a more secure and safer environment. In the end, the author seems to imply that a sound relationship with government significantly affects the final program.

COMMUNITIES, CRIME AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA is an insightful and creative study of crime prevention. Both the theoretical implications and empirical discoveries shed new light for future research. Although evidence might be constrained by artificial barriers, the final conclusion deduced from the available data appears convincing. While parts of the book are oddly organized, the overall work is coherent. For further improvement, the book would have been even better if the relations between bonding and bridging social capital could be illustrated more for the sake of the conclusion.

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© Copyright 2010 by the authors, Ying Li and Xiangfeng Yang.

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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

by Steven Kautz, Arthur Melzer, Jerry Weinberger, and M. Richard Zinman (eds). Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009. 328pp. Cloth. $49.95/£32.50. ISBN: 9780812241662.

Reviewed by Sonu Bedi, Department of Government, Dartmouth College. Email: Sonu.S.Bedi [at] dartmouth.edu.

pp.55-58

Most work on American constitutional law explores issues of constitutional interpretation and development, legal history, doctrinal or case law analysis, or social and political rights. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM is a provocative and illuminating series of essays that interrogates the very idea of constitutionalism rather than any one particular constitutional theory of interpretation or analysis. According to the editors, “[r]eflection on the character of the politics of constitutionalism is the overarching theme of this volume” (p.4). The ensuing essays do not so much consider the politics but rather the logic, theory, and system of constitutions. That is, what does it mean to have a constitution? What are the central features of American constitutionalism? What is the relationship between a constitution and the people it governs? What is the role of the judicial branch in a well functioning constitutional system? In what ways do constitutions differ in character? These are important questions, ones that, as the editors correctly point out, move “beyond the questions that divide the parties of the day” (p.1). The essays primarily discuss the logic of the United States Constitution,with two essays taking a more comparative perspective. The volume is divided into five Parts.

Part I analyzes the philosophical underpinnings of the idea of constitutionalism. Nathan Tarcov asks us to look to the history of political philosophy in better appreciating what it means to have a constitution. Drawing from Plato’s LAWS and Aristotle’s POLITICS, Tarcov suggests that the mixed regime (or “second best” regime) informs the ancient notions of constitutional government. These notions “are not based on a naïve or idealistic faith in the goodness of human nature . . . on the contrary, they recognize the necessity of countervailing institutions to check the universal human inclination toward tyranny, hubris, and pleonexia” (p.29). Tarcov connects this all-too-familiar logic of checks and balances with the modern idea of constitutionalism, one that incorporates Machiavelli’s take on foundings and the significance of Lockean consent. Rather than seeking commonalities between the ancient and modern ideas, Steven Kautz defends the distinctive liberal idea of constitutionalism, one which privileges the rule of law over private judgment. A core component of this liberal conception is “We the People.” Kautz defends it from classical objections that it is just a partisan description, one that does not rise above a partial conception of justice. In analyzing the alleged “nonpartisan” notion of “We the People,” Kautz seeks to temper the [*56] commitments of liberal constitutionalism.

Part II takes a historical approach to understanding American constitutionalism. These essays all tackle the problem of judicial review. In particular, they explore the textual, philosophical, and historical question of whether the Supreme Court ought to be the privileged interpreter of the Constitution. That is, leaving to one side one’s favored theory of interpretation, what role, if any, should other co-ordinate branches have in speaking upon constitutional issues? All too often we assume that the Supreme Court has the final say in constitutional matters. These essays interestingly question this assumption. Michael Zuckert analyzes this issue by considering three “essential institutions” proposed by James Madison that the constitutional convention ultimately rejected. These included: “a council of revision, a congressional negative on state law on behalf of federalism, and a congressional negative on state laws on behalf of individual rights and justice” (p.57). Zuckert argues that the convention’s rejection of these bodies informs a Madisonian view of judicial review that is ambivalent even paradoxical: the Court “has the implicit duty to be more than a legal institution” but “it has the explicit duty to be nothing but a legal” one (p.77). Leslie Friedman Goldstein looks to two “peaks of excellence in the history of judicial review[:]” “the jurisprudence of John Marshall” and “the decision in BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1954).” She argues that we consider these “peaks” not so much on the basis of the reasoning deployed by Marshall or the BROWN court. Rather, our admiration arises because in these instances the Court “correctly discerned and delineated the constitutional principle at stake and . . . deployed the judicial statesmanship required to make the principles stick as a matter of the rule of law” (p.87). James Stoner squarely confronts the question of who has the authority over the Constitution. He appeals to various instances of early constitutional resistance in the face of the Court’s supremacy including the passage of the 11th Amendment overturning the Court’s expansion of federal jurisdiction in CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA (1793) and Andrew Jackson’s veto of the Second United States Bank on constitutional grounds. Stoner draws from these cases to suggest that “constitutional resistance” invariably entails a kind of compromise. As Stoner points out, we must be willing to “admit that there are two sides to most constitutional questions and that the genius of constitutionalism is in acknowledging this fact and providing forms to accommodate it” (p.111).

