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A Challenge To Israel's Nuclear Blind Spot
Sunday, March 11, 2001; Page B02 Some years ago, I was riding on a bus in Jerusalem when a woman boarded
and sat down, placing her dog on the seat beside her. As the bus filled
up, a man asked the woman to hold the dog so he could sit down, too. "The
dog has a ticket," the woman snapped, defiantly showing the stub. The man
persisted. Before long, the other passengers had taken sides, shouting so
loudly that the driver finally pulled over to settle the matter. With
great solemnity, we took a vote. The dog won. No matter the subject, Israelis love to debate. On any given day, you
can hear a nation of self-styled pundits engaged in ferocious discussion,
often at high volume. All topics, from the political to the personal, are
fair game. All except one: the nuclear weapons that Israel possesses but refuses
to acknowledge. A thick canopy of ambiguity shrouds Israel's nuclear program, held in
place by legal restrictions that generally prohibit the disclosure of
state secrets -- including public discussion of Israel's nuclear weapons.
The only way journalists and academics have been able toaddress the issue
is by attributing any facts to "foreign sources" -- a device that allows
Israel to pretend it is keeping the world guessing about its nuclear
capability. This deliberate policy of obfuscation is called "nuclear
opacity." This week that policy will be challenged -- not by some foreign enemy
of Israel, but by one of its own. Avner Cohen is an Israeli scholar who
has been living in the United States for three years because he fears
arrest for publishing a political history of Israel's nuclear weapons
program. Today, he plans to leave his home in Takoma Park and fly back to
Tel Aviv, where he intends to confront the powerful defense establishment
in the name of academic freedom. There is a surreal aspect to this, because the broad facts of the
matter are widely known. Israel constructed its first nuclear device on
the eve of the 1967 Middle East War, and now, according to CIA estimates,
has between 200 and 400 nuclear warheads. Israel refuses to sign the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other accord that would require it
to account for the nuclear material it produces at its Dimona reactor in
the Negev Desert. And yet, publicly, Israel will only say that it will not
be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle
East. The origins of Israel's nuclear opacity policy go back to a White House
meeting between President Richard Nixon and Israeli Prime Minister Golda
Meir in 1969. Meir confirmed that Israel had developed nuclear weapons,
saying they were needed as a hedge against another Holocaust. Nixon and
his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger,recognized that the Israeli
bomb was already a fait accompli. They also agreed that Israel was
a responsible nuclear power, having possessed such devices before the 1967
conflict yet opting instead for a conventional war. And they were loath to
antagonize America's vocal pro-Israel lobby. Eventually, Washington and Jerusalem came up with a formula that would
avoid a bruising political confrontation: Israel would neither test nor
declare its nuclear weapons, and the United States would look the other
way. For Israel, this policy has provided the best of all possible worlds:
It has enabled the country to keep its nuclear weapons, unhindered by
U.S.-led non-proliferation efforts that have prevented the development of
such weapons by other countries; and it has continued to receive American
aid. For the United States, opacity has served as a lesser evil, helping
to keep Israel's nuclear thumb out of Arab eyes and thus reduce the
potential for regional war. But now, much to Israel's discomfort, Avner Cohen wants to discuss that
policy of opacity in public. Cohen hasn't been back to Israel since 1998,
when his book about the political history of Israel's nuclear bomb program
was published in the United States without the approval of the Israeli
censor. The book, "Israel and the Bomb," includes no technical or
operational details about Israel's nuclear arsenal, only a meticulously
researched history of Israel's decision to go nuclear, based on
declassified public documents and Cohen's interviews with key players in
the effort. But the book doesn't attribute anything to "foreign sources,"
and angry Israeli defense officials have threatened in the press to
prosecute Cohen if he ever returns home again. Still that is precisely what the 49-year-old Cohen plans to do. Cohen
has plans to deliver lectures this week on the question of scholarship and
government secrecy to fellow academics at Jerusalem's Van Leer Institute
and later this month at Tel Aviv University, but his lawyers have warned
him that he's likely to spend more time talking to police. Cohen could
