American politics forgives apostasy with remarkable indulgence. Marxists and communists frequently learned this, as they lurched from bombast to submission over a sixty year period. Consistently misreading the culture of American politics and often speaking as aliens rather than peers, they nonetheless benefited from recognition as "fellow citizens." Throughout this period, and continuing still, progressives have built upon foundations of antifederalism -- fears of privilege and organized wealth -- without ever understanding why the Antifederalists considered theirs the true conception of democracy. In the most recent agonizings about American political culture these heirs of Antifederalists (not the only heirs by any means) reflect sustained commitment to antifederalist democracy but have made no advance in understanding its genuine aims. For that reason, now and ever since the inception of the New Deal, they have pursued the one substantive goal which is entirely incompatible with antifederalism -- namely, the conceit that there is some one policy or one set of policies which constitute salvation for democracy. Their goal is to end, finally, the one objective of all true antifederalism, which is to assure a cultural and political agility which enables the people, consistent with their own presumptions, to follow such policies as they wish, from age to age. Antifederalism built upon opposition to notions of final policy, politically administered, while contemporary progressives seek still the illusion of a final policy that resolves social and political contradictions.
Gordon Lloyd and I captured the Antifederalists suspicions about final policies bottomed on governmental authority in our essay "In Support of Capitalism and Democracy":
The inverse is not applicable: there is no presumption that popular will shall always be generous and just. Rather, it is acknowledged that from place to place and time to time popular will shall waver, subject to generous and stingy influences. Antifederalists argued, however, that only a government organized so as to sustain the legitimate authority of that will could be just. Consequently, the practical effect, into the indefinite future that Antifederalists had to expect, was a dynamic politics that would merit variously praise as just and inclusive and criticism as unjust and exclusive.
This conception of political
life poses a severe challenge to contemporary progressives, who suffer
deeply by the thought of unborn millions who will not enjoy assured benefits
beyond the "mere" benefit of a just government. In that respect they are
much oriented as the founders were, although the founders spoke of unborn
posterity as peers rather than as beneficiaries and were content to leave
to them the policy determinations which would govern their specific enjoyments.
Kennedy's high rhetorical gloss struck an immediate but not a lasting responsive chord in his countrymen. The effect was immediate for the sufficient reason that ordinary humanity is ennobled by calls for self-sacrifice. Such calls rightly convey to human beings a sense of their own worth and self-sufficiency. The effect could not be sustained, however, because of Kennedy's unfortunate selection of the second person voice in which to phrase it. Over the long haul the expression separates the policy-maker from the citizen. "Ask not [me] what your country [I] can do for you." It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that all of our political culture since has been focused on the question of the effect of government on non-governing citizens. From the War on Poverty through Affirmative Action to the still unnamed "redemption of the middle class," the political culture of the United States has come to be grammatically parsed as a relation of doers and sufferers. The vote -- in elite discussions --does not rise beyond the level that Aristotle attributes to the voice of beasts: sufficient to convey pleasure and pain but not to distinguish the advantageous and the disadvantageous. Had Kennedy been minded to speak in the first person singular -- of the manner, perhaps, of saying, that "each night before I fall to sleep, I ask myself, not what my country can do for me, but what I can do for my country" -- he could have embraced his fellow-citizens in a common responsibility for making the decisions that would determine the extent and character of their enjoyments. Alas, he did not.
The account is limited, I believe, because it has not taken seriously the Antifederalist understanding that there is no intrinsic connection between the efficacy of the political methodology and the policy objectives espoused by the New Party. This is the identical intellectual flaw which leads Cohen and Rogers (among others) to expect that involving unions, environmental special interests, and other non-traditional centers of authority in corporate decision making will tend to make such nouveau participants anything other than corporate decision makers. It values policy-making above constitutionalism and prescribed results above open-ended responsibility. Accordingly, one suspects that, not unlike early century progressives, Cohen and Rogers would lose much of their enthusiasm for methods, which in themselves are surely commendable, if they had to face the reality that the folk who applied them came to sensibly different political conclusions.
The evidence of recent American
elections (including the 1994 election) makes quite clear that voters who
participate in the elections have lost substantial confidence in an array
of "final policy" alternatives of the last generation. Moreover, they have
diminished confidence in the policy makers. Their embrace of term-limits
is no accident, representing the more robust form of Antifederalism which
progressives are loath to acknowledge. Nor is it less meaningful that many
prospective voters, in the face of this wave, do not vote. The rationalizations
-- excuses -- of alienation and other pseudo-psychological accounts cannot
displace the obvious conclusion that, insofar as these prospective voters
are conscious of the moving wave, they participate in it at least to the
extent of welcoming it in precisely the manner as the bather who allows
the wave to break over his head at the beach. The decline of the Democratic
Party is not a mere decline of a liberal reliquary. It far rather reflects
popular disenchantment with a politics of doers and sufferers, and a potential
reinvigoration of sentiments of self-government.
