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Sociology 498: Homelessness
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Jencks's book began as a book review (of Burt and Rossi) for the New York Review of Books. By the time he had finished writing that review, he had enough information (and interest) to write his own book. This is perhaps my favorite book on homelessness (see my top ten reasons for liking this book!). His book is short but full. He reviews all the major explanations that have been given for homelessness and sorts out the evidence for and against each. Jencks is especially good at cautioning us not to conclude too much from any one study or one piece of evidence, and yet not to avoid drawing some conclusions, however tentative.
Jencks's research strategy is also different from the others. Like Burt, he concentrates on macro-level questions but instead of comparing cities, Jencks compares years. Why was there more homelessness in the 1980s than in the 1970s? What changed about the country that gave rise to this new phenomenon?
Jencks's preface and his table of contents will help you understand
where he is going with his causal analysis. Read them carefully.
Comparing them to our list of major causes
you will find that some of our causes (e.g., housing) are listed
in both his good explanations and his bad explanations.
This makes his analysis more complicated than what we have read so far.
While some people are easily defined as homeless, there are many
border-line groups who may or may not be defined as among the homeless.
Identify these border-line types and Jencks' decision to include or exclude
them from his definition of the homeless. How does this differ from
our previous analyses? Do you agree with Jencks' definition?
What is Jencks's preferred method of counting the homeless?
How do you explain the paradox about the fact half the homeless population
on any night have been homeless for more than a year, but half the people
who become homeless are off the streets within a couple of months?
Despite the difficulties in counting the homeless, Jencks perseveres in
creating estimates at different points during the 1980s. What is his
conclusion about the trend?
What is the difference in levels between the 1950s and the 1980s?
This trend is the main fact (his "dependent
variable") that he will spend the rest of the book trying to explain.
We have been critical of the common belief that mental illness causes
homelessness.
Jencks nicely reviews most of our objections and then tells us not
to make such a big deal out of these objections.
He ends up defending Rossi against our criticisms and concluding
that de-institutionalization has been an important cause of higher
rates of homelessness.
Where do you stand on this issue after reading Jencks?
What is the "awkward fact" that Jencks has to get around in arguing
that de-institutionalizing the mentally ill is one cause of the
trend in homelessness? How does he try to get around that problem?
Why does he spend so much time reviewing the history (the five waves)
of de-institutionalization?
Jencks discusses (and dismisses) alcoholism as a cause in less than
a paragraph. What is his argument and evidence?
What is the argument and evidence about crack as a cause of homelessness?
Is there an "awkward fact" about crack as well?
How does luck -- bad luck for the homeless, good luck for the affluent --
play a role in explaining individual outcomes?
What is the political purpose behind emphasizing bad luck as
a cause of homelessness? Why does Jencks think this is a bad
argument politically (i.e., not just factually incorrect, but
damaging for the cause of the homeless)?
Jencks closes the chapter with a comparison of liberal and conservative
explanations of homelessness. He argues both are correct.
Another way of thinking about this is our macro-micro distinction.
How does the macro-micro distinction (and the liberal-conservative
distinction) help us assign responsibility (blame?) for the rise
in homelessness.
In this chapter, Jencks combines two items from our list of causes.
In part,
he divides the two explanations by gender: lack of jobs may explain
men's homelessness; marital breakdown may explain women's homelessness.
(See the second paragraph).
But Jencks also
tries to combine the two explanations, much as
Rossi did in his
section on "The Accumulation of Troubles".
What does Jencks mean by his "vulnerability index" (p.50)?
The argument in this (and later) chapters gets complicated because
he is trying to combine arguments that we have been trying to
keep separate and evaluate separately.
Separating the arguments may be good for simplicity, but it may
hide the real process of becoming homeless. The argument gets
complicated in this chapter, but that is because Jencks believes
that the causes of homelessness have to be treated jointly.
