Michele J. Gelfand, Ph.D

· RESEARCH STATEMENT

MICHELE J. GELFAND, PH.D.

My program of research focuses on three areas: Cultural influences on negotiation, conflict, and justice; basic theoretical and methodological issues in cross-cultural psychology; and workplace diversity and discrimination.

Cultural Influences on Negotiation, Conflict, and Justice. Much of my research examines negotiation across cultures in order to expand the science of negotiation to be more global in its scope. My research on culture and negotiation focuses on the psychology of negotiation across cultures—how negotiators in different cultures construe themselves, their counterparts, and the situation—in order to understand the mechanisms through which culture exerts its effects. This psychological approach has been driven by my concern (discussed in Gelfand & Dyer, 2000) that historically, research on culture and negotiation has been bereft of theory, and as a result, our understanding of culture in negotiation has been quite limited. As an alternative, my research has sought to offer a more theoretically grounded and complex view of culture in negotiation. For example, I have illustrated that culture influences cognitive representations of conflict episodes (Gelfand, Nishii, Holcombe, Dyer, Ohbuchi, & Fukuno, 2001); metaphors for negotiation (Gelfand & McCusker, 2001; Gelfand, Wasti, et al., in progress); and judgment biases and behaviors in negotiation (Gelfand & Christakopolou, 1999; Gelfand, Higgins et al., 2002). At the same time, I have illustrated that cognitions and behaviors in negotiation are dynamic and can change depending on features of the situational context (Gelfand, Brett, Imai, Tsai, & Huang, under review; Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999; Morris & Gelfand, 2004; Triandis, Carnevale, & Gelfand et al., 2001).

For example, in Gelfand et al. (2001) in the Journal of Applied Psychology , my students, Japanese collaborators, and I used multidimensional scaling (MDS) to examine cultural influences on cognitive representations of conflict episodes. Consistent with the notion that culture influences information processing about conflicts, MDS analyses illustrated that U.S. and Japanese students had different cognitive representations of identical conflict episodes. Specifically, U.S. students perceived conflicts to be concerned with individual rights and autonomy, whereas Japanese students perceived the same conflicts to be concerned with violations of duties and obligations (or Giri Violations in Japanese terminology). Japanese students also perceived conflicts to be more about compromise (having mutual blame), whereas U.S. students perceived the same conflicts to be more about winning (with one party to blame). Analyses of newspaper accounts of conflicts in the U.S. and Japan were also consistent with these findings. This paper won the Best Empirical Paper award at the 1998 International Association for Conflict Management (IACM) Conference and received an honorable mention for the Otto Klineberg Award from the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

My research has also shown that culture influences negotiators’ judgments and scripts in negotiation (Gelfand & Christakopolou, 1999; Gelfand, et al., 2002; Morris & Gelfand, 2004). I have argued that judgment biases in negotiation need not be universal shortcuts, but rather can reflect different cultural ideals that negotiators have internalized as part of their self-system. Put differently, although all humans rely on heuristics in order to simplify reality, biases in negotiator cognition can be influenced by dominant cultural ideals and values, and thus, the types of biases that are prevalent in negotiation can vary systematically across cultures. For example, Gelfand & Christakoplou (1999) in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes showed that fixed pie error, a judgment bias in which negotiators falsely assume that their interests are diametrically opposed to their counterparts (Thompson & Hastie, 1990) was more prevalent in the U.S., an individualistic culture, than Greece, a collectivistic culture. Likewise, in Gelfand et al. (2002) in the Journal of Applied Psychology, we argued that when studying self-serving biases in negotiation—which are often implicitly assumed to be universal—we need to consider the nature of the self being served in a particular cultural context (Heine & Lehman, 1999). We expected that self-serving biases of fairness in negotiation would be consistent with ideals within individualistic cultures, where the self is served by focusing on one's positive attributes in order to "stand out" and be better than others, but would be disruptive to ideals in collectivistic cultures, where the self is served by focusing on one's negative characteristics in order to "blend in" and maintain interdependence with others (Heine & Lehman, 1999). In support of this notion, four studies, using different methodologies, found that self-serving biases in conflict and negotiation were greater in the U.S. as compared to Japan, and that such biases were related to lower negotiation outcomes among Americans. This article received the Best Published Article of the Year in 2002 Award from IACM.