What Cohen and Rogers, Schor, and it would seem, some number of their colleagues in the New Party in fact do, however, is to speak to the initiate; they resemble nothing so much as Koestler's poor Rubashov, speaking to the party of adherents on account of having nothing to say to anyone else. Thomas Jefferson's first inaugural proudly proclaimed, "We are all Republicans; we are all Federalists." What looked like mere rhetoric was in reality a substantial acknowledgment of the limits of partisanship, its subordination to the sense of membership in a single "people." Members of the New Party may have good reasons to eschew national identity. However those reasons do not establish any purchase for their judgments of the political system founded on United States national identity. Insofar as that identity is democratic, it becomes still more urgent that contributions to the deliberations sponsored by it establish themselves on the grounds of that identity. Nothing is more inappropriate in democratic politics than a rhetoric of "us" and "them" in point of the citizens common domestic concerns.
The danger of ventures like the New Party is that its adherents may regard their exclusive rhetoric as appropriate only to the extent their conceit of a final policy projects a time when, matters arranged conformably to their vision, there will be no such souls among their fellow citizens as those they consider responsible for contemporary dysfunctions. Not needing to fear their future existence, they need take no heed of their present being. Accordingly, they are deaf to the diverse answers to the questions they pose, regarding quality of life, kinds of growth, and distribution of benefits. Their task is to generate a final policy to answer these questions, when the point should be to live in a society in which persons can make these decisions for themselves -- and make their decisions stick.
For this reason, it is not
necessary to take particular note the of the New Party policy prescriptions.
They constitute answers to contingent circumstances which purport to respond
non-contingently and are, accordingly, obviously flawed. It is even appropriate
to ignore comments like those Juliet Schor makes in her pamphlet, over-dramatically
rejecting of Clinton Administration policies, while simultaneously embracing
the most important statement of Administration objectives: a world trading
system whose foundation is a series of international agreements guaranteeing
basic rights and protections for workers and citizens. The notion of an
international civil society, entertained as a point of transition from
the nation-state, is the very objective of contemporary "global village"
rhetoric, including that of the Clinton Administration.
The idea that the "global
village" means that we now live, as some would have it, with "America's
archaic political system" remains not only an untested idea but a probably
meaningless assertion. The transition many progressives would urge, away
from the nation, has by no means been a necessary consequence of learning
to live in a "single commercial community." Moreover, the very fact of
exertions to preserve the fundamental principles of the United States in
the face of changing contingencies domestically and internationally points
to the likelihood and desirability of confronting policy decisions with
an informed understanding of the requirements of those principles. It was
never intended at the founding of the United States that the regime designed
might live thereafter unreflectively. Or, to state it differently, while
it may be possible to choose a constitution by reflection and choice, it
does not necessarily follow that the people who do so will live immune
to the consequences of accident and force. Alexander Hamilton, of course,
spoke of "good government" rather than "constitution" in that formulation
from the first Federalist Paper. Progressives, however, speak of
a good economy, a "good quality of life," rather than good government,
presumably because the point is to escape the dynamism of democratic self-government
insofar as it affects primarily economic questions. What possible constitutional
principles could accomplish such a magical feat?
In this sense, it is utterly irrelevant whether Cohen and Rogers' and the New Party's diagnostics are accurate. As contributions to a political dynamic, the only thing that matters -- and the only reasonable standard of judgment -- is whether they address constitutional requisites in such a way as to convey reassurance that, following their prescriptions, this people and their posterity would unfailingly retain the ability to alter their course so as to assure their happiness as they think fit. These writers all fail this central test of the Declaration of Independence. Whatever the current mood of the American electorate reflects in point of policies, what matters about it is the people's indefeasible right to pursue the aims their judgments counsel within the traces laid out by a constitutional regime designed to prevent injustices.
Every friendly exhortation
to the people established under the constitution or any worthy successor
must meet the test of confessing, first, that the system established preserve
inviolate an openness to good-willed abandonment. Good-willed abandonment
is nothing less than the people acting on the strength of sure conviction
of their justice and prudence but nonetheless acting erroneously. Any attempt
to foreclose a people's susceptibility to error can only end by destroying
a people's ability to act rightly. There is no human life, however comfortable,
which can be defended against the fatal critique that it is lived by people
who can no longer act on the basis of their judgment. Self-government,
then, subordinates policy. Political parties founded solely on the basis
of policy alternatives -- and final policy at that -- are inimical to the
welfare of a democratic society. The Antifederalists, who also preferred
to strengthen social and local centers of democratic authority, recognized
this. Their progressive descendants have lost faith in this democratic
principle.
Professor W. B. Allen is Dean of James Madison College at Michigan State University.