Most of the arguments in this chapter derive from the numbers in Tables 5
and 6.
Each row tells a slightly different story. The chapter works its way
through these tables almost row-by-row.
Be prepared to follow Jencks through multiple zigs and zags of an argument.
Often he starts with the basic overall plausible argument, often with
some evidence that supports the argument.
Then, he will usually point out what may be wrong with that evidence,
sometimes citing previous writers on homelessness.
Then, he will rebut those criticisms.
This may even go on for another round or two before he comes to his
conclusion. If you can sort out these various zigs and zags of
the argument, you will appreciate what Jencks is doing much better.
Jencks begins with evidence about "long-term joblessness".
First, how is this different from "unemployment"?
How has long-term joblessness changed over time? and does this
support an economic explanation for homelessness or not?
Jencks then gets diverted (pages 52-53) into an excursion about the
possible causes of the changes in long-term joblessness.
This is interesting, but not logically connected to the main task of exploring
the link between joblessness and homelessness.
Nevertheless, realizing that this is a diversion, what is Jencks's evidence
concerning the cultural explanation of the rise of joblessness?
What is Jencks's evidence concerning the economic
explanation of the rise of joblessness?
Joblessness creates homelessness only if the jobless fall through
the "safety net". What are the three elements of Jencks's safety net?
Then, Jencks tries to evaluate whether the holes in the safety net
grew in the 1980s.
How does the evidence about personal income help evaluate changes
in the safety net? What is
Jencks's conclusion?
How does
evidence about marriage
help evaluate changes in the safety net?
What evidence is consistent with the marriage breakdown idea?
What evidence is inconsistent with the marriage breakdown idea?
(i.e., make sure you follow the zigs and zags of this argument!)
For women, Jencks begins by evaluating economic changes.
Are these consistent with an economic explanation of the rise of
women's homelessness?
Then, he evaluates marriage and family changes.
What part of these changes is consistent with, and what part is inconsistent
with the rise in homelessness?
Then Jencks gets diverted again into an interesting (but not essential)
speculation about several possible causes of the decline in marriage
(from the bottom of page 56 to the end of this section on page 58).
What are the causal arguments?
and what is the evidence about the arguments?
Finally, table 6 tries to pull all these factors together to estimate
changes in the numbers of people most vulnerable to homelessness.
Some of the changes seem to argue for a joint economic/marriage
causal explanation. Which ones? But there is another "inconvenient fact"
in this table that very much weakens this causal argument. What is
the problem with the numbers in table 6 for an economic/marriage explanation?
In this short chapter, Jencks reviews the micro-level evidence about
families and social skills as causes of homelessness.
First, Jencks explains why living alone puts somebody at much greater risk
of homelessness than somebody who is living with others. And yet
the homeless often (a third of the time) come from situations in which
they were living alone. According to Jencks, why do people live
alone when they can't really afford it?
Jencks is not at all clear about this, but you can dig out from this
chapter
the time trend in adults living alone.
Is this consistent
with a rise in homelessness in the 1980s? That is, does living
alone increase as homelessness increases?
Families often make the difference for poor adults in whether they become
homeless or not. Why, according to Jencks, is this not a very good
explanation of the rise of homelessness in the 1980s?
What is the evidence?
In this difficult chapter, Jencks tries to evaluate the argument we first
saw in Rossi's final chapter that it was the destruction of SROs and cheap
rooms that led to the spread of homelessness.
To evaluate whether this argument is really true, Jencks tries to
look at what happened to the supply of very cheap housing.
The data to do this are not great so that is one reason this is a difficult
chapter. Problems with the data and quarrels with earlier analyses
lead Jencks's argument through many zigs and zags.
I think it may be
easier for you if you know right away where he is headed. His principal
conclusion is summarized in the next to last paragraph of the chapter on
page 74 and in
the third paragraph ("My best guess...") on page 67.
Here he argues that it is the combination of housing shortages
and increases in poverty that led to the rise of homelessness in the 1980s.