While I have examined generalized tendencies toward cooperative and competitive construals and behaviors in negotiation across cultures, I have also argued that the situation is a powerful moderator of cultural effects in negotiation (Gelfand et al. under review; Gelfand & Cai, 2004; Gelfand & Dyer, 2000; Gelfand & Realo, 1999). In particular, I have shown that negotiators’ cognitions and behaviors within cultures are not static—they can change dramatically depending on the situation. For example, in a study of accountability in negotiations (Gelfand and Realo, 1999, Journal of Applied Psychology), I reasoned that since accountability is fundamentally a norm enforcement mechanism (Tetlock, 1992), and norms and standards for behavior vary across individualist and collectivist cultures (Markus & Kitayama, 1991), accountability to constituents would activate different cognitive construals and engender different behaviors in negotiations across cultures. As predicted, the results of a laboratory study and a judgment study illustrated that among collectivists, accountability activated cooperative construals and behaviors, and resulted in higher negotiation outcomes, whereas among individualists, accountability activated competitive construals and behaviors, and resulted in lower negotiation outcomes. These effects were reversed in unaccountable negotiations, when in effect, negotiators were released from normative pressures to do what is expected. In unaccountable conditions, collectivists were more competitive and achieved lower negotiation outcomes, as compared to individualists, who were more cooperative and achieved higher negotiation outcomes. This publication received the Best Published Article of the Year in 1999 Award from IACM. My other research (Triandis et al., 2001) illustrated that the relationship between negotiators moderates the effect of culture in negotiation. Contrary to the view that individuals in collectivistic nations are always cooperative, across 8 nations, we found that negotiators in collectivist cultures more competitive when negotiating with outgroups, as compared to negotiators in individualistic cultures. My recent research has continued to focus on the interaction of culture and the social context in negotiation. In one of the first studies of team negotiations across cultures, we found that teams outperform solos in deal-making but not disputing situations in the U.S., but teams outperform solos in disputing but not deal-making situations in Taiwan (Gelfand et al., under review, OBHDP). More generally, I have tried to offer a more theoretically grounded and complex view of culture in negotiation by illustrating psychological processes that mediate cultural differences and situational factors that moderate cultural effects.

My research continues to help cross-fertilize culture theory and negotiation theory. In a co-edited a book on culture and negotiation, The Handbook of Negotiation and Culture (Gelfand & Brett, 2004; Stanford University Press), we integrate culture into the mainstream of negotiation research by applying a culture lens to all areas of negotiation research. In Brett & Gelfand (2006), we provided an analysis of the underlying assumptions of negotiation theory from a cross-cultural perspective, and illustrated ways in which negotiation theory is grounded in part in Western values and norms. In another meta-theoretical paper (Gelfand & Barry, in progress), we are examining the field of negotiation over time through the dominant metaphors that have guided the science (e.g., Games, Sports, Battle), and are illustrating how the adoption of new metaphors can expand the field.

My research has also examined the influence of culture on justice and revenge. In a series of studies in the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, my colleagues and I (Brockner et al., 2001) illustrated that the theory of voice in decision-making—namely that providing voice to individuals will enhance perceptions of procedural justice (Lind & Tyler, 1988)—is not as applicable to cultures that are high on power distance (e.g., China, Turkey). Presently, I am working on projects that examine the cultural psychology of revenge in the U.S., Middle East, and East Asia. I theorize that culture not only influences revenge-eliciting events, but also affects the emotions that are triggered (e.g., anger versus shame) as well as behavioral responses used to get even (Shteynberg, Gelfand, & Kim, in preparation; Gelfand, Department of Homeland Security Presentation, 2006). I am also examining the notion that emotions stemming from injustices are more "contagious" in collectivistic cultures, and that individuals will seek revenge even when injustices have not been directly inflicted upon them personally. We have developed methods to examine "vicarious shame" and its consequences across cultures (Gelfand, Bell, & Shteynberg, 2005, AOM presentation; Gelfand, Shteynberg, Imai, & Mayer, 2006 AOM presentation) and have found preliminary evidence that supports these propositions. My research has also begun to examine ways to mitigate revenge responses through the use of social accounts such as apologies. Along with my colleagues (Maddux and Brett), I am examining how apologies are constructed in different ways across cultures—through a legal mindset in the U.S. and a relational mindset in Japan.