Part III considers the underlying logic of non-American constitutions. Mark Tushnet’s essay recovers James Bradley Thayer’s “weak-form” of judicial review contrasting it with the “strong-form” practiced in the United States. Countries that practice a weak form of review include New Zealand, United Kingdom, and Canada. For example, the New Zealand Bill of Rights mandates that “Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other meanings” (p.120). Weak judicial review permits other branches to interpret a constitution. The strong form on the other hand, exemplified by such cases as CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES (1997), [*57] contends that the Court is the privileged interpreter of the Constitution. No other branch may interpret the Constitution even if the interpretation is reasonable. Tushnet contrasts these types of judicial review and their implications for a dialogical account of constitutionalism in which co-ordinate branches speak to one another. Instead of focusing on the varying intensities of judicial review, Gary Jeffrey Jacobson draws our attention to the relationship between constitutional tradition and the regnant social order. In forcing us to step back from any particular constitution, he distinguishes between acquiescent constitutionalism, a constitutional logic that seeks to preserve social order, and militant constitutionalism, one that seeks to transform it. Counter-intuitively he argues that the United States Constitution is far more preservationist than militant, drawing a contrast to the Indian Constitution. Jacobson argues that whereas the Court in REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES (1878) pointed out that polygamy was “subversive of good order” the corresponding Indian supreme court decision argued that an anti-polygamy program created “good order.” “The juxtaposition of the defensive rationale of the American Court and the proactive reasoning of its Indian counterpart directs our attention to the contrasting ways in which the two constitutions relate to their respective social orders” (p.151).

Part IV analyzes the tension between democracy and constitutionalism. Larry Alexander revisits the question of what role the Court ought to have in our constitutionalism. He clarifies what is at stake in this debate by making the issue one of institutional competence. “Both ordinary majoritarian legislative decision-making and judicial decision-making are to be judged by how well they perform their tasks. Institutional design, including whether legislatures should be constrained by constitutional limits . . . is a matter of epistemological and motivational superiority, not a matter of moral principle” (p.168). Robert P. Young, Jr. defends a kind of judicial traditionalism or orginalism against what he calls the “Rorschach School” of interpretation. In particular, he sets his sights on Justice Breyer’s theory of “Active Liberty.” While he draws from the Constitutional convention to de-emphasize the role of the judiciary, his essay is less about constitutionalism and more about arguing for a particular theory of constitutional interpretation. Rogers M. Smith tackles the puzzle of democratization and what he calls “juristocracy.” That is, what accounts for the following two seemingly contradictory trends: “the spread of democracy” and “the rise of courts with the power to invalidate national legislation” (p.199). Drawing from Machiavelli’s political sociology of the grandi (the great) and the popolo (the people), Smith suggests that power of judicial review is driven by elites. Elites invest courts with the power to review democratically enacted legislation in order to ensure (at least partially) their “hegemonic status” (p.203). In doing so, they seek to temper the power of democracy.

Part V understands constitutionalism via politics. Keith Whittington’s contribution – which focuses more on the political character of constitutionalism than the other essays – locates the binding nature of [*58] constitutions in political practice. Eschewing a more theoretical approach, Whittington provocatively argues that we “cannot expect constitutionalism to operate outside of politics.” Rather, constraints imposed by constitutions “might fail because of politics, but they also must be maintained through politics” (p.223). Benjamin A. Kleinerman concludes the volume by considering the Supreme Court’s treatment of the constitutionality of cases implicating executive prerogative. He argues that the Court’s decisions in this area perversely contribute to the people’s willingness to pass the constitutional buck. In particular, “the court’s tendency to interpret the Constitution legalistically” to control executive action discourages Congress’ role in deploying the Constitution politically (p.251). Implicating the essays of Part II, Kleinerman laments the identification of American constitutionalism with the privileged role of the judiciary.

Often individual essays in edited collections run on their own tracks with no real sense of the arguments being made by their fellow contributors. Thankfully, this volume avoids such a charge. Given that the essays were drawn from two conferences, a virtue of the book is that the contributors do seem to be responding to and taking into account the arguments of their fellow contributors. This is not simply in direct reference to other essays in the volume but rather a keen sense that the contributors are all exploring a similar constellation of puzzles including the underlying theory of constitutionalism, the rule of law, the privileged status of the Supreme Court, the existence of judicial review, the relationship between the people and constitutionalism, and the character of a constitution. This volume would be of interest to scholars in political science and theory, public law, comparative constitutionalism, and, of course, constitutional law.