The first section asks what happened to the number of single-room
rental units. Simplify this: when did single room housing decline?
in the 1970s? in the 1980s? Why does Jencks conclude that the timing of
the decline causes a problem for housing shortage explanations?
If the number of single-room units doesn't explain the rise of
homelessness, maybe a rise in the price of minimal housing would help.
What is the time trend in very low rent rooms? Is this consistent with
a housing shortage explanation? What is the change in rental prices
for 1 room units? Is this increase in price a result of housing
shortages as Rossi originally claimed?
Third, Jencks tries to ask why the homeless may make a choice not
to spend their money on a room in 1980 but might have made a different
choice in 1950. What affects that choice? Is thinking about choices
a good way to think about homelessness? Do the homeless really have
choices to make or are they in trouble precisely because they don't have
the resources needed to make choices?
Finally, Jencks asks why new cheap housing didn't spring up to meet
the rising demand for cheap housing that resulted from the rise in poverty?
This pushes the causal chain back one step: what caused the shortage
of housing? (rather than did a shortage of housing cause the rise of
homelessness?)
Who are the "villains" of this market failure? As usual, Jencks finds
there is alot of blame to spread around.
Jencks describes and analyzes several trends in housing prices and
availability. Some trends point to a housing shortage explanation.
Some trends suggest that housing shortages are not a good explanation.
Be able to describe whether the evidence fits or doesn't fit for the following:
In this chapter, Jencks takes on both liberal proponents of more government
help and conservative critics of too much government intervention.
He provides quite persuasive evidence that both are wrong.
The liberals have argued that the rise of homelessness in the 1980s was caused by
the Reagan administration's welfare cuts, particularly cuts in appropriations
for housing assistance. The liberals argued that HUD's appropriations were cut from
$32 billion in 1978 to $11.7 billion in 1991. This seems like good evidence for
the liberals. What's wrong with it?
Some conservatives have singled out William Tucker's attack on rent control
as one of the causes of rising homelessness. This can be a tricky argument but
it's worth understanding. Jencks attacks this reasoning not because the
argument is necessarily wrong, but because it doesn't fit the evidence
Tucker shows that cities with more rent control have more homelessness.
There are at least three problems with the evidence that don't support a
causal conclusion here. Make sure you understand these problems.
One of the best parts of this chapter is the opening paragraph
which summarizes Jencks's story up to this point. Read it carefully!
The controversial point Jencks is trying to make is that some people
choose to be homeless. To understand the growth of homelessness
we have to understand why people would ever choose to be homeless.
Jencks offers some fairly reasonable "stories" that we can imagine might
be behind somebody choosing to leave their current housing and becoming
homeless. You should be able to tell at least three plausible
stories about why somebody would choose to become homeless.
If people are choosing to become homeless, does it follow that if we make
the homeless situation less intolerable by creating more humane shelters,
will we actually increase homelessness? That is, are we likely to make
the problem bigger by making it nicer?
Jencks calls these partial
solutions because different causes (see the
opening paragraph of the previous chapter) require different solutions.
He divides the causes into three different populations:
Chapter 1: Counting the Homeless
Chapter 2: Estimating the Increase
Chapter 3: Emptying the Back Wards
Chapter 4: The Crack Epidemic
Chapter 5: Jobs and Marriage
Chapter 7: Social Skills and Family Ties
Chapter 6: The Destruction of Skid Row
Chapter 8: Changes in the Housing Market
Chapter 9: Budget Cuts and Rent Control?
Chapter 10: Do Shelters Cause Homelessness?
Chapter 11: Some Partial Solutions
What is Jencks's solution for each?
What are the problems with doing more than what Jencks recommends?
What are the costs of not doing at least what Jencks proposes?
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| Last updated April 26, 2007 |
comments to: Reeve Vanneman.
reeve@cwmills.umd.edu
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