face arrest, trial and imprisonment on charges of criminally compromising
Israel's nuclear secrets. The Israeli security establishmentviews the return of Avner Cohen as an
opportunity to remind other Israeli scholars that challenges to the
country's most sacred policy taboo will not be tolerated. But it should
instead be an opportunity to permit some public discourse on the issue,
lifting security restrictions that can only corrode Israel's
democracy. Born in Tel Aviv, Avner Cohen grew up in the affluent suburb of Ramat
Hasharon, where his classmates were the children of Israel's top military
and political leaders. After earning his doctorate in philosophy from the
University of Chicago in 1981, he returned to Israel to teach at Tel Aviv
University, publishing scholarly articles on political theory, nuclear
ethics and proliferation. In 1990, Cohen won a MacArthur Foundation
fellowship and went to MIT to research Israel's nuclear history. With his frequent visits to Israel to conduct interviews and study
declassified documents, it wasn't long before Cohen and his work came to
the attention of Israeli authorities, who placed him under Mossad
surveillance. At MIT, the office of a colleague where Cohen's research
materials were stored was broken into. One day, Cohen found that the
entire windshield of his car had been carefully removed and politely
placed on the roof of the vehicle while the interior was apparently combed
for documents. Cohen tried to play by the rules: In 1994, he returned to Israel and
dutifully submitted a draft of his book to the Israeli censor -- who
banned it. Cohen appealed to the Israeli Supreme Court, but the court
chose not to rule, instead urging the two sides to find a compromise. In
the face of the censor's continued refusal to sign off on any part of the
book,a dispirited Cohen returned to the United States, where he completed
work on the manuscript as a fellow at Harvard and the United States
Institute for Peace.The book was published by Columbia University
Press. Since the book's publication, Cohen, now a senior researcher at the
National Security Archive at George Washington University, has become a
controversial figure in Israel. Defense officials regard him as a criminal
who compromised the country's most closely held secrets. Academics,
including some who have been deeply involved in Israel's nuclear effort,
say there is nothing in Cohen's book that damages Israeli national
security. Reuven Pedatzur, a writer on national security affairs for the
Israeli daily Ha'aretz, calls Cohen's story "a classic example of Israeli
democracy's black hole: the area of national security where the usual laws
of a democratic society do not apply." The time has come for Israel to shine some badly needed light into that
black hole. As an independent researcher, Cohen does not speak for the
Israeli government, and therefore his book poses no real threat to its
policy of opacity. And while no responsible person -- certainly not Cohen
-- suggests that the government should go "transparent," which would upset
a balance that has lasted well for more than 30 years, there are important
ancillary issues that Israelis have a right to explore. These include questions not only of policy but of environment, health
and safety. Where is nuclear waste being stored? How safe is that storage?
What effect is it having on the country's fragile water table? It took the
end of the Cold War for the United States to begin addressing
environmental disasters like the Hanford nuclear waste site in Washington
state. In theirtiny, crowded country, Israelis don't have the luxury of
waiting until peace permits such environmental issues to be discussed. And then there is the right of Israelis to know who they are as a
nation. As a piece of scholarship, Cohen's book joins the work of Israel's
so-called "new historians," who have used recently declassified documents
to reexamine national myths. Their work has provoked furious domestic
debate on the degree of Israel's vulnerability in 1948 (and hence, the
scope of its victory in the War of Independence), and whether the
Palestinians were driven out of Israel or left voluntarily, as the
official version claims. Preventing debate about Israel's nuclear history
denies citizens an important chapter in the nation's narrative, one that
is crucial for understanding what the country has become today. The return of Avner Cohen is more than just a test of the limits of
academic freedom. It is a test of the health of the country's democracy. A
growing number of Israelis feel they have been denied the freedom to
debate one of the government's most fateful decisions. Israeli authorities
should accept that granting that freedom is another way to protect the
nation's security. Jonathan Broder is a senior writer for the Jerusalem Report.
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