CASE REFERENCES:
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
CITY OF BOERNE v. FLORES, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

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© Copyright 2010 by the author, Sonu Bedi.

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ARRESTING ABUSE: MANDATORY LEGAL INTERVENTIONS, POWER, AND INTIMATE ABUSERS

by Keith Guzik. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009. 238pp. Cloth. $34.00. ISBN: 9780875804033.

Reviewed by Sawyer Sylvester, Department of Sociology, Bates College, Email: ssylvest [at] bates.edu.

pp.51-54

Keith Guzik’s ARRESTING ABUSE is based on his research into the practice in many jurisdictions of enhancing the criminal prosecution of domestic abuse cases by adopting mandatory arrest policies for the police and no-drop policies for the prosecution.

The process of arrest has always involved wide discretion on the part of the arresting officer, far beyond the determination of probable cause and often influenced by the demeanor of the offenders as well as the personal feelings of the officer about the seriousness of the harm. Discretion on the part of a public prosecutor is even greater, including the sole and unreviewable discretion whether to prosecute at all, despite the nature of the offense or the seriousness of the harm.

Critics of such discretionary practices might suggest that they are especially dangerous in domestic abuse since failure to arrest in these cases leaves the complaining partner at the mercy of the partner about whom a criminal complaint has just been made. Failure to prosecute may have much the same result.

Mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies have been developed in this context. The former requires police in domestic abuse cases to make an arrest solely on a showing of probable cause, and the prosecutor to go forward in all such cases – even in cases where the abused party recants. The actual criminalization of domestic abuse is unexceptional. After all, the victim of threats and assault is as much a victim of crime as one similarly victimized who is not in a domestic relationship. The exceptional element is the withdrawal of discretion from the agents of the state.

These policies are not without their critics. Some feminists, for example, have suggested that disallowing an abused woman to influence the decision whether to prosecute her abuser is to deny her any agency in the matter and to paternalistically enforce the state’s solution to the problem on her to the exclusion of all other outcomes. And the expanding criminalization of a variety of social problems Guzik feels is yet another example of Jonathan Simon’s concept of “governance through crime” (Simon 2007).

Still, if the end of that “governance” is to reduce the likelihood of the prosecuted domestic abuser reoffending, it must work as an effective deterrent. Guzik observes that what few studies there are of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies suggest that evidence of their success is quite thin. In addition, he notes that none of the studies has taken into account the [*52] abuser’s own reactions to the experience of arrest and prosecution.

It is not alone what the agents of the state do in regard to the abuser, and the meanings they attach to those acts, but also how those acts are perceived and given meaning by the abuser himself. It is only by considering these meanings that one may then ask whether mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution policies improve the deterrent force of criminal sanctions. To try to answer that question, Guzik uses a number of techniques to gather qualitative data on the events and perceptions connected to these policies. These include: ride-alongs with police on domestic abuse calls, field research at court hearings, and interviews with thirty individuals arrested and prosecuted for domestic abuse.

Guzik’s observations of police behavior during domestic abuse calls make up the first chapter of the book. He notes that there has been a significant change in the manner in which police deal with domestic violence calls, not only as a result of a high degree of compliance with mandatory arrest policies in place, but also because of general improvement in the organization and education levels of police departments in general. Perhaps such improvements supply a context in which mandatory arrest becomes a more acceptable practice.

The arrival at the scene of domestic abuse by the police is no longer the siren-filled assault it once was. The police tend to be far less confrontational and to introduce the force of the state in such a manner that multiple officers quietly occupy the location and engage in what Guzik calls “the artful distribution of space” (p.31). They separate the abuser from the abused, ensure the safety of officers, and quietly explain why an arrest may or may not be the necessary legal outcome of the events as the police have defined them.

At the end of this chapter, as with all the following chapters, there is a useful discussion section. For the chapter on the police, there is a discussion of the racial implications of mandatory arrest as well as a discussion of “The Gendered Performance of Domestic Violence Policing” (p.48).

In the second chapter on no-drop prosecution, Guzik makes use of the “courtroom workgroup” concept. In this classic bureaucratization of the justice system, the ends of justice are gradually lost in the effort to efficiently process as many cases as possible – an end seen as the greatest good for all parties. Too many cases face courts, prosecutors, and public defenders alike, a problem only made worse by no-drop policies. As a result, it is in the interest of everyone in the “workgroup” to have the accused plead guilty and not go to trial. Guzik describes in considerable detail many of the techniques used to bring this about: aggressive charging, manipulation of bond conditions, and the use of physical evidence in place of reluctant and often unreliable complainants.