Theoretical Issues in Cross-Cultural Psychology. In order to incorporate elements of culture into social/organizational theories, it is critical to develop theories and measurements of aspects of culture. Much of my research has concentrated on conceptualizing and developing measurements of individualism and collectivism (Gelfand et al., 2004; Gelfand et al., 1996; Gelfand & Holcombe, 1998, Kashima, Yamaguchi, Kim, Choi, Gelfand, & Yuki, 1995; Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and differentiating the constructs from relationality and gender differences (Kashima et al., 1995). For example, in the Kashima et al., in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, we debunked the myth that "Women are like Asians." We specifically presented evidence from a 5-country study that illustrated that cultural differences exist along individualist and collectivist dimensions of the self, whereas gender differences exist along a relational dimension of the self. My other research has illustrated that there are different types of individualism and collectivism (IC), namely vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), in order to move away from simple dichotomies to more complex configurations of IC in the field.

My research has also expanded the dominant focus on values in cross-cultural psychology to include a focus on cultural norms and social situations. I developed a multilevel theory of cultural variation in situational constraint and organized a 35 nation study to test the theory. This research was funded by the National Science Foundation, and ranked in the top 3 of 74 proposals reviewed in the Social Psychology Division. My theory proposed that there is cross-cultural variation in the degree to which social situations are strong versus weak (Mischel, 1977) and that such variation is linked to macro ecocultural and historical factors and micro psychological processes. In particular, at the most macro level of analysis, I expected that factors that create the need for predictability and order—such as high population density, a history of external threat, a lack of natural resources, extreme temperatures, and natural disasters—would be associated with a greater preponderance of strong versus weak situations within cultures. At a micro level, I expected that there are a variety of processes that are cultivated so that individuals are trained to fit into, and maintain, the predominantly strong or weak situational structure that comprises the cultural context. For example, I expected that individuals in societies with high situational constraint would have a greater need for structure, impulse control, self-monitoring ability, and greater chronic accessibility of ought-self-guides (e.g., prevention focus, Higgins, 1996) as compared to individuals in societies with low situational constraint. I further expected that there would be less individual variation (i.e., lower standard deviations across personality measures) in societies that have high situational constraint.

Many of these notions received empirical support in my multination nation study of culture and situational constraint. I created a measure of situational constraint based on Price & Bouffard (1974, JPSP), developed a survey to test the theory, conducted multination focus groups to examine the cross-cultural applicability of the survey content, and had the survey translated and backtranslated into 20 languages. Data was collected among working adults and students across 35 nations (N=approximately 7100 individuals). Construct validity of the situational constraint measure was also assessed in the survey in all nations as well as with actual observations of behavior across situations in Estonia and Greece. I also collected archival data on each country in order to test my theory regarding the relationship between macro societal variables and situational constraint. This data includes aspects of cultural institutions (e.g., freedom of the media, type of legal system, religion), geographic factors (e.g., population density, natural resources, amount of arable land, temperature, national disasters), population characteristics (e.g., ethnic homogeneity, migration rates) , international conflict (e.g., number of territorial conflicts over the last century), economic factors (e.g., GNP), and cultural health (e.g., crime, suicide, happiness, accidents). The data were analyzed using procrustes factor analysis, hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), and multiple regression. Analyses were presented at the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, and on Capitol Hill on behalf of NSF (Spring 2006), and will be submitted to the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. I have expanded this line of research to theorize on how cultural norms and the strength of situations relates to organizational phenomena (Gelfand, Nishii, & Raver, in press, 2006, Journal of Applied Psychology).

I also have a keen interest in basic issues of methodology and culture. I wrote a chapter on methodological issues in cross-cultural research (Gelfand, Raver, & Holcombe-Ehrhart, 2002) in the Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology Research Methods in which we illuminated numerous methodological issues that arise at each stage of the cross-cultural research process, from the conceptualization of the topic, to the choice of methodology, to the implementation of research designs, to analyzing and interpreting data. Above all, we sought to provide a realistic "roadmap" of the issues on which informed judgments need to be made when doing cross-cultural research. I recently contributed an entry on "Cross-cultural theory and method" to the Encyclopedia of I/O Psychology (Gelfand, Leslie, & Shytenberg, in press).