A domestic abuser may stoutly protest his innocence at the beginning – and may actually believe it. But the time when that assertion is most crucial is far off, at trial. Long before then, the legal process is engaged in a subtle redefinition of the abuser’s identity and autonomy. First, he is an arrestee, then in jail a prisoner (and if not bonded, [*53] stays that way). At arraignment, he is officially accused and may likely be made subject to a no-contact order, and when he finally meets his advocate, the latter may be more interested in disposing of the case quickly than in trying anything but a sure win. All the while, many will be trying to convince him to cut his losses. And at the end of this process his redefinition of self may have convinced him that he no longer may have much innocence to protest, especially if his vision of innocence has been redefined. As with the previous chapter, the chapter ends with a discussion of the implications of no-drop prosecution for issues of race and gender.

Guzik begins his discussion of the domestic abusers in his study by acknowledging that they can demonstrate a variety of violent and coercive behaviors. Abuse can be “coercive control” alone or with violence, and violence can exist alone or with “coercive control.” Guzik finally selects a typology for his research findings based on one suggested by Michael Johnston (2006) consisting of “situational couple violence” and “intimate terrorism.” Guzik is able, based on police reports, criminal history records, and abusers’ own accounts, to classify 25 of his 30 subjects into one or the other of these two classes.

It is from domestic abusers’ own accounts of their experiences of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution that Guzik derives his most interesting and revealing conclusions. The data from these accounts are framed within the context of power but power seen as a social relationship in flux, a relationship in which the justice system usually has the upper hand but which does not deny the abuser all agency. He can resist, create delay, and ultimately play the hole card – insist on a trial, although relatively few abusers do.

Not surprisingly, many abusers faced with the full power of the state, fueled by mandatory arrest and no drop policies, feel that they are being unfairly treated, and for behavior which over time they may have convinced themselves is justifiable. The special procedures of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution, together with jail detention, difficult bonding, and no-contact orders, seem to them to be punishment at the beginning of the criminal justice process instead of at the end where it should be. In fact, asserting that their abusive behavior was justified was common to the narratives of Guzik’s subjects. They provided “denials,” “minimizations,” “excuses,” and “justifications” (p.126). But Guzik found in his own subjects two other types of stories: those involving claims of self-defense or other disclaimers of responsibility. In these defenses, the abuser constructs his own identity as a reasonable person acting in response either to a genuine threat to his person or a threat to a traditional masculine identity, a threat by one whom he may have defined as shrewish, manipulative, and irrational.

In the last chapter, Guzik takes up what has to be the most fundamental question, “Does it work?” Do mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution produce the intended result – desistance from further abuse? Guzik notes that published statistics of recidivism are not encouraging; but, given his small sample, he is less interested in numbers [*54] of failures than in reasons for failure and where hope for success may lie. To find this out he examines the narratives of his subjects as they describe how their lives may have changed after their experience of mandatory arrest and no-drop prosecution. The picture is complex.

Although such policies did effect the immediate removal of the abuser, it was often at the cost of his job and reputation – both of which are iatrogenic to more long-term goals. Interestingly, some men expressed a renewed commitment to religion. But this often only allowed an abuser to create a more pleasing self-image without taking any genuine responsibility for past behavior. Other responses by his subjects, which Guzik refers to as “controlling the self,” freeing the self,” and “fitting the self” he finds equally double edged.

Nonetheless, returning to the distinction he has previously established, Guzik does find more positive outcomes for “situationally violent abusers” than “intimate terrorists,”, indicating that there may be some types of success in some types of abusers. As has been observed by others who have evaluated criminal justice programs, partial success may be the only realistic success one can hope for (Skogan 2006).

In his conclusion, Guzik restates that these mandatory policies are an example of a shift in the way in which domestic abuse is perceived, from a private problem to a public offense. But this shift entails a traditional view of a crime as a discrete event, whereas abuse is more frequently not a single incident of violence but a long subjection to coercive control. The criminal law is practiced in dealing with the former, less capable in dealing with the latter. Still, there are currently practices within the criminal justice system that might have the potential to deal with the ongoing nature of domestic abuse. Restorative justice programs and programs involving continuing court supervision are two that are suggested.

Altogether, this is a valuable book, well written and based on an excellent study. Some may cavil at research involving only 30 subjects. But Guzik makes no pretense that this is a sample from which to formally draw broader inferences. These are simply cases that Guzik mines for all the richness in qualitative data they provide. The implications for social policy he makes on the basis of those data are often imaginative and insightful.

REFERENCES:
Johnson, Michael. 2006. “Conflict and Control: Gender Symmetry and Asymmetry in Domestic Violence.” 12 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1003-18

Simon, Jonathan. 2007. GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR. New York: Oxford University Press.

Skogan, Wesley. 2006. POLICE AND COMMUNITY IN CHICAGO: A TALE OF THREE CITIES. New York: Oxford University Press.

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© Copyright 2010 by the author, Sawyer Sylvester.

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