Workplace Diversity. Lastly, my research has been concerned with diversity in organizations (Bowles & Gelfand, invited revision, AMJ; Gelfand, Kuhn, & Radhakrishnan, 1996; Gelfand, Nishii, Raver, & Schneider, 2005; Leslie & Gelfand, invited revision, OBHDP; Triandis, Kurowski, & Gelfand, 1994) and with understanding and improving the experiences of women in organizations (Fitzgerald, Drasgow, Hulin, Gelfand, & Magley, 1997; Gelfand, Fitzgerald, & Drasgow, 1995; Gettman & Gelfand, invited revision, JAP; Raver & Gelfand, 2005). My colleagues and I validated a measure of sexual harassment (Gelfand et al., 1995), and have documented some of the antecedents and consequences of harassment for women (Fitzgerald, et al., 1995; Fitzgerald, et al., 1997). In a recent paper in the Academy of Management Journal, we illustrated that sexual harassment affects more than individual level outcomes—it also impacts group processes (i.e., conflict and cohesion) and group outcomes (i.e., financial performance and team organizational citizenship behavior) (Raver & Gelfand, 2005). This paper received the 2003 Dorothy Harlow distinguished paper award from the Gender and Diversity Division of the Academy of Management. My research on sexual harassment has also been focused on broadening the literature to include extra-organizational sources of harassment, or harassment by clients and customers (CSH). In two recent field studies (Gettman & Gelfand, invited revision, JAP), we found that the prevalence of CSH was quite high among women (lawyers, consultants, grocery clerks), and the consequences of CSH were quite severe (post-traumatic stress experiences, negative job attitudes, and client withdrawal behaviors). We are currently planning research to test the notion that an extreme climate for service—one which focuses on a "customer is king mentality" may make women more vulnerable and increase CSH.

My other work has been concerned with subtle discrimination in organizations that often goes unnoticed. For example, Bowles & Gelfand (invited revision, AMJ) found that women and minorities are punished to a much greater extent than men and majority members when they break the same organizational rules. We adopted Robinson & Bennett’s (1995) typology of workplace deviance behaviors and varied whether the person performing deviant behaviors had a stereotypical male or female name and a stereotypical African-American or Caucasian name (i.e., Jamal, Latoya, Kristen, Greg). In st udies of branch managers and working samples from the community, we found support for the notion that women and minorities are punished to a greater extent for deviant behavior. This paper has been nominated for the Dorothy Harlow Award for the 2006 AOM conference and was invited to be published in the best paper proceedings.

My research has been concerned with other factors that inhibit women's advancement in organizations. Women have made progress in management in the last few decades yet they continue to earn less than men in comparable positions. Although this phenomenon is clearly multiply determined, I am examining whether gender differences in negotiating explains some of the variance in gender differences in pay attainment. Through funding from NSF, we have begun to examine the notion that women are much less likely to initiate negotiations than men (Babcock, Gelfand, Small, in press) which could prove to have serious monetary consequences over the course of their careers. For example, when asked "how long ago was the last time you initiated a negotiation?" the median response for women was one month ago whereas the median response for men was two weeks ago. When asked to think about the next negotiation they would initiate, women predicted that it would occur in one month and men predicted that it would occur in one week. We have recently replicated these effects in a series of laboratory studies, and have also examined situational conditions that increase propensity to negotiate among women (Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, invited revision for the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology).

My other research has focused on illuminating the psychology of gender after women have initiated negotiations. In a recent theory paper (Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006, Academy of Management Review), we developed a theory of relationality in negotiation that begins to illuminate distinct ways in which relational concerns get manifest at the negotiation table, along with the consequences that relationality has for the accumulation of economic and relational capital. This theory has its basis in my previous research on gender and the relational self (Kashima et al., JPSP) and extends it to the dynamic context of negotiation. We are currently developing measures of relational capital to examine the conditions under which relational capital is even more important than economic capital in negotiations.

Summary. As a cross-cultural social/organizational psychologist, I am dedicated to doing research that helps broaden the field to be more global in its scope. As a diversity scholar, I am committed to doing research that advances our understanding of discrimination and inequities in organizations and improves the lives of women and minorities. Across all of my research programs, I seek to develop new theories that ca n guide research and practice in the spirit of Kurt Lewin’s notion "there is nothing as practical as a good theory." I try to take a multilevel approach in my research and seek to understand phenomena that span societal, organizational, and individual levels of analysis. I seek to triangulate my findings by using multiple methods, including laboratory, field, and archival methods. Finally, I seek to inspire doctoral and undergraduate students to be passionate about research and include them in many aspects of my research.